STATE TREASURER V HOMER LEE JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE TREASURER,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2010
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
No. 294142
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 09-046457-CZ
HOMER LEE JOHNSON,
Defendant/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
and
UNUM LIFE INS CO,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff,
and
FLOYD D. JOHNSON, individually and as the
personal representative of the ESTATE OF MARY
ETTA JOHNSON, JAMES JOHNSON,
JEREMIAH JOHNSON, JOSEPH JOHNSON,
Counter-Defendants-Appellants,
and
CRANDELL FUNERAL HOME INC,
Counter-Defendant.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this suit seeking reimbursement for the costs of care for a prisoner under the State
Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act (the Reimbursement Act), see MCL 800.401 et seq.,
defendant/counter-defendant Homer Lee Johnson and counter-defendants Floyd D. Johnson, who
appeared on his own behalf and as the personal representative of the Estate of Mary Etta
Johnson, James Johnson, Jeremiah Johnson, and Joseph Johnson (collectively appellants) appeal
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as of right the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff State
Treasurer (the Treasurer). On appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred when it granted
summary disposition in favor of the Treasurer because, at the very least, there was a question of
fact as to whether Homer Johnson had an interest in the proceeds of the survivor benefit and life
insurance policy at issue. Because we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary
disposition in favor of the Treasurer, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 1995, the Muskegon Circuit Court sentenced Homer Johnson to serve 3 to
30 years in prison.1 After his incarceration, Homer Johnson’s wife, Mary Etta Johnson executed
a March 2001 beneficiary designation form that named Homer Johnson as the primary
beneficiary of a $77,000 basic life insurance policy that she had through her employer, the
Valspar Corporation. Unum Insurance Company underwrote the policy. On January 21, 2009,
Mary Johnson died. In her statutory will, Mary Johnson provided that her sons, Floyd Johnson,
James Johnson, Jeremiah Johnson, and Joseph Johnson, should receive all her property and she
named Floyd Johnson to be her personal representative.
On January 23, 2009, Homer Johnson executed a power of attorney that designated his
son, Floyd Johnson, as his attorney-in-fact. Around the same time,2 he signed a letter in which
he acknowledged that he was the beneficiary under his wife’s life insurance policy and stated
that he wanted “all legal documents, checks and all other Survivor Benefits information sent” to
Floyd Johnson, who he had appointed to be his attorney-in-fact. These documents were
forwarded to Unum along with a letter signed by Floyd Johnson on February 2, 2009, in which
Floyd noted that, with regard to his mother’s insurance claim, Unum would be unable to contact
his father by phone at the prison because “they won’t allow it.” He also wrote that “Any check
sent to the prison will be signed and cashed by the Muskegon prison and he’ll never see a
[c]ent.” Finally, he indicated that he was faxing his father’s power of attorney designation.
Homer Johnson also executed an assignment of insurance proceeds on January 24, 2009. That
document, which Floyd Johnson witnessed, instructed Valspar to assign $5,056.50 of Mary
Johnson’s insurance benefits to the Crandell Funeral Home.
On January 30, 2009, the Treasurer sued Homer Johnson and Unum on behalf of the
Michigan Department of Corrections (the Department) to recover the costs of care for Homer
Johnson under the Reimbursement Act. Specifically, the Treasurer sought the funds in Homer
Johnson’s prisoner account, the proceeds of the life insurance policy on Mary Johnson, and more
than $3,900 in expected survivor benefits. The Treasurer moved for an order directing Homer
Johnson to show cause why the prisoner account, survivor benefits, and insurance policy should
not be applied to reimburse the Department for its costs of care. The Treasurer also asked the
1
See People v Johnson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals issued March
21, 1997 (Docket No. 191520).
2
The letter is from late January 2009, but the exact date is difficult to read.
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trial court to appoint Unum to be Homer Johnson’s receiver of those benefits for the sole purpose
of freezing and holding the benefits until further order of the court.
On the same day, the trial court entered an ex parte order appointing Unum to be the
receiver of the survivor benefits and life insurance proceeds in order to hold them until further
order of the court. The order also provided that Homer Johnson must appear before the court on
March 2, 2009, in order to show cause as to why an order should not be entered applying those
assets to reimburse the Department. The hearing was later rescheduled for April 13, 2009.
