PEOPLE OF MI V DAMON JERALD BRADLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 18, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 295049
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 08-008128-FC
DAMON JERALD BRADLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and ZAHRA and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
and assaulting/resisting/obstructing an officer during the performance of his duties, MCL
750.81d(1). Because, the trial court did not err when it allowed defendant to represent himself at
trial, did not err in instructing the jury, and did not err in declining to order a second competency
evaluation, we affirm.
I
This case stems from an incident that occurred during the early morning hours of July 4,
2008 at Joe Martini’s bar in Grand Rapids, Michigan. There was a special event birthday party
at the bar that evening and Shannon Bowman was collecting a $10 cover charge to enter the bar.
Bowman testified at trial that she was seated at the front of the bar collecting the cover charge
when two men approached the front of the bar seeking entry. One of the men was defendant and
the other was Trinity Nelson. Bowman stated at trial that there was a “casual” or “nice” dress
code in place for the party. According to Bowman, neither of the men met the dress code
requirements because defendant was wearing a white t-shirt and Nelson was wearing a jersey.
Bowman stated that when security informed the men that they were not dressed appropriately
and could not enter the bar to attend the party, both men were unhappy, did not understand, and
insisted that they should be able to enter. The discussion continued for about 10 to 15 minutes
and the person whose birthday it was, Lacey Jones, came to the entrance and explained that they
could not enter as a result of the dress code. Bowman testified that after a lengthy discussion at
the bar entrance, defendant stated, “I’m gonna [sic] come back and shut you down.” Both men
then left the bar.
According to Bowman, about 40 minutes later the two men returned to the bar and
entered. Bowman testified that Nelson had a long-barreled handgun by his side, then raised it,
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and pointed it at her. She also testified that Nelson was “waving” the gun around. At first
Bowman froze and then begged for her life. Bowman was scared the whole time. Bowman
stated that when they saw that someone had a gun in the bar, everyone in the club started
screaming that someone had a gun then tried to run. Daniel McMillon, a club promoter in
attendance, testified that he saw Nelson trying to shoot the gun but it would not shoot. Then
shortly thereafter, according to Bowman, parts started to fall off the gun and it appeared that the
gun was falling apart. Bowman grabbed the money box but defendant “snatched” it from her
hands and said, “This is mine.” Bowman also testified that she could have handed the box to
defendant out of fear for her life because of the gun.1 Bowman testified that defendant and
Nelson ran out the front door of the bar and headed to another parking lot where they jumped
into an Explorer. As people were scattering, McMillon ran after defendant and Nelson and saw
them get into the white Explorer. He then tried to chase them but stopped when he saw police
taking over.
Officer Scott Ranburger of the Grand Rapids police department testified that he was on
road patrol at the time of the incident at Joe Martini’s on July 4, 2008. As he was driving along
28th Street he noticed suspicious activity. He saw two individuals running and it looked like they
had something in their hands. When Ranburger turned his cruiser around to get a better look at
what was going on, he was flagged down by a person (Mr. House) yelling that he had been
robbed by “two guys” with “a great big gun.” House jumped into the back of Ranburger’s
cruiser and then they both saw a white Explorer pulling onto the road. Ranburger engaged the
spotlight on his cruiser as the Explorer drive past his car. House identified the two men in the
car as the perpetrators. Ranburger followed the Explorer which travelled at posted speeds for a
short time and then sped up to over 70 mph and eventually ended up traveling through Griggs
Park. Ranburger initially gave chase but relented when assistance arrived because he had House
in the cruiser. Ranburger’s police cruiser had a video camera and the chase was recorded. The
prosecutor played the recording for the jury. Ranburger testified that other officers picked up
pursuit of the Explorer on the other side of the park where the Explorer came to a stop and a foot
chase ensued.
