WILLIAM HEFFELFINGER V BAD AXE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM HEFFELFINGER,
UNPUBLISHED
January 13, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 294752
Huron Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-003937-NZ
BAD AXE PUBLIC SCHOOLS and JAMES
WENCEL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and MURRAY and SERVITTO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in
defendants’ favor. We affirm.
Plaintiff was employed as the band director for Bad Axe Public Schools for many years.
In 2007, in an apparent response to certain of plaintiff’s conduct during his employment, plaintiff
signed a “last chance agreement” which provided that plaintiff must meet certain conditions in
order to continue his employment with the school. In 2008, the school superintendent, James
Wencel, began investigating plaintiff after discovering inappropriate photographs and
information on his school computer, and for other alleged improper conduct. According to
plaintiff, the allegations concerning inappropriate computer use and other allegations by Wencel
(including inappropriate behavior toward a female student and drinking alcohol with underage
students outside of school) were patently false. Also according to plaintiff, Wencel reported
these allegations to a parent of one of plaintiff’s students. The allegations and plaintiff’s
employment status were later discussed at a board of education meeting, open to the public, and
attended by both citizens and news media. The board ultimately determined that plaintiff had
violated the “last chance agreement” and, as required by the agreement, plaintiff thereafter
submitted his resignation.
Plaintiff initiated the instant action against Superintendant Wencel and the school district,
alleging that Wencel defamed plaintiff by falsely accusing him of inappropriate conduct.
Plaintiff also brought claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and asserted that the school district was liable for Wencel’s actions under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
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Defendants moved for summary disposition and the trial court granted defendants’
motion, finding, among other things, that defendants were entitled to governmental immunity as
to some of plaintiff’s claims of defamation (libel and slander), and that his remaining defamation
claim was not supported by any evidence and/or that the complained of statements made by
Wencel were true. The trial court further found that Wencel’s conduct did not rise to the level
contemplated by a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff now appeals that
ruling.1
While the trial court did not cite the rule upon which it relied in granting defendants’
motion for summary disposition, it cited to the governmental immunity statute (MCL 691.1407)
and clearly looked beyond the pleadings. We will therefore review the decision as though
premised on MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(10). We review de novo a trial court's
decision to grant summary disposition. Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 567; 719 NW2d 73
(2006).
A trial court properly grants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) where a claim
is barred because of immunity granted by law. When reviewing a motion under subrule (C)(7),
this Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of
the plaintiff, unless other evidence contradicts them. Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App
406, 429; 789 NW2d 211 (2010). “If no facts are in dispute, and if reasonable minds could not
differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, the question whether the claim is barred is an issue
of law for the court.” Id. at 430. Conversely, if a factual dispute exists as to whether immunity
applies, summary disposition is not appropriate. Id. When reviewing a motion under subrule
(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant record
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine
issue of material fact exists warranting a trial. Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 621; 689
NW2d 506 (2004).
On appeal, plaintiff first contends that the existence of material questions of fact
precluded summary disposition in defendants’ favor on plaintiff’s defamation claims and that the
trial court engaged in inappropriate fact-finding in determining that the challenged statements
were true. We disagree.2
1
Summary disposition was granted in defendants’ favor on all of plaintiff’s claims. However,
plaintiff does not appeal the trial court’s decision with respect to his invasion of privacy claim.
2
While plaintiff does not present any argument as to why summary disposition was
inappropriate specifically in favor of Bad Axe Public Schools, we would note that all of
plaintiff’s claims stem from the intentional actions of Wencel. A government entity cannot be
held liable for the intentional torts of its employees. Payton v City of Detroit, 211 Mich App
375, 393; 536 NW2d 233 (1995). As a result, summary disposition in favor of Bad Axe Public
Schools was proper.
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A communication is defamatory if, considering all the circumstances, it tends to so harm
the reputation of an individual as to lower that individual's reputation in the community or deter
third persons from associating or dealing with that individual. Kevorkian v American Medical
Ass'n, 237 Mich App 1, 5; 602 NW2d 233 (1999). The elements of a cause of action for
defamation are (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged
publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher,
and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication (defamation per quod). Burden v Elias
Bros Big Boy Restaurants, 240 Mich App 723, 726; 613 NW2d 378 (2000). Whether a
publication is privileged is a question of law for the court, unless the facts needed to make that
determination are disputed. New Franklin Enterprises v Sabo, 192 Mich App 219, 221; 480
NW2d 326 (1991).
