WHITESELL INTERNATIONAL CORP V WILLIAM WHITAKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WHITESELL INTERNATIONAL CORP,
UNPUBLISHED
January 18, 2011
Plaintiff/CounterDefendant/Appellant,
v
No. 287569
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-518716-CZ
WILLIAM WHITAKER,
Defendant/CounterPlaintiff/Appellee,
and
MRC INDUSTRIAL GROUP INC,
Defendant,
and
PIERCETEK INC,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
ON RECONSIDERATION
Before: MURPHY, P.J., and JANSEN and ZAHRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this commercial litigation case, plaintiff/counter-defendant Whitesell International
Corp (WIC), a successor of Whitesell Corporation appeals as of right a January 30, 2008
judgment in favor of defendant/counter-plaintiff William Whitaker (Whitaker). The judgment
reflects the jury’s finding in favor of Whitaker against WIC in the amount of $6 million for
tortious interference with business relationship or expectancy, and a $500,000 award “as a result
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of [WIC’s] flagrant violation of [t]he Michigan Antitrust Reform Act – MCL 445.773 et seq.”1
The judgment also reflects that the trial court ordered WIC to pay Whitaker $1,862,671.37 in
attorneys fees, $205,440.61 in costs, $36,600 in expert witness costs and $661,972.88 in
prejudgment interest. Initially, by a split decision, we affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
WIC sought reconsideration.
On reconsideration, we affirm the September 5, 2006 order dismissing “Counts I, II, and
IV of [WIC]’s complaint,” on the basis of res judicata/collateral estoppel. We also affirm trial
court’s order denying WIC’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of the NoerrPennington doctrine. However, we reverse the verdict because we conclude the trial court
committed error requiring reversal in directing a verdict on the question of trade secret. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
This case is the third lawsuit that an entity related to WIC has filed against Whitaker.
WIC’s complaint was dismissed on the basis of res judicata, but Whitaker continued to pursue
his counterclaim against WIC that generally alleges that WIC, through repeated sham litigation
to preserve its monopoly, prevented Whitaker from manufacturing interconnected pierce nuts. In
this case, WIC claimed that Whitaker had disclosed a trade secret relating to a process to
manufacture interconnected pierce nuts. Whitaker maintained that the process had never been
considered secret, and in any event, had been publicly disclosed by a patent that described the
process. Whitaker later added a counterclaim alleging that WIC’s sham litigation tortiously
interfered with his business relationships and expectancies.
II. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In general, pierce nuts are a type of fastener that pierce directly into sheet metal and
provide a threaded base on which to affix material to the sheet metal. In the 1970’s there were
three manufacturers of pierce nuts, MacLean-Fogg, Kean Manufacturing (Kean) and
Multifastener. At this time, Whitaker was working at Kean learning about pierce nuts and other
fasteners. Early on in 1970’s, MacLean-Fogg intended to enter the pierce nut market by
developing a new process to manufacture pierce nuts and differentiate itself from the
competition. According to David Trendler, Whitaker’s former supervisor, an engineer of
MacLean-Fogg, Bill Grube, invented a method to connect pierce nuts with a piece of wire.
Grube “invented the notion of starting from a raw coil of raw material through a straightener,
through a press, through a taper wound up on a reel ready to go to the customer, so it wasn’t five
or ten steps in between to make a final product.” Grube obtained United States Patent 3,999,659
in 1973. In 1980, MacLean-Fogg created a subsidiary, Stamptech, and constructed a building in
1
The jury also found that Whitaker had incurred damages of $2,971,301 as a result of WIC’s
antitrust violation but that determination was not referenced in the January 30, 2008 judgment.
However, the trial court, in its August 14, 2008 opinion on WIC’s motion for reconsideration,
indicated that “the parties stipulated that Whitaker would forego antitrust remedies since his tort
award was higher.”
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which Stamptech manufactured the interconnected pierce nuts according to the Grube patent.
The term “Stamptech process” was used to describe the Grube inline pierce nut process.
Whitaker started working for Kean in 1967. He ran a pierce nut press and eventually
learned to design, make and set dies. He was eventually promoted to general manager in 1985,
and manager of operations in 1990. In 1993, Whitaker left Kean to open a business to
manufacture pierce nuts. He and his longtime friend, Dennis Boerger, formed MIOH to make
interconnected pierce nuts using the Stamptech process as the patent had expired. Whitaker and
Boerger were aware of the Stamptech process from “experience in the pierce nut world.” The
parties agree that Kean sued Whitaker alleging disclosure of trade secrets. Whitaker at least
prevailed in part and was allowed to manufacture pierce nuts.
In 1993, MacLean-Fogg and MIOH merged. Trendler explained that, “[MacLean-Fogg]
had the machinery. Whitaker had 25 or 30 years business experience in the pierce nut business.”
