IN RE K PLOWMAN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2010
In the Matter of K. PLOWMAN, Minor.
No. 297331
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-054721-NA
Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and MARKEY and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent father appeals by right the order of the trial court terminating his parental
rights to his minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
In November 2008, respondent and the child’s mother were involved in a serious fight in
which respondent kicked the mother and hit her in the head while she was under the influence of
alcohol and illegal drugs. The fight occurred in the home in the presence of the child and the
mother’s other children and grew so violent that the mother’s 12-year-old daughter intervened to
protect the mother, stabbing respondent with a knife. The children, including respondent’s child,
were thereafter removed from the home. Respondent was jailed briefly after the incident but
released pending the outcome of charges arising from the incident.
Respondent and the child’s mother had a history of domestic violence and of substance
abuse. Petitioner offered services to respondent and the mother, including domestic violence
counseling, substance abuse assessment and testing, psychological evaluation, and parenting
classes. The record supports that respondent, however, generally declined to participate in
services, claiming not to need the services and rejecting the services as irrelevant because he
might be facing incarceration. Respondent also denied responsibility for the domestic violence
and denied a substance abuse problem, refusing further testing after some tests indicated positive
for drug use.
After six months, respondent was incarcerated in a county jail to serve a sentence related
to a conviction for the November 2008 domestic assault. While respondent was incarcerated, the
child protective proceedings involving the child continued, and though respondent’s counsel was
present during the proceedings, respondent did not attend three of these hearings due to his
incarceration. In February 2010, one month before respondent was to be released from jail, the
trial court held a termination hearing regarding his parental rights to the child. Respondent was
present at the hearing and represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
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court terminated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j),
and also terminated the parental rights of the child’s mother.
On appeal, respondent contends that he was entitled to attend the hearings that were held
while he was incarcerated in a county jail, and that failure to ensure his access to these hearings
violated his right to procedural due process. Our Supreme Court in its recent decision of In re
Mason, 486 Mich 142; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), addressed the issue of whether an incarcerated
parent had the right to participate in child protective proceeding hearings during his
incarceration. In Mason, the respondent father was incarcerated at the time that his children
were removed from the care of their mother. Several hearings were held while the respondent
was incarcerated and he did not attend either in person or by telephone. The respondent attended
the termination hearing and testified at that hearing, although still incarcerated. The trial court
thereafter terminated the respondent’s parental rights.
In Mason, our Supreme Court stated that MCR 2.004 requires the trial court and the
petitioner to arrange for a parent incarcerated in a Department of Corrections (DOC) facility to
participate by telephone in hearings for child protective proceedings; it rejected the argument
that the respondent’s participation in only some hearings fulfilled this requirement. Mason, 486
Mich at 154. But MCR 2.004, relied on by the Mason Court, applies only to persons
incarcerated under the jurisdiction of the DOC, not sentenced to incarceration in a county jail.
Further, the Mason Court’s decision to vacate the trial court’s termination order in that case was
not based on a denial of constitutional due process. See Mason, 486 Mich at 154: “We do not
reach the question whether reversal could be independently required under a due process
analysis.” Here, respondent attended the adjudication and disposition hearing, some review
hearings, and the termination hearing. Although he did not attend some review hearings while
incarcerated, he also missed at least one review hearing while not incarcerated. In addition,
respondent was represented by counsel at all hearings and counsel made no effort to procure
respondent’s presence or request that respondent be permitted to participate by telephone in
hearings that he did not attend. Respondent was accorded procedural due process because he
was given notice of the proceedings and had the opportunity to meaningfully participate in them.
See In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 118-119 (CORRIGAN, J.); 124 (CAVANAGH, J.); 763 NW2d 587
(2009); Mason, 486 Mich at 176-177 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting). Moreover, in Mason, our
Supreme Court did not automatically reverse the trial court’s order of termination simply
because the respondent had not been present at certain hearings. Rather, the majority in Mason
found reversal warranted because the trial court based its decision to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights solely upon the fact of his incarceration, Mason, 486 Mich at 160, 167, and
because the DHS violated its statutory responsibilities to provide the respondent with a
meaningful opportunity to comply with a case service plan, id. at 156, 169. Additionally, the
state failed to afford respondent the opportunity under MCR 2.004 to participate in the
proceedings, Mason, 486 Mich at 152-155, and the trial court’s decision was “replete with clear
factual errors and errors of law that essentially resulted in the termination of respondent’s
parental rights solely because of his incarceration.” Id. at 160.
Unlike Mason, a review of the record in this case demonstrates that ample evidence
existed to support the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
warranted pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and further demonstrates that the trial
court did not inappropriately base its decision to terminate solely on respondent’s incarceration.
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Reversal is not warranted. In this case, the trial court found under subsection (3)(c)(i) that the
conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood
that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. The
record supports this determination. During the approximately six months after the child was
removed but before respondent was incarcerated, respondent was offered services by petitioner,
including domestic violence counseling, which respondent declined, explaining alternatively that
he was not to blame for the violence, that he was too upset by the injustice of the accusations to
engage in counseling at that time, and that he felt there was no point in engaging in services
because he might be incarcerated soon. Petitioner also offered respondent substance abuse
assessment, as well as psychological testing, which again, respondent declined, asserting that he
did not have a substance abuse problem, though he later testified that he had been using alcohol
and illegal drugs consistently for the past 16 years. Respondent participated in some of the
offered drug tests, but declined further drug testing after producing some positive tests. After
incarceration on June 3, 2009, respondent became interested in receiving services. According to
respondent’s testimony, he began attending church services regularly in jail, as well as weekly
Narcotics Anonymous meetings. He also completed an offered behavioral therapy course while
in jail. He corresponded with the foster care worker, and refrained from misconduct while
incarcerated.
In arriving at its decision, the trial court in this case, unlike Mason, did not focus upon
respondent’s incarceration or lack of progress while incarcerated. The trial court acknowledged
that respondent in fact had made efforts during incarceration, including work on behavior
modification. The trial court, however, placed greater emphasis on the testimony of foster care
workers and the expert witness that no child would be safe in respondent’s care given his
propensity toward violence. Further, respondent in this case presented no plan for the care of his
child. Respondent’s only plan for the child was to ask the child to wait for respondent to
complete his jail sentence and then wait longer while respondent began to work on establishing a
stable lifestyle and home. Respondent could not be troubled to begin work on these issues in the
six months preceding his incarceration, nor had he arranged a plan for the child during his
anticipated incarceration. Unlike Mason, this case was not determined based upon incarceration
but upon lack of initiative and threat of extreme danger to the child. For the same reasons, the
record also supports the trial court’s determination that termination was warranted under
subsections (3)(g) and (3)(j).
We further reject respondent’s unpreserved contention that he was denied due process
because his parental rights were terminated one month before his release and because the trial
court did not terminate the mother’s parental rights until respondent’s termination proceedings
were completed. We detect no plain error affecting substantial rights in the actions of the trial
court noted by respondent. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999); In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).
We affirm.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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