Plaintiff identifies three primary publications made by Wencel which serve as the basis
for his defamation claims: (1) Wencel’s telling the school board members that plaintiff viewed
and kept pornography on his school computer and showing them the alleged inappropriate
content; (2) Wencel’s repeating the pornography allegations at a school board meeting open to
the public; and, (3) Wencel’s telling a parent of one of plaintiff’s band students that plaintiff
viewed pornography on his school computer, that plaintiff drank beer with students outside class,
and that plaintiff made inappropriate advances toward one of his female students. With respect
to the first and second publications, we find that summary disposition was properly granted.
Pursuant to MCL 691.1407(5):
A judge, a legislator, and the elective or highest appointive executive official of
all levels of government are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or
damages to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her judicial,
legislative, or executive authority.
“[T]he superintendent of the school district is [] absolutely immune from tort liability under
MCL 691.1407(5).” Nalepa v Plymouth-Canton Community School Dist, 207 Mich App 580,
589; 525 NW2d 897 (1994).
It is uncontested that Wencel, as the superintendent of schools, is the highest appointed
executive official of the school district. There has also been no assertion that Wencel was acting
outside the scope of his authority in reporting plaintiff’s alleged misconduct to the school board
and repeating the allegations at the school board meeting. Plaintiff, in fact, alleged in his
complaint that Wencel was “working in his capacity as the [s]uperintendent and in the course
and scope of his employment at all times relevant herein.” And, it is clear that the statements at
issue were made by Wencel during the course of his official duties as superintendent, given that
they involved a question of whether a teacher’s conduct within the school was appropriate and
whether a teacher should remain employed by the school district. Consequently, Wencel is
entitled to absolute immunity with respect to the statements made to the school board, both at
and prior to the school board meeting.
Moreover, in the context of a suit for defamation “[c]ommunications deemed absolutely
privileged are not actionable, even when spoken with malice.” Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich
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App 611, 618; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). The doctrine of absolute privilege has been extended to
apply to “communications made by a public official in furtherance of an official duty during
proceedings of subordinate legislative and quasi-legislative bodies,” including those rendered by
a public official at a duly convened meeting of a school board. Id. at 618-619; see also Nalepa v
Plymouth-Canton Community School Dist, 207 Mich App at 586-587. Thus, Wencel’s
communications to the school board were absolutely privileged.
Finally, with respect to the statements made at the school board meeting, we cannot
ignore the fact that plaintiff was unequivocally given the option of having the meeting closed to
the public. Plaintiff admitted the same and testified that his union representative advised him to
have a closed meeting. Plaintiff further testified that he was aware that whatever was said at the
meeting would be a matter of public record. Having known that the allegations would be
brought out at the board meeting, and having admitted that to the extent the allegations were
published at the board meeting, it was because he requested that the meeting be open, plaintiff
cannot now complain about the implicitly consented-to publication. For the above reasons, the
trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendants as it pertains to statements
Wencel made to the school board and during the school board meeting.
Plaintiff’s last basis for defamation involves Wencel allegedly telling a band parent
several negative things about plaintiff. Wencel denied making such statements. However, in an
affidavit submitted to the court, Ms. Maryanne Neeb swore that in late May or early June of
2008, Wencel told her that: (1) plaintiff drinks beer with students outside of school; (2) plaintiff
made inappropriate advances toward a female band student outside of school; and, (3) that
plaintiff’s online dating profile indicates he has a fetish for five inch stiletto heels. Ms. Neeb
swore that Wencel also, (4) asked her how she would feel if one of her daughter’s teachers was
viewing pornography on his school computer, which Ms. Neeb felt was an accusation against
plaintiff. With respect to these statements, the trial court determined that making such
statements to a parent was arguably outside the scope of Wencel’s authority such that absolute
immunity would not apply, but that the statements were nonetheless not actionable because they
were true. We agree, in part.
Again, the first element necessary to establish a defamation claim is a false and
defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff. Burden v Elias Bros Big Boy Restaurants, 240
Mich App at 726. Truth, then, is an absolute defense to a defamation claim. Porter v Royal Oak,
214 Mich App 478, 486; 542 NW2d 905 (1995).
With respect to statement (1), plaintiff testified that he had on one occasion drunk beer at
a bar when a student and her mother were present. It could be argued, then, that statement (1)
was true. As to statement (2), Ms. Neeb did not specify what constituted the “improper
advance.” Plaintiff did admit that he had been reprimanded for buying female students gifts. To
the extent that such action could be construed as making improper advances, the statement would
be true. However, absent any specific allegation purportedly made by Wencel about an
“improper advance” we simply cannot conclude that plaintiff has established that the statement
was false.
As to statement (3) in Ms. Neeb’s affidavit, plaintiff admitted that he posted a profile on
the website Match.com and did not deny that the profile indicated that he may have a fetish for
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shoes. A printed copy of the Match.com profile purported to be plaintiff’s contains such a
statement. Truth, then, is a defense to an allegation that the statement is defamatory.
