PEOPLE OF MI V MARIO DENNIS WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293896
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 08-001916-FC
MARIO DENNIS WILLIAMS, a/k/a BOBBY
MIMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and METER and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
and resisting arrest, MCL 750.81d(1). He was acquitted on a charge of domestic violence, MCL
750.81a(2). Defendant was sentenced as a fourth-habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 30 to 87½
years’ imprisonment on the murder conviction and to 1 to 15 years’ imprisonment on the
conviction for resisting arrest, with the sentences to be served concurrently. We affirm.
I. FACTS
This case arises out of the killing of Bobby Mims, who was defendant’s brother, by a
single stab wound to the chest.1 On October 17, 2008, Jessica Harold, who was defendant’s
long-time girlfriend, Latoya Daniels, defendant, Mims, and Bennie Easley were at Easley’s home
late in the evening celebrating Harold’s birthday. The evidence established that everyone was
drinking and that they were all intoxicated. There is no indication of any altercations between
persons in the group while at Easley’s home. The group then left Easley’s home and went to a
local bar, where they met a couple of other friends and saw people from school. While at the
bar, Harold spoke with some men, and this led to a heated argument and near fight between
defendant and the unidentified males. Defendant, Harold, and Daniels then left the bar in
1
As reflected in this opinion’s caption, defendant, in the past, had used his brother’s name as an
alias.
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Daniels’ vehicle, with Harold driving, defendant in the backseat, and Daniels in the passenger
seat. They headed to Harold’s apartment.
According to recorded statements made by Harold and Daniels to the police, defendant
and Harold were arguing and yelling at each other in the car and defendant physically struck
Harold. According to the same recorded statements, on arrival at Harold’s apartment, defendant
and Harold were still arguing and yelling at each other and defendant again hit Harold. When
testifying at trial, both Harold and Daniels acknowledged that defendant and Harold had been
arguing and yelling, but they claimed that defendant never struck or punched Harold.2 When the
prosecutor used the audiotapes of their police statements to, as framed by the prosecutor, “refresh
their memories,” the tapes were played in open court. Our only knowledge of the contents of the
tapes is based on the prosecutor’s commentary built into follow-up questions on the continuing
examinations of Harold and Daniels.3 With respect to their statements to police, Harold and
Daniels testified that they were intoxicated and did not recall making the statements, although
they conceded that it was their voices on the audiotapes. The record does not reflect that the
audiotapes were admitted into evidence at trial.
Because of the ongoing altercation between Harold and defendant, someone contacted
Mims and Easley by phone to let them know what was transpiring. By now, Mims and Easley
had left the bar and were at a McDonalds Restaurant, and they had planned to go back to
Easley’s home. Mims insisted that they now go to Harold’s apartment because of the fight
between defendant and Harold. Mims did not want his brother, defendant, to end up in jail
again. There was evidence that Mims and defendant had a close relationship and loved and
looked out for each other, but they did occasionally engage in fights when intoxicated.
Defendant was older than Mims. There was evidence that defendant stands about 5’10” and
weighs 150 pounds, while Mims stood about 5’9” and weighed 250 pounds. Defendant testified
that when they fought, in states of intoxication, no one ever suffered a physical injury and that
Mims usually got the better of defendant in fights because of Mims’s superior size.
Back at Harold’s apartment, which had a lower, main, and upper level, defendant and
Harold were yelling at each other, and defendant ended up smashing Harold’s cell phone.
Defendant admitted on the stand that he broke the cell phone, but denied ever hitting Harold. He
also tore up some money and flushed it down the toilet; however, defendant testified that it was
his own money. Daniels testified that she observed defendant tearing up Harold’s money and
flushing it down the toilet, but she claimed that she did not see defendant break Harold’s cell
2
Daniels did testify that, before entering Harold’s apartment, Harold and defendant were tussling
and shoving and pushing each other, but defendant did not use his fists to hit Harold. Harold
testified that she busted her lip, but this occurred because she fell down some steps, not from
being struck by defendant.
3
There were no transcripts made of the taped police statements, and the trial transcripts do not
include any verbatim communications made on the tapes, only references to the fact that the
tapes were played in court.