Officer Greg Bauer of the Grand Rapids police department heard a broadcast over his
cruiser radio about the robbery at Joe Martini’s and began pursuit. Bauer came across the
Explorer parked and saw two men running. Bauer chased defendant and ordered him to stop and
get on the ground. Eventually defendant tripped and fell. Defendant made it to his feet but
Bauer corralled him against a porch. Defendant continued “pushing” and “twisting” and was
able to spin away from Bauer. Bauer then deployed his taser to stop defendant from running.
Bauer fell on top of him and sat on his back because defendant was struggling with him and
trying to get away. Bauer testified that he had to deploy his taser a second time when he was
trying to handcuff defendant because defendant continued to resist. Officer Greg Rekucki
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Bowman estimated that the cash box contained approximately $2,000 to $3,000.
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testified that he heard Bauer in foot pursuit of defendant and proceeded to that location. On
arrival, he saw defendant stumble and assisted in handcuffing defendant. Bauer and Rekucki
both testified that crumpled clumps of money fell out of defendant’s pants during his arrest and
more money was found during the booking search. Officer Tony Leonard secured the white
Ford Explorer after defendant and Nelson abandoned it. Leonard found a live large caliber bullet
in the passenger door storage compartment and a metallic cash box containing only “guest
passes” used instead of cash to enter a bar. Police found defendant’s fingerprints on the exterior
of white Explorer.
Jean Malamis testified that his wife is the owner of Joe Martini’s bar and he is the general
manager. Malamis was present during the incident. He stated that Joe Martini’s has six
surveillance cameras that were operating on the night of the incident. Malamis made copies of
the surveillance footage and provided them to the Grand Rapids police. The DVDs do not have
audio and were dated and time stamped July 4, 2008, 1:16:09 a.m. The prosecutor showed the
footage of defendant and Nelson returning to the bar and entering the bar to the jury at trial. At
trial, Bowman narrated the silent videotape of the events. Bowman identified defendant and
Nelson on the DVD as well as herself. She then described the video showing Nelson and
defendant walking into the bar, Nelson walking through the bar with a gun, and defendant taking
the cash box.
Defendant presented Trinity Nelson to testify in his defense. Nelson testified that he and
defendant had been drinking vodka at defendant’s house and then went to the bar in a white Ford
Explorer. Nelson admitted that he was angry when he was not allowed to enter because of his
attire and returned to the bar with a gun because he “felt like, you know, these was friends of
mine, and they didn’t want to let me in the club, I felt like since I can’t come in, then I don’t
want nobody in there. I wanted to shut the club down, I didn’t want no party going on.” Nelson
stated that he walked through the club with the gun to put fear in people, especially the club
promoter. He stated that at one point the gun fell apart and he picked up the cylinder off the
ground before they left. Nelson testified that he did not point the gun at anyone, did not intend to
rob the club, and did not see defendant take the money box. Nelson admitted that the cash box
was in the back seat of the Explorer, but when the prosecutor asked Nelson how the cash box got
into the Ford Explorer, he responded, “I don’t know. I guess he must have had it. I don’t
know.” Nelson admitted that he pleaded guilty to armed robbery for his role in this incident.
The jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and
assaulting/resisting/obstructing an officer during the performance of his duties, MCL 750.81d(1).
Defendant now appeals as of right.
II
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing defendant to represent himself
at trial because the trial court did not substantially comply with the requirements to effectuate a
valid waiver of defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. Defendant did not preserve this issue
at trial and therefore, this Court reviews the issue for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). A defendant must establish that the error was plain, and that
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 734. Reversal is warranted only when
the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when the
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error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings
independent of the defendant's innocence. Id. at 736-737.
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has
the right to “the assistance of counsel for his defense.” US Const, Am VI; Gideon v Wainwright,
372 US 335, 343; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963). The Sixth Amendment applies to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 343-344. The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings” such as a preliminary examination. Moore v Illinois, 434 US 220, 231; 98 S Ct
458; 54 L Ed 2d 424 (1977). Once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, a defendant
has a right to counsel at all “critical” proceedings. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 244 n 11;
733 NW2d 713 (2007). However, a defendant has the right to waive the assistance of counsel at
trial and instead invoke his right to self-representation. Iowa v Tovar, 541 US 77, 87; 124 S Ct
1379; 158 L Ed 2d 209 (2004). A defendant’s waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. Id at 88.
