JASON R SALENBIEN V ARROW UNIFORM RENTAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JASON R. SALENBIEN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervening-Plaintiff,
v
No. 291517
WCAC
LC No. 08-000062
ARROW UNIFORM RENTAL LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
JASON R. SALENBIEN,
Plaintiff,
and
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervening-Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 291543
WCAC
LC No. 08-000062
ARROW UNIFORM RENTAL LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and JANSEN and BANDSTRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
-1-
In this workers’ compensation case, plaintiff and intervening plaintiff Allstate Insurance
Company (plaintiff’s no-fault insurance provider) appeal by leave granted from the decision of
the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) that affirmed the magistrate’s
determination that serious injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile accident did not arise
out of and in the course of his employment with defendant Arrow Uniform Rental Limited
Partnership. Although the WCAC majority applied the correct legal standard, we find the
majority erroneously upheld the magistrate’s determination that plaintiff’s destination after
leaving a potential client was speculative because the circumstantial evidence established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff was returning to the office when the accident
occurred. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse and remand.
I.
Plaintiff sustained serious injuries in a multi-vehicle accident on highway M-60, which
was triggered when a westbound semi-tractor trailer failed to stop for a vehicle making a left turn
from westbound M-60 onto a crossroad. The resulting chain-reaction collision forced the semitractor trailer across the center line and into plaintiff’s vehicle, which was traveling eastbound on
M-60. Plaintiff then lost control of his vehicle. The vehicle traveled off the road and collided
with an embankment. At the time of the accident, defendant1 employed plaintiff as a sales
consultant. Plaintiff had just completed a sales call on defendant’s behalf at the Hayes Lemmertz
plant on M-60 in Homer, Michigan, minutes before the accident occurred.
Intervening plaintiff commenced these proceedings to recover from defendant employer
the no-fault benefits it paid to plaintiff as a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident and
to shift responsibility for the payment of future benefits from it to defendant employer under the
Workers’ Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.1 et seq. Thereafter, plaintiff
commenced proceedings to recover worker’s compensation benefits for those same injuries.
The magistrate denied the claims of both plaintiff and intervening plaintiff. The
magistrate ruled that plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his
automobile accident and accident-related injuries arose out of and in the course of plaintiff’s
employment with Arrow. The magistrate acknowledged the general rule that a worker injured on
the way to or from work is not entitled to worker’s compensation benefits. He then concluded
that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that any of the recognized exceptions to this general rule
applied. The magistrate also concluded that plaintiff’s injury-related memory loss left to
speculation plaintiff’s destination after he left the Hayes Lemmertz plant and, consequently,
whether plaintiff was working at the time of his accident. The magistrate then ruled that
speculation could not support an award of benefits.
In a 2-to-1 decision, the WCAC affirmed the decision of the magistrate. The majority
acknowledged that, in prior decisions, the WCAC had found injuries sustained while an
employee was traveling to be compensable so long as the travel was an “integral” component of
1
Defendant rents uniforms to various employers and picks up and cleans the rented uniforms
once soiled.
-2-
the employee’s job. The majority also acknowledged that in those prior cases the employees had
been injured while actually performing their respective jobs. Conversely, in this case, according
to the majority, plaintiff failed to establish whether he was working at the time of his accident:
[Plaintiff] failed to establish whether or not he was working at the time of his
accident. [Plaintiff] has no memory of whether he was working or not at the time
of the accident. He may have been on his way to the office after a customer call.
He may have been on his way home. He may have been on his way to a third
undisclosed location.
While there was circumstantial evidence that [plaintiff] was working when
the accident occurred, the magistrate did not accept the testimony. There was also
evidence that suggested the plaintiff was not performing the task of bringing an
item (a smock) back to the office when the accident occurred. The magistrate
specifically found against the plaintiff’s speculative version of events.
Regardless of whether travel injuries are compensable, a plaintiff must
establish that the travel is related to the work. The plaintiff was unable to
convince the magistrate his travel at the time of the accident was related to his
work in any way. Because the plaintiff failed to establish factually, that his injury
arose out of and in the cause of employment, we affirm the denial of benefits.
II.
