PEOPLE OF MI V CLARENCE WARD VANCAMP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288708
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-004886-FH
TONY PALLONE,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288709
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-004886-FH
CLARENCE WARD VANCAMP,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and ZAHRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 288708, defendant, Tony Pallone (Pallone), appeals as of right his jury
trial convictions for two counts of uttering and publishing, MCL 750.249. Pallone was
sentenced to two years of probation. In Docket No. 288709, defendant, Clarence VanCamp,
appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for five counts of uttering and publishing, MCL
750.249. VanCamp was sentenced to five years of probation. We affirm.
Pallone first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.
Although Pallone moved for directed verdict at trial, he did not argue, as he does now, that the
instant case is merely a civil matter and not a criminal case. Accordingly, we review this
unpreserved claim for plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v Odom, 276 Mich App
407, 421; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). In any event, Pallone fails to cite a single statute or case to
support his argument. Argument must be supported by citation of appropriate authority or
policy. MCR 7.212(C)(7); People v Sowders, 164 Mich App 36, 49; 417 NW2d 78 (1987). In
addition, it is axiomatic that in the case of many crimes the defendant has also committed a tort.
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To accept the premise that criminal prosecutions would be precluded because the complained-of
acts could also give rise to a civil action would render a large portion of criminal statutory law
dead letter. People v Perkins, 473 Mich 626, 638; 703 NW2d 448 (2005) (courts should avoid
any construction that would render any part (in this case all) of a statute nugatory).
Pallone also argues that the verdict was not based on sufficient evidence. We disagree.
On appeal for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews all evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the prosecution proved all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe,
440 Mich 508, 513-516; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), modified on other grounds 441 Mich 1201
(1992). The trier of fact, not this Court, determines what inferences may be drawn from the
evidence, and concludes the weight to be given to those inferences. People v Hardiman, 466
Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Questions of credibility and of the intention of witnesses
are also left for the trier of fact. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864
(1999). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. Wolfe, 440 Mich at
515-516.
MCL 750.249 provides, in relevant part: “A person who utters and publishes as true a
false, forged, altered, or counterfeit record, deed, instrument, or other writing listed in section
248 knowing it to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeit with intent to injure or defraud is guilty
of a felony . . . .” [Emphasis added.] The elements of uttering and publishing are: (1) knowledge
on the part of the defendant that the instrument was false; (2) intent to defraud; and (3)
presentation of the forged instrument for payment. People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457;
628 NW2d 105 (2001). To be a false document, for purposes of uttering and publishing, an
instrument itself need not be forged. People v Aguwa, 245 Mich App 1, 5; 626 NW2d 176
(2001). A legally valid instrument acquired by deceptive means is still false, and is proscribed
by the uttering and publishing statute. Id. at 4-5. A defendant’s intent may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. Hawkins, 245 Mich App at 458 (emphasis added).
The victim and defendants had known each other for around 20 years. The victim
established a design company in 2003 and defendants performed work for the company as
independent contractors. After the victim returned from a vacation she realized that she was
missing several company checks. After reviewing a bank statement, the she discovered that the
checks had been made payable to defendants and some of their acquaintances. The victim made
repeated demands that defendants return the money but was never reimbursed. She eventually
contacted the police. Upon reviewing the checks, the victim testified that she recognized that
Pallone had forged her name and that VanCamp had endorsed several of the checks. She
testified that Pallone did not have authority to sign her name. She testified that when she
confronted Pallone about the checks, he “admitted it and said he was very sorry and it would
never happen again . . . .” He also said he would pay the money back but did not. In addition,
there was testimony that Pallone first “indicated to [Lieutenant John Szcepaniak of the Grosse Ile
Police Department] via the phone that he had the authority to sign checks and do the things that
he was doing.” This evidence, viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient that
a rational trier of fact could determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Pallone forged the checks
in question with intent to defraud the victim.