Michigan law also protects a defendant’s right to self-representation. Const 1963, art 1, §
13; MCL 763.1. For a defendant’s request to waive the assistance of counsel and represent
himself or herself to be valid under Michigan law, the request must meet a three-part test set out
in People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). First, the request must be
unequivocal. Id. at 367. Second, the trial court must determine whether the defendant is
knowingly asserting his right to self-representation. Id. at 368. Third, before accepting the
request, the trial court must determine whether “the defendant’s acting as his own counsel will
not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court and the administration of the court’s
business.” Id. MCR 6.005(D)(1) sets out the procedures a trial court should follow, consistent
with Anderson, when a defendant requests to represent himself. The trial court must advise the
defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory
minimum sentence, and the risk involved in self-representation. MCR 6.005(D); People v
Williams, 470 Mich 634, 642-643; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). Although a defendant has waived the
assistance of counsel, at each subsequent proceeding the record must affirmatively show that the
court advised the defendant of the right to a lawyer’s assistance, and to assistance at public
expense if he is indigent, and that the defendant waived those rights. MCR 6.005(E); People v
Lane, 453 Mich 132, 137; 551 NW2d 382 (1996). The presence of standby counsel does not
satisfy the notice and waiver requirements. MCR 6.005(E); Lane, 453 Mich at 139.
Trial courts must substantially comply with the waiver of counsel procedures set forth in
case law and the court rule before granting a defendant’s request to represent himself. People v
Russell, 471 Mich 182, 191; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). Substantial compliance requires the court to
discuss with the defendant the waiver of counsel requirements, and to find that the defendant
“fully understands, recognizes and agrees to abide by the procedures.” Id.
The trial court initially set the trial date as May 26, 2009. On that date, defense counsel
informed the trial court that defendant would not communicate with him, refused to see him at
the county jail, and did not accept any letters or correspondence that defense counsel sent him.
The trial court asked defendant if he wanted counsel to represent him at trial and initially
defendant’s response was, “I don’t know how I can represent myself.” After a short recess,
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defendant indicated that he had changed his mind and that he wanted to represent himself. The
trial court stated as follows:
All right, that’s fine, and I don’t have any problem with you representing
yourself. I do want to mention a couple of things, though. One is, this is a serious
charge for which you could get life in prison if you’re convicted. It is a risky
thing for someone who is not trained in the law to represent themselves. I feel
pretty confident here that Mr. Grace would be in a much better position to
represent you. I just want to make sure you’ve considered that. This is a decision
you wish despite knowing the risks or representing yourself; you understand that?
Defendant responded by asking for an adjournment so he could properly prepare for trial.
While the prosecutor opposed the adjournment because witnesses were scheduled to arrive, the
trial court ultimately granted defendant’s request. The trial court then stated as follows to
defendant:
And the other thing I want you to know, Mr. Bradley, is I’m going to leave
Mr. Grace on as consulting attorney so that you can consult with him about
things. You can’t have it both ways. You either represent yourself or he
represents you, one or the other. But he will be there for you to consult with if
you have any questions. I’ll have him here for your trial so that you can talk to
him and get advice from him if you’re so inclined.
In fact, if you decide prior to trial that you want Mr. Grace to represent
you, I believe he’s ready, willing and available and able to do so. So if you
change your mind, we will have Mr. Grace represent you at trial. But right now, I
assume that despite knowing the risks of representing yourself, despite knowing
that you’re subject to the same Court Rules and evidentiary rules as an attorney
would be, that you do want to represent yourself, correct? I just want to make
sure I’m right about that.