Section 301(1) of the WDCA provides that “[a]n employee, who receives a personal
injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act
at the time of injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act.” MCL
418.301(1)(emphasis added). At issue in this matter is whether the injuries sustained by plaintiff
in the July 26, 2006 automobile accident arose out of and in the course of his employment with
defendant. Whether the injuries of an employee arose out of and in the course of his
employment presents a question of law if the facts are not in dispute; otherwise, such issues
present mixed questions of fact and law. Koschay v Barnett Pontiac, Inc, 386 Mich 223, 225;
191 NW2d 334 (1971); Zarka v Burger King, 206 Mich App 409, 411; 522 NW2d 650 (1994).
This Court exercises de novo review of questions of law resolved in any final order of the
WCAC. Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 697 n 3; 614 NW2d 607
(2000). A decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal if it is predicated on erroneously legal
reasoning or the wrong legal framework. Ross v Modern Mirror & Glass Co, 268 Mich App
558, 561; 710 NW2d 59 (2005). This Court reviews the factual findings of the WCAC under the
“any evidence” standard. If there is any evidence supporting the WCAC’s factual findings, then
this Court must treat those findings as conclusive. Id.
Intervening plaintiff argues that the WCAC majority erroneously focused on plaintiff’s
destination at the time of the accident. They argue that plaintiff’s destination was irrelevant to
the question whether the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment with
defendant. Intervening plaintiff asserts that where travel to and from customer and potential
costumer locations was indisputably an integral part of plaintiff’s job, and plaintiff suffered
injuries in a motor vehicle accident after leaving a potential customer’s location, as a matter of
-3-
law, plaintiff’s accident arose out of and in the course of his employment regardless of whether
he was heading home or to the office. Intervening plaintiff further asserts that the WCAC
majority erroneously construed the “integral part of the job” concept as requiring, in addition, a
factual finding by the magistrate that plaintiff was working at the time of the accident. Both
intervening plaintiff and plaintiff further assert that even if it was material whether plaintiff’s
destination at the time of the accident was his home, the office, or some third destination, the
majority erred when it adopted the magistrate’s finding that the question of plaintiff’s destination
at the time of the accident could only be resolved through an exercise in speculation because
unrebutted, competent evidence indicated that plaintiff did, in fact, intend to return to the sales
office following his sales call.
A.
Generally, injuries sustained while the worker is traveling to or from work, and off the
work premises, are not compensable. Thomas v Certified Refrigeration, Inc, 392 Mich 623; 221
NW2d 378 (1974); Welch & Royal, Worker’s Compensation in Michigan: Law and Practice (5th
ed), § 5.2, p 5-2. As with most general rules, however, there are exceptions to the rule.
Camburn v Northwest School Dist (After Remand), 459 Mich 471, 478; 592 NW2d 46 (1999);
Welch & Royal, Worker’s Compensation in Michigan: Law and Practice (5th ed), § 5.2, p 5-2.
The WCAC has recognized such an exception where travel constitutes an integral part of the
worker’s job duties such that the ordinary hazards of travel are to be considered work-related
hazards. Naski v Contempo Kitchens, Inc, 2007 ACO 78, *3; Martin v Mutual of Detroit Ins Co,
2004 ACO 74, *7. We accord great weight to the administrative interpretation of the WDCA
unless that interpretation is clearly wrong. Hoste v Shanty Creek Mgt, Inc, 459 Mich 561, 569;
592 NW2d 360 (1999).
In Martin, the defendant insurance company employed the plaintiff as a debit route
insurance salesman. 2004 ACO 74, *1. The plaintiff’s regular job duties included selling life
insurance and traveling from client to client on a regular schedule to collect premiums. 2004
ACO 74, *6-7. The plaintiff sustained injury when, upon arriving at the destination of a
customer’s residence and stepping out of his vehicle in order to collect the premium from the
customer, the plaintiff slipped on ice that had formed on the street. 2004 ACO 74, *7. The
WCAC concluded that the plaintiff’s injury was compensable:
[T]he claimant before us is required to travel as an integral part of his job
duties. In such circumstances the ordinary hazards associated with travel are
considered work related hazards. As a result, his slipping on the ice exiting the
car at the location of his customer is an injury that arises out of and in the course
of his employment. [2004 ACO 74, *7 (footnote omitted).]