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phone; she only heard something breaking. The prosecutor then played an audiotape in which
Daniels informed the police that she observed defendant breaking Harold’s phone. Again,
Daniels, while acknowledging her voice on the tape, stated that she had no recollection of
making the statement.4 Eventually, Harold was upstairs in the apartment, and defendant and
Daniels were in the kitchen on the main level, with Daniels sitting on a stool. At this point,
Mims and Easley arrived at Harold’s apartment. They first checked on Harold upstairs, and she
was crying. Different versions were given regarding the events that next transpired.
According to Daniels, Mims came down the stairs to the main level and headed toward
the kitchen, all the while yelling and cussing out defendant, calling him a dummy and stupid.
Daniels testified that Easley tried to hold Mims back, half-heartedly, as he headed toward
defendant, and defendant moved to the area of the sink in the kitchen. Mims was angry and
enraged and was able to maneuver around Easley. Mims then approached defendant. Daniels
stated that defendant proceeded to hit Mims in the chest with his fist, but she also testified that
she then observed blood coming from Mims’s chest. Daniels claimed that she saw no weapons
being handled by either defendant or Mims, that Mims was trying to get defendant when
defendant hit Mims, that she did not see Mims strike defendant, that defendant did not appear as
if he wanted a confrontation until Mims came towards him, and that defendant’s “punch”
appeared to be a defensive move on defendant’s part. Daniels did not recall Mims saying
anything after the punch, and, when confronted by the prosecutor, she asserted that she did not
remember making a statement to police that Mims stated, “n****r just stabbed me in my heart.”
According to Daniels, the wounded Mims went upstairs and was bleeding, wheezing, and
panting. Daniels then hopped in her car and drove off, but she eventually returned to the crime
scene after a friend pleaded with her to do so. Daniels testified that she never talked to anyone
upon her return to the scene, but, after then going home, she later went to the Ypsilanti Police
Department and talked to police in the early morning of October 18.
According to Easley, at the point in which Mims was consoling Harold upstairs, Mims
exclaimed that Harold did not deserve what defendant did to her, and Mims was becoming very
angry. Easley testified that Mims was tired of defendant always screwing up and tired of
cleaning up defendant’s messes. Easley indicated that Mims yelled that he was about to beat
defendant’s ass. Somewhere around a landing between the main and upper levels of the
apartment, Easley grabbed hold of Mims and tried to calm him down. After a few minutes,
Mims told Easley that he was calm and would not do anything. Easley testified that he then let
go of Mims, at which time Mims proceeded to the kitchen area and Easley remained behind with
Harold. A few minutes later, Mims returned and started stumbling up the stairs, muttering,
“Damn, you gonna stab me.” Mims went to a bathroom upstairs and removed his shirt. Harold
started to treat Mims’s knife wound, putting pressure on the wound. Easley called 911, and
when Mims started going downstairs, he collapsed on the landing. Easley testified that, from his
vantage point, he could not see the stabbing or the actual confrontation between defendant and
4
Harold testified that she knew nothing about any money being torn, nor did she observe anyone
breaking her phone, although she assumed defendant did it.
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Mims, nor did Easley recall ever seeing Daniels. Easley stated that Mims had no weapons, and
he did not witness Mims striking defendant. Easley told the 911 operator and later a detective
that he did not know who stabbed Mims.
According to Harold, she was upstairs or in the stairwell when the stabbing occurred and
she did not witness the altercation between defendant and Mims. Harold testified that she had
been crying and sitting with Mims before he headed downstairs toward the kitchen. Mims was
yelling at defendant. The next time she saw Mims, he had been stabbed, and she treated his
wound, resulting in her jacket being covered in blood. Harold did not see any weapons on the
night of the incident.
Defendant testified that, while he was in the kitchen “chilling,” Mims came running
down the stairs heading to the kitchen, yelling that he was going to “f**k” defendant up and that
he was going to beat defendant’s ass. He never observed Easley grabbing hold of Mims.
According to defendant, when Mims was almost upon him, defendant punched him in the chest.
Defendant claimed that Mims was holding a knife, which is something that defendant had never
seen before. Defendant was fearful for his life. The two began to tussle and fell to the floor, at
which point Mims indicated that he had been stabbed. Defendant testified that he never touched
the knife. Consistent with a 911 tape played for the jury, defendant stated that he twice told the
911 operator that he had stabbed his brother, but he testified that it was accidental and that he
punched and tussled with Mims in self-defense. Defendant conceded that he did not tell the 911
operator that it was an accident or done in self-defense. Defendant explained that he later ran
from the police because he was scared and because he feared that the police would screw up the
investigation and improperly accuse him of a crime.
