IN RE WAINSCOTT MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of WAINSCOTT, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 25, 2011
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 299229
Jackson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-001604-NA
CHRISTOPHER WAINSCOTT,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ANNETTE WAINSCOTT,
Respondent.
In the Matter of WAINSCOTT, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 299230
Jackson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-001604-NA
ANNETTE WAINSCOTT,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHRISTOPHER WAINSCOTT,
Respondent.
Before: METER, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the order terminating
their parental rights to their four minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).
We affirm.
Respondent-mother first claims that it was fundamentally unfair to terminate her parental
rights under § 19b(3)(c)(i). She asserts that termination came about as a result of drug use and
that she was unable to engage in inpatient treatment for a variety of reasons. The treatment plan
required her to wean herself from methadone so she could enter into the inpatient program she
desired. She did wean herself in November of 2009, but she never sought inpatient treatment or
successful completion of parenting classes, and she did not work any further toward reunification
with her children before her incarceration. Likewise, respondent-father failed to substantially
comply with the provisions of his parent-agency agreement that were established to rectify the
conditions that led to adjudication. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that
§ 19b(3(c)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(K); In re Mason,
486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612
NW2d 407 (2000).
We also do not believe that the trial court clearly erred in finding that § 19b(3)(g) had
been established by clear and convincing evidence. Contrary to respondents’ arguments, the
court is not precluded from considering prior conduct and behavior in determining whether the
parents fail to provide proper care or custody and would be unlikely to do so within a reasonable
time considering the ages of the children. Therefore, the court did not clearly err in finding that,
based on their conduct or capacity, the children would likely be harmed if returned to
respondents’ care under § 19b(3)(j). The court may consider how a parent treats one child to be
probative of how that parent might treat another child. See, generally, In re Powers, 208 Mich
App 582, 588; 528 NW2d 799 (1995); see also In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 84; 627 NW2d 33
(2001).
Lastly, we find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. MCR 3.977(K); In
re Jenks, 281 Mich App 514, 516-517; 760 NW2d 297 (2008). As the trial court indicated,
respondents simply did not make any progress during the thirteen months the children had been
under the court’s jurisdiction. Based on respondents’ past behavior, even though they apparently
wanted to improve, there were “no guarantees” that they would, and in the meantime, the
children needed permanence and stability, they could not just “wait to see how things turn out.”
We agree.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
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