Defendant responded, “I believe that’s correct.” After the adjournment, defense counsel
forwarded all relevant materials regarding defendant’s case to defendant in jail. On June 12,
2009, defendant sent a letter to the trial court stating that the jail denied him access to the law
library and asking for access. On July 8, 2009, the trial court sent a letter to the Captain Randy
Demory at the Kent County Jail requesting that defendant be granted reasonable access to the jail
law library so he could prepare for trial which was scheduled to occur on August 31, 2009. The
trial court sent a copy of that letter to defendant and, in a separate letter, stated as follows, “Mr.
Bradley, if you wish Mr. Grace to represent you, you should make sure he is aware of that. If
you wish to represent yourself, that is also your choice. Whatever you decide.” On the date set
for trial, August 31, 2009, the following exchange occurred at the outset:
The Court:
You are Mr. Bradley, sir; is that right?
Defendant:
I believe so.
The Court:
Alright, Mr. Bradley, do you wish to represent yourself or have
Mr. Grace represent you in this matter?
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Defendant:
I believe Mr. Grace did show that he’s unwilling to represent the
person on trial, so I have to proceed on my own.
The Court:
Mr. Grace, are you unwilling to represent the defendant?
Mr. Grace:
No, sir. I am here and ready.
The Court:
It’s your choice Mr. Bradley. And I would tell you that you have
every right to represent yourself if you want. If you prefer to be represented by
counsel, Mr. Grace will represent you. He indicated he’s able, ready, and
prepared to do so.
I would note for you that the charge that you’re currently facing
here and to which you’re to be tried starting today is a count of armed robbery. If
you’re found guilty of that, the maximum sentence you could receive is life in
prison, or any term of years. If there’s any kind of aggravated assault or serious
injury involved, you’d be required to be incarcerated for not less than two years.
There’s also another count of resisting and obstructing a police
officer. That is a felony also. That carries a maximum penalty of two years in
prison and/or a fine of up to $2,000.
With respect to both of those charges, I should tell you that it’s
being alleged here that this would be at least your third felony conviction. The
jurors will not be told about that. We’re simply going to go on the armed robbery
charge and resisting and obstructing a police officer charge. But if, for some
reason, you are convicted of either one of those two offenses, then the – and if it’s
shown later on that, in fact, you do have two prior felony convictions, the
maximum potential sentence you’d receive is doubled. And on the armed robbery
charge, of course, it’s already a possibility of life in prison. But on the resisting
and obstructing a police officer, for example, if you were only found guilty of
that, the maximum penalty, rather than being two years and/or $2,000, would be
four years and/or $4,000. Do you understand that?
Defendant:
I’m ready to proceed.
The Court:
All right. I’ll take that as a understanding because the only other
thing I wish to advise you of is while I’m – if you wish to represent yourself,
that’s okay. There are risks of that. I mentioned that to you other times you’ve
been in front of me, that you are still subject to the court rules, you’re subject to
the same laws that attorneys are subject to here. I assume you’re not as well
versed in these procedures as an attorney would be. I’m providing Mr. Grace to
be with you in case you want to consult with him during the trial, but if you do
things that aren’t permitted by law, I’ll make a ruling right away and you’re
subject to the same court rules an attorney would be.
Given the seriousness of this case, carrying a potential life in
prison, it’s – it seems to be very risky to go forward on your own and not have an
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attorney represent you. But you’re indicating that’s what you wish; is that
correct, you want to represent yourself?
Defendant:
charged.
As stated before, I have no choice but to represent the person
The Court:
No, you have choices. I told you Mr. Grace will represent you
today. He’s been involved with this, he’s knowledgeable about the case, and he
indicates he’s ready, willing, and able, if you want him to, to represent you. So
there is a choice there. And at any time, you could have hired your own attorney
to represent you, too, so there have been choices. But we’re ready to do this trial.
This has been sitting around for a long time and we’re ready to proceed.
So the question today is whether you want Mr. Grace or whether
you’re going to represent yourself.
Defendant:
I’m already prepared.