Pallone also argues that the prosecutor abused his discretion in bringing criminal charges,
again arguing the instant case is a civil matter and not a criminal one. As discussed previously,
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Pallone fails to cite authority for his argument that the existence of a civil liability somehow
precludes criminal liability. Further, the prosecutor has discretion to bring any charges
supported by the evidence. People v Yeoman, 218 Mich App 406, 413-414; 554 NW2d 577
(1996). Here, because there was sufficient evidence to convict Pallone of the crimes charged, we
conclude that Pallone fails to show that the prosecution abused its discretion in bringing charges
against him.
We now turn to VanCamp’s arguments. VanCamp argues that the evidence was
constitutionally insufficient to sustain the convictions on the two counts of uttering and
publishing. We disagree.
Unlike Pallone, there is no evidence that Vancamp forged the victim’s signature.
However, several of the checks were made payable to him, were endorsed by him and cashed.
Further, the victim testified that when she informed VanCamp that Pallone had forged her
signature on several checks, VanCamp acted surprised. VanCamp cannot now suggest that he
had innocently endorsed the checks that Pallone had forged. VanCamp admits that this was a
credibility contest. This Court is not in a position to judge the victim’s credibility. Avant, 235
Mich App at 506. Although circumstantial, there is evidence that VanCamp knew that he
endorsed several checks that Pallone had forged, intending to defraud the victim. Viewed in a
light favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient so that a rational trier of fact could determine,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that VanCamp knowingly endorsed checks forged by his partner,
with intent to defraud the victim.
VanCamp next argues that his constitutional right to counsel was infringed because his
trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
Here, there was not a hearing in the trial court, and this Court’s review is limited to the
existing record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Wilson,
242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). The questions presented by a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact; findings of fact by the
lower court are reviewed for clear error, and questions of constitutional law are reviewed de
novo. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US
Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Where the issue involves counsel’s performance, a
defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under professional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, if not for
counsel’s errors, the result would have been different and the result that did occur was
fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688; 104 S Ct
2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 309, 312-313; 521 NW2d 797
(1994).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). To succeed
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that, but for an error by
counsel, the result of the proceedings would have been different and that the proceedings were
fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764
(2001). The defendant bears a “heavy burden” on these points. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590,
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599; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 140;
659 NW2d 611 (2003). “This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding
matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.”
Garza, 246 Mich App at 255.
VanCamp first argues that defense counsel should have “moved to exclude reference to
his prior conviction.” (Emphasis added). Initially we note that at trial, defense counsel asked
Lieutenant Szcepaniak whether he had prior contact with VanCamp’s previous attorney, and he
replied, “[y]es, I believe he represented Mr. VanCamp’s on his prior criminal complaint.”
(Emphasis added). Thus, VanCamp’s assertion on appeal that his prior conviction was presented
to the jury is erroneous. We also conclude that defense counsel engaged in reasonable trial
strategy by skillfully continuing the questioning of Lieutenant Szcepaniak without pause,
minimizing the significance of prior criminal complaint to the jury. In any event, the reference
to VanCamp’s on his prior criminal complaint was not repeated, not mentioned by the
prosecution in argument, and certainly not emphasized to the jury. Thus, we conclude VanCamp
failed to establish that the result would have been different. Strickland, 466 US at 687-688.
VanCamp also argues that defense counsel failed to object when the trial court failed to
give the cautionary instruction contained in CJI2d 4.11. We disagree. Again, we find defense
counsel may have determined that any instruction would have highlighted defendant’s prior
criminal complaint. Defense counsel may have chosen not to draw unnecessary attention to this
evidence. VanCamp fails to overcome the presumption that the defense counsel was engaged in
sound trial strategy. Further, VanCamp’s brief on appeal contains only a conclusory argument
that he would have benefited from the instruction. Because he does not argue or offer support
for his position that but for defense counsel’s failure to request the instructions the outcome of
trial would have been different, we conclude that defendant's final claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel must fail. Strickland, 466 US at 687-688.
