PEOPLE OF MI V MANJEET SINGH BHATTAL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 4, 2011
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290739
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-215305-FC
MANJEET SINGH BHATTAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and ZAHRA and K.F. KELLY, JJ.
GLEICHER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm defendant’s conviction, but write separately
to explain the basis for my view that sufficient and admissible evidence supported the jury’s
verdict.
On March 29, 2007, police in Troy discovered 12 kilograms of cocaine in a Ford
Expedition licensed in Illinois, and occupied by Andon Filipi and Anthony Gonzalez.
Subsequently, the Oakland County prosecutor charged that defendant Manjeet Bhattal (also
known as Mani) and codefendants Filipi, Gonzalez, Tonin Prendi, and David Trevino had
conspired to deliver the cocaine. Gonzalez testified for the prosecution in exchange for a plea
agreement limiting his minimum sentence to two and a half years.
Gonzalez commenced his trial testimony by describing the nature and history of his
relationships with Bhattal, Filipi and Trevino. He explained that he grew up in the Chicago area
with Filipi and Trevino, and that all of the alleged conspirators continued to reside there.
Gonzalez related that for several years, he and the charged conspirators, including Bhattal,
worked together in a marijuana enterprise. Gonzalez recounted that he began purchasing large
quantities of marijuana from Filipi around two years before the Troy cocaine bust. During their
marijuana business dealings, Gonzalez accompanied Filipi on a drive to an apartment complex in
Waterford, Michigan. There, Filipi delivered $50,000 cash to an Albanian man who Filipi
identified as “his connection’s brother-in-law.” Gonzalez believed that Filipi’s marijuana
“connection” “was from Canada.”
Over the vigorous objection of Bhattal’s counsel, Gonzalez also detailed a series of
marijuana transactions involving Bhattal. Gonzalez testified that between August 2006 and
December 2006, he and Bhattal drove from Chicago to the Horseshoe Casino in Indiana, where
they picked up 150 to 200 pounds of marijuana. When they arrived at the casino, Bhattal handed
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Gonzalez the key to a Dodge pickup truck, which Gonzalez used to transport the marijuana back
to Illinois. When the marijuana had been sold, Gonzalez and Bhattal made a second trip to
Indiana, picked up another 150 to 200 pounds of marijuana, and again transported the load to
Illinois. At some point after the second marijuana road trip with Bhattal, Filipi introduced
Gonzalez to David Ruiz.1 Gonzalez recounted that Ruiz supplied cocaine to Filipi, and was “a
friend” to both Filipi and Bhattal. Gonzalez encountered Ruiz a second time at an establishment
he described as a “bar slash club” in Chicago, where Bhattal joined them.
Trevino, a lower-level participant in the drug enterprise, lived in a Chicago-area
apartment owned by Filipi, and watched over marijuana stored there. On March 23, 2007,
Trevino’s girlfriend called the police after an episode of domestic violence, and Trevino alerted
Filipi that a police visit to the apartment was imminent. When Filipi received Trevino’s call, he
was in a car with Gonzalez, driving to Bhattal’s house “[t]o meet with Mani.” They picked up
Bhattal, drove to Trevino’s apartment, and noted the presence of police vehicles. After Filipi
went home, Gonzalez and Bhattal drove around together all night, using cocaine. Gonzalez
remembered that as they drove, Filipi telephoned Bhattal, and Gonzalez heard Filipi declare,
“[T]hat has to be moved.”
The next morning, March 24, 2007, Gonzalez and Bhattal drove to a taxi dispatch office
that Bhattal and Filipi had rented. Bhattal unlocked the taxi office and removed some ceiling
tiles, revealing two black “computer. . . laptop” bags. Bhattal instructed Gonzalez to extract the
bags from the ceiling and place them into the trunk of a taxi cab that Bhattal backed up to the
building. Gonzalez described the bags as “fairly heavy.” In response to questioning by the
prosecutor, Gonzalez elaborated as follows concerning the weight of the bags:
Q. And did, were the bags that you carried, would they have fit say 10
pounds of marijuana in them each?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So the size of the bags that you carried would not fit 10 pounds
of marijuana, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Were the bags heavier than 10 pounds?
A. Apiece?
Q. Yes.
A. Uh, they were around 10 pounds.
1
The record also refers to Ruiz as David Roese.
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Q. Apiece?