There was police testimony that a knife with blood on it was found in the kitchen or
living room area, that there was no effort to lift fingerprints from the knife because one of the
group’s friends had arrived and picked up the knife, that blood was found on the main level of
the home and on Mims’s shirt, that the knife blade matched the hole in Mims’s shirt, that Harold
and Daniels were not intoxicated by the time they spoke to the police, that Harold told police that
Mims had asked defendant before the knifing how he could put his hands on Harold, that Mims
was found in the apartment when police arrived, being cradled in Harold’s arms, and that no
weapons were found on Mims. There was also police testimony that when they arrived, a person
was outside the apartment waiving them to Harold’s unit. After police entered the apartment and
determined what occurred, they became suspicious and deduced that the person they saw on
arrival was defendant. The police began a search of the grounds around the apartment complex
and spotted defendant. However, he was able to escape on foot. Defendant turned himself in to
police about a month later with the assistance of his attorney.
The chief medical examiner testified that Mims died of a single stab wound to the left and
center side of his chest, below the left collarbone. The depth of the stab wound was three inches
into the chest. The knife perforated the sac surrounding the heart, a thoracic artery, and the right
ventricle. The medical examiner testified that Mims was stabbed in a downward motion, with
the sharp edge of the blade pointing downward. He opined that the stabbing occurred when
Mims and the perpetrator were standing upright. On cross-examination, the medical examiner
testified that it was possible, based on the nature of the wound, that the stabbing occurred by
Mims falling on the knife during a fight between Mims and the perpetrator.
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We note that defendant moved for a directed verdict on the homicide and resisting arrest
charges, and the trial court denied the motion.
II. ANALYSIS
A. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CHARGE
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict on the charge of first-degree murder where there was insufficient evidence to establish
the requisite elements of premeditation and deliberation.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. People v
Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 122; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). “When reviewing a trial court's
decision on a motion for a directed verdict, this Court reviews the record . . . to determine
whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecutor, could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime charged
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 122-123, citing People v Mayhew, 236 Mich
App 112, 124-125; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). A challenge relative to a trial court’s decision on a
motion for a directed verdict due to insufficiency of the evidence generally implicates the same
principles applicable to a claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. People
v Lewis (On Remand), 287 Mich App 356, 365; 788 NW2d 461 (2010). We consider “all
evidence adduced up to the time of the motion for a directed verdict.” People v Allay, 171 Mich
App 602, 605; 430 NW2d 794 (1988). This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of
determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich
508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Circumstantial evidence
and reasonable inferences that arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). All
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich
App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
“To establish first-degree premeditated murder, the prosecutor must prove that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim with premeditation and deliberation.” People v Taylor,
275 Mich App 177, 179; 737 NW2d 790 (2007); see also People v Bowman, 254 Mich App 142,
151; 656 NW2d 835 (2002). The elements of deliberation and premeditation may be inferred
from the various circumstances surrounding a killing. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 229;
749 NW2d 272 (2008). The Unger panel further elaborated:
Premeditation may be established through evidence of (1) the prior
relationship of the parties, (2) the defendant's actions before the killing, (3) the
circumstances of the killing itself, and (4) the defendant's conduct after the
homicide. Some time span between the initial homicidal intent and the ultimate
killing is necessary to establish premeditation and deliberation. However, the time
required need only be long enough “to allow the defendant to take a second look.”
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence may
constitute satisfactory proof of premeditation and deliberation. [Id. (citations
omitted).]
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While a close call, we find that there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
deliberate the charge of first-degree murder. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, any error
in denying the motion was harmless, considering that defendant was acquitted of first-degree
murder and convicted of second-degree murder and that there was no indication of jury
compromise. The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, supported
a finding that defendant killed Mims by stabbing him with a knife and that he intended to kill
him, especially given the nature of the wound. And defendant does not argue to the contrary on
these matters. With respect to deliberation and premeditation, the testimony of Harold, Daniels,
and Easley indicated that Mims was yelling and in a rage outside of the kitchen area and was
held back by Easley, at least temporarily, while defendant remained in the kitchen. Reasonable
inferences that arise from the evidence are that defendant heard Mims yelling and could hear him
approaching the kitchen, that defendant procured a knife from somewhere in the kitchen and had
time to prepare and to think about his actions before Mims freed himself from Easley, and that
defendant, after having the time to take a second look, however brief, then proceeded to stab
Mims in the chest. There is no indication that defendant was prevented, time-wise and
logistically, from simply leaving the home after Mims became angered, and defendant chose to
use a dangerous weapon despite the fact that the brothers’ history of intoxicated fights did not
entail physical injuries and the use of weapons. Further, Mims was stabbed in a downward
motion to a three-inch depth in the chest, thereby indicating that defendant had to raise the knife
upward somewhat before bringing it down and driving it into Mims’s chest; a brief process for
sure but time to take a second look. As to defendant’s conduct after the stabbing, defendant
resisted and fled the police, which can support an inference of consciousness of guilt. Unger,
278 Mich App at 226. Under all of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in allowing the jury to deliberate the first-degree murder charge.