The Court:
All right. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Grace:
Your Honor, I’m just wondering, if I may, I’ll leave Mr. – Mr.
Bradley, in court, can sit here or there, whatever Mr. Bradley would prefer.
The Court:
Unless Mr. Bradley prefers otherwise, I’d just as soon have you
close to him so if he wants to consult with you and whisper to you or whatever,
you can give him advice.
Is that okay with you Mr. Bradley?
Defendant:
I would prefer he can sit back there.
The Court:
All right. We’ll have him sit back there.
Mr. Doyle?
Prosecutor: Yes, your Honor. I have wanted to address an issue, but, your
Honor, I believe you’ve covered it under Michigan Court Rules 6.005(D)(1)(2),
the employment of or waiver in this particular case of a lawyer. As indicated in
People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, a 2004 case, I think you’ve already adequately
done that today.
Any other issue, your Honor, regarding the defendant representing
himself, depending on whether it comes up in trial or how it comes up, we can
address that with possibly a special jury instruction when we get to that point.
Other than that, you Honor, the People are ready to proceed.
The Court:
Okay. All right, we’ll have the jurors summoned – summoned up then.
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Defendant specifically asserts that the trial court’s warnings to defendant about the risks
of representing himself at trial were “insufficient to establish that Mr. Bradley was properly and
thoroughly advised of the risks of self-representation at trial and was insufficient to ensure that
he had any real or substantive idea of what dangers self-representation might include; simply,
there was no basis upon which a reviewing court might find a valid and effective waiver.”
Defendant does not further explain this argument. The record belies defendant’s claim.
Again, before a defendant may represent himself, the trial court must determine that: (1)
the defendant’s request is unequivocal; (2) the defendant is asserting his right knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily; and (3) the defendant’s self-representation will not disrupt, unduly
inconvenience, and burden the court. Russell, 471 Mich at 190. In addition, pursuant to MCR
6.005, the trial court has a duty to inform the defendant of the charge and penalty he faces,
advise him of the risks of self-representation, and offer him the opportunity to consult with
retained or appointed counsel. MCR 6.005(D)(1). The trial court need only substantially
comply with these requirements, and if the court is uncertain regarding whether any of the
waiver procedures are met, it “should deny the defendant’s request to proceed in propria persona,
noting the reasons for the denial on the record.” Russell, 471 Mich at 191 (citation omitted).
The record is more than clear that defendant’s request was unequivocal, that defendant
asserted his right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Russell, 471 Mich at 190. The trial
court gave defendant every opportunity to be represented by Mr. Grace. Defendant was adamant
that he would represent himself at every turn. The trial court repeatedly explained the risks
associated with representing himself to defendant, but defendant stated that he wanted to
represent himself. Defendant even asked the trial court for an adjournment so he could have
time to prepare for trial. The trial court granted defendant’s request despite inconveniencing the
prosecutor who had witnesses present for trial on the first trial date. On defendant’s request, the
trial court contacted the jail to ask that defendant’s wishes to use the jail law library to prepare
for trial were reasonably accommodated. When the date of trial arrived, the trial court again
advised defendant of the risks associated with representing himself and explained the charges to
him and the possible sentences he faced if convicted of either charge. Defendant continued to
state that he was prepared and ready to proceed on his own behalf. Even so, the trial court asked
Mr. Grace to remain present and available if defendant had any questions throughout the course
of trial. The trial court even asked defendant where he would prefer Mr. Grace to sit, so that
defendant could whisper questions to him if the need arose.
Moreover, the trial court’s determination that defendant’s self-representation would not
disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court was also a proper determination. Russell,
471 Mich at 190. Defendant was professional and appropriate at all times throughout the course
of trial, especially when the jury was present. Prior to trial, on several occasions before the
court, defendant’s answers were non-responsive and defendant took to citing “UCC jargon” and
speaking in what can only be described as legal gibberish. However, defendant did not make any
nonsensical or inappropriate comments before the jury and was at all times able to rationally and
professionally communicate with the trial court, the prosecutor, and witnesses. Defendant was
prepared for trial, asked probative questions of witnesses, raised objections, and overall
demonstrated an understanding of our criminal justice system. Defendant has not shown plain
error.
