PEOPLE OF MI V DIQUAN MICHAELS FERGUSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 292978
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 09-225516-FH
DIQUAN MICHAELS FERGUSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and METER and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f,
carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227, driving while license suspended (DWLS),
MCL 257.904, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, second offense,
MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to
concurrent terms of 28 to 90 months’ imprisonment for both the felon in possession and the
CCW convictions, and to a consecutive term of five years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. The court also imposed a 136-day sentence for the DWLS conviction and credited
defendant for 136 days’ served. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the police engaged in an illegal search and
seizure because the officer who initiated the traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle should have
observed a temporary license plate that was allegedly affixed to the back window. Defendant
argues that because he committed no other apparent traffic or criminal violations, the police had
no reason to follow through with the stop and continue with their inquiries. Therefore, any
evidence found in his vehicle should have been suppressed. We disagree.
This Court ordinarily reviews de novo a trial court’s ultimate ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence, although underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. People v
Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). However, defendant failed to raise his
challenge to the constitutionality of the police stop below; therefore, our review is for plain error
affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). In
addition, this Court must “exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse” and should only
reverse when the plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when
the error seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Id.
-1-
In Williams, 472 Mich at 312, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of narcotics
found in his vehicle, “asserting that the search and seizure were predicated on an illegal
detention.” Our Supreme Court set forth the applicable standards, stating:
In assessing the protections created by [the Fourth] [A]mendment, the
United States Supreme Court has long held that the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness. Reasonableness is measured by examining the
totality of the circumstances. Because of endless variations in the facts and
circumstances implicating the Fourth Amendment, reasonableness is a factintensive inquiry that does not lend itself to resolution through the application of
bright-line rules.
In analyzing the propriety of the detention here, we apply the standard set
forth in Terry v Ohio, 392 Mich 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). Under
Terry, the reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
In this case, there is no dispute that the initial traffic stop was occasioned
by defendant's speeding, and was therefore based on probable cause and was
reasonable.
As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals erred when it agreed with
defendant that the purpose of this traffic stop was fully effectuated when
defendant handed [the trooper] his driver's license and other requested paperwork.
This view of the essential nature of the traffic stop imposes an unreasonable
restriction on an officer's ability to investigate a violation of the law.
A traffic stop is reasonable as long as the driver is detained only for the
purpose of allowing an officer to ask reasonable questions concerning the
violation of law and its context for a reasonable period. The determination
whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take into account the
evolving circumstances with which the officer is faced. . . . [W]hen a traffic stop
reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified in extending the
detention long enough to resolve the suspicion raised.
It is no violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to ask reasonable
questions in order to obtain additional information about the underlying offense
and the circumstances leading to its commission. For example, in addition to
asking for the necessary identification and paperwork, an officer may also ask
questions relating to the reason for the stop, including questions about the driver's
destination and travel plans. [Williams, 472 Mich at 314-316 (citations and
quotations omitted).]
The Williams Court emphasized that a police officer has considerable discretion in
enforcing the traffic laws and that the discretion can be exercised effectively only if the officer is
allowed to ask reasonable questions concerning the context of a traffic offense. Id. at 315 n 8.
-2-
Implicit in an officer’s authority is the power to ask follow-up questions when the initial answers
given are suspicious. Id. at 316.
Here, the police officer pulled defendant over for not displaying a license plate. The
officer testified that defendant’s car windows were “dirty” and tinted. A photograph of the
vehicle taken at the time of the stop, which was admitted into evidence, reveals that the back
window of the vehicle was so dirty that, even if a temporary license (paper plate) was affixed to
the rear window, it was not visible from the outside. The officer testified that, during the entire
stop, she “never did observe [a] paper plate.” There is no evidence in the record indicating that a
paper plate was indeed affixed to the rear window. Although she was unsure how it came to be
there, the police officer did testify that “[t]here was a paper plate with the paperwork.” This
would suggest that, although there was a paper plate, it was not affixed to the window. The
officer, upon making contact with defendant as he sat in the car, asked for defendant’s driver’s
license and paperwork for the vehicle. Defendant, who appeared nervous to the officer,
immediately volunteered that he just bought the vehicle, and he handed over “some” paperwork
showing a recent purchase, which paperwork the officer later identified as the vehicle’s
registration. The officer did not state that this particular paperwork included the vehicle’s paper
plate. And she did testify that she did not become aware of the paper plate until after the stop
and search was completed. Defendant, after stating that he had just purchased the car, asked the
officer if she wanted to see his state identification card, but she demanded his driver’s license.
Defendant then admitted that his license was suspended and that the vehicle was purchased in his
sister’s name because of his suspension.
Driving with a suspended license is an arrestable offense in Michigan, MCL
257.904(3)(a) and (b), and a check of the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)
revealed outstanding warrants for defendant’s arrest. The police placed defendant under arrest,
patted him down, and then searched his vehicle. Officers discovered six plastic baggies
containing marijuana in the center console and a stolen firearm under some seats.
MCL 257.225 provides in relevant part:
(1) A registration plate issued for a vehicle shall be attached to the rear of
the vehicle. . . . .
(2) A registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a
horizontal position to the vehicle for which the plate is issued so as to prevent the
plate from swinging. The plate shall be attached at a height of not less than 12
inches from the ground, measured from the bottom of the plate, in a place and
position which is clearly visible. The plate shall be maintained free from foreign
materials that obscure or partially obscure the registration information, and in a
clearly legible condition.
***
(6) A person who violates this section is responsible for a civil infraction.
Because there was no evidence showing that a regular license plate, nor a paper plate,
was affixed to the rear of the vehicle, and because, assuming the presence of an affixed paper
-3-
plate, it was necessarily obscured, a civil infraction was committed. Accordingly, the police had
the right to stop the vehicle and ask reasonable questions concerning the civil infraction, which
would include asking for a driver’s license and registration, as the officer requested here. These
questions revealed a new set of circumstances, i.e., that defendant was driving on a suspended
license. The circumstances further evolved when the officer discovered the outstanding arrest
warrants when running a LEIN check. Under the totality of the circumstances, the police had the
authority to arrest defendant and conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. These actions were
reasonable. There was no constitutional violation, and thus there was no error in admitting the
evidence found in the vehicle, let alone a plain error. Reversal is unwarranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.