DAWN DUBUC V DR ADEL ALI EL-MAGRABI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAWN DUBUC,
UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
DR. ADEL ALI EL-MAGRABI and QUALIFIED
MEDICAL EXAMINERS, INC.,
No. 287756
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-727798-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and SAAD and SHAPIRO, JJ.
SHAPIRO, J (dissenting).
Because I conclude that both the tortious interference and defamation (libel) claims
should survive summary disposition and that there is a question of fact as to the existence of a
qualified privilege, I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2003, plaintiff, a manager at Ford Motor Company, was in an automobile
accident in which she suffered a closed head injury as well as orthopedic injuries.1 She was
certified as disabled by her physicians. Consistent with her contract of employment with Ford,
she was placed on disability leave and received disability benefits through Unicare, Ford’s
insurer. The Unicare plan provided that recipients of such benefits “submit to examinations by a
physician designated by it for the purpose of determining whether to continue payment of
Disability Benefits.” Unicare requested that plaintiff submit to such an examination by
defendant Dr. Adel Ali El-Magrabi. Dr. El-Magrabi was an agent of defendant Qualified
Medical Examiners (QME), a company that brokers physician services for such examinations
and the examination took place at their offices rather than the private office of Dr. El-Magrabi.2
1
Plaintiff had a B.S. in mechanical engineering and an M.B.A., both from the University of
Michigan.
2
Although there are two defendants, all references to defendant in the singular are to Dr. ElMagrabi.
-1-
Unbeknownst to defendants, plaintiff tape-recorded the evaluation. A copy of that
recording was provided to the trial court and to this Court. The ultimate determination as to what
was said during the evaluation process, and the meaning of those words given the speakers’ tones
and the context in which they were spoken, is for the fact finder. At the summary disposition
stage, this Court is required to consider the recorded material and all inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, as the non-moving party. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Oberlies v
Searchmont Resort, Inc, 246 Mich App 424, 427; 633 NW2d 408 (2001). “‘All factual disputes
for the purpose of deciding the motion are resolved in the plaintiff’s (nonmovant’s) favor.’”
Vargas v Hong Jin Crown Corp, 247 Mich App 278, 282; 636 NW2d 291 (2001), quoting
Jeffrey v Rapid American Corp, 448 Mich 178, 184; 529 NW2d 644 (1995). There being no
agreed upon transcript of the recording, this Court must do so based upon its hearing of the entire
recording.
The recording reveals plaintiff came to the scheduled examination and asked the QME
receptionist if her attorney, who had accompanied her, could remain in the examination room.
The receptionist, who remained in the examining room, advised her that the attorney could come
in and stay. Plaintiff and the receiptionist had a conversation in which plaintiff appears to have
been forthcoming. When Dr. El-Magrabi entered the room, plaintiff’s attorney had not yet
entered. Dr. El-Magrabi asked plaintiff her name, which she provided. Plaintiff asked defendant
if her attorney knew that the examination was beginning, presumably so he could come into the
room, but he ignored her question. Her attorney did come in the room and defendant asked
plaintiff for the date of the injury, which she provided. At that point, he accused her of “reading
something,” which she explained she was not. Over the course of the next 15 minutes, during
which he asked plaintiff questions about her injuries and treatment, defendant repeatedly
interrupted plaintiff with other questions and talked over her as she attempted to answer his
questions, even though her answers were prompt and responsive. While, as noted above,
ultimately this is a question for the finder of fact, I conclude after hearing the tape that plaintiff
was forthcoming with her answers and cooperative while defendant was impatient and
discourteous. Although he later testified in deposition that two to three hours had been
scheduled for his examination of the patient, his tone throughout was that of a doctor who had
many more important places to be and could hardly tolerate taking a few minutes out to evaluate
this patient as he was being paid to do. After defendant barely allowed plaintiff to get answers
out for about 15 minutes, plaintiff’s counsel, who had not been instructed to remain silent, asked
defendant, in a respectful tone, to give plaintiff more time to answer the questions. At that point,
defendant got up and began to leave the room. Plaintiff’s attorney stated that he “won’t say
another word,” but defendant left the room and refused to return to continue the exam even after
plaintiff’s attorney volunteered to leave the examination room altogether.
According to the receptionist, who went out to speak with him, defendant said he “was
done” and that plaintiff should get dressed and leave. Plaintiff was concerned that she had not
been examined and asked the receptionist why the doctor left. The receptionist stated that she
did not know why. Plaintiff asked the receptionist if she had been answering defendant’s
questions and the receptionist said that she had been answering them. Plaintiff expressed
concern that she had not had a chance to give full answers because defendant kept cutting her off
and because defendant had left without finishing the exam.