A. I believe.[2]
After placing the bags in the taxi, Gonzalez and Bhattal picked up Ruiz, who already knew of
Trevino’s arrest. Eventually they dropped off Ruiz, and Gonzalez transported Bhattal home.
Two days later, on March 26, 2007, Bhattal rented a Ford Expedition at O’Hare Airport.
On March 27, 2007, Filipi and Prendi purchased cell phones at a store in Waterford, Michigan.
The store’s owner recalled that the next day, Filipi and Prendi returned to the store, and Bhattal
arrived in an Expedition bearing Illinois plates. Bhattal proceeded to purchase the same model
cell phone as had Filipi and Prendi. Evidence supplied by an Illinois detective established that
Bhattal had flown to Michigan that morning.
Gonzalez testified that on the night of March 28, 2007, Bhattal and Filipi arrived at
Filipi’s Chicago-area apartment in an Expedition. Filipi, Bhattal and Gonzalez then drove the
Expedition to O’Hare airport, so that Bhattal could retrieve a truck Filipi had parked there. On
March 29, 2007, Gonzalez and Filipi drove the Expedition to Michigan, where they met Prendi at
a car wash. Filipi pulled a bag from Prendi’s vehicle and placed it in the back of the Expedition.
Gonzalez understood that the bag contained cocaine destined for delivery to Canada. At 5:00
p.m., the police stopped the Expedition, and shortly thereafter discovered the cocaine.
Bhattal asserts that Gonzalez’s testimony concerning the 2006 marijuana transactions
constituted “prior bad acts” evidence inadmissible under MRE 404(b), and that no evidence
supported Bhattal’s knowledge that Gonzalez and Filipi were dealing in cocaine. According to
Bhattal’s brief on appeal, “[T]here was no evidence of any specific intent on the part of Mr.
Bhattal to either deliver, or conspire to deliver, cocaine.” (Emphasis in original). Although I
agree with the majority’s resolution of both issues, I propose a somewhat different analysis.
Bhattal submits that because Gonzalez “repeatedly stated that Mr. Bhattal was not
involved with the cocaine transactions involving Gonzalez, Filipi and Prendi,” the prosecutor
improperly “widen[ed] the scope of the case” “by tying [Bhattal] to previous marijuana deals.”
Bhattal insists that the marijuana evidence qualified as inadmissible under MRE 404(b), and that
its presentation prejudiced his defense. Bhattal acknowledges that background or res gestae
evidence does not implicate MRE 404(b), but argues that no evidence tended to support that
Bhattal’s marijuana trafficking evolved into participation in the cocaine conspiracy. The
majority adopts an analysis predicted on MRE 404(b), concluding that the marijuana evidence
evidenced Bhattal’s “knowledge of, and … intent to participate in, drug trafficking.” Ante at 6.
In my view, MRE 404(b) does not govern the admissibility of the evidence of Bhattal’s
participation in a marijuana drug enterprise because the prosecutor admitted it to give the jury
“an intelligible presentation of the full context in which disputed events took place.” People v
2
As noted in the majority opinion, 12 kilograms of cocaine weigh approximately 26 pounds.
Ante at 2 n 1.
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Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 741; 556 NW2d 851 (1996). Consequently, I disagree with the majority to
the extent that it relies on Bhattal’s “intent” and “knowledge” as proper bases for admitting the
evidence.3
In United States v Hardy, 228 F3d 745, 748 (CA 6, 2000), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit defined “background or res gestae evidence” as consisting of “those
other acts that are inextricably intertwined with the charged offense or those acts, the telling of
which is necessary to complete the story of the charged offense.” The Sixth Circuit further
explained:
Proper background evidence has a causal, temporal or spatial connection
with the charged offense. Typically, such evidence is a prelude to the charged
offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events
as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness’s testimony, or
completes the story of the charged offense. [Id.]
In United States v Barnes, 49 F3d 1144, 1149 (CA 6, 1995), a case cited in Hardy, 228 F3d at
748, the Sixth Circuit distinguished evidence implicating FRE 404(b) from evidence detailing “a
continuing pattern of illegal activity.” The Sixth Circuit characterized evidence admitted under
FRE 404(b) as “extrinsic,” because it describes other crimes, wrongs or acts that occur at
“different times and under different circumstances from the offense charged.” Id. In contrast,
conduct “intrinsic” to the charged crime falls outside the scope of FRE 404(b). Id.
