PEOPLE OF MI V BILLEY JAMES CHOATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 292193
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 07-009405-FH
BILLEY JAMES CHOATE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and DONOFRIO and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). The trial
court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to eight to 20 years’
imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant initially urges this Court to vacate his conviction on the ground that the
prosecutor failed to prove that the crime occurred in Lapeer County, and that the circuit court
thus lacked jurisdiction to convict him of the crime. The Lapeer County Prosecutor charged
defendant with an August 4, 2006 breaking and entering of a residence located at “7720 Burnside
Road, Brown City, Lapeer County.” Several witnesses confirmed at trial the address where the
break in occurred, but no witnesses specifically testified that the residence sat within Lapeer
County. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, alleging that “there is no evidence
submitted that this crime occurred in Lapeer County.” The trial court denied the defense motion,
explaining as follows:
The testimony was that on several occasions the testimony was that the
specific address of the break-in was 7720 Burnside Road, Brown City, Michigan,
Lapeer County. Again, there’s a Brown City mailing address but it is within the
County of Lapeer. The victims themselves never said Lapeer County. They
continued to refer to Burnside Road and their address.
I believe the officer did indicate that he went out to the Burnside Road
address in the County of Lapeer but the Court will take judicial notice that 7720
Burnside Road is within the County of Lapeer and not within Sanilac County, so
your motion for improper venue is considered and denied for a directed verdict.
-1-
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to take judicial
notice of adjudicative facts. Freed v Salas, 286 Mich App 300, 341; 780 NW2d 844 (2009).
The Michigan Rules of Evidence sanction judicial notice of facts when the fact
“judicially noticed . . . is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” MRE 201(b). The trial court inaccurately recalled the trial
testimony, which did not specifically note that 7720 Burnside Road was situated in Lapeer
County. But the trial court acted within its discretion when it took judicial notice of the county
in which 7720 Burnside Road is situated, namely Lapeer County, because the county within
which the break in took place is readily and accurately ascertained by resort to atlases or maps,
“sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” MRE 201(b); Freed, 286 Mich App
at 341. However, the trial court did not satisfy the requirement in MRE 201(f) that “[i]n a
criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.”
Yet any error relating to the proof of venue at defendant’s trial or the trial court’s neglect
to inform the jury of its taking of judicial notice regarding the situs of the crime remains subject
to harmless error evaluation, according to the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v
Houthoofd, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket Nos. 138959, 138969, decided July 31,
2010). In Houthoofd, the Supreme Court found that none of the acts comprising the defendant’s
charged crimes had taken place in Saginaw County, the situs of the defendant’s trial. Id., slip op
at 9-16. The Supreme Court next considered “whether statutory venue error in criminal
prosecutions is subject to a harmless error analysis under MCL 769.26.” Id., slip op at 16. In
pertinent part, the Supreme Court, analyzed the nature of the improper venue:
. . . [W]e must first examine whether statutory venue error is a
constitutional error in order to determine the applicable standard of review. In
People v Lee[, 334 Mich 217, 225; 54 NW2d 305 (1962),] this Court recognized
that “[i]n the absence of any limitation by constitutional provision, it seems to be
generally recognized that the power of a State legislature to fix the venue of
criminal prosecutions in a county or district other than that in which the crime was
committed is unrestricted.” . . . The Court noted that there was no explicit venue
mandate in the Michigan Constitution of 1908. . . . and this omission carried over
to the . . . 1963 Constitution[]. Thus, Michigan’s constitution only requires that a
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial before an impartial jury
be preserved, and does not require that the jury trial be in the county where the
crime occurred; as a result, statutory venue error is not a constitutional error.