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On or about November 17, 2006, QME sent a letter, written and signed by defendant, to
Unicare. The letter contained several statements that are wholly inconsistent with the recording
of the actual interaction. The letter stated in pertinent part:
During the interviewing process, I was not able to secure any meaningful
history from her. It was a distraction with her and her lawyer talking at the same
time. I had advised her attorney that he could stay but that she would have to be
the person who gave the history and answered the questions posed. During this
time period Ms. Dubuc would not answer the questions with any creditability, she
did direct her conversation to the attorney present in the examination room and I
was unable to complete my history or physical examination . . . . After several
attempts to get a history and repeated attempts to have her answer my questions
without the help of her attorney, I terminated the evaluation.
Although a fact finder may hear the tape differently, after hearing the tape I have no difficulty
concluding that each of these statements is, at best, incomplete and misleading, and that a
factfinder, after hearing the recording, could reasonably conclude that the statements are
knowing falsehoods rather than expressions of opinion. Indeed, several of the statements are, on
their face, assertions of objective facts.
Defendant stated in the report that he was “unable” to complete physical examination, but
the recording indicates that he never attempted any sort of physical examination of plaintiff.
Defendant also stated in his report that plaintiff and her attorney were talking at the same time,
but this factual statement is not supported by the audio recording and defendant acknowledged in
his deposition that the only time plaintiff and her attorney answered questions at the same time
was “near the end . . . when I terminated the exam.” Further, there is no indication in the
recording that plaintiff directly spoke to her attorney while defendant was still in the examination
room. With regard to defendant’s statement in his report that plaintiff would not answer any
questions with “creditability,” defendant explained in his deposition that he meant “the
information she gave me could not balance each other. . . . I didn’t feel comfortable with the
imbalance and that presentation. . . . I was just saying all the information I was getting could not
be used to render an opinion that is credible.” In his written report, however, defendant merely
stated that plaintiff’s answers to his questions lacked creditability, not that he was unable to write
a credible report. Of course, had he actually conducted a physical examination, he may very
well have been able to prepare a credible report.
On June 15, 2007, Unicare’s Senior Disability Claims Examiner sent a letter to plaintiff’s
counsel informing him that plaintiff’s disability benefits were terminated as of the date of
defendant’s examination. The sole reason cited in the letter for the termination was that
“UniCare’s Independent Medical Examiner (Dr. El-Magrabi) was not allowed to procure medical
information relative to Ms. Dubuc’s condition” and that as a result “UniCare was not allowed to
obtain appropriate medical certification of her claim [sic] condition.” In sum, UniCare took the
position that plaintiff could not qualify as disabled under the contract because plaintiff refused to
provide information to defendant or prevented him from examining her.
On June 27, 2007, after receipt of the letter from Unicare terminating plaintiff’s benefits,
plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to defendant and to QME stating in pertinent part:
-3-
You made false statements in your report to Unicare concerning Ms.
DuBuc. First, you stated that during the interview process you were not able to
secure any meaningful history from her. You also stated in the report that you
made several attempts to get a history and repeated attempts too have her answer
your questions without the help of her attorney and then terminated the
evaluation. Based on your statements, Unicare has terminated Ms. DuBuc’s
disability benefits. . . . The basis for the termination of benefits . . . is due to your
allegation that you were unable to procure medical information relative to Ms.
DuBuc’s condition. Your conduct has caused significant harm to Ms. DuBuc. In
most situations, it would be your word against her word and her attorney. There
is a taped recording of the evaluation which confirms that you have falsified
information in your letter dated November 17, 2006. We are asking that you
retract your statements immediately. Please [send the retraction letter to Unicare]
within two weeks. Without your retraction letter, Ms. DuBuc will continue to
suffer harm from your conduct. Ms. Dubuc’s damages include . . . loss of
income, medical insurance and emotional harm related to your conduct.
No retraction letter was sent. Plaintiff then filed the instant three count complaint. Count
I alleged “tortuous interference with contract/fraud” and Count II alleged “libel/slander.” The
gravaman of both counts was that defendant’s letter to Unicare contained “false and untrue
statements” that led to the loss of her disability benefits and termination of her employment.
Count III alleged that Dr. El-Magrabi was negligent. Defendants promptly filed a motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The trial court granted the motion as to
Counts I and III. The trial court then heard defendant’s motion to dismiss the libel count under
both (C)(8) and (C)(10). The court stated at the hearing that the statements made by defendant
were statements of opinion and that defendant’s opinion that plaintiff did not answer his
questions with credibility in his letter could not be considered defamatory even if false.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the dismissal of Count I, tortious interference, and Count II,
libel.