MIOH was dissolved in the merger and Whitaker went to work for Stamptech. Whitaker owned
21 percent of Stamptech and was president and general manager, but reported to MacLean-Fogg.
Stamptech manufactured interconnected pierce nuts from 1993 to 1998 using the same
machinery built in 1971. There was no evidence that any Stamptech employee signed a
confidentiality agreement.
In the late 1990’s, Whitesell Corporation was a large supplier of cold-headed threaded
fasteners (screws, bolts, etc) to major-appliance makers, but had no presence in the automotive
industry. Its owner, Neil Whitesell, sought entry to the automotive industry and Trendler
suggested he purchase Stamptech, as MacLean-Fogg’s owner no longer wanted to compete in the
pierce nut business. In 1998, Whitesell Corporation formed Whitesell of Michigan (WOM) and
began negotiations to purchase Stamptech.
On August 31, 1998, Whitaker, on behalf of himself, Stamptech and MIOH2 executed an
“Assignment of Manufacturing Rights” which assigned rights to WOM “in any manufacturing
processes, designs, products, or systems related to Pierce Nuts, Insert Nuts, Application Tooling
and related products previously produced by Stamptech.” The document assigned “all right and
title to all processes in order to encourage [WOM] to purchase Stamptech assets and assume its
operation.” The document did not mention intellectual property or trade secrets. Neil Whitesell
testified that Whitaker represented to him that the Stamptech process, which previously was
called the Grube process, was confidential. He also testified that Tim Taylor of MacLean-Fogg
also represented to him that the Stamptech process was confidential, and a rudimentary drawing
of the Stamptech process was attached to the “Assignment of Manufacturing Rights.” The
purchase price was $850,000. Whitaker was retained as general manager at WOM. He executed
a confidentially agreement and non-competition agreement.
Whitaker’s tenure at WOM was relatively short. On July 23, 1999, Whitaker either was
fired or resigned. According to WIC, Whitaker abruptly quit, leading an employee walkout
while WOM was trying to fill critical orders for General Motors. WIC claims GM was required
2
Whitaker signed the agreement on behalf of MIOH, though MIOH was dissolved in 1993.
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to dispatch an emergency-response specialist to avoid a supply disruption. In its brief on appeal,
WIC notes that “GM’s only other source of pierce nuts, Fabristeel, was having its own delivery
and quality problems.” According to Whitaker, Bob Wiese, WOM’s secretary-treasurer, fired
him following an ongoing dispute over reductions in his and WOM employees promised health
care coverage and benefits.
Whitesell Corporation and WOM sued Whitaker in Washtenaw circuit court (Washtenaw
action) alleging breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with business
relationships/expectancies, and conspiracy. The complaint mentioned that Whitaker had signed
a confidentiality agreement and alleged Whitaker was “wrongfully retaining possession of
company property and information.” Whitaker counterclaimed seeking to null and void his noncompetition agreement. The parties accepted a mediation agreement and a $10,000 judgment
was entered against Whitaker in October 2000. Whitaker notes that his mediation summary
expressly provided that Whitaker “has now commenced operations making pierce nuts for a
company known as the ‘Pierce Nut Company’ [(PNC)] located in Livonia, Michigan. This
company manufactures the same product and sells it to the same customer base as does
Stamptech.” Whitaker also notes that counsel for Whitesell Corporation and WOM signed a
satisfaction of judgment dated August 23, 2001, which reflected that PNC was a garnishee of
Whitaker.
Whitaker and Richard Brodie formed the PNC. The PNC built machines to produce
interconnected pierce nuts according to the Stamptech process. The PNC manufactured
interconnected pierce nuts, but there was testimony that the PNC could not secure enough sales
and had quality problems.
In July 2001, WOM filed suit against the PNC, Whitaker and Brodie in Alabama state
court alleging Whitaker was violating the non-competition agreement at the PNC. Whitaker had
never worked in Alabama but WIC was headquartered there. The case was removed to Alabama
federal court and then transferred to the federal court in the eastern district of Michigan (federal
action). Whitaker moved to dismiss on the basis of res judicata. Counsel for WOM filed a
response that was almost three weeks late. In an October 25, 2001, opinion, the federal district
court noted that under Michigan law, “[a] settlement arising from the acceptance of a mediation
award disposes of all claims in the action as it subsumes the underlying claims by merging and
barring all the included claims and preexisting causes of actions.” The federal court agreed with
Whitaker that “Whitaker’s alleged violation of a non-compete agreement could have been raised
and resolved in the prior action.” Further, the federal court noted that the Washtenaw county
mediation panel report stated that the “[c]ounterclaim is resolved with the main claim.” The
federal court further observed that one of “Whitaker’s counterclaims alleged that the noncompetition agreement was invalid.” The federal court concluded that “the mediation award
encompasses this claim, which means that Plaintiff is barred from asserting it against Defendant
Whitaker.” The federal court, however, determined that because “[the PNC] and Brodie were
not parties to the non-competition agreement and were not involved in the lawsuit that resulted in
the mediation agreement[,] . . . the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply to Plaintiff’s
action against Defendants [the PNC] and Brodie.”