[Houthoofd, slip op at 17-19 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added), citing Const
1963, art 1, § 20.]1
1
To the extent that the instant defendant premises his venue-related claim of error on provisions
of the United States Constitution, “‘By the provisions of the Federal Constitution, criminal trials
must take place in the State and district wherein the crime was committed, but it was long ago
determined that these provisions apply only to prosecutions in Federal courts.’” Lee, 334 Mich
(continued…)
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Given that the defendant in Houthoofd had preserved his claim of venue error, slip op at
17, the Supreme Court scrutinized as follows whether the error warranted reversal of the
defendant’s convictions:
This Court has held that the standard of review for preserved
nonconstitutional error places the burden on the defendant to establish a
miscarriage of justice under a “more probable than not” standard in order to
warrant reversal. This generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the
error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Defendant has not
established prejudice for the witness intimidation or solicitation charges. With
respect to the witness intimidation charge, defendant has proffered no argument
that it is more probable than not that the outcome of the trial would have been
different had he been prosecuted in another county, nor has he shown that he was
deprived of a fair trial by an impartial jury. With respect to the solicitation
charge, defendant argues that he was prejudiced because the prosecutors in
Arenac County had declined to prosecute him on that charge. However, this is
not the same as arguing that it is more probable than not that the outcome of the
case would have differed had he been tried in Arenac County. MCL 769.26
requires a miscarriage of justice in order to warrant reversal. Defendant received
a fair trial before an impartial jury, and it cannot be argued that there was a
miscarriage of justice simply because the trial was in Saginaw County. Therefore,
defendant has not meet his burden of proof to establish that, more probably than
not, there was a miscarriage of justice by trying him for witness intimidation and
solicitation to commit murder in Saginaw County. Thus, we hold that lack of
proper venue is subject to a harmless error and that the venue error did not
undermine the reliability of the verdicts. Accordingly, defendant did not suffer a
miscarriage of justice and his convictions for witness intimidation and solicitation
to commit murder should not be vacated. [Id., slip op at 20-21 (footnotes omitted,
emphasis added).]
The Supreme Court additionally highlighted that the “defendant’s convictions should not be
vacated because the Legislature has provided, in MCL 600.1645, that ‘(n)o order, judgment, or
decree shall be void or voidable solely on the ground that there was improper venue.’” Id., slip
op at 21.
In this case, defendant on appeal offers no argument or suggestion that the purportedly
improper venue in Lapeer County either adversely affected his right to a trial by an impartial jury
or otherwise prejudiced his right to a fair trial in any respect. Consistent with Houthoofd, slip op
at 20-21, we conclude that any venue-related error in this case amounted to harmless error
because defendant “has not meet his burden of proof to establish that, more probably than not,
there was a miscarriage of justice by trying him” in Lapeer County.
(…continued)
at 224, quoting 14 Am Jur, pp 929-930, citing Burton v United States, 202 US 344; 26 S Ct 688;
50 L Ed 1057 (1906).
-3-
II
Defendant next avers that the prosecutor introduced insufficient evidence of his identity
as the culprit of the charged home invasion. “The test for determining the sufficiency of
evidence in a criminal case is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
people, would warrant a reasonable juror in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). “The standard of review is deferential: a
reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in
support of the jury verdict. The scope of review is the same whether the evidence is direct or
circumstantial.” Id. at 400.
Although no physical or other direct evidence linked defendant to the August 2006 home
invasion of 7720 Burnside Road, ample properly admitted circumstantial evidence supported his
home invasion conviction. Steven Williams, his wife, and two sons moved into the rental home
at 7720 Burnside Road in 2005. The trial testimony of Williams and his former wife, Denise
Fleming, reflected that they shared a friendly relationship with defendant at the time of the home
invasion. Williams and Fleming described that they had regular contact with defendant, whom
Fleming had known for many years; Williams, Fleming, the children and defendant frequently
spent time together, had cookouts, and helped each other with various tasks. Defendant thus had
visited 7720 Burnside Road on multiple occasions. In the evening of Friday, August 4, 2006,
Williams and Fleming drove north to Wolverine for the weekend. Before leaving, Williams and
Fleming closed and locked the windows and doors of 7720 Burnside Road, and arranged for the
children to stay with Williams’s parents. According to Williams, only his parents, the landlord,
his employer, and defendant and his then fiancée, Farrah Fleming, Denise Fleming’s sister, knew
of Williams’s and his wife’s planned trip to Wolverine.