On March 17, 2009, Unum filed a motion and counterclaim asking to interplead Crandell,
Floyd Johnson, James Johnson, Jeremiah Johnson, and Joseph Johnson under MCR 3.603(B).
Unum alleged that each of the parties that it sought to interplead may have an interest in the
survivor benefits and insurance proceeds at issue and asked the court to permit it to deposit the
survivor benefits and insurance proceeds with the court pending settlement of the respective
rights of the parties. Finally, Unum asked the trial court to dismiss it from the suit.
On April 1, 2009, Unum served notice on the trial court and the parties that it had
received a disclaimer from Homer Johnson. In the disclaimer, which was dated March 23, 2009,
Homer Johnson purported to disclaim any interest that he may have to his wife’s survivor
benefits in the amount of $3,930.18 and to her life insurance proceeds in the amount of $77,000.
On April 7, 2009, Homer Johnson’s trial counsel filed an answer and brief in which he
argued that the Treasurer’s complaint should be dismissed. He also filed an objection to the ex
parte motion to show cause. In his brief and objection, Homer Johnson’s trial counsel argued
that, as a result of his March 23, 2009, disclaimer, Homer Johnson did not have the assets that
were the subject of the Treasurer’s complaint. Therefore, the complaint did not state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to show cause on April 13, 2009. At the
hearing, the appellants’ counsel argued that the Treasurer could not get at the survivor benefits
and insurance proceeds because Homer Johnson had disclaimed his interest in those assets.
Specifically, he argued that Homer Johnson could disclaim his interest at any point prior to
receiving actual control of the funds.
Counsel for the Treasurer disagreed and noted that Unum had submitted documents into
the record that showed that Homer Johnson had asserted his right to the funds at issue and, for
that reason, could not subsequently disclaim his interest in the funds. After obtaining the parties’
agreement regarding Unum’s payment of Crandell and depositing the remaining funds, the trial
court indicated that it was not prepared to rule on the motion at the hearing. Instead, it asked the
parties if they wanted to submit the matter on briefs:
THE COURT: Well probably the cleanest way to do this would be for you to
submit competing motions for summary disposition. We don’t have any factual
disputes do we Ms. Harris?
MS. HARRIS [counsel for the Treasurer]: I don’t think so. I think it’s all legal.
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MR. LADAS [counsel for appellants]: As long as we know there is no claim
form by him we agree.
After agreeing to this procedure, Homer Johnson’s counsel asked to go back on the
record so that Homer could make a record about the circumstances surrounding his execution of
the assignment in favor of Crandell. The parties agreed to let him make the record and he was
sworn in. He then testified that his son, Floyd Johnson, brought two forms to him at the prison
and told him that one was to authorize the cremation of his wife and the other was so the funeral
home could get its money. Homer stated that he was reluctant to sign the assignment because he
could not read it because it was covered up by the other paper, but that the officer on duty
ordered him to fill it out. He also testified that he was not aware of any insurance proceeds at
that time. On cross-examination he admitted that he understood that the funds that were to be
paid to the funeral home were to come from the insurance proceeds, but stated that he was under
duress at the time.
On April 24, 2009, the trial court entered an order granting Unum’s request to interplead.
It also granted Unum’s request to deposit the $3,930.18 in survivor benefits and $77,000 in life
insurance proceeds—for a total of $80,930.18—with the court. The trial court indicated in its
order that the parties had agreed that Unum could pay $5,056.50 to Crandell and agreed that
Unum would have no liability to any of the parties for the funds paid to Crandell. Finally, the
Court dismissed Unum with prejudice upon payment of the $5,056.50 to Crandell and the deposit
of the remaining $75,873.68 with the clerk of the court.
On May 11, 2009, the Treasurer moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9)
and (C)(10). In its motion, the Treasurer argued that Homer Johnson could not disclaim his
interest in the benefits and insurance proceeds under MCL 700.2910(1)(a) and (c), because he
had already accepted the proceeds and assigned a portion prior to his disclaimer. The Treasurer
also argued that, because the Reimbursement Act requires a prisoner to reimburse the State and
specifically provides exceptions that do not include a power to disclaim an interest, Homer
Johnson could not effectively disclaim his interest in the proceeds at issue.
