PEOPLE OF MI V ALLEN MITCHELL BLAIR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 25, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293677
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-008458-FC
KENNEDY LEE NIX,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293734
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-008458-FH
ALLEN MITCHELL BLAIR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and ZAHRA and FORT HOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Kennedy Nix and Allen Blair were tried jointly, before a single jury. They
were each convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL
750.84, and felonious assault, MCL 750.82. Defendant Nix was sentenced to concurrent prison
terms of four to ten years for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction and two
to four years for the felonious assault conviction. Defendant Blair was sentenced as an habitual
offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 8 to 20 years for the assault
with intent to do great bodily harm conviction and two to four years for the felonious assault
conviction. Defendant Nix appeals as of right in Docket No. 293677, and defendant Blair
appeals as of right in Docket No. 293734. In Docket No. 293677, we remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. In Docket No. 293734, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
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Defendants were convicted of assaulting Charles Baker, the boyfriend of defendant Nix’s
mother, Kecia Nix. According to Kecia, defendant Nix entered Kecia’s bedroom, where Baker
was lying on a bed, and accused Baker of taking Kecia’s money. Kecia asked defendant Nix to
leave the room, but he refused. Baker and Kecia both testified that defendant Nix subsequently
hit Baker in the jaw or cheek. Baker hit defendant Nix back. Kecia tried to break up the fight
and called the police. According to both Baker and Kecia, defendant Nix called for defendant
Blair, who was already in the house, to help him “get Baker.” Baker claimed that both
defendants thereafter assaulted him over a period of approximately an hour. Baker stated that he
was knocked down to the floor, where he was kicked, hit, and stomped, and that he was struck
with bottles, chairs, a coffee table, and the wooden handle of a snow shovel. Baker testified that
both defendants participated in the assault, during which defendant Nix attempted to ram the
handle of a shovel into Baker’s rectum and also scraped Baker’s face with a steak knife while
telling him that he was going to leave in a “body bag.” Baker and Kecia both received serious
injuries that required treatment at a hospital.
Defendant Nix testified at trial that it was Baker who first assaulted him. Defendant Nix
claimed that he only used his fists to defend himself from Baker, and that he never used any
weapon. Defendant Blair denied participating in any assault on Baker and claimed that his
involvement was limited to attempting to break up the fight between defendant Nix and Baker.
I. DOCKET NO. 293677
A. INSTRUCTION ON SELF-DEFENSE
Defendant Nix argues that a new trial is required because, although the trial court
instructed the jury on his claim of self-defense, it erroneously instructed that, to be entitled to
claim self-defense, it was necessary for the jury to find that at the time defendant Nix acted, he
“must have been . . . engaged in commission of a crime.” Defendant Nix did not object to the
trial court’s self-defense instruction at trial, and the issue is unpreserved.
The lower court record reflects that the trial court instructed the jury that, for defendant
Nix to be entitled to self-defense, he “must have been . . . engaged in commission of a crime” at
the time he acted. However, a correct instruction would have indicated that defendant “must not
have been engaged in the commission of a crime” to lawfully claim self-defense. CJI2d 7.22(3)
(emphasis added); see also MCL 780.972(2). We note that the trial court later accurately
instructed the jury that “the person claiming self-defense must not have acted wrongfully and
brought on the assault.” We also note that the jury did not request clarification of the trial
court’s seemingly conflicting instructions. On appeal, the parties acknowledge that the court
indicated to the jury that it would be provided a written copy of the jury instructions, but the
lower court record does not contain any verification that this was done.
On appeal, the prosecution requests “a hearing to determine whether the transcript
contains a typographical error,” and suggests that this Court query whether any record evidence
exists to determine whether the jury was provided with a correct written copy of the jury
instruction on self defense. We agree with this course of action. MCR 7.216(A) provides that
“[t]he Court of Appeals may, at any time, in addition to its general powers, in its discretion, and
on the terms it deems just,” including “(4) permit . . . corrections, or additions to the transcript or
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record” and to “ (5) remand the case to allow additional evidence to be taken.” Accordingly, in
Docket No. 293677, we remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II. DOCKET NO. 293734
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant Blair argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and felonious assault. We disagree.
An appellate court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction should not
turn on whether there was any evidence to support the conviction, but whether there was
sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). The evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution.
Id. at 514-515. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution.
People v John T Williams, Jr, 268 Mich App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624 (2005).
The testimony of Baker and Kecia indicated that defendant Blair participated in the
assault of Baker by hitting Baker in the head with several bottles, by stomping or kicking
Baker’s neck, chest, head, back, and legs while Baker was lying on the ground, and by throwing
a coffee table that bounced off the wall and struck Baker in the head. This testimony was
sufficient to enable the jury to find each of the elements of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder and felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Bailey, 451
Mich 657, 668-669; 549 NW2d 325 (1996), amended 453 Mich 1204 (1996); People v John
Davis, Jr, 216 Mich App 47, 53; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). Although defendant Blair argues that
Baker and Kecia were not credible, the credibility of their testimony was for the jury to resolve
and this Court will not resolve it anew. People v Thomas Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617
NW2d 381 (2000).
B. SENTENCING
Defendant Blair also argues that his sentence of 8 to 20 years’ imprisonment for assault
with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder is unconstitutionally cruel and/or unusual,
contrary to US Const, Am VIII and Const 1963, art 1, § 16. We disagree.
A sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the offense constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment. People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 30, 32-40; 485 NW2d 866 (1992). Here, defendant
Blair was sentenced within the sentencing guidelines range of 34 to 100 months. A sentence
within the guidelines range is presumptively proportionate, People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987); People v Powell, 278 Mich App 318, 323-324; 750 NW2d 607
(2008), and a sentence that is proportionate is not cruel or unusual punishment, People v Terry,
224 Mich App 447, 456; 569 NW2d 641 (1997). There is nothing unusual about defendant
Blair’s age or background, or the circumstances of this case, to overcome the presumptive
proportionality of defendant Blair’s sentence, especially considering that his conviction arises
from his participation in an extremely assaultive offense, that he has prior convictions for
receiving or concealing stolen property and possession of cocaine, and that he committed this
offense while on probation. Thus, defendant Blair’s sentence is not cruel or unusual.
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In Docket No. 293734, we affirm. In Docket No. 293677, we remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction, defendant having a right to appeal the
final order issued by the trial court on remand. MCR 7.202(6)(b)(iv).
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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