PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH RAY THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 20, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294789
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 09-002487-FC
KENNETH RAY THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and WHITBECK and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Kenneth Thomas appeals as of right his jury conviction of first-degree
premeditated murder.1 The trial court sentenced Thomas to mandatory life imprisonment
without parole. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Debra Jean VanKlaveren, the victim, was found dead on January 5, 2009, in her
apartment. Asphyxia by manual strangulation was determined to be the cause of death. Billie Jo
Lowry talked to VanKlaveren about rent money on January 2, 2009, outside VanKlaveren’s
apartment. VanKlaveren advised Lowry that she did not have the rent money that day. Lowry
returned on Monday, January 5, 2009, but received no response when she knocked on
VanKlaveren’s door.
Lowry then got permission from her supervisor and entered
VanKlaveren’s locked apartment using her own keys. From across the apartment, Lowry saw a
person on the bed in the bedroom. Upon realizing that the person on the bed was VanKlaveren,
Lowry left the apartment and contacted the police.
Thomas was staying with VanKlaveren in December 2008 and early January 2009.
VanKlaveren’s neighbor, David Badger, testified that he saw Thomas leave VanKlaveren’s
apartment on Saturday night, January 3, 2009. Badger observed Thomas lock VanKlaveren’s
apartment door and then drive away in VanKlaveren’s car.
1
MCL 750.316.
-1-
On January 5, 2009, Thomas telephoned his brother for a ride. When Thomas got in his
brother’s car, he was high on crack cocaine and was speaking rapidly about numerous topics.
Thomas told his brother, “I might have choked someone.” His brother was upset and brought
Thomas to their sister’s home. Thomas then told his brother, his sister, and his brother-in-law
that he did choke someone, that the person he choked still had a pulse, and that she was on a bed.
Thomas demonstrated to them how he choked his victim, by placing both thumbs and fingers
together with a circle in the center.
After his arrest, Thomas also allegedly confessed to his cellmate while incarcerated.
Thomas told Christopher Eugene Cummings that he was smoking crack cocaine with
VanKlaveren. She started pointing and telling him to look under the furniture for some crack
cocaine that may have dropped. Cummings testified that Thomas said he then pushed
VanKlaveren’s hand away, punched her in the face, and choked her. Cummings testified that
Thomas said “Deb” was the person he choked. Thomas said he left the apartment after he
choked her, but that he later came back to take money from VanKlaveren and to take her dog so
that no one would hear it barking. Thomas said that he moved VanKlaveren to the bed so it
would look like she was asleep. Thomas now challenges his conviction on several grounds.
II. CHALLENGING THE CONVICTION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Thomas argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he caused the death
of VanKlaveren. Additionally, Thomas argues that the trial court should have granted his motion
for a directed verdict regarding premeditation. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence, a court must review the record de novo and view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that each
element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.2 The standard of review for a
directed verdict is the same as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.3
B. ANALYSIS
In order to convict Thomas of first-degree premeditated murder, the prosecution had to
prove that Thomas intentionally killed VanKlaveren and that his acts were done with
premeditation and deliberation.4
Thomas challenges the evidence establishing that VanKlaveren died of strangulation and
argues that the evidence supports a conclusion that she died of a cocaine overdose. This
argument has no merit. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy determined that the
2
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000); People v Hawkins, 245 Mich
App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
3
People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 122; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
4
People v Bowman, 254 Mich App 142, 151; 656 NW2d 835 (2002).
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cause of death was manual strangulation. The pathologist based his conclusion on the facts that
VanKlaveren had bruising on her neck and that the decomposition around her head and neck
suggested a large amount of blood was trapped in the area, which is consistent with
strangulation. Additionally, VanKlaveren’s hyoid bone, a small bone in the neck that is likely to
break during manual strangulation, was broken. Finally, the pathologist recognized that although
there was a significant level of cocaine in VanKlaveren’s system, he found no indication of a
cocaine-induced heart attack or any other natural cause of death.