In August 2002, the PNC was declared bankrupt. On August 1, 2003, Fabristeel
purchased the assets of the PNC. Until that point, Fabristeel made pierce nuts using a “batch”
process, in which the pierce nuts were not interconnected. Pierce nuts made using the “batch”
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process are later interconnected by crimping wire to the back of the pierce nut, a process known
as “knurling.” Although interconnected, the process of manufacturing knurled pierce nuts
requires more steps than required by the Stamptech process. There was testimony that, before
the sale, Fabristeel knew that the PNC had manufactured pierce nuts, but did not know the
manner of production. Fabristeel only knew the process was different from their own. There
was testimony by an employee of Fabristeel, Jorge Gonzales, that he was not allowed into the
PNC building until after the sale. He testified that after the sale he entered the building and the
PNC employees appeared busy moving items. Gonzales testified that there were five
interconnected pierce nut lines and that he “thought it was a very interesting and unique
process.” He testified that Fabristeel was unable to effectively operate the PNC pierce nut
machines and offered Whitaker a job. Whitaker declined.
In 2003 Whitaker began negotiations with defendant Michigan Rivet Company (MRC)
and eventually signed an employment contract in September 2004. Whitaker executed a
confidentiality agreement and non-competition agreement with MRC, and assigned MRC his
rights to the pierce anchor plate.3 MRC established a subsidiary company, defendant Piercetek,
to manufacture pierce nuts. MRC invested $1 million to allow Whitaker to create an
interconnected pierce nut line. Whitaker began building the machine but production delays and
costs slowed the process.
In 2004, the Whitesell Corporation purchased Fabristeel and became WIC. The WOM
pierce nut machines were sent to Taylor, Michigan. Gonzales testified that he recognized that
the WOM pierce nut machines and the PNC pierce nut machines used the same process.
WIC learned that Whitaker was working with MRC and its subsidiary, Piercetek. In June
23, 2005, WIC filed the instant action against Whitaker, MRC and Piercetek. The complaint
alleged defendants misappropriated trade secrets, tortiously interfered with WIC’s business
relationships/expectancies and misappropriated a patented design for a pierce anchor plate. On
July 5, 2005, Piercetek filed a counterclaim seeking relief under the Michigan Antitrust Reform
Act (MARA), MCL 445.773. Pierecetek alleged that WIC controlled the interconnected pierce
nut market and had a monopoly.
WIC obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO), and sought to turn it into a
preliminary injunction against Whitaker, MRC and Piercetek, restraining them from
manufacturing pierce nuts, and compelling the withdrawal of Whitaker’s pierce anchor plate
patent application. At the July 6, 2005 hearing, WIC argued that it had purchased intellectual
property rights from Whitaker in the sale of Stamptech.
However, Robert Wiese,
treasurer/secretary of WIC, admitted that nowhere in the Stamptech sale documents was there a
representation that the process was confidential. Further, Wiese admitted that he “did not require
[Stamptech] to rep or warrant that the public did not view that this was really a trade secret.”
Wiese admitted that he did not “review whether any of the Stamp Tech [sic] employees had
signed confidential agreements.” He also admitted that did not know whether technical
3
The jury rejected Whitaker’s claims relating to the pierce anchor plate.
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personnel were allowed to view the pierce nut machines. He also admitted that Whitaker’s noncompetition agreement had long since expired. The trial court concluded that WIC had failed
establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and dissolved the TRO.
WIC then obtained a second ex parte order, and filed a motion for injunction to prevent
the sale of the MRC pierce nut machines. The trial court denied WIC’s motion for preliminary
injunction. The court noted that the Grube patent seems “to describe the very item, the process
for making the very item that was handed this Court as an exemplar, if you will.” The court also
noted WIC had not produced any confidentiality agreements from Stamptech employees. The
court indicated that “the companies that existed before [WIC]; that is Stamptech and MIOH,
apparently did not maintain the confidentiality of the Stamptech process; and if that is the case
there can be no trade secret.” The court, however, specifically indicated that “I am not finding
that there was or was not a trade secret.”
On November 4, 2005, creditors of MRC filed an involuntary petition for bankruptcy.
Piercetek, a wholly owned subsidiary of MRC, was included in the bankruptcy proceedings.