Furthermore, assuming error, it was harmless. In People v Graves, 458 Mich 476; 581
NW2d 229 (1998), the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after the jury was
instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder, along with voluntary manslaughter. Our
Supreme Court, overruling the rule of automatic reversal established in People v Vail, 393 Mich
460; 227 NW2d 535 (1975), found it unnecessary to decide whether the defendant had been
entitled to a directed verdict on the first-degree murder charge, given the jury’s ultimate verdict.
Graves, 458 Mich at 478-479. The Graves Court explained:
Although it might have been error to submit the first-degree murder
charge to the jury, it is undisputed that a second-degree murder charge was
properly submitted to the jury. The jury acquitted defendant not only of the firstdegree murder charge, but also of the supported second-degree murder charge.
Where a jury acquits a defendant of an unwarranted charge (first-degree murder)
and a lesser included warranted charge (second-degree murder) before convicting
of a still lesser charge (voluntary manslaughter), we find that it is highly probable
that the erroneous submission of the unwarranted charge did not affect the
ultimate verdict. There is no basis on this record to find that it was a product of
juror compromise.
If, however, sufficiently persuasive indicia of jury compromise are
present, reversal may be warranted in certain circumstances. That is to say, a
different result may be reached, . . . where the jury is presented an erroneous
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instruction, and: 1) logically irreconcilable verdicts are returned, or 2) there is
clear record evidence of unresolved jury confusion, or 3) as the prosecution
concedes in the alternative, where a defendant is convicted of the next-lesser
offense after the improperly submitted greater offense.
It is for these reasons that we overrule Vail and find that any error in
submitting the first-degree murder charge to the jury was harmless in light of the
fact that the jury returned a manslaughter conviction. [Graves, 458 Mich at 487488 (emphasis in original).]
We are not presented with circumstances involving logically irreconcilable verdicts, nor
is there clear record evidence of unresolved jury confusion. And there was sufficient evidence to
support the second-degree murder conviction. Indeed, defendant does not present an appellate
argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the murder conviction. However, as
indicated above, the Graves Court allowed for the possibility that reversal might be appropriate
where a jury convicted a defendant of the next-lesser offense despite acquitting the defendant on
the charge sought to be dismissed pursuant to a motion for a directed verdict. This was the
situation presented in People v Moorer, 246 Mich App 680; 635 NW2d 47 (2001), a case similar
to the one at bar. In Moorer, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after the jury
was instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder and voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter, and this Court held:
Defendant . . . contends that reversal is warranted because the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal of the first-degree
murder charge. Defendant does not dispute that the charge of second-degree
murder was properly submitted to the jury. Accordingly, any error arising from
the submission of the first-degree murder charge to the jury was rendered
harmless when the jury acquitted defendant of that charge. As our Supreme Court
observed in Graves:
“[A] defendant has no room to complain when he is acquitted of a charge
that is improperly submitted to the jury, as long as the defendant is actually
convicted of a charge that was properly submitted to the jury. Such a result
squares with respect for juries. Further, not to adopt this view is to countenance a
misuse of judicial resources by automatically reversing an otherwise valid
conviction.” [Moorer, 246 Mich App at 682-683 (citation omitted).]
The Moorer panel rejected the defendant’s claim, premised on Graves, that the record
contained persuasive indicia of jury compromise and confusion such that the harmless error
principle was inapplicable. Id. at 683 n 1. The defendant pointed to the fact that the jury had
twice requested that the court repeat the instructions regarding the four alternate homicide
charges. Id. The Court found that the reason proffered by the defendant in support of his claim
that the jury reached a compromise verdict was inadequate and would require judicial
speculation on the part of the panel. Id. This Court noted that the trial court had instructed the
jurors not to compromise their views simply to reach a verdict, that the jurors had been polled,
with each juror affirming his or her guilty vote on second-degree murder, and that jury questions
during deliberations are not necessarily indicative of jury compromise. Id.