With respect to statement (4) in Ms. Neeb’s affidavit, assuming that Ms. Neeb’s
interpretation of the general statement about a teacher viewing pornography on his school
computer was in reference to plaintiff, it appears that plaintiff had already made the accusation
against him public by sharing it with his students--one of whom was Ms. Neeb’s daughter.
Wencel testified that Ms. Neeb approached him with concerns about what she had been hearing
about plaintiff, and Ms. Neeb did not suggest otherwise. Nowhere in her affidavit does Ms.
Neeb state that the questioned posed to her by Wencel was the first time she had heard any
suggestion that plaintiff was being accused of accessing pornography on his school computer.
Additionally, while the trial court did not find it to be so, we are satisfied that Wencel, as
superintendent, was acting within the course and scope of authority when speaking to Ms. Neeb
and allegedly advising her of his concerns with respect to plaintiff. Again, plaintiff alleged as
much in his complaint. And, the scope of a superintendent’s authority is broad because of his
responsibility in loco parentis, with his role having been said to include any act taken as chief
administrator and disciplinarian in the school district. See, Baker v Couchman, 447 Mich 1097,
729 NW2d 520 (2007).
Moreover, to avoid liability, it is not necessary for a defendant to prove that a publication
is literally and absolutely accurate in every detail. Collins v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 245 Mich
App 27, 33; 627 NW2d 5 (2001). Rather, substantial truth is an absolute defense to a defamation
claim. Id. “It is sufficient for the defendant to justify so much of the defamatory matter as
constitutes the sting of the charge, and it is unnecessary to repeat and justify every word . . . so
long as the substance of the libelous charge be justified. . .” Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle
Creek Michigan, 440 Mich 238, 259; 487 NW2d 205 (1992), quoting McAllister v Detroit Free
Press Co, 85 Mich 453, 460-461; 48 NW 612 (1891).
Here, Wencel testified that he was present when the school’s technology director
conducted testing to see if the school’s newly installed computer filter system was working
properly. According to Wencel, during the testing he witnessed the access and block of access to
certain websites from plaintiff’s workstation under plaintiff’s login and password, and that some
of the websites contained objectionable content and images. Wencel further testified that he had
the hard drive on plaintiff’s computer preserved and that he thereafter engaged the services of an
expert to review the contents of the same. The expert prepared a report stating that a forensic
examination on the hard drive confirmed access (or attempted access) to inappropriate websites.
While plaintiff flatly denied accessing or attempting to access inappropriate websites on the
computer, he also testified at deposition that he is unaware of anyone using his password on the
computer assigned to him. Plaintiff also agreed that if pornographic images were on his
computer hard drive, accessed by way of his password, they would be attributable to him. There
was no evidence suggesting that the findings of the expert, or that Wencel’s statements
concerning what he witnessed on plaintiff’s computer were not true. Given the testimony, the
statements attributed to Wencel can be deemed substantially true. Summary disposition was
appropriate on plaintiff’s defamation claim as it pertains to statements made to Ms. Neeb.
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Plaintiff next contends that he adequately established all of the necessary elements of his
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, such that summary disposition on this claim
was inappropriate. We disagree.
The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are “(1) extreme
and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional
distress.” Teadt v Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 237 Mich App 567, 582; 603 NW2d 816
(1999). A party is only liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when “the
conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community.” Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670, 674; 604 NW2d 713 (1999).
Whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery is a question of law for the court. If reasonable minds could differ on the
subject, the issue becomes a question of fact for the jury. Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175,
197; 670 NW2d 675 (2003).
Plaintiff asserts that Wencel’s statements concerning plaintiff were so derogatory in
nature and made without any basis whatsoever, such that they meet the threshold for a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. As previously indicated, however, Wencel, as
superintendent, is entitled to absolute immunity so long as he is acting within the scope of his
executive authority. Generally, “[t]here is no ‘intentional tort’ exception to governmental
immunity.” Smith v Dep't of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 544; 410 NW2d 749 (1987). Having
already determined that the statements made by Wencel were within the scope of his authority,
plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress fails.
Moreover, we do not find that the challenged statements rise to the level of extreme or
outrageous conduct, or that there has been a demonstration that Wencel intended the statements
to inflict emotional pain upon plaintiff. Wencel is the superintendent of schools and oversees the
schools in his district. Wencel received evidence of a teacher’s alleged misconduct, some of
which occurred during school hours and on school property, and discussed the same with the
school board. The allegations having been made and made public (even by plaintiff), it is not
unreasonable that Wencel would discuss the same with a concerned parent of one of plaintiff’s
students. Even absent the application of immunity, then, plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress would be properly dismissed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen Fort Hood
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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