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Defendant also contends that defendant’s request for self-representation cannot be seen as
unequivocal when defendant abandoned his own representation and asked Mr. Grace to deliver
closing argument on his behalf. We agree with the prosecutor’s response to this issue, that “the
fact that [d]efendant subsequently changed his mind does not mean that his original request to
represent himself was equivocal.” Defendant was adamant that he wanted to represent himself
leading up to trial, at the outset of trial, and throughout nearly four days of trial despite repeated
warnings tendered by the trial court. Defendant has not shown error.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court had concerns about defendant’s mental state and
for that reason should not have concluded that defendant was adequately advised of the risks of
self-representation. The record does reflect that early on in the proceedings defendant would
almost exclusively respond to questions by the trial court in nonsensical terms citing “UCC
jargon.” Also, defendant sent the trial court a series of motions referencing the UCC but having
nothing to do with the instant case against him. The trial court, not being able to communicate
with defendant, sent defendant for a forensic examination of his mental well-being. Defendant
refused to participate with the examination and physically left the room. When defendant
appeared before the trial court the next time, defendant eventually ceased his UCC references
and actually began to respond to the trial court in rational terms. From that point on, defendant
was able to effectively communicate his positions to the trial court and counsel including
representing himself, asking for an adjournment to prepare for trial, requesting that Mr. Grace
forward evidence to him for his trial preparation, and sending a letter to the trial court asking it
for assistance in accessing the jail law library. And, we do find it important that defendant did
not lapse into the “UCC jargon” at any point during trial. Instead, defendant was coherent,
rational, and focused on his own representation when it suited his needs. Defendant has not
shown error.
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on
unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530. He specifically asserts that unarmed robbery is a necessarily
included lesser offense of armed robbery and evidence was presented in this case which
supported a conviction of unarmed robbery. We review de novo claims of instructional error.
People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 606; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). However, we review for an
abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination that a jury instruction is not applicable to the
facts of the case. People v McKinney, 258 Mich App157, 163, 670 NW2d 254 (2003).
Importantly, “[t]he right to a properly instructed jury is fundamental to the right to receive a fair
trial.” People v Embree, 68 Mich App 40, 44; 241 NW2d 753 (1976).
All of the elements of a necessarily included lesser offense are contained in a greater
offense. People v Walls, 265 Mich App 642, 645; 697 NW2d 535 (2005). However, the greater
offense contains at least one element that the necessarily included lesser offense does not. Id. at
644. Therefore, on request, an instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is proper “if
the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of
the lesser included offense, and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” People v
Silver, 466 Mich 386, 388; 646 NW2d 150 (2002); Walls, 265 Mich App at 644. If evidence has
been presented in the case that supports a conviction of a lesser included offense, the refusal to
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give the requested instruction is error requiring reversal. People v Hendricks, 446 Mich 435,
442; 521 NW2d 546 (1994).
Unarmed robbery is a necessarily included lesser offense of armed robbery. People v.
Reese, 466 Mich 440, 446-447; 647 NW2d 498 (2002). The element distinguishing unarmed
robbery from the offense of armed robbery is the use of a weapon. Id. at 447. Thus, to find
error requiring reversal, we must determine whether the facts surrounding the use of a gun were
disputed and a rational view of the evidence would support an unarmed robbery instruction. Id.;
Walls, 265 Mich App at 644. Testimony at trial established the presence of a gun at the robbery.