There was testimony that NES, a Taiwanese company, had been interested in purchasing the
machinery from MRC and Piercetek to manufacture interconnected pierce nuts. Attorney
Gordon Eng testified that Stephen Ling, an attorney for NES, asked him to help draft an asset
purchase agreement that would be submitted to Steven Engleman, president of MRC. Under the
agreement, NES offered $1.3 million for the assets of Piercetek. The agreement also provided
that Whitaker would be 20% owner and president of a company that NES would form, Pierce
Fastener Products (PFP), along with $150,000 salary and a car allowance. The agreement also
provided that Whitaker would receive an incentive if PFP grossed more than $10 million in
yearly sales and that NES would provide Whitaker a $200,000 litigation loan. Eng testified that
Ling raised concerns about WIC’s litigation against Whitaker, MRC and Piercetek. Eng testified
that NES would not buy MRC property that was subject to litigation.
NES reduced its offer to purchase Piercetek assets to $1.1 million. The reduced price
reflected that MRC was in bankruptcy and that there was no need to obtain a non-competition
agreement. However, Eng testified that an attorney for WIC, Chris Royce, left him a voice mail
indicating WIC was claiming “trade secrets in the assets of Piercetek. He noted that they were in
litigation, which involved Bill Whitaker and MRC and he threatened to sue NES if NES went
forward and purchased the Piercetek assets.” There was evidence that MRC’s bankruptcy
lawyers and lawyers for MRC’s debtors felt that WIC was interfering with the bankruptcy
proceedings.
After the first failure to purchase Piercetek’s assets, Eng continued to negotiate an
agreement that would exclude the “trade secret” so that NES and PFP could acquire the Piercetek
assets without the threat of a lawsuit. Eng, however, “never got a response that [NES] could put
their hands around and say, okay, this is the part or the piece of the process that we can carve out
and not have to worry about litigation.” Further, Eng offered specific purchase prices, but WIC
“wouldn’t tell [Eng] if that was enough to keep them from suing us.” In addition, a letter from
counsel for WIC to Eng indicated that:
Mr. Whitaker has signed an employment agreement with MRC Associates having
a two-year non compete provision. Mr. Whitaker has not been released from his
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obligation. WIC Corporation intends to assert the rights it acquired under the
agreement pursuant to its acquisition of the Piercetek assets.
Eng testified “basically they’re saying don’t employ Mr. Whitaker because they have this
employment agreement.”
Eng testified that he attempted to purchase portions of MRC, and WIC attempted to
condition the purchase on NES not hiring Whitaker. NES would not proceed without Whitaker.
Eng also testified that WIC was negotiating to purchase the Piercetek assets and sought to elicit
statements from MRC for use in the current litigation. Whitaker’s brief on appeal cites the April
12, 2006 “consent judgment” as the primary example of statements WIC elicited from MRC and
Piercetek. It states,
Defendant MRC is liable to Plaintiff [WIC] for its misappropriation of trade
secrets relating to the automated in-line process for the manufacture of pierce nuts
and its tortious interference [sic] [WIC]’s contract and business relationships;
Defendant Piercetek is liable to Plaintiff [WIC] for its misappropriation of trade
secrets relating to the automated in-line process for the manufacture of pierce nuts
and its tortious interference [sic] [WIC]’s contract and business relationships;
MRC and Piercetek shall assign any and all claims they have, or may have,
against third parties, including but not limited to Defendant Bill Whitaker, arising
in connection with the transaction and occurrences set forth in [WIC]’s Verified
Complaint.
WIC offered $1,025,000 for the Piercetek assets. The offer included language allowing
them to sue Whitaker for any breach of any employment or license agreement with MRC. WIC
also provided $50,000 to Engleman and other individuals not to compete, even though MRC
would not likely be able to compete and Engleman did not have knowledge of pierce nuts to
compete. The bankruptcy trustee approved the sale to WIC.
In June 23, 2006, Whitaker filed in the instant litigation a motion for summary
disposition against WIC on the basis of res judicata. Whitaker argued that WIC’s suit raised
issues that were or could have been raised in the earlier Washtenaw action or the federal action.
At the August 17, 2006 hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The court held that in either
the Washtenaw action or the federal action, “simple discovery devices could have revealed not
only what Mr. Whitaker’s involvement with [the PNC] was, but whether or not he was using the
so-called Stamptech [p]rocess . . . .”
WIC also sought summary disposition based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and lack
of standing. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is derived from two United States Supreme Court
cases pertaining to the Petition Clause4 and antitrust laws: Eastern Railroad Presidents
4
The Petition Clause is found in the last line of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no
(continued…)
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Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 US 127; 81 S Ct 523; 5 LEd2d 464 (1961), and
United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381 US 657; 85 S Ct 1585; 14 L Ed 2d 626
(1965). J & J Const Co v Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich 722, 727 n 5;
664 NW2d 728 (2003), citing McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 24; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).