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT
Tortious interference with a contractual relationship requires three elements: “(1) a
contract, (2) a breach, and (3) instigation of the breach without justification by the defendant.”
Wood v Herndon, 186 Mich App 495, 499; 465 NW2d 5 (1990) (quotations and citation
omitted). In order to prove such a claim, plaintiff must show “the intentional doing of a per se
wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law for the purpose of
invading the contractual rights or business relationship of another.” Id. Certainly, knowingly
making false statements to a contracting party about the other contracting party, where the
statements bear directly on the contract, is sufficient to show malice, or at least a lack of
justification.
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A claim may fail if the defendant’s actions were taken for a legitimate personal or
business interest. Id. at 500. However, it is difficult to conceive what legitimate business or
personal interest could account for making false statements in a medical report. Even if this
Court were able to conceive of such a legitimate reason,3 it would not justify summary
disposition, as there would still be a question of fact as to whether that hypothetical legitimate
interest was the reason for defendant’s statements or, as evidenced by the tape recording of the
events, his statements were based on pique or anger.
Nevertheless, the majority, relying on Wood, concludes that although defendant “may
have been negligent in his performance of the IME,” his conduct was motivated by a legitimate
business interest and, therefore, defendants cannot be liable. Wood does not support this
proposition and, in fact, supports plaintiff’s position in this case.
In Wood, the defendant was a private investigation business that provided insurance
companies with a weekly listing of vehicle fires obtained from public information in the hope
that the insurance company would hire it to perform an investigation on any claims the insurance
company subsequently elected to investigate. Id. at 496-497. The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant’s submission of the weekly report to the plaintiff’s insurer, which included the
plaintiff’s vehicle, constituted tortious interference with the insurance contract because, based on
the defendant’s investigation, the claim was denied based on a theory that the plaintiffs had
arranged the theft and arson of the vehicle. Id. at 497-499. This Court noted that there were two
cases concerning whether legitimate personal and business interests were sufficient to overcome
a tortious interference claim:
In interpreting the requirement that the defendant’s wrongful conduct be for the
purpose of invading the contractual rights or business relationship of another
person, this Court has developed a rule that a defendant is not liable for tortious
interference of contract where he is motivated by legitimate personal or business
interests. In Christner v Anderson, Nietzke & Co, PC, 156 Mich App 330, 348349; 401 NW2d 641 (1986), this Court held that a defendant’s legitimate
motivation per se shields it from liability in a tortious interference action. In JimBob [v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71, 95-96; 443 NW2d 451 (1989)], however, this
Court declined to adopt such a rule, indicating instead that the defendant’s
motivation is but one of several factors to be weighed in assessing the propriety of
the defendant’s actions with other factors, including (1) the nature of the
defendant’s conduct, (2) the nature of plaintiff’s contractual interest, (3) the social
utility of the parties’ respective interests, and (4) the proximity of the defendant’s
conduct to the interference. Jim-Bob, supra at 96-97. [Id. at 500.]
3
The majority suggests that the “legitimate interest” was the desire to conduct the medical
evaluation that defendants were retained to perform. However, I do not see how being hired to
conduct an exam can be construed as a legitimate reason for refusing to conduct the exam and to
knowingly report falsehoods about the examinee.
-5-
Thus, although a legitimate personal or business interest may preclude liability, it is not an
absolute defense, and other facts must be taken into consideration. In Wood, this Court found no
interference because “[t]here is no evidence to suggest that defendants manufactured evidence to
falsely create a potential defense” and that the information submitted to the insurance company
“was not only accurate, but was derived from public information.” Id. at 502.
The same cannot be said of defendant’s actions in this case. The representations made by
defendant were clearly inaccurate based on the audio recording. Furthermore, the Wood Court
indicated that “[h]ad there been some showing that defendants manufactured evidence or
maliciously or falsely represented to AAA that the fire was attributable to arson or that plaintiffs
had arranged for the theft of the automobile, then perhaps it could be said that there was a
tortious interference with contract.” Id. at 503. In my view, this is precisely what happened
here. Defendant either manufactured or maliciously and falsely represented that plaintiff was
lying about her claims and that she refused to give a proper medical history. Under the
circumstances, I think there is sufficient evidence for this to be a jury question and, therefore,
would conclude that summary disposition was inappropriate. See also Hall v Claya, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 17, 1008 (Docket No. 277202)
(concluding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence of both tortious interference with a
contract and defamation when an employee of the plaintiff’s employer falsely reported to the
plaintiff’s private disability insurer that the plaintiff was working full-time while collecting
disability; “From the evidence that the information that defendant volunteered was false,
however, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant acted with malice or reckless disregard
of the truth. The evidence showed that the inaccurate information conveyed by defendant caused
plaintiff’s insurer to cease paying benefits and demand a refund of benefits previously paid.”).