When Williams and Denise Fleming returned to 7720 Burnside Road in the early evening
of Sunday, August 6, 2006, they found the front door ajar. They called the police after further
inspection revealed that almost the entire home and the garage had been ransacked. Williams
catalogued at length the long list of equipment, tools, firearms, and other objects stolen from the
residence. On August 6, 2006, Williams gave the police defendant’s name as a potential suspect
or person with knowledge of the home invasion. Williams explained that he could identify no
enemies or other potential suspects, and that “just the way my house was broken into. . . . just
that my house was went [sic] through a certain way that somebody knew what they were doing,
they’d been there before, and they took specific items that in my opinion that . . . were easily . . .
taken and gotten rid of.” Williams later reiterated at trial that he suspected defendant because the
“house was gone through a certain way and just the way my things had be [sic] taken and the
way the house had be [sic] gone through just I had an indication that I guess maybe just a
personal indication.” Williams added that defendant had not appeared to pick up his fiancée’s
daughter as scheduled on Friday, August 4, 2006, before Williams and his wife went north, and
that he had increased suspicions about defendant’s involvement when defendant
uncharacteristically failed to contact Williams or his family after the home invasion.2 On August
2
In Williams’s words, “[W]e’d seen each other and heard from each other on a daily basis prior
to that happening and I figured if you’re as good friends as we were and as close as our families
were that he might have wanted to stop by to see how we were doing and that never happened.”
-4-
7, 2006, Farrah Fleming drove to 7720 Burnside Road to visit, and Williams spotted many tools
belonging to him on the floor of her car. Farrah Fleming testified that she did not see defendant
much over the course of the prior weekend, long stretches of which defendant spent away from
their home.
Michigan State Police Trooper Steven Anthony Kramer recounted his trips to 7720
Burnside Road on August 6, 2006 and August 7, 2006. Kramer discovered on August 6, 2006
two “very faint” sets of double tire prints on the lawn, and “a boot print of some type” “on the
back door which was kicked in to gain entry into the residence” and “in the garage on a piece of .
. . board.” However, Kramer never identified matches for either the tire or boot prints. Kramer
dusted several areas of the residence and the garage for fingerprints and recovered some, but
none of the fingerprints matched anyone identifiable. Kramer interviewed “the only neighbor
that would have had a direct view of the residence,” but gained no useful information from her.
Kramer tried unsuccessfully on multiple occasions to contact defendant in the months after the
home invasion. Michigan State Police Trooper Ted Stone ultimately interviewed defendant in
the Lapeer County Jail in December 2006. Trooper Stone reviewed Trooper Kramer’s reports
before questioning defendant. Trooper Stone recited the following details from his interview:
Stone Initially he just said he knew what I wanted to talk to him about or
about the incident but that he didn’t have anything to do with it.
***
We spoke about the fact that Trooper Kramer had been trying to get a hold
of him for a while . . . . He indicated to me that he knew the police wanted to talk
to him when they would pull into his driveway and he’s [sic] look out his front
window and then go back and hide in the house. He didn’t want to speak to the
police because he had warrants and didn’t want to go to jail . . . .
He . . . made a comment, I don’t believe I asked him a question but he
made a comment he doesn’t even own a pair of boots.
***
Prosecutor: Is that statement by Defendant in response to a question by
you or did—
Stone: No, there was no question about that. . . .
***
He basically just told me “I don’t even own a pair of boots.”
***
I did ask him where he was the date of the incident and he told me he was
at home.
***
-5-
. . . He had indicated, again without any prompting, that if his fingerprints
were found in the home it’s because he had been there before. Again, I didn’t ask
him about that.
