IN RE J M ESCALANTE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
January 13, 2011
In the Matter of J. M. Escalante, Minor.
No. 298610
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-052090-NA
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and ZAHRA and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent father appeals as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights
to the minor child, J. M. Escalante, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication
continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (child will be harmed if
returned to parent. We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination of
respondent father’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The condition leading to
adjudication was respondent father’s physical abuse of his step-daughter, who was J.M.’s twoyear-old half sister, K. Snyder. Respondent father was charged with third-degree child abuse and
pleaded guilty to domestic violence for that offense. The record supports that this abuse was a
symptom of difficulty managing his anger and lack of appropriate parenting skills and
disciplinary techniques. In addition, respondent father lacked employment that resulted in
inadequate housing and inability to provide the minor child, J.M., with basic physical necessities.
These conditions constituted failure to provide proper care of J.M., and placed her at risk of
physical abuse in respondent father’s care. More than 182 days elapsed between the August 17,
2009 initial dispositional order in J.M.’s case and the May 3, 2010 termination hearing.
Respondent father argues on appeal the evidence did not show he failed to properly care
for J.M. because he did not physically abuse her, and he never had the opportunity to parent her
because she was removed at birth. We disagree. Respondent father’s own testimony showed he
had inflicted corporal punishment on K. Snyder on more than one occasion for screaming,
crying, and wetting the bed. The trial court noted this “discipline” clearly constituted physical
abuse. We recognize that there are differences between the children where J.M. is respondent
father’s biological child, and early reports indicated she was a much calmer, quieter baby than K.
Snyder, who threw as many as six uncontrollable screaming and kicking tantrums a day.
However, respondent father abused K. Snyder on more than one occasion as her stepfather, and
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his treatment of one child is probative of how he might likely treat another child. In re Powers,
208 Mich App 582, 588-589; 528 NW2d 799 (1995).
Further, and of equal importance, respondent father completed a psychological evaluation
showing no barriers to his ability to learn to become an appropriate parent. He completed two
different parenting programs and learned some skills needed to care for an infant. However,
according to the DHS caseworker and his probation officer, respondent father did not benefit
from anger management classes or the Thinking for Change group, and failed for 10 of the 11
months of the proceeding to admit his abuse of K. Snyder or to follow up on a referral to
individual counseling. His conversations with the caseworker regarding concepts taught in
parenting classes and videotapes showed he did not internalize appropriate parenting and
disciplinary techniques. Therefore, the evidence fully supported that he made no progress
addressing the crux of his inability to safely and properly parent, which was difficulty controlling
his anger and lack of parenting and appropriate disciplinary skills. In addition, he failed to
pursue referrals for housing and an employment program that would train and place him in a job,
thus enabling him to provide J.M. a home and basic necessities.
Given clear and convincing evidence over 11 months that respondent father made no
progress on any aspect of his parent agency agreement other than interacting somewhat better
with J.M. at visits, there was no reasonable likelihood he would rectify the condition of J.M.’s
risk of harm in his care and no reasonable expectation he would become able to provide J.M.
with proper care within a reasonable time. The trial court accurately noted respondent father’s
compliance was not only too late, but also superficial, and did not clearly err in terminating his
parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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