On May 11, 2009, appellants’ counsel also filed a motion for summary disposition. In
that motion, appellants’ counsel argued that the Treasurer’s claim should be dismissed under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) because Homer Johnson effectively disclaimed any interest that he had in the
survivor benefits and insurance proceeds. Specifically, he argued that Homer Johnson only had a
mere possibility of receiving the disputed funds prior to his disclaimer and that he could only
assert his right to the funds by filing a claim and having it approved by Unum. Because he did
not file a claim and Unum never disbursed the funds to him, he could still disclaim his interest.
On August 7, 2009, the trial court entered an opinion and order granting the treasurer’s
motion for summary disposition and denying appellants’ motion for summary disposition. The
trial court determined that, when the Treasurer filed its complaint, Homer Johnson had a vested
interest in the funds at issue. It also noted that Homer Johnson executed a document assigning
some proceeds to Crandell and directing the remaining to be paid to him and signed a letter
directing that checks and survivor benefits information be sent to his son. Further, the court
noted that there was a letter from Unum that acknowledged these documents as a claim. For that
reason, the trial court concluded that Homer Johnson’s disclaimer was ineffective under MCL
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700.2910(1)(a) and (c). The trial court also concluded that Homer Johnson had a statutory duty
to reimburse the State and, for that reason, could not disclaim his interest in order to avoid
complying with the Reimbursement Act as provided under MCL 700.2904(2).
On August 27, 2009, the trial court signed an order releasing 90% of the funds on deposit
with the court to the state agency that handles reimbursements and the remaining balance to
Homer Johnson. Appellants then moved for reconsideration, which motion the trial court denied
on September 1, 2009.
This appeal followed.
II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellants argue that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor
of the Treasurer and denied their motion for summary disposition. This Court reviews de novo a
trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates
Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). This Court also
reviews de novo the proper construction of statutes such as the Reimbursement Act and the
statute governing the disclaimer of property interests. Granger Land Dev Corp v Dept of
Treasury, 286 Mich App 601, 608; 780 NW2d 611 (2009).
B. ASSETS SUBJECT TO REIMBURSEMENT
Prisoners have a statutory obligation to reimburse the State for the costs associated with
their incarceration. State Treasurer v Schuster, 456 Mich 408, 419; 572 NW2d 628 (1998). And
the attorney general has the authority to file a complaint seeking reimbursement for those costs.
MCL 800.404(1). The costs include “transportation, room, board, clothing, security, medical,
and other normal living expenses for prisoners.” MCL 800.401a(b). Moreover, the attorney
general has the authority to seek reimbursement from any of the prisoner’s assets, which include
all “property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due a prisoner or former
prisoner including income or payments to such prisoner from social security, worker’s
compensation, veteran’s compensation, pension benefits, previously earned salary or wages,
bonuses, annuities, retirement benefits, or from any other source whatsoever . . . .” MCL
800.401a(a).
In this case, the attorney general sued on behalf of the Treasurer and sought
reimbursement of the costs of care associated with incarcerating Homer Johnson from the
survivor benefits and life insurance proceeds payable to him as a result of his wife’s death. On
appeal, appellants argue that the benefits and proceeds were not Homer Johnson’s assets within
the meaning of MCL 800.401a(a) because the benefits and proceeds were never directly paid to
him. Rather, they argue that the funds would only become assets if Unum received a formal
claim from him, approved the claim, and then disbursed the funds to him. We do not agree that
Homer Johnson had to fill out a formal claim to the funds or have the funds disbursed to him
before those funds could be considered an asset subject to reimbursement.
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The Reimbursement Act is worded to apply to any property—tangible or intangible—
belonging to or due to a prisoner from any source whatsoever. MCL 800.401a(a). As our
Supreme Court has explained, this broadly worded language was intended to “to shift the burden
of incarceration expenses to prisoners and from the taxpayers whenever possible.” Schuster, 456
Mich at 418. The fact that an asset is intangible or illiquid does not pose a barrier to the State’s
efforts to seek reimbursement; rather, the question is whether the asset belongs to the prisoner or
is due to the prisoner. A beneficiary’s right to the proceeds of a life insurance policy become
absolute upon the death of the insured—that is, the proceeds are due to the beneficiary even
though the beneficiary has not yet completed the formal requirements that precede disbursement.