Here, Gonzalez’s testimony depicting Bhattal’s role in acquiring large quantities of
marijuana established that Bhattal and his conspiracy codefendants regularly worked together in
furtherance of a unitary drug enterprise. Bhattal’s marijuana activities connected closely in time
with the cocaine delivery and involved the same cast of characters. The circumstances
surrounding Bhattal’s marijuana-related links to Filipi and Gonzalez provided context to
Bhattal’s actions after the police visit to Trevino’s apartment and fleshed out the structure of the
conspiracy. In my view, the marijuana evidence tended to prove that Filipi, Gonzalez, Trevino
and Bhattal engaged in a single conspiracy to violate drug laws, rather than two separate and
distinct enterprises distinguished by differing product lines.
“Seemingly independent
transactions may be revealed as parts of a single conspiracy by their place in a pattern of
regularized activity involving a significant continuity of membership.” United States v Grassi,
616 F2d 1295, 1303 (CA 5, 1980).
In reaching this conclusion, I remain mindful that courts should use great care in
characterizing evidence as “inextricably intertwined” with a charged offense, lest this avenue of
admissibility circumvent MRE 404(b). See United States v Bowie, 232 F3d 923, 928 (CA DC,
2000):
3
The record reveals that the prosecutor never invoked MRE 404(b) in support of the admission
of the challenged evidence.
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[T]reating evidence as inextricably intertwined not only bypasses Rule
404(b) and its attendant notice requirement, but also carries the implicit finding
that the evidence is admissible for all purposes notwithstanding its bearing on
character, thus eliminating the defense’s entitlement, upon request, to a jury
instruction. See Fed R Evid 105. There is, as well, a danger that finding evidence
“inextricably intertwined” may too easily slip from analysis to mere conclusion.
What does the “inextricably intertwined” concept entail? When is a defendant’s
crime or act so indistinguishable from the charged crime that an item of evidence
is entirely removed from Rule 404(b)?
Bearing in mind the cautions expressed in Bowie, I believe that the marijuana conspiracy
evidence presented here seamlessly blended with Bhattal’s actions in furtherance of the cocaine
delivery. Instead of representing an entirely separate chapter of Bhattal’s life, the marijuana
evidence showed a continuing pattern of illegal activity that removed the evidence from the
realm of MRE 404(b).
But even excluding any consideration of Bhattal’s participation in the marijuana
transactions, sufficient evidence existed to convict Bhattal of conspiring to deliver the 12
kilograms of cocaine found inside the Expedition. Given Bhattal’s friendship with Ruiz and
Filipi, his close association with both of them on the night the police visited Trevino’s apartment,
and the movement of the ceiling contents the next morning, the prosecutor’s circumstantial
evidence reasonably tended to establish beyond a reasonable doubt Bhattal’s awareness that
Trevino’s domestic problems had jeopardized the secrecy of a quantity of hidden cocaine.
Furthermore, a jury could readily infer that Bhattal rented the Expedition to facilitate
transportation of the cocaine from Illinois to Canada, and that he bought a matching cell phone to
coordinate communications with his coconspirators.4 Moreover, Gonzalez’s description of the
weight of the bags removed from the taxi office ceiling is consistent with the contents
comprising 12 kilograms of cocaine, not marijuana. Because a reasonable probability exists that
the laptop bags contained cocaine, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Bhattal’s actions
in removing the bags furthered the interests of the conspiracy. “[T]he prosecution need not
negate every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence, but merely introduce
evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury in the face of whatever contradictory evidence
the defendant may provide.” People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 273 n 6; 536 NW2d 517 (1995).
Although Bhattal argues that Gonzalez exculpated him by testifying that Bhattal lacked
awareness of the cocaine conspiracy, a jury could have disbelieved Gonzalez’s testimony on this
point. “The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence
4
The evidence shows that someone other than Bhattal drove the Expedition to Michigan, and
Bhattal’s awareness that the vehicle he rented at O’Hare airport had been driven to Michigan. In
light of this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Bhattal traveled to Michigan on March
28, 2007 in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objectives.
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presented at trial.” People v Eisenberg, 72 Mich App 106, 115; 249 NW2d 313 (1976). For
these reasons, I agree with the majority that sufficient clear and convincing evidence supports
Bhattal’s conviction for conspiring to deliver more than 1,000 grams of cocaine.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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