CITY OF MADISON HEIGHTS V RICHARD M CRAZE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF MADISON HEIGHTS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 293042
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-090254-AS
RICHARD M. CRAZE,
Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,
and
MADISON HEIGHTS CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant/cross-appellee, Richard M. Craze (Craze), appeals as of right an
order denying superintending control in this dispute over termination of employment with
petitioner-appellee/cross-appellee City of Madison Heights (petitioner) and respondentappellee/cross-appellant, Madison Heights Civil Service Commission (the Commission). The
Commission cross-appeals as of right1 the same order. We affirm.
Craze, a former Madison Heights police officer, first argues that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s complaint for superintending control because
petitioner has no right to appeal the Commission’s decision under MCL 38.514(1). We disagree.
1
Although the Commission filed a claim of cross appeal on July 30, 2009, quite inexplicably, it
adopts petitioner’s brief, yet asks that this Court reverse the trial court’s order of June 22, 2009.
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“Both subject-matter jurisdiction and statutory interpretation issues raise questions of law
that are considered de novo on appeal.” Polkton Charter Twp v Pellegrom, 265 Mich App 88,
98; 693 NW2d 170 (2005). “In general, subject-matter jurisdiction has been defined as a court’s
power to hear and determine a cause or matter.” In re Estate of Lager, 286 Mich App 158, 162;
779 NW2d 310 (2009). “If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its acts and proceedings are
invalid.” City of Riverview v Sibley Limestone, 270 Mich App 627, 636; 716 NW2d 615 (2006).
Pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 13:
The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by
law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as
otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and
remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals
within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court;
and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme
court.
See also MCL 600.605. In addition, pursuant to Const 1963, Art VI, § 28:
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative officer or
agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasijudicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by
the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the
determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are
authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same
are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole
record. [Emphasis added.]
MCL 38.501 et seq. (referred to as “Act 78”), addresses the creation of civil service
commissions for police officers and firefighters. MCL 38.514(1) states, in relevant part:
The tenure of each person holding an office, place, position, or employment under
this act shall be only during good behavior and efficient service, and any person
may be removed or discharged, suspended without pay, and deprived of vacation
privileges or other special privileges by the civil service commission for
incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct,
insubordination, discourteous treatment to the public, neglect of duty, a violation
of this act or of the rules of the commission, or for any other failure of good
behavior, or for any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in
office. . . . If the person sought to be removed or reduced demands it, the civil
service commission shall grant him or her a public hearing . . . . At the hearing,
the burden shall be upon the removing officer to justify his or her action. . . . If
the civil service commission sustains the action of the removing officer, the
person removed shall have an immediate right of appeal to the circuit court of the
county in which the city, village, or municipality is situated . . . . [Emphasis
added.]
When this Court engages in statutory interpretation,
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the primary purpose . . . is to give effect to legislative intent. Legislative intent is
determined by reviewing the language of the statute. When the language is
unambiguous, we presume the Legislature intended the meaning plainly
expressed. A statute is construed by considering both the plain meaning of a
critical word or phrase and its placement, purpose, and grammatical context
within the statute. Every word, phrase, and clause must be given effect.
[Riverview, 270 Mich App at 631-632 (internal citations omitted).]
As provided above, MCL 38.514(1) states that an officer terminated by a civil service
commission can appeal the decision, but, as Craze correctly notes, the statute does not address a
course of action for a city to appeal a decision. Nevertheless, “[b]ecause the Legislature has not
provided for appeal from municipal civil service boards, review is by complaint for
superintending control.” In re Payne, 444 Mich 679, 687; 514 NW2d 121 (1994). Moreover,
“[t]he process of seeking an order of superintending control is not an appeal. It is an original
civil action designed to require the defendant to perform a clear legal duty.” Beer v Fraser Civil
Serv Comm, 127 Mich App 239, 242; 338 NW2d 197 (1983). “A superintending control order
enforces the superintending control power of a court over lower courts or tribunals. A circuit
court has jurisdiction to issue orders of superintending control over administrative tribunals of a
judicial or quasi-judicial nature.” Id. at 243; MCR 3.302. As in the case at bar, “a city civil
service commission acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it renders a decision on an appeal by a
removed employee.” Id. See also Barham v Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd, 184 Mich App
121, 127-129; 457 NW2d 349 (1990). Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear
petitioner’s complaint for superintending control.
Craze next argues that petitioner lacked standing to file a complaint for superintending
control because it could not show an injury resulting from the Commission’s order. We
disagree.
Whether a party has standing is a question of law subject to de novo consideration on
appeal. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 612; 684 NW2d 800
(2004), overruled on other grounds by Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, ___ Mich
___; ___ NW2d ___ (2010), slip op at 1. “[A] litigant has standing whenever there is a legal
cause of action.” Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 34.