The testimony reasonably tending to establish defendant’s participation in the home
invasion showed that (1) defendant was one of very few people who knew of Williams’s and his
wife’s plans for a weekend getaway beginning on August 4, 2006; (2) defendant had a high
degree of familiarity with 7720 Burnside Road and the wealth of equipment and tools stored
there; (3) some of Williams’s tools appeared in a car that defendant regularly drove; (4)
defendant behaved distantly and differently toward Williams and his family on the weekend of
August 2006 and thereafter; and (5) defendant later volunteered to the police his claim that he
did not own any boots, which declaration reasonably suggests his knowledge that the home
invader had left boot prints at 7720 Burnside Road. Standing in isolation, the facts enumerated
above would not suffice to prove defendant’s participation in the home invasion. However,
viewing the evidence together, and “in a light most favorable to the people,” drawing all
reasonable inferences and making credibility choices in support of the jury verdict, we conclude
that the evidence and inferences warranted the jury’s reasonable finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant committed the early August 2006 home invasion at 7720 Burnside Road.
Nowack, 462 Mich at 399-400.3
III
Defendant lastly challenges the propriety of the trial court’s ruling to admit other acts
evidence under MRE 404(b). This Court reviews for a clear abuse of discretion a trial court’s
decision whether to admit evidence. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
MRE 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of evidence of a defendant’s other acts or crimes
when introduced solely for the purpose of showing the defendant’s action in conformity with his
criminal character. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
But evidence of a defendant’s other acts or crimes qualifies as admissible under the following
circumstances: (1) the prosecutor offers the evidence for a proper purpose under MRE
404(b)(1), including to prove the defendant’s “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme,
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the
same is material”; (2) the other acts evidence satisfies the definition of logical relevance within
MRE 401; and (3) any unfair prejudice arising from the admission of the other acts evidence
does not substantially outweigh its probative value, MRE 403. Starr, 457 Mich at 496; People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 439-440; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion to introduce under MRE 404(b) evidence that
defendant had broken and entered a garage in 2007 and broken into an electronics store in 1989.
The prosecutor theorized that the other acts evidence showed defendant’s “preparation, common
3
Defendant does not specifically contest the sufficiency of proof of the other mandatory home
invasion elements. Nonetheless, our review of the record reveals substantial proof of the
requisite first-degree home invasion elements. MCL 750.110a(2); People v Wilder, 485 Mich
35, 42-43; 780 NW2d 265 (2010).
-6-
scheme, plan or system in doing an act,” specifically that defendant “forces entry into buildings
that he knows for certain are unoccupied, with the intent to commit a larceny.” The trial court
granted the prosecutor’s motion in part and denied it in part, reasoning in pertinent part:
In the case at bar the prior incident that occurred in 1989 of forcing entry
into a building the defendant knows for certain is unoccupied, mirror the conduct
at issue before this Court. In other words, the house was vacant at the time the
alleged B and E took place. Hence, this Court finds this evidence is logically
relevant to several issues other than establishing a propensity for wrongdoing and
it is, therefore, admissible under MRE 404(b) as long as the evidence in question
is not being used to show action in conformity with character it is admissible. . . .
Again, in the case at bar similar act evidence was offered to show a plan or
scheme to establish the absence of mistake. These are permissible purposes and
since one cannot look into the human mind, what one intends must usually be
deduced from what one does.
Furthermore, the probative value of this evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. “Prejudice inures when marginally
probative evidence would be give undue or preemptive weight by the jury.”
***
The complained of actions established . . . defendant’s modus operandi or
pattern of action and the unlikeness [sic] of any coincidence or misrecollection on
behalf of the immediate victim. Furthermore, although . . . Defendant may be
prejudiced by the admission of this evidence, the Court will take great precautions
by repeatedly instructing the jury concerning the proper consideration of other
bad acts evidence and will give an instruction thereto.