In Naski, the defendant employer manufactured and installed kitchen and bathroom
countertops. The defendant employed the plaintiff as a “measurer.” The largest part of the
plaintiff’s job involved traveling to customers’ homes to measure for the installation of
countertops. The plaintiff sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident while traveling from his
home to a customer’s home. 2007 ACO 78, *1. The WCAC affirmed the magistrate’s
conclusion that the plaintiff’s injury occurred while he was performing a work duty, explaining:
-4-
The record establishes that traveling to the homes of customers was the
primary part of Mr. Naski’s work duties. We . . . affirm the magistrate . . .
because we believe travel to customers’ homes was a primary mission of his
employment, and therefore an integral part of his job duties. [2007 ACO 78, * 3
(footnote omitted).]
The WCAC majority in the present case acknowledged this travel-as-an-integralcomponent exception, but found that it did not apply in this case. The majority observed that the
exception applied only where the employee was actually performing his or her job at the time of
the injury. The majority then agreed with the magistrate that plaintiff had failed to establish
whether he was engaged in work-related travel at the time of his accident. Intervening plaintiff
complains that the WCAC majority misapplied the Martin-Naski exception. According to
intervening plaintiff, “[i]f motor vehicle travel to and from customer location is, indeed,
established to have been an ‘integral part’ of the plaintiff’s job, and the plaintiff was injured
while so traveling in conjunction with a work-related customer visit, then by definition, the
plaintiff ‘was working at the time of his accident’ regardless of whether he was just arriving or
just leaving the customer’s location.”
Intervening plaintiff applies the Martin-Naski exception too broadly. Neither Martin nor
Naski expressly speaks to compensability for an injury sustained during travel from a customer
location. Rather, the scope of those decisions is limited to circumstances involving injuries
sustained during travel to a customer’s location. An extension of the Martin-Naski exception to
travel from a customer’s location regardless of employee’s intended destination after leaving the
customer’s location is inconsistent with the notion that there must be a nexus between work and
injury in order to impose liability under the WDCA.
Generally, for an injury to be compensable under the WDCA, there must be a sufficient
nexus between the employment and the injury so that is may be said that the injury was a
circumstance of the employment. Thomas v Certified Refrigeration, Inc, 392 Mich 623, 632,
635; 221 NW2d 378 (1974); Bowman v R L Coolsaet Constr Co (On Remand), 275 Mich App
188, 191; 738 NW2d 260 (2007); Thomas v Staff Builders Health Care, 168 Mich App 127, 130;
424 NW2d 13 (1988). This nexus exists where the circumstances of employment place the
employee where he was when he was accidentally injured. Thomas, 392 Mich at 631-632.
Conversely, if a personal purpose is so great as to dwarf the business portion of the trip, then it
can no longer be said that the trip is a circumstance of employment. Id. at 635.
Both Martin and Naski involved injuries sustained en route to a client of the employer.
The trips made by the plaintiffs in Martin and Naski were a circumstance of their employment
because their travel was for the purpose of meeting clients and performing business related tasks,
i.e., collecting insurance premiums and measuring for countertop fabrication and installation,
respectively. The purpose of the travel at the time of injury in both Martin and Naski was purely
a business purpose, and therefore, when injury occurred on the way to a client’s location there
was a clear nexus between employment duties and injury, such that the injuries could be said to
have been a circumstance of the employment. Thomas, 392 Mich at 632; Bowman, 275 Mich
App at 191; Thomas, 168 Mich App at 130.
In this case, however, unlike in Martin and Naski, plaintiff had met with the prospective
client and was injured in an accident that occurred after he had left the client’s premises.
