PEOPLE OF MI V LEVESTER LEE HATHORN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 20, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294571
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-010716-FC
LEEVESTER LEE HATHORN, a/k/a
HATHORN LEE LEEVESTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and GLEICHER and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and breaking and entering, MCL 750.110.
The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender to 900 months to 100 years’
imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, to life imprisonment for the assault with intent
to commit murder conviction, and to 20 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the breaking and entering
conviction. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
On May 24, 2008, the victim was working at her place of employment in Plymouth,
Michigan. She was all alone that day and the doors had locked automatically when she entered
the building. A few hours later, she was startled when defendant appeared in her office and
asked her for money. The victim responded that she did not have any. Defendant then hit the
victim to the ground and hit her repeatedly in the head with a hard object. Defendant dragged
the victim to another room, tied her up, and told her he was going to kill her. He then left and
the victim managed to untie herself and call 911 for help.1 Evidence collected from the scene
identified the DNA of an unknown male and the victim’s DNA mixed together. The unknown
male’s DNA was entered into a database containing prior offenders’ DNA to determine whether
1
The victim had to have several surgeries to relieve pressure from her brain.
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it matched the DNA of any prior offender.
defendant’s DNA.
The DNA entered into the system matched
Defendant was arrested and brought before a jury. The DNA evidence was admitted at
trial. The victim also identified defendant as her attacker. She testified that she saw his face as
he was hitting her and also while he was tying her up. The victim indicated that she told police
that defendant was a black male in his 30s, had no facial hair or wrinkles, and was about 5 feet
10 inches tall and 180 pounds. She testified that defendant looked no different at trial than at the
time of the attack, except that he now had facial hair. A sketch was introduced into evidence
depicting the assailant the victim had described to a sketch artist. The defense theory was that
defendant’s identity was mistaken. The jury convicted defendant as charged.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
On appeal, defendant argues that counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to
obtain a DNA expert and an eyewitness identification expert. Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel present mixed questions of fact and law, which we review for clear error and de novo,
respectively. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). However, because
defendant did not move for a Ginther2 hearing, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the
record. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under professional norms, and that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different. People v Seals,
285 Mich App 1, 19-20; 776 NW2d 314 (2009). A defendant must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s decisions constituted sound trial strategy and this Court will not
second-guess counsel’s decisions with the benefit of hindsight. People v Henry, 239 Mich App
140, 146; 607 NW2d 767 (1999). Further, although the decision to call witnesses is a matter of
trial strategy, the failure to do so may constitute ineffective assistance if the failure deprives the
defendant of a substantial defense. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308
(2004).
A. DNA EXPERT
Defendant first points out that the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion for
appointment of a DNA expert, but nothing in the record shows that counsel ever obtained the
expert. Consequently, in defendant’s view, defense counsel’s failure to obtain the DNA expert,
for consultation purposes or to provide testimony at trial, rendered counsel’s assistance
ineffective. We disagree.
It is untrue, as defendant asserts, that nothing in the record demonstrates whether defense
counsel ever consulted a DNA expert. At a June 8, 2009 hearing, at which defense counsel was
appointed to represent defendant, counsel indicated that he “already [had] a person in mind to
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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review the DNA who’s one of the top experts in the world.” At a pretrial conference hearing on
June 12, 2009, counsel again indicated that he intended to consult a DNA expert, and the trial
court entered an order granting defendant’s motion for the appointment of a DNA expert that
same day. At trial, part of counsel’s trial strategy was to discredit the DNA evidence as a “recent
[scientific] development” secondary to the more conclusive evidence of the absence of
fingerprints. The reasonable implication to be drawn from these events is that counsel did
consult a DNA expert in preparing his case, that he moved to get paid for it, and that he
ultimately found the expert’s testimony unfavorable. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the lack
of conclusive evidence on the record showing that counsel did in fact consult the expert is not
grounds for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. We also note that defendant never
moved for a Ginther hearing to establish that counsel failed to consult the DNA expert, he never
moved for a remand in this Court for a Ginther hearing, and he has not provided an affidavit, or
other documentary evidence, from defense counsel establishing that counsel did not consult a
DNA expert. Thus, the argument that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failure to
consult an expert lacks factual support in the record. Accordingly, counsel’s performance in this
regard was not deficient.
We also reject defendant’s related contention that counsel’s assistance was ineffective for
failing to call a DNA expert as a witness. Defendant concedes that a strategic decision existed
justifying counsel’s decision not to call the witness and we agree. As defendant notes, counsel
may not have called the witness because his or her testimony would “merely confirm the
[testimony] of the prosecutor’s expert.” In our view, defendant has not overcome the
presumption that this strategy was a sound one. Defendant provides no evidence or argument
indicating that the DNA expert would have testified that the DNA analysis was flawed or
otherwise mistakenly identified defendant. In other words, defendant has failed to show or
explain how counsel’s failure to call this DNA expert deprived him of a substantial defense. See
Dixon, 263 Mich App at 398. Counsel’s decisions with regard to the DNA expert did not fall
below the objective standard of reasonableness under professional norms.
B. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EXPERT
Defendant also contends that counsel’s performance was deficient because he did not
request the appointment of an eyewitness identification expert. We disagree. As defendant
suggests, an eyewitness identification expert could have explained to the jury how an
eyewitness’s memory is affected by time, by traumatic events, and by seeing the alleged
defendant in prison clothing. However, under the circumstances, counsel may have decided not
to request an eyewitness identification expert because the witness may have bolstered the
reliability of the victim’s identification. Instead, counsel may have believed that the better tactic
would be to expose the shortcomings of the victim’s identification through cross-examination
and closing argument. We believe this to be the case, given that defense counsel attacked the
victim’s credibility by pointing out the time between the incident and trial, the fact that the
victim lost her glasses during the altercation, and the suggestive nature of the identification
procedure. Further, we note that even if an eyewitness identification expert had been called, he
or she would not have provided evidence amounting to a substantial defense. The testimony
would only have affected the victim’s credibility and the weight the jury would assign to her
eyewitness identification. Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s
decision not to call an eyewitness identification expert fell below objectively reasonable
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professional norms. And, even if counsel’s decision was deficient, it would not have affected the
outcome of the proceedings, given the DNA evidence placing defendant at the scene. Defendant
was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. No relief is warranted on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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