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Here, defendant argues that, absent the first-degree murder charge being presented to the
jury, there was significant indicia that the jurors may have instead chosen to convict defendant of
voluntary manslaughter. In support, defendant reasons that a rational view of the evidence
favored a finding that defendant committed voluntary manslaughter. Defendant further reasons
that “[t]he jury . . . expressed doubt by finding [defendant] not guilty of the domestic violence
charge, perhaps reflecting a decision to compromise by convicting [defendant] of second-degree
murder.” We do not quite understand the rationale with respect to the latter reason given by
defendant. The decision to convict defendant of second-degree murder and to acquit him of
domestic violence may simply have reflected the jury’s conclusion that defendant did not act
with premeditation and deliberation but did act with malice, taking the case out of the realm of
manslaughter, and that the charge of domestic violence was not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt given the conflicting evidence regarding whether defendant struck Harold. These verdicts
are not irreconcilable, and the facts underlying each charge pertained to a different series of
events. Defendant’s argument is predicated on pure speculation. There is nothing in the record
indicating jury compromise, nor did the jurors pose any questions to the court, let alone
questions suggesting jury confusion. The trial court instructed the jurors not to give up their
honest opinions about the case just because other jurors disagree or “just for the sake of reaching
a verdict.” Further, the jurors were polled after the guilty verdict on second-degree murder was
announced by the foreperson, and each juror agreed that this was his or her verdict. This case is
consistent with Moorer, and reversal is unwarranted.
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF AUDIO RECORDINGS OF POLICE STATEMENTS
Defendant next challenges the prosecutor’s use of the audiotapes to refresh the memories
of certain witnesses. In particular, defendant takes exception with the prosecutor playing the
tapes when Daniels testified regarding whether defendant hit Harold in the car, when Daniels
testified regarding whether defendant broke Harold’s phone and flushed her money down the
toilet, and when Harold testified regarding whether she was struck by defendant in the car and
again at her apartment. Defendant contends that the proper method to refresh a witness’s
memory is to let the witness observe a writing or object and then follow up with additional
questions; it does not involve disclosing the information to the jury and essentially admitting the
material into evidence.
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). An abuse of discretion exists if the trial
court's decision falls outside a principled range of outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247,
269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). However, evidentiary decisions involving preliminary questions of
law, such as whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes admissibility, are reviewed de novo.
Lukity, 460 Mich at 488. “[I]t is an abuse of discretion to admit evidence that is inadmissible as
a matter of law.” Id.
Under MRE 612, a party may utilize a writing or object to refresh a witness’s memory,
and the adverse party is entitled to have the writing or object produced at trial. In People v
Favors, 121 Mich App 98, 109; 328 NW2d 585 (1982), this Court discussed the parameters of
MRE 612, explaining:
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Where the memory of a witness is to be refreshed, it is not necessary and
is often highly prejudicial to permit the jury to hear the substance of the statement
to be employed. Where memory or recollection is being refreshed, the material
used for that purpose is not substantive evidence. Rather, the material is employed
to simply trigger the witness's recollection of the events. That recollection is
substantive evidence and the material used to refresh is not. The substance of the
statement used to refresh is admissible only at the instance of the adverse party.
MRE 612. Accordingly, we are of the view that the trial court erred in permitting
the prosecutor to place before the jury the substance of the witness's prior
statement to the police officer. [Citation omitted.]
In the case at bar, if the prosecutor was simply attempting to refresh the witnesses’
memories, it would have been improper to play the audiotapes for the jury to hear. However, the
testimony by Daniels and Harold not only reflected a lack of recollection on certain matters, it
also reflected outright denials of charged events, mainly defendant striking Harold in the car and
at the apartment. Indeed, Harold was adamant that defendant never hit her. The taped
statements stood in direct conflict with Harold’s and Daniels’ trial testimony. Under MRE
613(b), “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible
unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party
is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise
require.” In Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 165; 732 NW2d 472 (2007), the Michigan
Supreme Court explained the process to be used in admitting evidence pursuant to MRE 613(b):
Before attempting to impeach a witness by offering extrinsic evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement, a litigant must lay a proper foundation in accordance
with the court rule. To do so, the proponent of the evidence must elicit testimony
inconsistent with the prior statement, ask the witness to admit or deny making the
first statement, then ask the witness to admit or deny making the later,
inconsistent statement, allow the witness to explain the inconsistency, and allow
the opposite party to cross-examine the witness. However, “extrinsic evidence
may not be used to impeach a witness on a collateral matter . . . even if the
extrinsic evidence constitutes a prior inconsistent statement of the witness,
otherwise admissible under MRE 613(b).” [Citations omitted; omission in
original.]