Thomas also argues that there was insufficient forensic evidence linking him to the crime
and that the police should have performed DNA analysis and matched the unmatched
fingerprints discovered at the scene. However, forensic evidence is not necessary to show that
there was sufficient evidence to find Thomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thomas’s
argument that police officers should have conducted DNA analysis is also meritless because
police have no duty to assist in developing potentially exculpatory evidence, and they have no
duty to perform any particular tests.5 Thomas confessed to multiple people, was seen leaving
VanKlaveren’s apartment on the night later determined to be close to the time of the murder, and
was later driving VanKlaveren’s car. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to find Thomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alternatively, Thomas argues that there is not sufficient evidence of premeditation.
Premeditation means “to think about beforehand.”6 There is no specific time requirement for
premeditation, but sufficient time must have elapsed “to allow the defendant to take a second
look.”7 The relationship between the defendant and the victim, the defendant’s conduct before
and after the crime, and the circumstances of the killing itself may all be considered when
determining whether the defendant acted with premeditation.8
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence may
constitute satisfactory proof of premeditation and deliberation.”9 Evidence of manual
strangulation can be used as evidence that the defendant had an opportunity to take a “second
look.”10 According to Thomas’s own confession, he first punched VanKlaveren and then
strangled her; thus, the time it took for Thomas to punch and strangle VanKlaveren afforded him
opportunity to take a second look. Additionally, Thomas’s attempt to conceal the killing is also
relevant evidence of premeditation.11 The evidence and reasonable inferences supported that
Thomas placed VanKlaveren on the bed to look like she was sleeping, he took VanKlaveren’s
5
People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 460-462; 719 NW2d 579 (2006).
6
People v Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 300; 581 NW2d 753 (1998).
7
People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995).
8
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 229; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
9
Id.
10
People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003).
11
Id.
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dog so no one would be alerted of a problem because of barking, and he locked VanKlaveren’s
apartment door. Thomas also stole money from VanKlaveren and took her car after killing her,
leading to a reasonable inference suggesting that Thomas planned the murder in order to obtain
money and the car.12 In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the directed verdict
because there was sufficient evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, for a
rational jury to find Thomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree premeditated
murder.
III. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Thomas argues that several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings denied him the right to
present a defense. Thomas did not object on the basis of his right to present a defense at trial;
thus, the issue is not properly preserved. We therefore review Thomas’s unpreserved claim for
plain error.13 Under the plain error standard, the defendant must show that an error occurred,
that the error was plain, and that the plain error affected substantial rights.14 An error is plain
when it is clear and obvious.15 The error affects substantial rights when the defendant is
prejudiced, meaning the error affected the outcome of the trial.16
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense.17 However, the right is not
absolute, and a defendant must still comply with “established rules of procedure and evidence
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”18
The right to present a defense “extends only to relevant and admissible evidence.”19
B. WITNESS QUESTIONING
During the trial, Thomas wanted to question his brother regarding his brother’s personal
belief about Thomas’s reliability while high on crack cocaine and regarding Thomas’s capacity
for violence. The trial court sustained an objection to the testimony and found that the personal
beliefs of Thomas’s brother were not relevant. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
12
See Plummer, 229 Mich App at 301.
13
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 379; 749 NW2d 753 (2008).
18
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
19
People v Likine, __ Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (2010), citing People v Hackett, 421 Mich
338, 354; 365 NW2d 120 (1984).
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probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”20 The trial court did not
plainly err when making the evidentiary decision to exclude the personal feelings of Thomas’s
brother. Whether Thomas’s brother personally believed Thomas’s confession is irrelevant to
whether Thomas actually choked VanKlaveren, and is therefore not admissible evidence.21
C. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING PRIOR INCIDENT
Thomas challenges the trial court’s limitation on his development of evidence regarding a
December 16, 2008 destruction of property incident at VanKlaveren’s apartment.
