IN RE BROWN MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
January 18, 2011
In the Matter of BROWN, Minors.
No. 298910
Gratiot Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-007374-NA
In the Matter of T. L. BROWN, Minor.
No. 299039
Gratiot Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-007374-NA
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent father appeals as of right the trial court order
terminating his parental rights to his two sons, B. E. Brown and T. L. Brown, under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j). Respondent mother appeals as of right the order
terminating her parental rights to T. L. Brown under the same subsections. We affirm.
The children were removed in October 2008. A caseworker found eleven-year-old B. E.
Brown outside without supervision, adequate clothing, or access to shelter. Nineteen-month-old
T. L. Brown was not immediately taken for medical attention when he developed a fever, and he
had been left for long periods unattended in a baby swing. Services including Families First and
Early Head Start had been provided.
Respondents made admissions, and a case service plan (CSP) and parent agency
agreement were adopted in December 2008. Respondents were provided psychological
evaluations, individual therapy, and parenting classes, and respondent father received drug
screens and substance abuse treatment. Participation in AA was also required for the father. The
trial court found that respondents cooperated with these services and visited consistently, but
they failed to improve sufficiently to have the children returned. Respondent father’s anger
remained a significant barrier, and respondent mother’s cognitive limitations would prevent her
from being able to care for the children without full-time help.
On appeal, respondent father claims that clear and convincing evidence did not support
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), or (j). We disagree. Termination of
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parental rights requires a finding that at least one of the statutory grounds under MCL
712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re B & J, 279 Mich App
12, 18; 756 NW2d 234 (2008). The trial court must then order termination of parental rights if it
finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). Trial court findings are
reviewed for clear error. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). A finding is
clearly erroneous “if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK,
468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
In the present case, the evidence was clear and convincing to prove the statutory
subsections with respect to both parents. While respondents participated well in services and
clearly loved their children, they failed to make sufficient improvements to be able to provide a
safe home. A parent must benefit from services sufficiently in order to be able to provide a safe,
adequate home. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676-677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). The
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that this did not occur here. Respondents were
provided intensive, one-to-one parenting instruction with feedback, several parenting classes,
nutrition and budgeting classes, and individual therapy. Respondent father also received
substance abuse services. Previously, respondents had assistance from Families First, EHS, and
maternal and infant support services. That these services were insufficient was clear from the
testimony and reports of the evaluating psychologist, caseworker, therapist, and other service
providers. The children had special needs; B. E. Brown had attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder and could not function in a chaotic environment, while T. L. Brown had asthma
requiring daily breathing treatments. Respondent father worked many hours and was
uncomfortable with the nurturing/caretaking role. Respondents’ therapist opined that respondent
mother could not parent independently, while respondent father’s parenting skills were “very,
very poor.” While respondents worked very hard, the therapist felt that no amount of services
would result in substantially more change. The record supported this conclusion and the trial
court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
and (ii), (g), and (j).
Respondent mother also argues that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because her attorney failed to seek accommodation for her developmental disability and
depression under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq. Such
accommodation should be sought when the CSP is adopted or soon afterward. In re Terry, 240
Mich App 14, 26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). Here, no motion for a new trial or for an evidentiary
hearing was filed concerning the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Review is thus
limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Shively, 230 Mich App 626, 628 n 1; 584
NW2d 740 (1998). Applying by analogy the standards from criminal cases, a parent claiming
ineffective assistance must show that counsel’s performance was defective, and that the deficient
performance was prejudicial and deprived the parent of a fair trial. People v Lloyd, 459 Mich
433, 446; 590 NW2d 738 (1999). To show prejudice, the appellant must show that, but for
counsel’s error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different.
Shively, 230 Mich App at 628.
The record here does not support respondent mother’s argument that counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the ADA claim in the trial court. As noted, respondent mother was
provided with many services, including counseling and one-to-one parenting instruction, yet she
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was unable to improve to the point where the children could be left alone in her care. Thus, trial
counsel did not make a prejudicial, outcome-determinative mistake by failing to raise the ADA
issue. “The ADA does not require petitioner to provide respondent with full-time, live-in
assistance with her children.” Terry, 240 Mich App at 27-28. Here, respondent father would not
be available as a full-time parent while still continuing to support the family, and his plan to
work fewer hours or quit his job was not realistic. Petitioner also attempted to explore the
possibility of relatives helping to care for the children. The record does not support respondent
mother’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Lastly, respondents both claim that the trial court erred in failing to affirmatively find that
termination was in the children’s best interests as is now required by MCL 712A.19b(5). The
court used the former language in its opinion, finding that termination was not clearly contrary to
the children’s best interests. We find no error requiring reversal under the circumstances of this
case. The court’s order clearly found termination to be in the children’s best interests. Courts
speak through their orders and not their oral or written opinions. Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich
571, 576; 255 NW2d 632 (1977); Gazella, 264 Mich App at 677. Moreover, the record clearly
and convincingly showed that termination was in the children’s best interests. While
respondents loved their children and tried their best, the children would continue to be at risk in
respondents’ care. The trial court opinion contained numerous findings supporting this
conclusion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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