PEOPLE OF MI V TENORA BAYSO BROOKS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 287948
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-012211-FH
TENORA BAYSO BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and WILDER and GLEICHER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC III), MCL 750.520b(1)(b) and was sentenced to 2 to 15 years’ imprisonment. He appeals
as of right. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
On the evening of January 26, 2007, the victim went to a bar alone and met defendant.
The victim knew defendant and considered him a friend. The two played pool and danced.
Later in the evening, they returned to defendant’s apartment and defendant forced the victim to
have sex with him. After the encounter ended, the victim left defendant’s apartment and
immediately reported the incident to police. Defendant was eventually arrested and charged with
CSC III. Defendant’s theory at trial was that the encounter was consensual. He contended that
he had offered the victim $200 for sex and that she had insisted instead on receiving $250 after
the sexual encounter. The trial court found the victim’s version of events to be more credible
and defendant was convicted. This appeal followed.
II. EVIDENTIARY DECISIONS
Defendant argues that the trial court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings. We
review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion, People v Starr, 457 Mich
490, 491; 577 NW2d 673 (1998), and, to the extent that defendant asserts constitutional
violations, our review is de novo, People v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124, 131; 687 NW2d 370
(2004). Further, because defendant did not specifically object on constitutional grounds below,
reversal is not be required unless defendant can show plain error affecting his substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
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A. MRE 609
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by prohibiting the defendant from crossexamining the victim regarding her prior conviction for unlawful use of a motor vehicle. He
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by disallowing the evidence and also violated his
right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses
testifying against him. US Const, Am VI; People v Spangler, 285 Mich App 136, 142; 774
NW2d 702 (2009). A key component of this right is the right to cross-examine those witnesses.
Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 315; 94 S Ct 1105; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974). However, a
defendant’s right of confrontation is not without limitations; it protects the “opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v Fensterer, 474 US 15, 20; 106 S Ct 292;
88 L Ed 2d 15 (1985) (emphasis in original). Judges “retain wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based
on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v Van
Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679; 106 S Ct 1431; 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986); see also People v Adamski,
198 Mich App 133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993).
Under MRE 609(a), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime may not be
admitted for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness unless the evidence has been
elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination and (1) the
crime contained an element of dishonesty or false statement, or (2) the crime contained an
element of theft and (a) was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or death under the
law under which the witness was convicted, and (b) the court determines that the evidence has
significant probative value on the issue of credibility. See People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236,
241-242; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). The conviction of unlawful use of a motor vehicle can be used
for impeachment under MRE 609(a) because it is a crime containing an element of theft and it
was punishable by more than one year in prison. People v Hayward, 127 Mich App 50, 63; 338
NW2d 549 (1983).
Here, the trial court refused to admit evidence of the victim’s 2006 conviction for
unlawful use of a motor vehicle to impeach the victim’s credibility. During trial, the following
colloquy occurred during cross-examination of the victim:
Defense Counsel: Have you been convicted of any –
The Court: Counsel.
Defense Counsel: Prior felonies involving theft or dishonesty?
The Court: I – I don’t like those questions. No, no, I don’t care.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, it goes to her credibility.
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The Court: It doesn’t go to anything. All it does is just makes the –
discourages the witness from testifying. I don’t believe that. I realize there are
cases on that. But that’s not going to make any difference. It’s not going to make
any difference at all. Those are silly lawyer rules that are used to influence the
jury, it’s not going to influence me at all.
***
Defense Counsel: It has to do with credibility.
The Court: Oh, I know it does. I know it does. It’s just a silly rule that
you can impeach a person who’s been hold up [sic] for shoplifting but you can’t
impeach them if they raped or murdered somebody. That’s just ridiculous. I
personally don’t think it’s going to impeach anybody’s credibility at all. All it
does is embarrass the witness.
Although it is the prerogative of a trial court to determine whether a conviction is
probative or not under MRE 609(a), the trial court here flat-out refused to learn what the
conviction was. Without knowing the substance of the conviction, it was necessarily impossible
for the trial court to determine whether its admission was probative of the victim’s credibility.
Thus, under the circumstances, the trial court violated defendant’s right to confront the victim
and abused its discretion by failing to properly apply MRE 609(a). Nonetheless, the error was
harmless and defendant has failed to show that it affected his substantial rights. The trial judge
indicated that he found past criminal convictions to have little probative value and that he would
not give it any weight. Thus, even if the trial court knew the nature of the victim’s criminal
conviction, it still would have found defendant guilty of CSC III.