The trial court did not plainly err when it determined that the contents of the police report
related to the incident were inadmissible hearsay and found that testimony regarding the incident
relied on facts not in evidence. Police reports are hearsay and do not fall within any hearsay
exception when the reports contain observations made at the scene of a crime or while
investigating a crime.22 Additionally, questions or arguments relying on facts not in evidence are
improper.23 The facts of the property destruction incident were not in evidence; thus, the trial
court properly prohibited Thomas from asking questions that relied on the facts of that incident.
Additionally, Thomas’s right to present a defense extends only to the right to present “relevant
and admissible evidence.”24 The trial court properly found that the evidence Thomas wished to
solicit—evidence regarding the police report and facts behind the destruction of property
incident—was inadmissible. Further, Thomas cannot show that the trial court’s decision to
exclude additional development of the facts of the destruction of property incident affected his
substantial rights. The court still permitted Thomas to point to the incident itself and make the
arguments in closing that someone else had a motive to murder VanKlaveren. Thus, the trial
court’s decision did not preclude Thomas from presenting his defense and did not affect
Thomas’s substantial rights.25
D. ADDITIONAL TIME TO REVIEW EVIDENCE
Thomas challenges the trial court’s ruling regarding his request for additional time to
review fingerprint cards and photographs of VanKlaveren’s apartment. Discovery in a criminal
case is within the discretion of the trial court.26 The trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it declined to call a recess during trial and make immediate copies of the fingerprint cards and
photographs for Thomas. Instead, the trial court provided defense counsel with time to review
20
People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 552-553; 679 NW2d 127 (2004), quoting MRE 401.
21
MRE 401; MRE 402.
22
People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 413; 670 NW2d 659 (2003).
23
People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
24
Hackett, 421 Mich at 354.
25
Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
26
People v Lemcool, 445 Mich 491, 498; 518 NW2d 437 (1994).
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the cards during trial in lieu of making copies, and defense counsel accepted that solution.
Where a defendant expresses satisfaction with a trial court decision, an issue challenging that
decision is waived and the defendant may not seek appellate review.27 The trial court’s
evidentiary decision regarding the photographs was not an abuse of discretion because defense
counsel had all the photographs before trial and was familiar with the images. Defense counsel
simply did not have printed copies. Thomas was able to introduce any photograph it requested
during trial, and defense counsel was able to effectively cross-examine the witness. Thus, the
trial court’s decision did not impinged upon Thomas’s right to present a defense.
E. SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
Thomas challenges the trial court’s ruling that his questions to the detective about DNA
testing of VanKlaveren’s fingernails were outside the scope of his recross examination and
impermissible. Evidentiary rules permit the court to limit cross-examination to matters testified
to on direct examination.28 Because the prosecution explored no issue related to collection of
fingernails for DNA testing during redirect examination, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it limited Thomas’s questions about DNA tests.29
F. ARGUMENT TO JURY
Thomas argues that he should have been permitted to discuss the discovery problems
leading up to the trial in front of the jury. “A trial court has wide, but not unlimited, discretion
and power in the matter of trial conduct.”30 The trial court properly limited the information to
which the jurors were exposed in order to ensure that the jurors’ ability to make an impartial
decision was not impaired.31
G. CONCLUSION
In sum, none of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings deprived Thomas of the right to
present a defense. Thomas cannot show that any of the trial court’s rulings affected his
substantial rights; thus, Thomas’s right to present a defense was not violated.
IV. CUMULATIVE EFFECT
Thomas argues that the cumulative trial errors amounted to a deprivation of his right to a
fair trial. Thomas did not preserve the issue by making a cumulative error objection before the
27
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
28
MRE 611(c).
29
People v Minor, 213 Mich App 682, 684; 541 NW2d 576 (1995) (“Whether a trial court has
properly limited cross-examination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”).
30
People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
31
MCR 6.414(B).