Where a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its
discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A litigant may have
standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial
interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the
citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended
to confer standing on the litigant. [Id., slip op at 35.]
As it relates to an order for superintending control “a party . . . must still have standing to
bring the action.” Beer, 127 Mich App at 243. “A party lacks standing to bring a complaint for
superintending control where [the] plaintiff has shown no facts whereby it was injured.” Id.
Nevertheless, “where the party challenging the commission’s action is the city itself . . . there
exists a sufficient interest in the outcome to insure sincere and vigorous advocacy so as to confer
standing.” Id. at 243-244 (emphasis added). More specifically, as is the case here, “[t]he city . .
. as the political unit employing the police officer, is directly affected by the commission’s
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decision that the employee may not be dismissed.” Id. at 244 (emphasis added). Furthermore, in
Core v Traverse City, 89 Mich App 492; 280 NW2d 569 (1979), where a firefighter was
terminated after engaging in illegal hunting activities, this Court found that, “public trust in the
members of the fire department is essential for its efficient operation. [The plaintiff firefighter’s]
actions were detrimental to that trust . . . .” Id. at 497-498. Because the Commission decided
that Craze could not be dismissed and Craze’s actions violated the public trust, petitioner can
show injury sufficient to confer standing.
Craze next argues that the trial court erred in determining that both the Commission’s
order of January 8, 2008, and its supplemental findings of December 8, 2008, were not supported
by substantial evidence. We disagree.
The circuit court should accept findings of a municipal civil service commission that are
supported by substantial evidence. In re Payne, 444 Mich at 682-683. A circuit court “should
assume superintending control over a municipal civil service board . . . when the record of the
adjudicative hearing does not contain substantial evidence to support the finding.” Id. at 690.
“‘Substantial evidence’ has a classic definition: the amount of evidence that a reasonable mind
would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. While it consists of more than a scintilla of
evidence, it may be substantially less than a preponderance.” Id. at 692. This Court’s review of
the circuit court’s decision is to determine whether the court “applied correct legal principles and
whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the . . . factual
findings.” Boyd v Civil Serv Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 234; 559 NW2d 342 (1996). This
standard “is indistinguishable from the clearly erroneous standard of review . . . . [A] finding is
clearly erroneous when, on review of the whole record, this Court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 234-235.
Petitioner terminated Craze for taking a Home Depot merchandise card from a suspect’s
garage during a drug raid in which Craze participated while on assignment to the Oakland
County Sheriff’s Department (“OCSD”) Narcotics Enforcement Team (“NET”). Petitioner
determined that Craze violated the following work rules: Rule 4:4, Conduct Unbecoming
Department Personnel;2 Rule 4:5, Conformance to Laws;3 Rule 4:39, Processing Property and
Evidence;4 and Rule 4:44, Truthfulness.5
2
“Personnel shall conduct themselves, at all times, both on and off duty, in such a manner as to
reflect most favorably on the Department. Conduct Unbecoming Department personnel shall
include that which brings or may bring, the Department into disrepute or reflects discredit upon
the employee or the department, which impairs the efficient operation of the department.”
3
“(A) Personnel shall obey all laws of the United States and of any State or local jurisdiction.
(B) A conviction for a violation of any criminal act shall be prima facie evidence of a violation
of this section.”
4
“(A) Property or evidence that has been discovered, gathered, or received in connection with
departmental responsibilities will be processed in accordance with established departmental
guidelines. (B) Personnel shall not convert to their own use, manufacture, conceal, falsify,
destroy, remove, tamper with, or withhold any property or evidence in connection with an
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Craze appealed his termination to the Commission, which held a hearing, and then, on
January 9, 2008, issued an opinion. The Commission observed that Craze took the Home Depot
merchandise card, determined that it was worth $125, and used it to purchase items for his
personal use. The Commission declared that these acts were “clearly inappropriate” and required
that Craze “be severely punished.” The Commission determined that petitioner had sustained its
burden in proving that Craze’s actions violated Rule 4:4, Conduct Unbecoming Department
Personnel. However, the Commission determined that petitioner had not met its burden of proof
regarding Rule 4:5, Conformance to Laws, Rule 4:39, Processing Property and Evidence, and
Rule 4:44, Truthfulness. The Commission nevertheless reiterated that Craze’s conduct
warranted “severe sanction,” and ruled that he be reinstated “without any back pay and without
any accrued benefits. From the date of termination until the date of issuance of this Opinion and
Order, January 9, 2008.”
The trial court did not analyze the facts as they applied to each alleged work rule
violation and draw conclusions, but rather, it found that the Commission failed “to identify
substantial evidence underlying its findings” for Rules 4:39, 4:44, and 4:5. The court thus
remanded “the matter to [respondent] Commission for more specific findings regarding the
substantial evidence supporting their conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate that
[respondent] Craze violated these three rules.”
