PEOPLE OF MI V NICHOLAS COLE SINNETT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 23, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293738
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 08-017122-FC
NICHOLAS COLE SINNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea for unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530. We reverse and remand to the trial court.
Defendant’s conviction arises from his unauthorized taking of a diamond ring that was
owned by someone who had met with him under the pretense that defendant was interested in
purchasing it. Before defendant absconded with the ring, it was alleged that he acted nervously
and that he placed his hand inside a breast pocket of his jacket leading the victim to believe that
defendant may have been armed. Although defendant was initially charged with armed robbery,
he was permitted to plead guilty to unarmed robbery. Between the time of the plea proceeding
and his sentencing, defendant wrote several letters to the trial court. In those letters defendant
challenged the factual basis of his plea, indicating that he never threatened the victim or had his
hand in his jacket pocket before the victim voluntarily gave him the ring to inspect. Defendant
admitted, however, to committing a larceny. Defendant repeatedly asserted his innocence with
regard to the unarmed robbery guilty plea and, in at least one letter, requested that he be allowed
to withdraw his plea.
At the sentencing hearing and before sentencing, defendant again requested to withdraw
his guilty plea in this matter. The court refused to consider the motion to withdraw the plea,
stating that the request “should be done more formally and it can be done after sentencing.” The
sentencing hearing proceeded and concluded with defendant being sentenced to 20 to 50 years,
an upward departure from the guidelines range of 50 to 200 months.
After sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, or for an
evidentiary hearing, primarily arguing that he was actually innocent of unarmed robbery.
Defendant admitted that he was guilty of larceny only. The court denied the motion. Defendant
-1-
then filed this delayed application for leave to appeal, which was granted by order entered on
October 6, 2009.
Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because,
prior to sentencing, he repeatedly challenged the factual basis for the plea, asserted his
innocence, and moved to withdraw his plea. We agree. A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Harris, 224
Mich App 130, 131; 568 NW2d 149 (1997).
There is no absolute right to withdraw an accepted guilty plea. People v Gomer, 206
Mich App 55, 56; 520 NW2d 360 (1994). A court may permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn in
the interest of justice before sentencing unless withdrawal of the plea would substantially
prejudice the ability to prosecute the defendant because of the prosecutor’s reliance on the plea.
MCR 6.310(B)(1). In the absence of a procedural error in receiving the plea, a defendant must
“establish a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea.” Harris, 224 Mich App at 131.
When a defendant asserts his innocence before sentencing, a court should be liberal in
considering a request to withdraw a guilty plea. People v Bencheck, 360 Mich 430, 432; 104
NW2d 191 (1960). However, the request need not be granted where it is obviously frivolous.
People v Hundley, 181 Mich App 137, 138; 449 NW2d 121 (1989). And a defendant’s true
motive in requesting a withdrawal must be based on a concern other than sentencing. People v
Camargo, 163 Mich App 581, 584; 415 NW2d 211 (1987).
Defendant argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea before
sentencing under MCR 6.310(B) because he repeatedly asserted his innocence and disavowed
the factual basis for the plea to an assaultive crime in several letters to the court prior to
sentencing, at his presentence investigation interview, as well as at the sentencing hearing prior
to sentencing. We agree.
A conviction for unarmed robbery requires proof that, in the course of committing a
larceny, the defendant used force or violence against a person or assaulted or put a person in fear,
although not armed with a dangerous weapon. See MCL 750.530; People v Johnson, 206 Mich
App 122, 125-126; 520 NW2d 672 (1994). In this case, it was alleged that defendant had his
right hand over the upper left breast pocket of his coat when he told the victim to give him the
ring thus placing the victim in fear before he fled with the ring. At the plea hearing, the court
attempted to establish the factual basis for the plea. The following exchange between the court,
attorneys, and defendant occurred:
The Court: . . . He intended when he reached his hand in his pocket that
that to scare her. Isn’t that an essential element? I think it is. This is not the time
to pussyfoot around stuff like that.
Mr. Novelli [defense counsel]: No, it’s not pussyfooting around, it’s just
that the plea –
The Court: Well if he reached inside his jacket to scratch himself that –
that would not be the armed robbery, if any jury would believe that.
-2-
Ms. Cavanaugh [the prosecution]: Judge, I believe the element can be
that he put her in fear. . . . That he put her – that she was afraid and he intended to
put her in fear.
The Court: I think he had to intend that. I mean he can’t reach – scratch
himself and inadvertently scare her.
Mr. Novelli: What we’re struggling over is the reaching, Judge, not the
other circumstances that would be enough to justify or being reasonably
apprehensive. . . .