Bowman saw Nelson with a long-barreled gun at his side when he entered the bar, watched him
raise the gun so that it was pointing directly at her, and then she watched him walk throughout
the bar with the gun “waving” it around. There was also testimony that partygoers inside the bar
were agitated and scattering because they saw the gun and were scared as Nelson walked toward
the back of the bar. Nelson admitted that he brought the gun into the bar because he was angry
that he was not allowed into the birthday party and that he wanted to shut down the party. There
was even testimony that Nelson was trying to fire the gun but the gun was malfunctioning and
started to fall apart. Importantly, Bowman specifically testified that she was scared because of
the presence of the gun and that was why she let the cash box go freely when defendant
“snatched” it. There was no other testimony indicating that defendant or Nelson did any other
action that put Bowman or the other people present in fear. Under these facts, where people
were scattering and actually yelling that someone’s got a gun, defendant’s argument that he did
not see the gun or was not otherwise aware that Nelson had a gun, is irrational and not supported
by the evidence. Our review of the record reveals that a rational view of the evidence does not
support an unarmed robbery instruction. Reese, 466 Mich at 448. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on unarmed robbery.
IV
Defendant has also filed a Standard 4 brief with this Court. In it, defendant argues that
the trial court committed reversible error when it ordered defendant to undergo a forensic
examination, then vacating that order, and finding defendant competent to stand trial. He also
asserts that the trial court erred when it then denied defendant’s written request for a forensic
examination and then proceeding to trial without a competency hearing. “[A] defendant is
presumed competent to stand trial unless his mental condition prevents him from understanding
the nature and object of the proceedings against him or the court determines he is unable to assist
in his defense.” People v Mette, 243 Mich App 318, 331; 621 NW2d 713 (2000). Where a
defendant does not raise the issue, “the trial court ha[s] no duty to sua sponte order a competency
hearing,” People v Inman, 54 Mich App 5, 12; 220 NW2d 165 (1974), unless facts are brought to
the trial court’s “attention which raise a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to the defendant’s competence.”
People v Harris, 185 Mich App 100, 102; 460 NW2d 239 (1990).
Here, it is true that at the beginning of these proceedings, defendant’s statements to the
trial court may have been sufficient to create a “bona fide doubt” regarding his competency.
Defendant questioned the court’s jurisdiction over him and raised questions that he may be in an
admiralty court. Defendant repeatedly answered questions with the same phrase, “I accept that
statement for value and honor,” followed by a string of indiscernible “UCC jargon.” The trial
court believed it could not communicate with defendant and at that point did request a forensic
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review of defendant’s mental health on December 1, 2008. Dr. David Boersma attempted to
perform a forensic competency examination on January 28, 2009, but defendant refused to
cooperate stating that he did not want to participate in the examination. Defendant declined to
provide a reason for his refusal to participate and walked out of the interview room. Dr.
Boersma also reported that defendant had been seen by mental health staff at the jail on two
occasions and defendant denied having a history of psychiatric problems, had no current mental
health concerns, and had no need for contact with mental health staff. Thereafter, the trial court
rescinded the order for a competency evaluation. Defendant continued to speak and
communicate to others only in the UCC jargon until the trial court explicitly informed him, in
May 2009, that defendant would stand trial on the charges that day. It seems to this Court that as
soon as defendant was aware that the trial court intended to proceed to trial despite defendant’s
senseless communications, defendant abandoned the UCC jargon and instead began to
communicate clearly and even expressed his desire to represent himself. It was at this point that
defendant asked for an adjournment to prepare his defense. On the date of trial, defendant was
prepared, was appropriate at all times, and in fact, was an effective advocate for himself. While
defendant’s statements during the early portion of this case may have necessitated a competency
hearing, that was certainly not the case two months before trial and during trial. The record is
plain that defendant understood the charges against him, and not only was able to assist in his
own defense, but he actually put on his own defense over the course of a four day trial. In other
words, there is simply no indication on the record before us that defendant was incompetent to
stand trial. Therefore, the trial court did not plainly err in failing to order a second competency
hearing.
V
The trial court did not err when it allowed defendant to represent himself at trial, did not
err in instructing the jury, and did not err in declining to order a second competency evaluation.
Defendant has not shown error on this record, and we affirm defendant’s convictions.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-11-
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