Whitaker sought summary disposition arguing that WIC’s claim was a sham because it knew the
Grube patent disclosed the Stamptech process. The trial court denied both motions, finding a
factual dispute in regard to whether WIC sued in bad faith. On August 20, 2007, Whitaker
amended his counter-claim to add a count of tortious interference with business relationship or
expectancy.
Over 25 days of trial, there was extensive testimony relating to whether the Stamptech
process was secret and whether WIC had a monopoly over interconnected pierce nuts. At the
end of trial, Whitaker moved for directed verdict, arguing the Stamptech process was not a trade
secret. Whitaker argued that testimony at trial revealed that a patent previously filed by attorney
Raymond Scott of the law firm that currently represented WIC (though not at the time he filed
the patent) indicated that “prior patents describe a number of methods” of making interconnected
pierce nuts. On cross-examination, Harold Woods, WIC’s vice-president of sales, admitted that,
at the time the above patent was filed, 2002, “there were two known methods of putting pierce
nuts on wire, Stamptech and batch knurling.” From this admission, Whitaker claimed that Scott,
a patent attorney for WIC, had represented to the patent office that the Stamptech process had
been described in a previous patent. In other words, WIC filed the instant suit with imputed
knowledge that the Stamptech process had been described in prior patents. The court accepted
the above argument as indicating Woods admitted that the Stamptech process had been publicly
disclosed. The court also relied on evidence from Jorge Gonzales, in which he admitted that
language in the Grube patent described a characteristic of a product made by the Stamptech
process. The court concluded that the Stamptech process was not a trade secret. However, the
court made clear that “I am not ruling as to whether or not [WIC] reasonably believed it to be a
trade secret.”
The parties presented closing arguments, and written summaries of their respective
theories were also presented during the jury instructions. Whitaker’s factual theory at trial was
that he was a guru of the interconnected pierce nut business. He claimed that WIC by and
through its lawyers has systematically and wrongfully used the court system, threats and
acquisitions to attempt to monopolize the interconnected pierce nut marketplace. He claimed
that WIC has been successful in this attempt because it controls one hundred percent of the North
American interconnected pierce nut market. Whitaker highlighted the previous litigation and
argued that WIC knew or should have known interconnected pierce nuts were not trade secrets
and maintained that the instant lawsuit was solely filed to prevent competition.
WIC claimed that that the Stamptech process was a trade secret and that WIC did not
have a monopoly on the inter-connected pierce nut business. WIC maintained in any event that
(…continued)
law. . .abridging the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”
The protections provided by the First Amendment, including the Petition Clause, have been
extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. J & J Const Co, 468 Mich at 729, citing
Whitehill v Elkins, 389 US 54, 57; 88 S Ct 184; 19 L Ed 2d 228 (1967).
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it was immunized from suit under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because it had a reasonable
belief that there was a chance of prevailing in the instant case to protect its legal rights.
The jury retired and returned its verdict in favor of Whitaker. This appeal followed.
III. THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. When reviewing
a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court must examine the documentary evidence presented
and, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547
NW2d 314 (1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of establishing through affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence that a genuine issue of disputed fact
exists. Id. A question of fact exists when reasonable minds can differ on the conclusions to be
drawn from the evidence. Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Industries (On Rehearing), 441
Mich 379, 398-399; 491 NW2d 208 (1992). Only “the substantively admissible evidence
actually proffered” may be considered. Maiden, 461 Mich at 121; see also MCR 2.116(G)(6).
Summary disposition is properly granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden, 461 Mich at 120.
We review de novo issues of constitutional law. J & J Const Co, 468 Mich at 729, citing
McDougall 461 Mich at 24.
B. ANALYSIS
We conclude that while the facts presented by WIC could support a legal argument that
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine generally immunizes WIC from suit against it as a result of its
attempt to protect its alleged trade secret, there was evidence supporting the conclusion that WIC
engaged in sham litigation, which is an exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Thus,
summary disposition was properly denied.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is derived from two United States Supreme Court cases
pertaining to the Petition Clause and antitrust laws: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference,
365 US 127; United Mine Workers of America, 381 US 657; J & J Const Co, 468 Mich at 727, n
5. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is “a principle of constitutional law that bars litigation arising
from injuries received as a consequence of First Amendment petitioning activity, regardless of
the underlying cause of action.” Azzar v Primebank, FSB, 198 Mich App 512, 517; 499 NW2d
793 (1993). Thus, “parties who petition the government for governmental action favorable to
them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust laws even though their petitions are motivated by
anticompetitive intent.” Arim v General Motors Corp, 206 Mich App 178, 190-191; 520 NW2d
695 (1994), citing Video Int’l Production, Inc v Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc, 858
F2d 1075, 1082 (CA 5, 1988). Although the doctrine was initially limited to actions in regard to
the Legislative process, that “the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine [extends] to efforts
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to influence administrative agencies and the courts.” Id., at 190, quoting Potters, 800 F2d at 578,
citing California Motor Transport Co v Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508, 510; 92 S Ct 609, 611;