The audiotapes revealed prior inconsistent statements and the statements pertained to a
relevant matter, not a collateral matter, where the interactions between Harold and defendant
related to the domestic violence charge and also provided evidence of events that precipitated the
murder. Although the prosecutor may not have precisely followed the procedure outlined in
Barnett for admitting impeachment evidence, the points in Barnett were touched on by the
prosecutor and the evidence was admissible.
Further, assuming error, it was harmless. MCL 769.26; Lukity, 460 Mich at 495.
Defendant was acquitted of assaulting Harold, and the challenged evidence predominantly
concerned the domestic violence charge. With respect to Daniels’ testimony regarding Harold’s
cell phone and the destruction of cash, defendant himself testified that he broke Harold’s phone
and that he tore up the money, although he claimed that it was his own money. In sum, we
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cannot conclude that it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted
absent the presumed error. Id.
C. INSTRUCTION ON DEFENSE OF ACCIDENT
Finally, defendant argues that the jury was insufficiently instructed on the defense of
accident. In People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007), this Court outlined
the general principles applicable to claims of instructional error:
Claims of instructional error are generally reviewed de novo by this Court,
but the trial court's determination that a jury instruction is applicable to the facts
of the case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A defendant in a criminal trial
is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence against him or
her. The trial court's role is to clearly present the case to the jury and to instruct it
on the applicable law. Jury instructions must include all the elements of the
offenses charged against the defendant and any material issues, defenses, and
theories that are supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are reviewed in their
entirety, and there is no error requiring reversal if the instructions sufficiently
protected the rights of the defendant and fairly presented the triable issues to the
jury. [Citations omitted.]
When an intentional act must be established as an element of a crime, “the occurrence of
the crime is inconsistent with accident.” People v Hess, 214 Mich App 33, 37; 543 NW2d 332
(1995). Criminal homicides that require proof of intent “are excusable if the killing is
accidental.” Id. at 37-38. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that a homicide is excusable
where a death results from an accident and the actor was not criminally negligent. Id. at 38. The
Hess panel defined an “accident” as, in part, “‘a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to
whom it happens; an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for event,
happening or occurrence[.]’” Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
Here, defendant’s testimony that Mims was somehow stabbed when the two of them
tussled and fell to the ground, along with his testimony that it was an accident, supported an
accident instruction.5 The full extent of the court’s instruction specifically on the defense of
accident was as follows: “The Defendant says he is not guilty of murder because Bobby Mimms’
[sic] death was accidental.” The trial court then immediately launched into instructions on selfdefense. Defendant argues that the one-sentence instruction, while consistent with the first
sentence in CJI2d 7.1 and 7.2, was inadequate and should have included the remaining language
from either of the two standard instructions. CJI2d 7.1, with relevant language inserted by us,
provides:
5
In closing argument, defense counsel raised the defenses of accident and self-defense.
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(1) The defendant says that he is not guilty of murder because Bobby
Mims’s death was accidental. That is, the defendant says that Mims died because
he was accidentally stabbed when the two tussled and fell to the ground.
(2) If the defendant did not mean to stab Mims then he is not guilty of
murder. The prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
meant to stab Mims.
CJI2d 7.2 also pertains to the defense of accident, but it is concerned with situations in
which a defendant did not know the consequences of his or her actions; therefore, CJI2d 7.1 is
the more relevant instruction in this case.
When the trial court was discussing the instructions with the parties, defense counsel
agreed to simply using the one-sentence instruction. Later in the discussion, defense counsel
appeared to have second thoughts, indicating that he was “wondering if there should be some
type of a follow-up sentence . . . [s]omething to the effect of . . . if you find this to be accidental,
he is not guilty because this statement alone, I don’t know if that’s (indecipherable).” The
prosecutor then stated that the one-sentence instruction referenced the defendant not being guilty
if the stabbing was accidental, and the court chimed in that it thought that defendant’s concerns
were covered in the self-defense instructions. Regardless of the soundness of these remarks,
defense counsel responded, “Okay, thank you.”