See Aetna Life Ins Co v Owens, 318 Mich 129, 138-139; 27 NW2d 607 (1947) (noting that the
beneficiary’s interest in the policy attached instantly upon the death of the insured); Dogariu v
Dogariu, 306 Mich 392, 406; 11 NW2d 1 (1943) (holding that upon the insured’s death, the right
to the insurance proceeds vested instantly in the beneficiary and could not be altered through a
provision in the insured’s will). Thus, as her primary beneficiary, Homer Johnson obtained a
vested right to the proceeds of his wife’s survivor benefit and life insurance policy upon her
death. And, even in the absence of actual disbursement of the proceeds, that vested right
constituted an asset from which the State could properly seek reimbursement under the
Reimbursement Act.
C. THE POWER TO DISCLAIM PROPERTY INTERESTS
Even if he had an interest in the life insurance proceeds and survivor benefit, appellants
nevertheless argue that Homer Johnson could and did effectively disclaim his interest to those
funds. A person may disclaim a disclaimable interest in whole or in part. MCL 700.2902(1).
However, “if a disclaimed interest arises under a governing instrument other than a will or trust
created by will, the disclaimer must be delivered after the effective date of the governing
instrument and before any event described in [MCL 700.2910]”. MCL 700.2904(2). A person
does not have an unlimited right to disclaim property; rather, a person may not disclaim an
interest in property after the occurrence of certain events:
The right to disclaim property is barred by any of the following events that occur
after the event giving rise to the right to disclaim and before the disclaimer is
perfected:
(a) An assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the property,
or a contract for such a transaction.
***
(c) An acceptance of the disclaimable interest or a benefit under the disclaimable
interest after actual knowledge that a property right has been conferred. [MCL
700.2910(1).]
In this case, Homer Johnson, as her primary beneficiary, obtained a vested interest in the
proceeds of Mary Johnson’s survivor benefit and life insurance after she died. Dogariu, 306
Mich at 406. That is, by naming her husband as her beneficiary, when Mary died, she effectively
conferred a vested right to the proceeds of her survivor benefit and life insurance to Homer
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Johnson. Indeed, had Unum wrongfully refused to pay the benefits to him, Homer Johnson
could have sued Unum and compelled it to disburse the funds. Accordingly, he had a property
right to the funds at issue after his wife’s death.
Shortly after Mary died, Homer Johnson executed a document appointing his son, Floyd
Johnson, to be his attorney-in-fact. He also signed a letter in which he stated that “as [the]
beneficiary of [my] wife Mary Etta Johnson” that he wanted “all legal documents, checks and
other Survivor Benefits information sent to” his son Floyd. He also specifically noted that Floyd
held his power of attorney and could “take care of all my legal affairs.” Additionally, Floyd
Johnson signed a letter that was ultimately sent to Unum in which he acknowledged that he was
his father’s attorney-in-fact and indirectly stated that Unum should not contact Homer Johnson at
the prison or send any check there. He also specifically noted that his letter concerned his
mother “Mary Johnson’s insurance Claim: 4397314.” Taken together, these documents indicate
that Homer Johnson understood that he was Mary’s beneficiary, understood that he had a right to
the proceeds of her life insurance and survivor benefits, and that he accepted that property right
within the meaning of MCL 700.2910(c).3
Homer Johnson also executed an assignment of the insurance proceeds to Crandell in
order to pay Mary Johnson’s funeral expenses. In the assignment, he directed that $5,056.50 of
the proceeds go to Crandell and instructed that the remaining should be forwarded to him.
Although he later testified that he did not know what he was signing, Homer Johnson admitted
that the assignment was to pay Mary Johnson’s funeral expenses and he admitted that he
understood that the funds were coming from the insurance proceeds. He also stated that he
wanted Crandell to get paid for its services.
These documents clearly establish that Homer Johnson knew that he was the beneficiary
of his late wife’s insurance policy and survivor benefits and accepted his property right in those
funds. Once he accepted his property right and assigned a portion of the funds after his right
vested, Homer Johnson lost his right to disclaim any interest in those funds. MCL
700.2910(1)(a) and (c). Consequently, his March 2009 attempt to disclaim any interest in the
funds was ineffective.