On appeal, Craze argues that the Commission’s findings were based on substantial
evidence, and therefore, the trial court erred in not upholding them and instead, remanding to the
Commission for further fact finding. Craze asserts that petitioner, by adopting Act 78 (to MCL
38.501 et seq.), has chosen the Commission to be the agency for enforcing civil service
requirements. According to Craze, in the instant case, reasonable minds may differ regarding
whether discharge or suspension was the appropriate punishment and the trial court and
petitioner failed to consider that Craze had an outstanding record and lack of prior disciplinary
action. Thus, Craze concludes that the trial court erred when it failed to affirm the Commission’s
January 9, 2008, order. We disagree.
We agree with the trial court that, with respect to Rule 4:5, Conformance to Laws, the
Commission discussed only the fact that Craze had been acquitted of larceny from a building,6
and did not consider whether Craze’s conduct constituted the violation of any other laws.
Regarding Rule 4:39, Processing Property and Evidence, although the Commission notes that
OCSD Sergeant Bart Wilson testified that he would not have included the merchandise card on
the property tabulation sheet from the raid had Craze in fact presented it, the Commission did not
investigation or other police action, except in accordance with established departmental
guidelines. (C) Disposition of property and/or evidence shall be made in accordance with
established departmental guidelines.”
5
“All personnel shall be truthful in all respects, in their conduct or actions, related to their
employment and operations of the Department.”
6
The elements of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360, are “(1) an actual or constructive taking,
(2) an asportation, (3) with a felonious intent, (4) of someone else’s property, (5) without that
person’s consent, (6) in a building.” People v McFarland, 165 Mich App 779, 781; 419 NW2d
68 (1988).
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consider the fact that Rule 4:39(B) instructs that “personnel shall not convert to their own use,
manufacture, conceal, falsify, destroy, remove, tamper with, or withhold any property or
evidence in connection with an investigation or other police action, except in accordance with
established departmental guidelines.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, in its findings for Rule 4:44, Truthfulness, the Commission does consider many
more facts than it did for the other rules, namely, the varying statements that Craze made during
his initial interrogation by the OCSD and then in the Madison Heights Police Department’s
internal disciplinary interview. However, in the process of considering these various statements,
the Commission glossed over Craze’s initial denial of his actions, which runs afoul of Rule 4:4:
“All personnel shall be truthful in all respects, in their conduct or actions, related to their
employment and operations of the Department.” Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that the Commission failed to support its conclusions in its January 9, 2008, opinion with
substantial evidence.
On remand, the Commission issued supplemental findings of fact, concluding, again, that
its findings were based upon substantial evidence. Regarding Rule 4:5, Conformance to Laws,
the Commission first stated that its determination of whether petitioner met its burden of proof
was based on what was presented at the hearing. According to the Commission, “[a]t the time of
discharge, the focus of [petitioner’s] contention . . . was that [respondent] Craze was charged
with a felony of larceny in a building.” The Commission noted that Craze had been acquitted of
this charge in September 2007, and stated, “we believe that it would be . . . inappropriate for us
to determine based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, what additional crimes, if any,
[respondent] Craze could have been charged with and convicted of stemming out of this incident.
. . .” The Commission thus concluded that petitioner failed to meet its burden of proof because
“at the time the card was taken (i) there was no indication of value and (ii) no indication of
ownership, so there was no intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property . . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
The Commission next found that petitioner did not meet its burden of proof regarding a
violation of Rule 4:39, Processing Property and Evidence because (1) the sergeant in charge of
the investigation would not have included the Home Depot merchandise card on the search
warrant tabulation sheet “because it had no monetary or evidentiary value,” and (2)
“[respondent] Craze’s taking of the card was on his own personal accord and not pursuant to his
responsibility relating to ‘property or evidence in connection with an investigation or police
action.’” Finally, the Commission found that petitioner did not meet its burden of proof
regarding Rule 4:44, Truthfulness, because Craze’s different answers regarding whether he
committed an unlawful act were not, in fact, conflicting, and furthermore, even though he
initially denied taking the card, this denial lasted only “a matter of seconds.” Thus, the
Commission concluded that its findings were supported by substantial evidence and reiterated its
decision that Craze should be punished by a suspension without pay and benefits rather than
termination.