In People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215, 219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000), our Supreme Court
discussed the principle of waiver:
Waiver has been defined as “the ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.’” It differs from forfeiture, which has been
explained as “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” “One who
waives his rights under a rule may not then seek appellate review of a claimed
deprivation of those rights, for his waiver has extinguished any error.”
***
In the present case, counsel clearly expressed satisfaction with the trial
court’s decision to refuse the jury’s request and its subsequent instruction. This
action effected a waiver. Because defendant waived, as opposed to forfeited, his
rights under the rule, there is no “error” to review. [Citations omitted.]
Here, the record supports a conclusion that defendant effectively waived this issue by
agreeing to the one-sentence instruction. Although defense counsel subsequently began
rethinking the issue and showed some hesitation, he once again went along with the instruction.6
6
Under MCL 768.29, “[t]he failure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not be
ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the
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Furthermore, assuming a preserved error or a plain error, we cannot conclude that
defendant was prejudiced. In People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174, 184-185; 713 NW2d 724
(2006), our Supreme Court held:
[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that defendant has not
met his burden of demonstrating that the failure to instruct on the accident defense
undermined the reliability of the verdict. As the Court of Appeals explained,
“[t]he jury instructions explaining the intent element of murder made it clear that
a finding of accident would be inconsistent with a finding that defendant
possessed the intent required for murder.” Further, the jury was instructed
regarding the lesser offense of statutory involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.329,
but instead concluded that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder. If the
jury had any doubts regarding whether defendant had the requisite malice for
second-degree murder, it could have convicted him of statutory involuntary
manslaughter, which does not require a finding of malice. The jury instead found
that defendant possessed a mental state that was greater than simply intentionally
pointing a weapon at the victim. [Citation omitted.]
Here, there was at least a partial instruction on accident, not a complete failure to instruct
on the defense as was the case in Hawthorne. While a fully-read standard instruction would
have been preferable, we cannot conclude that the reliability of the verdict was undermined by
only giving the jury the one-sentence instruction when considering that instruction in conjunction
with other jury instructions. As part of the instructions on second-degree murder, the jury was
instructed that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in part, that
defendant either acted with an intent to kill, an intent to do great bodily harm, or with knowledge
that he was creating a very high risk of death or great bodily harm knowing that death or such
harm would likely result. In other words, the prosecution had to prove that defendant acted with
malice, and if the jury believed that the stabbing was the result of an accident, it could not
concomitantly conclude that malice was present. Consistent with Hawthorne, if the jurors had
any doubts regarding whether defendant had the requisite malice for second-degree murder, the
jury could have convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, which does not require a finding of
malice, or it could have acquitted him. The instructions as given would have permitted the jury
to acquit defendant of murder had it concluded that an accident occurred. The jury, however,
instead found defendant guilty of second-degree murder. Reversal is unwarranted.
accused.” Defendant ultimately did not request the court to instruct the jury pursuant to CJI2d
7.1 or 7.2 in full. Thus, even if there was no waiver, defendant was required to establish plain
error affecting his substantial rights. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 642-643; 664 NW2d
159 (2003)(examining MCL 768.29 and applying plain-error test where the defendant failed to
request a cautionary accomplice instruction, which he claimed should have been given). For the
reasons set forth below, defendant fails to show a plain error affecting his substantial rights.
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III. CONCLUSION
We hold that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation such that the
trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the charge of firstdegree murder. Further, where the jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder and there
was no evidence of juror compromise, any error in submitting the charge of first-degree murder
to the jury was harmless. We further hold that there was no error in allowing the jury to hear
audiotapes of statements made by Harold and Daniels to the police, as the statements constituted
prior inconsistent statements made by those witnesses, despite the prosecutor’s references to
refreshing the witnesses’ memories. Assuming error, it was harmless because the taped
statements primarily related to the charge of domestic violence and the jury acquitted defendant
of that charge. Finally, with respect to the argument of instructional error relative to the defense
of accident, defendant waived this argument by voicing approval of the accident instruction as
given. Moreover, assuming preserved or plain error in not providing the full instruction as
reflected in CJI2d 7.1, the presumed error was not prejudicial when considering the instructions
in their entirety.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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