D. QUESTIONS OF FACT AND IMPROPERLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE
Appellants argue that the trial court could only consider the assignment to Crandell in
determining whether Homer Johnson’s disclaimer was effective because the parties agreed to
limit the record evidence to the evidence submitted at the April 13, 2009 hearing. They further
argue that Homer Johnson’s testimony at that hearing created a question of fact as to whether he
knowingly and voluntarily signed the assignment. We are not persuaded by either argument.
3
We reject appellants’ contention that the letters merely acknowledged a potential benefit. With
this letter Homer Johnson did more than acknowledge a potential benefit, he identified himself as
Mary’s “beneficiary” and directed that any “legal documents” and “checks” should be sent to his
son, who was acting as his attorney-in-fact.
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As already noted, at the April 13, 2009 hearing, the trial court indicated that it was not
prepared to rule on the motion to show cause.4 For that reason, it suggested that the parties
should resolve the matter by filing competing motions for summary disposition. Although the
parties seemed to agree that there were no factual disputes concerning the evidence, there was no
discussion on the record—or otherwise—that provided that the evidence for these motions would
be limited in any fashion. Indeed, the counsel for the Treasurer agreed to return to the record and
let Homer Johnson testify in order to avoid having to depose him at a later date. Thus, the record
actually belies appellants’ position that the parties did not intend to collect and submit further
evidence on the motion for summary disposition.
It is also well settled that a party making a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) must support that motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence. Barnard Mfg, 285 Mich App at 369-370. Hence, when making her
motion for summary disposition—a motion that the trial court asked her to make—the
Treasurer’s trial counsel had to submit or refer to record evidence to support her position.
Further, contrary to appellants’ position on appeal, the evidence does not have to be in
admissible form; the content need only be admissible at trial. Id. at 373. Accordingly, because
the documents were admissible in content, the Treasurer’s trial counsel properly supported her
motion for summary disposition with letters and documents executed by Homer Johnson and his
son, who was acting as his father’s attorney-in-fact. See MRE 801(d)(2). And, even if those
documents had not been submitted with the Treasurer’s motion, the trial court would have had to
consider them to the extent that the Treasurer referred to them because the documents were
already part of the lower court record. Barnard Mfg, 285 Mich App at 377-378 (noting that a
trial court must consider evidence that a party refers to in its brief if the evidence is then filed in
the action). Similarly, the trial court had the discretion to independently consider evidence
contained in the record when determining whether to grant a motion for summary disposition.
Id. at 377 n 6, 380 n 8. Therefore, the trial court did not err in considering all the documentary
evidence submitted and referred to in the Treasurer’s motion for summary disposition.
Because the other documentary evidence was undisputed and clearly established that
Homer Johnson had lost his right to disclaim the property at issue under MCL 700.2910(1)(c),
even if we were to agree that there was a question of fact as to whether Homer Johnson had
effected a knowing assignment of the survivor benefit and insurance proceeds under MCL
700.2910(a), the trial court correctly determined that—as a matter of law—Homer Johnson’s
4
The trial court had the authority to disburse the funds at issue after the April 13, 2009, if it
appeared to the court that the funds were assets subject to the Treasurer’s claims. See MCL
800.404(3). However, the trial court elected to give the parties the opportunity to submit the
matter on competing motions for summary disposition and it is clear from the record that
appellants’ trial counsel agreed to this suggestion as long as everyone agreed that Unum had
never received a formal claim to the funds at issue from Homer Johnson.
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attempt to disclaim his interest in the property at issue was ineffective.5 The trial court also did
not err when it determined that the life insurance proceeds and survivor benefits were assets of
Homer Johnson that were subject to reimbursement under the Reimbursement Act.
Consequently, the trial court did not err when it granted summary disposition in favor of the
Treasurer and denied appellants’ motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
5
Because of our resolution of this issue, we decline to consider the Treasurer’s alternate
argument that, under MCL 700.2910(2), the Legislature effectively precluded prisoners from
disclaiming property in order to avoid reimbursing the Department under the Reimbursement
Act.
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