Finally, VanCamp argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the
trial court judge for purposes of sentencing,1 and now VanCamp requests a new trial. We
disagree.
Because VanCamp did not move for a new trial below, this claim is unpreserved and we
review for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Odom, 276 Mich App at 421.
A trial judge has broad, but not unlimited, discretion when controlling the court’s
proceedings. People v Taylor, 252 Mich App 519, 522; 652 NW2d 526 (2002). The overriding
principle is that a court’s actions cannot pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. People v Davis,
216 Mich App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). Invading the prosecutor’s role is a clear violation of
this tenet. People v Ross, 181 Mich App 89, 91; 449 NW2d 107 (1989). The trial court, pursuant
1
The motion to disqualify was made after trial and before sentencing, and VanCamp did not
request a new trial. Therefore, VanCamp only sought disqualification for purposes of
sentencing.
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to MRE 614(b), may question witnesses in order to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant
information. Conyers, supra, 194 Mich App 395, 404; 487 NW2d 787 (1992). “However, the
trial court must exercise caution and restraint to ensure that its questions are not intimidating,
argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial.” Id. at 405. The test to determine whether a new
trial is warranted is whether the judge’s questions and comments may well have unjustifiably
aroused suspicion in the mind of the jury as to a witness’s credibility and whether partiality quite
possibly could have influenced the jury to the detriment of the defendant’s case. Id. at 404.
When a trial judge’s questioning does cross the line of judicial impartiality, a harmless-error
standard is used. Davis, supra, 216 Mich App 51.
Here, the trial court conducted an extended examination of the victim. The record
reflects 22 pages of questioning. However, the questioning was mundane, eliciting evidence
describing the layout of her office in which the checks were taken from and how the checks were
produced. Indeed, VanCamp does not cite to one aspect of the trial court’s questioning that
adversely effected him. Further, the trial court elicited evidence favorable to defendants,
including evidence that the victim sometimes loaned defendants money without a written
agreement. There is no indication that the trial court’s questions were intimidating,
argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial. VanCamp cites no authority to for the proposition
that extensive questioning by the trial court alone constitutes error requiring reversal.
VanCamp also argues that the trial court was hostile to VanCamp’s counsel.
Specifically, VanCamp claims that the trial court was not sensitive to the hearing problems of
VanCamp’s counsel. The trial court admitted that it was “annoyed” with VanCamp’s counsel
because on several occasions in which VanCamp’s counsel did not respond to the trial court’s
requests and cited hearing problems; yet on other occasions he spoke to the jury in soft tones,
indicating that he could hear fine. Although we have concerns that the trial court harbored
annoyance for VanCamp’s counsel during trial, we simply cannot locate anywhere in the lower
court record where this annoyance was manifested. Indeed, VanCamp’s brief on appeals only
contains the following analysis: “the judge yelled very loudly and in general did not handle the
issue of Mr. Vancamp’s attorney’s hearing problem.” A party may not leave it to this Court to
search for the factual basis to sustainor reject his position, but must support factual statements
with specific references to the record. People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 413; 760 NW2d 882
(2008). VanCamp fails to establish error requiring reversal.
Last, we reject VanCamp’s claim that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court
allegedly laughed in presence of the jury when Pallone claimed to be ill and yelled at Pallone
when he tried to hand something to the victim at trial. VanCamp fails to explain how the trial
court’s behavior toward Pallone adversely affected him. The trial court adequately explained
that it raised its voice at Pallone because the contact occurred shortly after the victim had
testified against Pallone and the trial court sought to prevent any confrontation. In regard to the
trial court allegedly laughing in the presence of the jury, the trial court explained that it initially
believed Pallone was malingering but then changed its mind and apologized.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court’s actions were not so extreme as to constitute a
complete abandonment of the veil of impartiality such that the verdict of a jury would be
overturned. The laughter was not aimed at VanCamp, and in his questioning of witnesses, the
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trial court judge did not indicate any bias toward the prosecution. Accordingly, a new trial is not
warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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