However, this Court also finds that this alleged incident on January 14,
2007 has no relevance to the charge [in] th[is] case. Although the padlock on the
building was found broken, it was not determined anything was missing and the
police report does not indicate the neighbor observed anything in the open truck . .
. Defendant was operating. Therefore, the Court will exclude any reference to the
alleged incident that may have taken place on January 14, 2007.
With respect to evidence offered to prove the existence of a common plan, scheme, or
system, the Michigan Supreme Court has explained as follows:
Today, we clarify that evidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant
to show that the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the
charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are
manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system. Logical relevance is not
limited to circumstances in which the charged and uncharged acts are part of a
single continuing conception or plot.
-7-
In describing the degree of similarity necessary to support the presence of a common plan,
scheme, or system, the Supreme Court in Sabin, 463 Mich at 65-66, elaborated in relevant part as
follows:
In [People v Ewoldt, 7 Cal 4th 380, 402-403; 867 P2d 757 (1994),] the
Supreme Court of California provided guidance for ascertaining the existence of a
common plan used by the defendant to commit the charged and uncharged acts.
As Ewoldt explains, the necessary degree of similarity is greater than that needed
to prove intent, but less than that needed to prove identity.
“To establish the existence of a common design or plan, the common
features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar
spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.
For example, evidence that a search of the residence of a person suspected of rape
produced a written plan to invite the victim to his residence and, once alone, force
her to engage in sexual intercourse would be highly relevant even if the plan
lacked originality. In the same manner, evidence that the defendant has
committed uncharged criminal acts that are similar to the charged offense may be
relevant if these acts demonstrate circumstantially that the defendant committed
the charged offense pursuant to the same design or plan he or she used in
committing the uncharged acts. Unlike evidence of uncharged acts used to prove
identity, the plan need not be unusual or distinctive; it need only exist to support
the inference that the defendant employed that plan in committing the charged
offense.”
The evidence of defendant’s 1989 breaking and entering of the electronics retailer in the
early morning hours and the facts surrounding the instant breaking and entering of 7720
Burnside Road share some marked similarities, primarily that defendant broke and entered in
each case buildings that he knew were unoccupied. The list of similarities is not extensive and
the record demonstrates some dissimilarities between the two robberies, including that one
occurred at a retail establishment rather than a residence. However, if “reasonable persons could
disagree on whether the charged and uncharged acts contained sufficient common features to
infer the existence of a common system used by defendant in committing the acts,” “the trial
court’s decision on a close evidentiary question such as this one ordinarily cannot be an abuse of
discretion.” Sabin, 463 Mich at 67. “We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining, under the circumstances of this case, that the evidence was admissible
under this theory of logical relevance.” Id. at 67-68. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding no risk of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed the probative
value of the 1989 breaking and entering evidence. Given the probative value inherent in the
other act evidence and the prosecutor’s brief presentation of the other act evidence, which
spanned a total of 10 transcript pages, the trial court correctly found minimal likelihood “that
marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.”
Ackerman, 257 Mich App at 442 (internal quotation omitted).
Even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion when it deemed the 1989 breaking
and entering relevant toward proving a common plan, scheme, or system employed by defendant
in committing the home invasion of 7720 Burnside Road, it does not “‘affirmatively appear’ . . .
more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative,” People v Lukity, 460 Mich
-8-
484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), quoting MCL 769.26, in light of (1) the properly admitted
evidence of defendant’s guilt; (2) the brief presentation at trial of the other act evidence and the
prosecutor’s similarly brief closing argument references to the other acts evidence4; and (3) the
trial court’s cautionary instruction to the jury about the limited consideration it could give the
other act evidence, specifically that it could consider the evidence only with respect to “whether .
. . [it] tends to show that . . . Defendant used a plan, system, or characteristic scheme that he has
used before or since,” which instruction tracked CJI2d 4.11. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App
361, 380-381; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
4
The prosecutor’s closing argument references to the 1989 breaking and entering spanned about
2 transcript pages in total.
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