B. MRE 613
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit the
victim’s medical records for impeachment purposes, in which the victim stated to a doctor that
the assault occurred in a parking lot and not in defendant’s apartment. We disagree.
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes may be
admitted if “the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite
party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice
otherwise require.” MRE 613(b); see People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 359; 447 NW2d 157
(1989). However, a trial court may refuse to admit extrinsic evidence for purposes of
impeachment regarding collateral matters. People v Wofford, 196 Mich App 275, 281; 492
NW2d 747 (1992). Moreover, a trial court may exclude such evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. MRE 403;
People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 461; 751 NW2d 408 (2008).
Here, defense counsel attempted to introduce the medical records for purposes of
impeaching the victim:
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Defense Counsel: That [the victim] indicated that her history – physical history
and the physical [sic] that the alleged rape had taken place in the car parking lot
while she was going toward her car.
Prosecutor: Your Honor. I object to that.
The Court: I think – you asked the question about injury. And she said
that there was none. If you wish to have it admitted for the purpose, the Court
will accept that.
Defense Counsel: But also he stipulated to the history.
***
The Court: Well, she denied that and stated it happened. And the
defendant said it happened in his apartment. The only difference is he is claiming
that it was a contract and they both agree that it was at his apartment.
So I will admit it for that limited purpose. But not for any other purpose.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the medical records for
purposes of impeaching the victim. Although the medical records were admissible under MRE
613(b) as extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements, the evidence was merely cumulative.
Defense counsel had already asked the victim during cross-examination about statements she had
made to doctors that were recorded in her medical records. The victim denied making the
statement that the assault had occurred in a parking lot. Therefore, the trial court was aware of
the prior inconsistent statement and it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the
medical records for impeachment purposes because it was merely cumulative of the victim’s
testimony on cross-examination. Relief is not warranted on this basis.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant also asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to call two witnesses favorable to the defense. We disagree. Because defendant
did not establish a testimonial record regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, our
review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352;
619 NW2d 413 (2000).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Eloby (After Remand), 215 Mich App 472, 476; 547 NW2d 48
(1996). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713
(2007). Counsel’s decision whether to call or question a witness is presumed to be a question of
trial strategy and we will not substitute our judgment for the judgment of counsel regarding these
matters. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
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Defendant contends that trial counsel should have called (1) Dr. Andrew Kagel, the
doctor who treated the victim following the assault and who would have testified that the victim
told him she was sexually assaulted in a parking lot instead of in defendant’s parking lot, and (2)
defendant’s friend, Kevin Washington, who would have testified that defendant and the victim
had previously had a sexual relationship. The alleged failure to investigate these witnesses
whose testimonies would have impeached the victim’s credibility, however, did not amount to
deficient performance. Our review of the record reveals that their testimonies would have been
cumulative of impeachment evidence already in the record. The substance of Dr. Kagel’s
testimony was in the record in the form of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim
regarding the recorded statements in her medical records. As to Washington, testimony that the
victim and defendant had a previous sexual relationship would be cumulative of the testimony
defense counsel elicited from the victim on cross-examination that the victim had allegedly told
police officers that she had previously dated defendant. Thus, defendant has failed to show that
he was deprived of a substantial defense due to counsel’s decision not to produce these
witnesses. Rather, a review of the record reveals that counsel did raise the defense of consent
during her direct examination of defendant and further bolstered that theory by attacking the
victim’s credibility and during closing argument. The failure to call a witness constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel only if it deprived the defendant of a substantial defense.
People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). Counsel’s failure to do so here
did not deprive defendant of a substantial defense.
Further, even if defense counsel’s performance was deficient, no evidence in the lower
court record indicates that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different. The issue in this case concerned whether defendant and the victim had consensual sex.
The trial court determined that it believed the victim and not defendant because defendant told an
unbelievable story about offering the victim money for sex, but refusing to pay her up-front.
Conversely, the trial court found the victim’s credibility to be strengthened by the fact that she
immediately went to the police after the incident and appeared before them “crying hysterically.”
None of the new evidence that defendant claims should have been admitted would undermine the
findings of the trial court, let alone create a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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