-5-
Although it is clear from the evidence adduced at the hearing before the magistrate that
plaintiff’s travel was an integral part of plaintiff’s sales job, and that plaintiff would not have
been traveling on M-60 at the time of the accident but for having completed his sales meeting at
Hayes Lemmertz, it is also clear that plaintiff had accomplished the purpose of his meeting and
had left the Hayes Lemmertz premises and was en route to a new destination. If that destination
was his home, then such a trip would be deemed personal travel. Consequently, the nexus
between employment duties and injury would have ended once plaintiff left the premises of
Hayes Lemmertz. In other words, at the time of the accident, plaintiff’s circumstances would
have been no different than an employee injured on the way home from a fixed place of business,
and he would have been exposed to no greater traffic risks than any worker was be exposed to
during a drive home. Generally, an employer receives no special benefits from an employee’s
travel from work. Bowman, 275 Mich App at 191. Under such circumstances, the nexus
between employment and injury required for compensation under the WDCA would not be
present. Therefore, plaintiff’s destination was relevant for a determination as to whether he is
entitled to benefits under that Act. Contrary to the assertions of intervening plaintiff, the WCAC
properly examined plaintiff’s destination at the time of the accident to determine whether his
injuries were compensable under the WDCA. A non-work-related destination at the time of the
accident would remove plaintiff’s injuries from the scope of the WDCA, while a work-related
destination would bring his injuries within the ambit of the WDCA.
B.
However, even though we conclude that the WCAC applied the proper legal theory to
this action, we also conclude that plaintiff and intervening plaintiff correctly assert that the
WCAC majority erroneously determined that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his travel at the
time of the accident was work-related.
The record conclusively establishes that plaintiff has no memory of his intended
destination after leaving Hayes Lemmertz. He did not tell defendant’s vice president of sales or
branch service manager of his intended destination upon leaving Hayes Lemmertz. The human
resources manager of Hayes Lemmertz did not recall whether plaintiff told her of his intended
destination upon leaving the plant. The route plaintiff traveled at the time of the accident could
have led him to his office or his home. If this was the only evidence available to the magistrate
and the WCAC then the conclusion that plaintiff had failed to show that his destination at the
time of the accident was a work-related destination would be supported under the “any
competent” evidence standard. However, our review of the record reveals that this was not the
only evidence presented on this issue. Rather, there was significant circumstantial evidence that
plaintiff’s destination at the time of the accident was defendant’s Jackson office, where he
intended to perform tasks in furtherance of defendant’s business. A friend of plaintiff and a
cousin both testified that approximately 1½ hours before plaintiff’s accident, plaintiff informed
each that he intended to return to the office before returning home for the day. Plaintiff testified
that it was his “habit, routine and practice” that he would return to the office at the end of the day
to clear his head, to print maps for the next day’s sales calls, to update his database and sales
logics, to review his appointments for the following day and to prepare interoffice mail.
Additionally, defendant’s vice president of sales testified that it would not have been unusual for
plaintiff to return to the office following a sales call and stay after the 5:00 p.m. closing time of
the office.
-6-
In light of this circumstantial evidence and the magistrate’s finding that plaintiff’s friend
and his cousin provided “reliab[le]” testimony, the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff had failed
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his destination at the time of the accident
was work-related is not supported under the any competent evidence standard. Despite the fact
that plaintiff informed both the friend and cousin of his intent to return to the office after leaving
Hayes Lemmertz and despite the fact that plaintiff provided this information less than two hours
before the accident, according to the WCAC majority, essentially because plaintiff did not
announce as he was leaving Hayes Lemmertz that he was returning to the office or tell a superior
of his intent to return to the office, plaintiff’s destination could not be ascertained as plaintiff
could have changed his mind about his destination during the two hours that followed his
expression of his intent to return to the office. Such reasoning reflects an exercise in speculation,
which may not support a compensation determination. See e.g., Mansfield v Enterprise Brass
Works Corp, 97 Mich App 736, 742; 295 NW2d 851 (1980). Conversely, we note that contrary
to the majority finding of the WCAC, there is no evidence in the record from which it may be
inferred that plaintiff was no longer intending to act in a manner consistent with his prior
expression of intent as related by both plaintiff’s friend and his cousin. Absent evidence from
which it could be inferred that plaintiff changed his mind prior to returning to the office as he
had previously stated to two people, we must find that the WCAC majority’s speculative
conclusion to the contrary is not supported by any competent evidence.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