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trial court; thus, we review Thomas’s claim for plain error affecting substantial rights.32 Thomas
argues that the contentious nature of the trial, combined with the lack of evidence and the limits
on his right to present a defense combine to create cumulative error requiring reversal. “The
cumulative effect of several minor errors may warrant reversal even where individual errors in
the case would not warrant reversal.”33 In order to reverse based on cumulative error, the errors
“must be of consequence.”34 Thus, the effect of the errors must “have been seriously prejudicial
in order to warrant a finding that defendant was denied a fair trial.”35
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to convict Thomas, and the rules of evidence and
procedure justified claimed barriers to his right to present a defense. Neither of those errors can
be combined with any others to create a valid cumulative error argument. Additionally, Thomas
has not identified any specific conflicts occurring during trial that, standing alone or combined
with any others, were of consequence and require reversal. There are no errors to accumulate,
and when no errors are found, “a cumulative effect of errors is incapable of being found.”36
V. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Thomas argues that his counsel was ineffective. Thomas did not properly preserve his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and we review unpreserved claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel for errors apparent on the record.37
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the burden is on the
defendant to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that the deficiency so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair
trial.38 In order to show deficiency, a defendant must show that “counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”39 To
demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”40
32
Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
33
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 388; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 128; 600 NW2d 370 (1999).
37
People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
38
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303, 311-312; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
39
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
40
Id. at 694.
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B. GUILTY PLEAS
Thomas claims that trial counsel was deficient because counsel advised Thomas to plead
guilty to two unrelated impeachable felonies before the trial, and, as a result, Thomas did not
testify. There is no evidence in the record that establishes that defense counsel recommended
that Thomas plead guilty to the other felonies; thus, Thomas has failed to establish the necessary
factual predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.41 Similarly, Thomas has not
established a factual predicate for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective because trial
counsel suggested the prosecution’s case was stronger than the defense. Because Thomas has
not established a factual predicate for his claim, the challenged performance cannot be found to
be ineffective.42
C. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY REVIEW EVIDENCE
Thomas argues that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to adequately
review photographs and fingerprint evidence before trial. A failure to reasonably investigate a
case can constitute a deficiency amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel.43 Even
assuming, however, that trial counsel was deficient in his lack of preparation, Thomas has not
shown that the alleged deficiency prejudiced his case. Trial counsel was familiar with the
fingerprint evidence and the photographs and was able to cross-examine relevant witnesses with
the evidence and photographs during trial. Additionally, the key evidence incriminating Thomas
was unrelated to the fingerprint and photograph evidence.
Thomas also argues that trial counsel was deficient because he failed to review and
investigate the possibility of suppressing evidence gathered from VanKlaveren’s apartment. The
trial record does not conclusively establish whether police ever obtained a warrant for the search;
thus, Thomas’s claim that there was a possible suppression issue has merit. However, even if the
police did not have a warrant, the initial search of the apartment was justified under the
emergency-aid exception, which permits police investigating a situation to enter a residence
without a warrant when police “reasonably believe someone is in need of immediate aid[.]”44
The emergency-aid exception permitted officers to seize the body of VanKlaveren and any other
evidence in plain view.45 The primary evidence against Thomas was the evidence obtained from
the autopsy of VanKlaveren’s body regarding her injuries and cause of death. Thus, even if there
was no warrant obtained, the evidence that strongly linked Thomas to VanKlaveren’s murder fell
within an exception to the warrant requirement and would not have been suppressed. Thomas
has not established that he was prejudiced as a result of any deficiency by his counsel. Thus,
Thomas has not met his burden to establish that trial counsel was ineffective.
41
People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 60; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
42
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
43
People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 490-491; 684 NW2d 686 (2004).
44
People v Davis, 442 Mich 1, 25; 497 NW2d 910 (1993).
45
Id.
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D. FAILURE TO REQUEST POST-TRIAL RELIEF
Thomas argues that trial counsel was deficient because counsel failed to request any
relief in a post-trial motion. We disagree. After trial, Thomas filed “Additional Trial
Objections,” which were merely a reiteration of objections already addressed during trial. “Trial
counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position,” and the post-trial objections did not
contain any position that warranted a request for relief.46
We affirm.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
46
People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
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