PEOPLE OF MI V IDRIS ZURI KUMASI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 292950
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-214006-FH
IDRIS ZURI KUMASI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and JANSEN and BANDSTRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted from the trial court’s order revoking his
probation and status under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, (“HYTA”), MCL 762.11 et seq., in
connection with his plea-based conviction of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and
sentencing him to a prison term of 1-1/2 to 20 years. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. FACTS
In August 2007, defendant, then 16 years old, entered a guilty plea to first-degree home
invasion. He admitted that he assisted another person in entering a dwelling without permission
and taking items from within. The trial court sentenced defendant as an adult, but under the
provisions of the HYTA, to two years’ probation, with the first year to be served in jail, but with
credit for 208 days served and the remaining time suspended “for entry into the Sheriff’s Boot
Camp.” The court also ordered defendant to pay costs, fees, and restitution. The court twice told
defendant to, “Get a job and keep it.”
Defendant signed a probation order that contained a condition that he “make genuine
efforts to find and maintain legitimate employment of a minimum of 30 hours per week, unless
engaged in an alternative program approved by the field agent.”
In June 2008, a notice of probation violation was filed alleging six different violations:
(1) new criminal activity, (2) failure to report, (3) failure to pay costs, (4) failure to acquire a
GED, (5) failure to participate in substance abuse treatment, and (6) failure to maintain verifiable
employment. Prior to defendant tendering a plea of guilty, defendant, through his counsel,
denied most of the allegations in the complaint, however, defendant pled guilty to failure to pay
costs as ordered by the trial court. The trial court then found defendant guilty of failure to
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maintain employment. Following some discussions with defense counsel and the Department of
Corrections, the trial court then revoked defendants’ probation and HYTA status, and sentenced
him to a prison term of 1-1/2 to 20 years. Defendant later filed a motion for a new probation
violation hearing, which the trial court denied.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked a sufficient basis for each finding
of a probation violation.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion.
See People v Knox, 115 Mich App 508, 515; 321 NW2d 713 (1982). A decision whether to hold
an evidentiary hearing is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Mischley, 164 Mich
App 478, 482; 417 NW2d 537 (1987). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to select a
principled outcome from a range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Kahley, 277
Mich App 182, 184; 744 NW2d 194 (2007). A trial court’s findings of fact may not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C).
III. COSTS
At the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new probation violation hearing, defense
counsel suggested that defendant misunderstood the timing requirements that applied to his
obligation to pay costs. On appeal, defendant asserts that he lacked the ability to pay and should
not have been found in violation of his probation for failing to do the impossible. But defendant
in the first instance, unequivocally and unconditionally pleaded guilty to violating his probation
for failing to pay costs, and the fact that he did not pay costs was not in question.
Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who pleads guilty “may raise on appeal only those
defenses and rights which would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against the
defendant.” People v New, 427 Mich 482, 491; 398 NW2d 358 (1986). The Supreme Court
explained in New that “[s]uch rights and defenses reach beyond the factual determination of
defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial.” Id.
(emphasis retained; internal quotations and citation omitted). The Court reiterated that “where
the defense or right asserted by defendant relates solely to the capacity of the state to prove
defendant’s factual guilt, it is subsumed by defendant’s guilty plea.” Id.
Defendant in effect wishes to withdraw his guilty plea, but no such formal motion was
brought before the trial court. Because defendant’s arguments concerning his failure to pay costs
relate to the question of his factual guilt, whether it should be mitigated because of a
misunderstanding or inability to pay, we decline to entertain such arguments, and thus affirm the
trial court’s decision to accept defendant’s plea of guilty to violating his probation by failing to
pay costs.
IV. EMPLOYMENT
At the probation violation hearing, defendant conceded that he did not have employment
outside of being a student, and defense counsel argued mitigation in the matter without offering
to bring evidence, then or in the future, to show that defendant had in fact acquired some
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employment. On appeal, defendant complains that the matter should have been more fully
litigated, but does not assert that he had any employment at the time relevant. At issue, then, is
whether the trial court erred in treating the bald fact of defendant’s unemployment, but for his
being a full-time student, as a probation violation. We conclude that the record clearly reveals
that defendant was told both orally and in his terms and conditions of probation, which he
signed, that he must “make genuine efforts to find and maintain legitimate employment of a
minimum of 30 hours per week, unless engaged in an alternative program approved by the field
agent.” Further, both the original and amended orders assigning defendant to HYTA status
include the direction, “MAINTAIN AND/OR SEEK EMPLOYMENT AS DIRECTED BY
P[robation] O[fficer].” Even if defendant felt that his full-time position as a student obviated his
obligation to seek employment, we are still left with a plea of guilty to a violation of probation,
and the fact that defendant does not dispute that he failed to seek and/or maintain employment.
Rather, he merely argues that he was not required to do so by his probation officer, and further,
that because he was a full-time student; he was not required to fulfill this particular obligation of
his probation. “While a trial court must consider evidence presented in mitigation of the
probation violation, it need not determine that mitigating circumstances justify allowing the
defendant to remain on probation.” People v Knox, 115 Mich App 508, 514; 321 NW2d 713
(1982).
Defendant explained to the trial court, “I was told I didn’t need to get a job cause I was a
full time student,” and added, “I was looking for a job, but it wasn’t required from my probation
officer.” The trial court was not obliged to take this account at face value. See People v
Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592 NW2d 75 (1998) (“it is well settled that this Court may
not attempt to resolve credibility questions anew”), and consequently we cannot hold that the
trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant’s probation. People v Laurent, 171 Mich
App 503, 505; 431 NW2d 202 (1988).
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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