III. LIBEL
An action for libel has four elements. Hawkins v Mercy Health Servs, Inc, 230 Mich App
315, 325; 583 NW2d 725 (1998). In order to prevail, plaintiff must show:
(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an
unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least
negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by
the publication. [Id.]
At the summary disposition stage, plaintiff is not required to prove each element by a
preponderance of the evidence, but instead simply demonstrate that a question of material fact
exists as to each. Id. at 336. Although the “court may decide as a matter of law whether a
statement is actually capable of defamatory meaning,” Ireland v Edwards, 230 Mich App 607,
619; 584 NW2d 632 (1998), our Supreme Court has “consistently viewed the determination of
truth or falsity as a purely factual question which should generally be left to the jury”.
Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 137; 476 NW2d 112 (1991) (CAVANAGH, J.,
concurring).
The trial court did not make clear as to which element(s) it concluded plaintiff had failed
to create a question of fact, but the trial court appears to have been primarily concerned with
whether the statements made by defendant were false and defamatory. The majority concludes
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that the statements were not capable of defamatory meaning because the statements made by
defendant in his letter, even if false, “w[ere] not intended to, nor did it, reflect upon plaintiff’s
reputation.” The majority does not explain how it reaches the conclusion that the statements did
not “reflect upon plaintiff’s reputation” other than to cite Sawabini v Desenberg, 143 Mich App
373; 372 NW2d 559 (1985). However, that case is plainly distinguishable and, in my view,
suggests that summary disposition is improper here.
The plaintiff, Sawabini, was a physician who had been sued in an underlying medical
malpractice case alleging that he had improperly prescribed drugs to an addict who subsequently
died. Id. at 376. Sawabini’s malpractice insurer retained the defendant, Desenberg, to represent
Sawabini. Id. During that litigation, Desenberg became aware, through an unrelated but similar
case, of a credible expert who had testified that it is within the standard of care for a physician to
medically maintain a drug abuser on limited quantities of the drugs if efforts at detoxification
and withdrawal fail, or are not indicated. Id. Desenberg wrote a letter to the claims adjustor for
Sawabini’s malpractice insurer, which was copied to the attorneys for Sawabini’s co-defendants.
Id. at 376-377. The letter reviewed the testimony from the other case of this potential expert and
stated:
“If an expert such as [he] is going to be helpful in these cases, the Defendant
physicians are going to have to take the position that they knew or strongly
suspected that the patients were long-time drug abusers who could not be
successfully cured and, therefore, needed to be controlled as well as practicable.
Based on our conversations with at least our insureds and the contents of their
records, that might be a very legitimate position.” [Id. at 376 n 1.]
Sawabini’s personal counsel then sent a letter to Desenberg directing him to retract the
letter he had sent and to withdraw from the case. Id. at 377. Desenberg did withdraw from the
case, but did not retract his letter. Id. Sawabini sued Desenberg for, inter alia, libel and
defamation of character on the grounds that the letter contained “‘false and defamatory
statements and innuendos intended to mean that plaintiff was guilty of professional malpractice,
impropriety and/or criminal behavior which recipients of said letter understood them to have this
meaning.’” Id. at 378.
I agree with the majority that Sawabini directs us to consider the purpose of the
communication and its intended audience in determining whether the statements are capable of
defamatory meaning. However, the purpose of the communication and the intended audience in
the instant case could not be more different than that in Sawabini. In Sawabini, the letter was a
business-like exploration of litigation strategies among aligned parties and it merely alludes to
the possibility that the plaintiff’s testimony would be such that the proposed defense could be
offered. It makes no specific references to anything Sawabini had said or done and it is clear
from the letter that it is the writer’s position, as well as that of a well-credentialed expert, that
prescribing drugs in such fashion is medically proper in some cases. Id. Additionally, Sawabini
contained no claim of a specific harm caused by the letter. Rather, there are only undefined and
non-specific injuries to reputation despite the fact that there was no assertion of defamation per
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se. By contrast, in this case, defendant’s letter (1) was sent to a party with interests directly
contrary to those of plaintiff; (2) attributed statements and actions directly to plaintiff; (3)
attributed statements and actions to plaintiff that were grounds for discontinuation of her long
term disability benefits; and (4) had a tone that was dismissive and negative.4
In the present case, whether plaintiff directed her answers to her attorney during the
examination, and whether plaintiff’s attorney and plaintiff answered questions at the same time
throughout the examination, were matters of fact, capable of being proven true or false, and
clearly caused harm because they resulted in plaintiff’s benefits being denied. Defendant’s
statements imply that plaintiff is lying, covering up, or, at the very least, not worthy of belief.