30 L Ed 2d 642 (1972).
The action allegedly protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is the instant WIC
lawsuit seeking the court’s influence to protect alleged trade secrets. However, even assuming
that WIC is generally immunized from being prosecuted under the antitrust laws under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, we conclude there is evidence to conclude that Whitaker established
at least one accepted exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine—the sham exception:
The “sham” exception comes into play when the party petitioning the government
is not at all serious about the object of that petition, but engages in the petitioning
activity merely to inconvenience its competitor. Thus, the sham exception is said
to apply when one party has begun litigation not to win that litigation, but rather
to force its competitor to waste time and money in defending itself. Similarly, a
party that “petitions” the government by engaging in administrative processes
only to preclude or delay its competitor’s access to those processes may be liable
for antitrust damages under the “sham” exception. [Video Int’l Production, Inc,
858 F2d at 1082.]
Under the sham exception, “[o]nly if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a
court examine the litigant’s subjective motivation.” Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc v
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc, 508 US 49, 60; 113 S Ct 1920; 123 LEd2d 611 (1993). The
sham litigation exception requires that the suit be “objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” Id. “[T]he evidentiary
burden [is] on the antitrust plaintiff to prove that the action of the defendant comes within the
sham exception to Noerr-Pennington in this kind of case.” Id; Gene Cope & Associates, Inc v
Aura Promotions, Ltd, 692 F Supp 724 (ED Mich 1988). The “sham exception” has been
narrowly construed by courts. See Westmac, Inc v Smith, 797 F 2d 313 (CA 6, 1986); Razorback
Ready Mix Concrete Co v Weaver, 761 F 2d 484 (CA 8, 1985).
There was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that WIC’s instant complaint is
“objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits.” The evidence admitted in regard to the federal action indicates that the instant case
was barred by res judicata/collateral estoppel, discussed, infra Section IV. The federal action
alleged Whitaker violated his confidentiality agreement by disclosing the Stamptech process.
Issues raised by the confidentiality agreement implicate any trade secret that Whitaker would
have disclosed in violation of the confidentiality agreement. Further, the Washtenaw action that
had been settled included a counterclaim by Whitaker to null his non-competition agreement.
Issues raised in regard to Whitaker’s ability to compete against WOM would clearly indicate that
Whitaker intended to return to making pierce nuts, interconnected or otherwise. Given
Whitaker’s previous employment with WIC, a persuasive argument can made that any trade
secret claim could and should have been brought at that time.
Further, there is also evidence that WIC did not reasonably believe the Stamptech process
was a trade secret, and thus WIC filed the instant suit only to harass Whitaker or force him to
stop competing. There was evidence that hundreds of people had seen the Stamptech process.
There was evidence suggesting no company ever associated with the Stamptech process,
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including Stamptech, MIOH, or MacLean-Fogg, required any employee to sign a confidentiality
agreement. There was evidence suggesting a lack of due diligence to discover whether the
Stamptech process had been kept secret before WOM purchased Stamptech. There was also
evidence that the Grube patent described the Stamptech process, suggesting a likely reason that
MacLean-Fogg and Stamptech may not have not considered it confidential. While Neil
Whitesell and other executives of WIC maintain that Whitaker had orally assured them that the
inline interconnected pierce nut process was confidential, there is no document indicating that it
had been kept confidential. Further, there was no evidence of any security of the Stamptech
process. We conclude there is evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that WIC did
not reasonably believe that the Stamptech process was a trade secret and merely filed the instant
suit to harass Whitaker or prevent him from competing. WIC’s motion for summary disposition
was properly denied.
IV. RES JUDICATA
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the question whether res judicata bars a subsequent action de novo.
Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 119; 680 NW2d 386 (2004), citing Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v
Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 379; 596 NW2d 153 (1999).
B. ANALYSIS
We conclude the trial court properly determined that principles of res judicata arising
from both the Washtenaw County action and the federal action bar the instant lawsuit.
Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the facts or
evidence essential to the action are identical to those essential to a prior action. Sewell v Clean
Cut Mgt, Inc, 463 Mich 569, 575; 621 NW2d 222 (2001). The purposes of res judicata are to
relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and
encourage reliance on adjudication. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc, 460 Mich at 380.
Under Michigan law, res judicata requires that: (1) the prior action was decided on the
merits; (2) the decree in the prior action was a final decision; (3) the matter contested in the
second case was or could have been resolved in the first; and (4) both actions involved the same
parties or their privies. Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478 Mich 412, 418; 733
NW2d 755 (2007); Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 531; 726 NW2d 770 (2006). The
burden of establishing the applicability of res judicata is on the party asserting it. Baraga County
v State Tax Comm, 466 Mich 264, 269; 645 NW2d 13 (2002).