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The trial court, on the other hand, disagreed, and, in an opinion and order after remand to
the Commission, ruled that the Commission’s findings were not supported by substantial
evidence. The court first stated that, regarding Rule 4:5, Conformance to Laws, the Commission
focused solely on the question of whether Craze committed larceny in a building, while ignoring
the fact that petitioner determined that Craze violated MCL 750.157p.7 The court concluded,
“the undisputed evidence establishes that [respondent] Craze admitted to taking the card and
using it. Further, there is no evidence that he knew the rightful owner of the card, much less
obtained the owner’s permission. Considering these facts, the violation of the law is clear . . . .”
When addressing Rule 4:39, Processing Property and Evidence, the trial court noted that
the Commission relied on “the testimony of the sergeant in charge of the investigation that he
would not have noted the Home Depot Card on the evidence log because it had no evidentiary
value and it had no obvious monetary value.” Nevertheless, the court observed that Rule 4:39
states that police officers “shall not convert to their own use, manufacture, conceal, falsify,
destroy, remove, tamper with, or withhold any property or evidence in connection with an
investigation. . . .” Thus, “[b]ased on the undisputed evidence that [respondent] Craze took the
card and used it to make personal purchases, [respondent] Craze plainly violated this rule by
converting property connected to an investigation for his own use.” Finally, regarding Rule
4:44, Truthfulness, the court ruled that Craze’s initial denial of taking the card, however
“fleeting,” did not change the fact that such a denial was “plainly untruthful.”
The trial court concluded that, because the Commission’s findings were not supported by
substantial evidence, the court could issue an order of superintending control. The court noted,
however, that the Commission had authority under MCL 38.514(1) to impose discipline on an
employee and determine whether an employee should be terminated, and further, the
Commission’s decision regarding the appropriate penalty is not subject to the substantial
evidence test because it does not involve findings of fact. Thus, the court ruled that, since it had
reversed the Commission’s findings regarding the work rule violations, it was remanding the
matter a second time, “for consideration of the appropriate discipline.” We find the trial court’s
reasoning persuasive and conclude that the trial court did not clearly err.
Finally, Craze argues that the trial court improperly substituted its findings of fact and,
consequently, forced the Commission to impose termination rather than suspension, which is a
violation of Act 78. We disagree.
A trial court must determine whether a commission’s findings were supported by
substantial evidence. In re Payne, 444 Mich at 682-683. The trial court did not substitute its
findings of fact; it essentially determined that the Commission ignored the facts, i.e., the
7
MCL 750.157p states: “A person who has in his or her possession, or under his or her control,
or who receives from another person a financial transaction device with the intent to use, deliver,
circulate, or sell the financial transaction device, or to permit, cause, or procure the financial
transaction device to be used, delivered, circulated, or sold, knowing the possession, control,
receipt, use, delivery, circulation, or sale to be without the consent of the device holder, is guilty
of a felony.”
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substantial evidence that petitioner had presented in support of its decision to terminate Craze.
In so doing, the Commission failed to produce substantial evidence in support its own decision.
This Court’s review of the trial court’s decision is to determine whether the court “applied
correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial
evidence test to the . . . factual findings.” Boyd, 220 Mich App at 234. This Court reviews for
clear error, id. at 234-235, and in light of the above discussion, we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Furthermore, as is clear from the trial court’s
opinion and order, the court properly remanded for a reconsideration of discipline; it did not
require that a specific type of discipline be imposed. See Core, 89 Mich App at 503 (“Since we
are unable to say that the commission would have upheld plaintiff's discharge had they not
considered [improper evidence], we must remand the case. The commission is to render its
decision without taking that conduct into account.”)
On remand, the Commission issued its April 14, 2009 opinion upholding Craze’s
discharge:
Numerous cases stand for the proposition that the Commission has the authority
to decide the reasonableness of any discipline recommended and impose[] lesser
discipline, if warranted. . . . [H]owever, we are now required to substitute the
findings of fact made by the Court, in lieu of our own . . . . Based upon the
Court’s determination that Craze violated all four (4) work rules, rather than one
(1) work rule, we believe that we have no alternative under these circumstances,
but to uphold the City’s decision to discharge Craze.
As previously noted, we disagree with the Commission’s characterization that the trial court
substituted its findings of fact for the Commission’s. The trial court had concluded that the
record of the adjudicative hearing did not contain substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s findings concerning the Rules 4:5, 4:39 and 4:44 and we agree. Upon second
remand, the Commission had discretion to impose the punishment it deemed appropriate in light
of the four rule violations. While the use of the phrase “we have no alternative” could be read as
a failure to recognize its discretion, counsel for the Commission conceded at oral argument that
the Commission fully recognized that at the time it issued this opinion, it retained discretion as to
the appropriate sanction. The opinion makes clear that the Commission determined that the
appropriate punishment for violation of all four work rules was discharge. Thus, we agree with
the trial court that “there is nothing apparent on the face of the Commission’s decision that
would take it outside the principled range of outcomes.”
Affirmed. Petitioner may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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