KRISTIN CASSEN V RICHARD SLATER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KRISTIN CASSEN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291301
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-096290-CZ
RICHARD SLATER, d/b/a FIRE LAKE
FESTIVAL, L.L.C.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and METER and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order denying his motion to quash a judgment. We
affirm.
Defendant, a Michigan resident, invested in a South Carolina company whose purpose
was to facilitate a four-day music festival in South Carolina. Plaintiff, operating out of her home
in Virginia, was hired to work on behalf of the festival. She claimed that defendant breached
various agreements related to her involvement in the festival and sued him in Virginia. The
Virginia court entered a default judgment against him.
Defendant first argues that his appearance before a Virginia court to challenge the entry
of the judgment against him for lack of personal jurisdiction did not thereby create jurisdiction
for the Virginia court, and therefore, the Virginia judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit
in Michigan.
This Court reviews jurisdictional issues de novo. See Pontiac Food Ctr v Dep’t of Cmty
Health, 282 Mich App 331, 335; 766 NW2d 42 (2008). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (UEFJA), MCL 691.1171 et seq., is interpreted “to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.” MCL 691.1178. Pursuant to MCL
691.1173:
A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of
congress or the laws of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of the
circuit court, the district court, or a municipal court of this state. The clerk shall
treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court,
the district court, or a municipal court of this state. A judgment filed under this
-1-
act has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the circuit court,
the district court, or a municipal court of this state and may be enforced or
satisfied in like manner.
Under the UEFJA, a foreign judgment is “any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United
States or of any other court that is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.” MCL 691.1172.
See Blackburne & Brown Mortgage Co v Ziomek, 264 Mich App 615, 620; 692 NW2d 388
(2004).
“The Full Faith and Credit Clause, US Const, art IV, § 1, provides, in relevant part, that
‘Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State.’” LME v ARS, 261 Mich App 273, 285; 680 NW2d 902
(2004). “The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to prevent the litigation of issues in
one state that have already been decided in another.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
The res judicata effect of a judgment from another jurisdiction must be respected
in Michigan courts. [The] constitutional provision relates to the effect of judicial
proceedings of other states as evidence or as a bar to further litigation. [Jones v
State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 202 Mich App 393, 406; 509 NW2d 829 (1993),
modified on other grounds by Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429; 526 NW2d
879 (1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).]
Defendant, citing Big Vein Coal Co of West Virginia v Read, 229 US 31, 38; 33 S Ct 694;
57 L Ed 1053 (1913), argues that “an appearance may be made for the sole purpose of raising
jurisdictional questions, without thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court over the
action.” Defendant concludes that his appearance before the Virginia court to challenge the
entry of the judgment against him for lack of personal jurisdiction did not create jurisdiction for
the Virginia court. Defendant further argues that Michigan need not give a foreign judgment full
faith and credit where jurisdiction has been successfully attacked because, where there is a lack
of jurisdiction over the parties, the action is void. Defendant concludes that the Michigan court
erred in enforcing the judgment because the Virginia court did not, in fact, have jurisdiction. We
are not persuaded by defendant’s arguments.
It is true that a collateral attack on a judgment of a sister state “may be made in the courts
of this [s]tate by showing that the judgment sought to be enforced was void for want of
jurisdiction in the court which issued it.” Blackburne, 264 Mich App at 620-621 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). In other words,
[t]he United States Constitution does not compel Michigan courts to give a
foreign judgment full faith and credit when the jurisdiction of the foreign court
has been successfully attacked. Thus, to be enforceable under the UEFJA, the
foreign judgment must have been entered by a court with jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter. [Id. at 621 (citation omitted).]
As will be discussed below, however, Virginia’s jurisdiction has not been successfully attacked.
-2-
The case on which defendant relies held that a person could appear to challenge a court’s
jurisdiction for attachment proceedings without “submitting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the action.” Big Vein Coal Co, 229 US at 38. However, the Supreme Court also noted in that
case that, “where the defendant appears by motion and objects to the jurisdiction, and also
submits a question going to the merits of the action, it being one of which the court had
jurisdiction, there is a general appearance in the case which gives jurisdiction . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added). In addition to raising the jurisdictional issue, defendant raised issues in the
Virginia court going to the merits of the action. Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction was litigated
in Virginia, and this by itself precludes appellate relief for defendant.
As plaintiff points out, “a state court’s final judgment determining its own jurisdiction
ordinarily qualifies for full faith and credit, so long as the jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly
litigated in the court that rendered the judgment.” Marshall v Marshall, 547 US 293, 314; 126 S
Ct 1735; 164 L Ed 2d 480 (2006) (emphasis removed). The general rule is that
a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit – even as to questions of jurisdiction
– when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully
and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original
judgment. [Durfee v Duke, 375 US 106, 111; 84 S Ct 242; 11 L Ed 2d 186
(1963).]
As stated in Tomai-Minogue v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 770 F2d 1228, 1233 (CA 4,
1985):
Where jurisdiction is in dispute, the choice between a default and special
appearance is crucial for purposes of a subsequent challenge to enforcement. A
default judgment has res judicata effect when rendered by a court having both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction, under the full faith and credit
requirement. Morris v Jones, 329 US 545, 550-51, 91 L Ed 488, 67 S Ct 451
(1947). Before a court is bound by a judgment rendered in another state,
however, it may inquire into its jurisdictional basis, and if either personal or
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, full faith and credit is not owing.
Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co v North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins
Guaranty Assn, 455 US 691, 705, 71 L Ed 2d 558, 102 S Ct 1357 (1982). Thus, a
defendant sued in a foreign jurisdiction may, under Baldwin v Iowa State
Traveling Men’s Assn, 283 US 522, 525, 75 L Ed 1244, 51 S Ct 517 (1931), elect
not to appear, thereby reserving the right to dispute jurisdiction subsequently,
because the jurisdiction question has never been actually litigated.
In contrast, where the defendant makes a special appearance, and the
jurisdictional issue has been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the
original forum, the resulting judgment is entitled to full faith and credit even as to
the existence of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Underwriters, 455 US
at 706; Durfee v Duke, 375 US 106, 111, 11 L Ed 2d 186, 84 S Ct 242 (1963);
Baldwin, 283 US at 525-26. See also 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure, §§ 4430, 4442 (1981). [Emphasis added.]
-3-
The pertinent question is whether the issue of personal jurisdiction was fully and fairly
litigated in the Virginia court. On February 28, 2008, defendant filed an amended motion in the
First Judicial Circuit of Virginia to set aside a default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff;
defendant raised three grounds. Defendant asserted that (1) plaintiff committed fraud by suing
defendant instead of Fire Lake L.L.C., (2) the judgment was void because of defective service of
process under Va Code Ann 8.01-329, and (3) the judgment was void for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Va Code Ann 8.01-328.1. Hearings on defendant’s motion to set aside the
default judgment were held on April 23, 2008, and June 2, 2008. Following the hearings, the
parties also submitted memoranda of law to the court.
At the hearing, in opening statements, defense counsel argued, among other things, that
the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against defendant. Defendant
gave testimony, including testimony that he had never met plaintiff, he never personally entered
into any contracts with her, he never promised to pay her certain sums of money, and any
payments that were made were made by Fire Lake. Furthermore, defendant stated that he never
came to Virginia on behalf of Fire Lake and he never did any business in Virginia on behalf of
Fire Lake or as an individual. Defendant admitted on cross-examination, however, that Fire
Lake had a bank account in Michigan that he set up, and he wired money from it to plaintiff in
Virginia. Defendant signed the requisite paperwork for the wire transfers as an individual and
not in any capacity for Fire Lake. He also sent email to plaintiff directing her to forward
contracts for his review and signature. In addition, defendant sent checks to plaintiff that were
drawn on the Fire Lake account, but signed by him as an individual. Finally, defendant admitted
that he gave plaintiff direction in her activities, but that he was not the only one.
The Virginia court found personal jurisdiction proper pursuant to Virginia’s long-arm
statute, Va Code Ann 8.01-328.1, which states, in relevant part:
A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s:
1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth;
2. Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth . . . .
[Emphasis added.]
The Virginia court explained that, as held in Glumina Bank dd v DC Diamond Corp, 259 Va 312,
316; 527 SE2d 775 (2000), “any money judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is void.” The court went on to note that
where the questioned judgment is rendered by default, the factual allegations
contained in the pleadings are deemed true by the operation of the court’s rules of
procedure. Therefore, when determining if the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant at the time of the questioned judgment, the court
uses those factual allegations deemed true by default.
The court concluded that there was a sufficient basis to uphold the assertion of personal
jurisdiction:
-4-
The complaint alleged that [defendant], a resident of Michigan, as the
major investor reached several agreements with plaintiff regarding business she
was to conduct on his behalf within the Commonwealth. Additionally, the motion
for default judgment and/or summary judgment asked the trial court to deem her
requests for admissions, which defendant received along with the complaint,
admitted. The court did so finding that the “defendant is in default as alleged in
plaintiff’s motion for default and/or summary judgment” and incorporating those
admissions into the findings of the court. Those deemed admissions further
bolster plaintiff’s case and provide a stronger basis for the court’s exercise of
long-arm jurisdiction. In addition, plaintiff testified that her services were
engaged for the purpose of negotiating and hiring musical acts for the festival
from her home in Chesapeake, Virginia, as well as securing advertising and
promotion for said festival while operating from the Chesapeake location.
The court also concluded that plaintiff did not commit fraud on the court and that service of
process was proper. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion to set aside the default
judgment.
Generally, for an issue to be fully and fairly litigated, the party against whom estoppel is
asserted must have had an opportunity, as a matter of law, to obtain review of the initial
judgment. Monat v State Farm Insurance Co, 469 Mich 679, 685; 677 NW2d 843 (2004).
Defendant makes no claim that he was unable to appeal the Virginia circuit court’s decision on
personal jurisdiction to the Virginia Court of Appeals, and therefore, based on the above
discussion, this issue was fully and fairy litigated and entitled to full faith and credit.
Accordingly, the Michigan court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash entry of the
Virginia judgment.
Defendant next argues that the Virginia court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction did not
satisfy an applicable long-arm statute or the requirements of due process. However, because it
was not error to give the Virginia judgment full faith and credit, and the Virginia court found that
Virginia had personal jurisdiction over defendant, there is no basis for this Court to review the
Virginia court’s decision.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that a foreign judgment be given the
same effect that it has in the state of its rendition. The res judicata effect of a
judgment from another jurisdiction must be respected in Michigan courts. This
constitutional provision relates to the effect of judicial proceedings of other states
as evidence or as a bar to further litigation. [Jones, 202 Mich App at 406
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).]
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.