PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY RAVON WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 22, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 292070
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-003560-FH
ANTHONY RAVON WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and JANSEN and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by right the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument. MCR 7.214(E).
A Detroit police officer saw a Lincoln Navigator legally parked on a street. But the
officer noticed illegally tinted windows and what appeared to be fresh bullet holes in the side of
the vehicle. After passing the vehicle, the officer turned and saw defendant get out of the truck
and place a small, dark-handled object under the hood. The officer and his partner went around
the block and initiated a traffic stop for the tinted windows. After defendant was arrested for
failing to have a driver’s license, the first officer told his partner what he had seen. The officer’s
partner found a handgun under the hood, in the location the first officer indicated. The circuit
court granted defendant’s motion to suppress the handgun because it was not found in the
passenger compartment of the vehicle.
In Arizona v Gant, ___ US ___; 129 S Ct 1710, 1721; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009), the
United States Supreme Court cited positively its previous decision in United States v Ross, 456
US 798, 820-821; 102 S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982). As the Gant Court observed, “[i]f
there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, [Ross]
authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” Gant, 129
S Ct at 1721. Distinguishing automobile searches conducted under the rationale of Ross from
other types of automobile searches, the Gant Court further noted that “Ross allows searches for
evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search
authorized is broader.” Gant, 129 S Ct at 1721. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has
made clear that Ross survives Gant and remains good law.
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In the instant case, defendant was arrested for not having a driver’s license in his
possession. Standing alone, this offense would not have given the officers probable cause to
search defendant’s vehicle for contraband. See Gant, 129 S Ct at 1719. Accordingly, the central
question is whether the officers had independent probable cause under Ross to believe that the
Navigator contained other contraband or evidence of criminality. We conclude that they did.
A finding of probable cause requires a “substantial basis” for concluding that a search
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90, 102; 597 NW2d
194 (1999); see also Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 236; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).
“There must be ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.’” Garvin, 235 Mich App at 102, quoting Gates, 462 US at 238. “The
determination whether probable cause exists to support a search, including a search of an
automobile without a warrant, should be made in a commonsense manner in light of the totality
of the circumstances.” Garvin, 235 Mich App at 102.
The facts of this case were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that a search
of defendant’s vehicle would lead to evidence of a crime or contraband. The fresh bullet holes in
the side of the vehicle, coupled with the fact that the officer saw defendant hiding a small, darkhandled object under the hood after seeing the police, gave rise to a “fair probability” that the
search would lead to a handgun. Id. Because the officers had probable cause independent of the
offense for which defendant was arrested, they were fully authorized to search beneath the hood
of defendant’s vehicle. See Gant, 129 S Ct at 1721. The circuit court erred by granting
defendant’s motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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