WIC only challenges the third element in which our Supreme Court “has taken a broad
approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but
also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable
diligence, could have raised but did not.” Adair, 470 Mich at 121, citing Dart v Dart, 460 Mich
573, 586; 597 NW2d 82 (1999). “Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction for
purposes of res judicata is to be determined pragmatically, by considering whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit . . . .”
Id., at 125 quoting 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments 533, at 801.
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WIC specifically argues that the instant case arises from a different transaction than that
underlying the Washtenaw case and the federal case. In the Washtenaw action, Whitesell
Corporation and WOM sued Whitaker for breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with
business relationships/expectancies, and conspiracy. The complaint mentioned that Whitaker
had signed a confidentiality agreement and alleged Whitaker was “wrongfully retaining
possession of company property and information.” Whitaker counterclaimed seeking to null and
void his non-competition agreement. The parties accepted a mediation agreement and a $10,000
judgment was entered against Whitaker in October 2000.
We conclude that claims in which Whitaker sought to disclose trade secrets should have
been raised in relation to a claim to null and void a non-competition agreement. How Whitaker
would attempt to compete with WOM, especially considering his former experience, would
clearly form a convenient trial unit. Further, little diligence would need be exercised to discover
any potential trade secret disclosure, given pleadings indicating that, Whitaker “has now
commenced operations making pierce nuts for a company known as the [PNC] located in
Livonia, Michigan. This company manufactures the same product and sells it to the same
customer base as does Stamptech.”
Further, for the same reasons, the instant case is barred by res judicata because of the
resolution of the federal action. In that case, there was no question that Whitaker was competing
against WOM and his method of competition would have been highly relevant. The trial court
correctly granted Whitaker’s motion for summary disposition.
We are not persuaded that application of res judicata was improper because MRC and
Piercetek had not yet been formed. This position ignores that the federal court essentially held
that WIC could no longer assert claims arising from Whitaker’s employment with WOM because
those claims should have previously been resolved. “Unless it is set aside by a court, a default
judgment is absolute and is fully binding, under the doctrines of estoppel and merger of
judgment, and res judicata, as one after appearance and contest.” 7 Michigan Pleading and
Practice (2d ed), § 44.17. Further, we recognize that the instant case involves overlap between
the doctrines of res judiciata and collateral estoppel. This is likely the case whenever there are
multiple lawsuits that are all based on the ending of a single employment relationship. And
while collateral estoppel does not apply to consent judgments (the Washtenaw action), collateral
estoppel certainly applies to default judgments (the federal action). See Rohe Scientific Corp v
National Bank of Detroit, 133 Mich App 462, 467; 350 NW2d 280 (1984). We must give some
meaning to the language contained with the judgment of the federal court.5
5
We disagree with the dissent that it is “impossible to conclude that WIC could have brought a
claim or cause of action in the two earlier suits pertaining to Whitaker’s use and disclosure of the
Stamptech [p]rocess . . . .” Whitaker’s breach of the non-competition agreement and
confidentiality agreement could have only related to his use and disclosure of the Stamptech
process. The dissent even attempts to narrow its analysis by noting that res judicata or collateral
estoppel do not apply “relative to . . . [Whitaker’s] association with MRC and Piercetek.” This is
a telling distinction, suggesting that res judicata or collateral estoppel would be applicable if
Whitaker, on his own behalf, disclosed the Stamptech process to others after the two earlier suits
(continued…)
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V. TRADE SECRET
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict is reviewed de novo.
Sniecinski v BCBSM, 469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003); Silberstein v Pro-Golf of
America, Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 455; 750 NW2d 615 (2008). The appellate court reviews all
the evidence presented up to the time of the motion to determine whether a question of fact
existed. The trial court must view the testimony and all legitimate inferences from the testimony
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a prima facie case was
established. Locke v Pachtman, 446 Mich 216, 223; 521 NW2d 786 (1994). When the evidence
could lead reasonable jurors to disagree, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury. Moore v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 279 Mich App 195, 202; 755 NW2d 686 (2008).
Directed verdicts are viewed with disfavor, particularly in negligence cases. Berryman v K Mart
Corp, 193 Mich App 88, 91; 483 NW2d 642 (1992). But if no factual question exists, the trial
court may grant a directed verdict. Mich Mut Ins Co v CNA Ins Cos, 181 Mich App 376, 380;
448 NW2d 854 (1989). A directed verdict is appropriate only when no factual question exists
upon which reasonable minds could differ. Smith v Foerster-Bolser Constr, Inc, 269 Mich App
424, 427-428; 711 NW2d 421 (2006).