There is nothing hyperbolic about the statements; they were “reasonably understood as stating
actual facts about plaintiff.” See Ireland, 230 Mich App at 618-619. Furthermore, even if
defendant’s statements were true, if the implications the statements created were false, the
question of whether the statements were defamatory must be left up to the jury. Hawkins, 230
Mich App at 327-328. Thus, under the circumstances, defendant’s statements are potentially
actionable, and plaintiff’s libel claim should go to the jury.5
III. PRIVILEGE
Defendants argue that El-Magrabi’s communication to UniCare was privileged.
Defendants claim a privilege for internal communications between a client and consultant
because “it is inconceivable that their potential to injure a plaintiff outweighs the public good of
professional analysis and consultation.” Defendants cite no authority to establish their claimed
privilege. “It is not sufficient for a party ‘simply to announce a position or assert an error and
then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and
elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his
position.’” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998), quoting Mitcham v
Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
Moreover, defendants fail to distinguish between an absolute privilege and a qualified
privilege and do not indicate which they assert applies. It is clear that an absolute privilege
4
Even if Dr. El-Magrabi’s statements were viewed as “opinions,” this would not justify
summary disposition. Although a statement is not defamatory if it “could not be reasonably
understood as stating actual facts about plaintiff,” or if it is clearly rhetorical or hyperbole,
Ireland, 230 Mich App at 618-619, “a statement of ‘opinion’ is not automatically shielded from
an action for defamation because ‘expressions of “opinion” may often imply an assertion of
objective fact.’” Smith v Anonymous Joint Enterprise, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2010)
(July 30, 2010) slip op at 25, quoting Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1, 18; 110 S Ct
2695; 11 L Ed 2d 1 (1990). “[A] statement of opinion that can be proven false may be
defamatory because it may harm or deter others from associating with the subject.” Id.
5
I also conclude that plaintiff has established that defendant’s statements were defamatory per se
because she produced factual support for her claims that defendant’s report was false, that it was
written with knowledge that it was false, and that is was injurious to her employment and
livelihood. Glazer v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432, 438; 506 NW2d 570 (1993).
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cannot apply here, as such a privilege only arises in the context of matters of public concern.
Bolton v Walker, 197 Mich 699, 706-707; 164 NW 420 (1917). Qualified privilege, “relates
more particularly to private interests, where the occasion casts upon the defendant a duty, or
right, to communicate to another in regard to some matter of special concern to one or both or to
others for the protection or society, or some interest he represents, and the courts sometimes hold
such privilege a complete defense to otherwise actionable utterances, as a matter of law, when
satisfied no malice is affirmatively shown.” Id. Very few Michigan cases have discussed the
scope of the qualified privilege and those few that have, have offered only limited general
guidance. See Dadd v Mount Hope Church, 486 Mich 857; 780 NW2d 763 (2010).
Regardless of the limited caselaw regarding the extent of the qualified privilege, it is
clear that, even if the communication falls within it, the privilege may be overcome by proof that
the defendant made the statement knowing it was false or in reckless disregard of whether it was
true. Id.; Fortney v Stephan, 237 Mich 603, 610; 213 NW 172 (1927); Mino v Clio School Dist,
255 Mich App 60, 73; 661 NW2d 586 (2003).
Because El-Magrabi was present during the interview upon which he reported, he knew,
or should have known, whether his statements concerning plaintiff were false. Moreover,
although he stated in his deposition that he did not initially intend to write a report and that he
could not write a credible report based on the information obtained during the IME, he did
dictate a report, which he did not read over afterward, and allowed defendant QME to
electronically attach his signature. These circumstances clearly create a question of fact whether
defendant acted in bad faith or with malice, and so summary disposition based upon a qualified
privilege would not be proper.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because I find fact questions that must be resolved by a jury exist as to both the tortious
interference and defamation claims and that defendants’ claim of qualified privilege does not bar
the claim as a matter of law, I conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition
and would reverse and remand for discovery and trial.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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