The Court: Well, put it this way, if he reached in there (inaudible) would
understand that she could be scared that he was reaching for a weapon. That
would be sufficient, I believe. Is that true, Mr. Sinnett?
Mr. Sinnett [defendant]: Yes, sir.
The Court: You think – she could really think you were reaching – she
could reasonably think when you go like this and say give me the ring and you
reach inside your breast pocket like that, she could reasonably believe that you
were reaching for a weapon. Is that true?
Mr. Sinnett: Yes, sir.
The Court: Are you satisfied on that then? All right. All right. I think
that’s sufficient then. And then you actually took the – you actually took the
diamond ring, is that true?
Mr. Sinnett: Yes.
The Court: And you fled the scene, is that correct? You ran away.
Mr. Sinnett: After we discussed a lot more, sir.
In the time between the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing, defendant wrote several
letters to the trial court repeatedly stating that he never reached inside, or had his hand in, his
breast pocket. Defendant indicated that the victim voluntarily gave him the ring to examine and,
after further discussion, he fled with the ring. Thus, he admitted to larceny, but not unarmed
robbery. Defendant also repeatedly claimed in his letters that he did nothing to threaten the
victim into giving him the ring. Apparently, defendant passed a polygraph in that regard. The
presentence investigation report indicates, in defendant’s description of the offense, that his
intentions were to “run with the ring,” but that he “never threatened [the victim] in any way[,]
shape or form.” Further, at defendant’s sentencing hearing, defendant’s attorney indicated that
defendant “asked me to withdraw the plea” and requested that the charge be reduced to larceny
on the ground that the results of a polygraph test defendant underwent were favorable. We
conclude that defendant should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea before
sentencing.
-3-
As stated above, when a defendant asserts his innocence before sentencing, a court
should be liberal in considering a request to withdraw a guilty plea. Bencheck, 360 Mich at 432.
“Doubts concerning substantiation of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal are to be resolved in
defendant’s favor.” People v Lewis, 176 Mich App 690, 693-694; 440 NW2d 12 (1989). In
Lewis, this Court accepted that a letter sent to the trial court was considered a motion. Id.
Although in Lewis the defendant did not assert his innocence in the one letter requesting to
withdraw his plea, defendant’s statements that were incorporated into the presentence report
included his claim of innocence and were found sufficient to assert his innocence. Id. at 694. In
our case, defendant repeated in several letters to the court his claim of innocence to the charge of
unarmed robbery. The presentence report also included his claim of innocence to the charge.
And before sentencing his attorney requested on defendant’s behalf that defendant be allowed to
withdraw his plea. Thus, defendant’s request should have been granted unless the request was
obviously frivolous. See Bencheck, 360 Mich at 432; Hundley, 181 Mich App at 138.
If a defendant merely states a belief in his innocence but fails to indicate how his earlier
factual recital supporting his guilty plea was faulty, the request to withdraw may be deemed
frivolous. Lewis, 176 Mich App at 694. In this case, defendant repeatedly stated in letters to the
court before sentencing that he did not have his hand in his pocket and did not threaten the victim
into giving him the diamond ring. This claim is arguably supported by the fact that defendant
met with the victim for the purpose of discussing a sale of the ring, i.e., he did not have to use
force or a threat of force to obtain the ring. However, defendant readily admitted to larceny of
the ring.
Further, review of the colloquy that took place at the plea hearing does tend to support
defendant’s claim that he did not admit to reaching inside or having his hand in his breast pocket
before being handed the ring. Again the Court stated: “Well, put it this way, if he reached in
there (inaudible) would understand that she could be scared that he was reaching for a weapon.
That would be sufficient, I believe. Is that true, Mr. Sinnett?” To which defendant responded in
the affirmative. However, defendant did not admit that he actually did reach “in there” or
threaten the victim in any way. And defendant indicated that even after he had the ring in his
hand, he and the victim actually had a discussion “a lot more” before he fled with the ring. Thus,
under MCR 6.302(D)(1), it does not appear that the plea was accurate with regard to its factual
basis. Pursuant to MCR 6.302(A), a court may not accept a plea of guilty unless it is convinced
that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate. In light of this factual discrepancy, as
well as the facts that defendant admitted to committing a larceny, and that the focus of
defendant’s letters was the accuracy of his plea, not sentencing concerns, we conclude that
defendant’s request to withdraw his plea was not obviously frivolous. Thus, the trial court
abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. In light of our
resolution of this issue, we need not consider defendant’s other claims on appeal.
Defendant’s conviction is reversed, his sentence vacated, and this matter is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