B. ANALYSIS
WIC argues that the trial court erred in granting Whitaker’s motion for directed verdict
on the issue whether the Stamptech process was a trade secret, and that this error requires
reversal.
We agree that the trial court erred in granting Whitaker’s motion for directed verdict. As
mentioned, there were over 25 days of trial and extensive testimony was presented relating to
whether the Stamptech process was secret. Whitaker moved for directed verdict at the end of
trial. In granting Whitaker’s motion, the trial court relied on the testimony of WIC’s vice
president Harold Woods. At trial, Woods was shown a patent application indicating, “prior
patents describe a number of methods of making interconnected pierce nuts using ‘a wire or a
plurality of wires.’” Woods was asked about the meaning of the patent, and testified that in 2002
he knew of only two methods for making interconnected pierce nuts, the “batch knurling”
process and the “Stamptech process.” From this admission, Whitaker argued that the Stamptech
process must have been described in a prior patent.
An objective view of Woods’ testimony indicates that he only knew of two processes,
and he clearly did not know whether there existed more processes. Further, Woods is not a
patent lawyer and his opinion as to an ambiguous phrase in a patent application is not probative
of whether the Stamptech process was described in an earlier patent. Thus, we conclude that the
trial court erroneously relied on Woods’ testimony to conclude there was no trade secret.
(…continued)
had been resolved. Here, the operative facts upon which every claim an entity of WIC has
brought against Whitaker include that he disclosed the Stamptech process to those that did not
know the Stamptech process.
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Further, we conclude that Jorge Gonzales’ testimony does not support the circuit court’s
grant of directed verdict. The court held that, “[i]f [WIC] claims that the [exhibit] 260C was the
Stamptech process and Mr. Gonzales says that the process was described in paragraph four of the
Grube patent, then the Stamptech process is the Grube patent, it’s in the public domain, it’s not a
trade secret.” However, the record clearly reflects that exhibit 260C is an example of a product
made by the Stamptech process, not a description of the Stamptech process itself. Thus, the
court’s decision is unsupported in this regard.
In addition, the record reflects that the trial court likely committed additional error in
relying on the testimony from Woods and Gonzeles in granting the motion for directed verdict.
As addressed in MGA, Inc v LaSalle Mach Tool Inc, 148 Mich App 350, 384 NW2d 159 (1986),
a Michigan trial court, only after carefully consideration whether the patent issues “arise under”
federal law, “must define the scope of the claims.” Id., at 355-356. Here, it is unclear the trial
court did so. Further, even if the scope of the patent was clear, “the trier of fact must decide
whether the claims, as construed in law, cover the accused machine.” Id., at 356. Thus,
testimony from Woods and Gonzeles in regard to whether the Stamptech process was covered by
the Grube patent is merely evidence presented for the jury’s consideration, not the basis of a
motion for directed verdict.
Although the circuit court offered additional reasons to support its decision that the
Stamptech process was not a trade secret, we conclude those reasons merely raised questions of
fact. A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Moore v Detroit
Entertainment, LLC, 279 Mich App 195, 202; 755 NW2d 686 (2008). This was an extensive
trial with sharply divided testimony in regard to whether the Stamptech process was secret.
Directed verdicts are viewed with disfavor, Berryman, 193 Mich App at 91, and the court should
have deferred to the jury.
Whitaker alternately argues “even if the trial court had erred in directing a verdict on this
point, [WIC] was still free to argue, and did argue, that it believed or had reason to believe it had
a viable trade secret claim.” Although WIC was technically able to make this argument to the
jury, we nonetheless conclude that the trial court’s decision was not harmless.6 The central issue
in this case is whether WIC “reasonably believed the Stamptech process was a trade secret, not
whether the circuit court reasonably believed the Stamptech process was a trade secret.
On the eve of jury deliberations, the trial court granted a directed verdict and
communicated to the jury that the Stamptech process was not a trade secret. The judicial
determination that there existed no trade secret undermined WIC’s ability to argue that it
reasonably believed the Stamptech process was a trade secret. This decision effectively required
the jury to accept that the Stamptech process was not a trade secret, and telegraphed to the jury
that WIC’s trade secret claim was objectively baseless. Thus, we conclude that, given this
6
We reach this decision independent of any conclusion in regard to res judicata/collateral
estoppel. The res judicata/collateral estoppel issue is decidedly a legal question and the import
of such a ruling should not form the basis of a decision whether WIC “reasonably believed” that
the Stamptech process was a trade secret.
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ruling, it became a foregone conclusion how the jury would decide the sham exception. In
addition, even though the jury was also required to conclude that WIC’s primary objective in
bringing the trade secret claim was to hurt Whitaker, this conclusion was facilitated when the
trial court informed the jury that WIC’s lawsuit was meritless. Therefore, we conclude that the
trial court committed error in granting Whitaker’s motion for directed verdict, and that this error
requires reversal.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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