PEOPLE OF MI V TRAVIS DAVID CASTILLO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290698
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-005192-FH
TRAVIS DAVID CASTILLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: METER, P.J., and SERVITTO and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of first-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 10
to 40 years imprisonment for his conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was entitled to a mistrial or curative instruction regarding
testimony from Detective Gregory Hill, which defendant contends consisted of inadmissible
testimony regarding prior bad acts. Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a mistrial or to request a curative instruction. We disagree.
We review unpreserved claims of evidentiary error for plain error affecting a defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v
Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 12; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). Defendant’s unpreserved argument regarding
his right to a mistrial is also reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Nash,
244 Mich App 93, 96; 625 NW2d 87 (2000).
In addition, whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a
mixed question of fact and law. “A judge first must find the facts, and then must decide whether
those facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We review the factual
findings for clear error, and the constitutional question de novo. Id. However, because there was
no hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), our
review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich
135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Hill whether defendant was
incarcerated in the Macomb County Jail on each occasion when Hill interviewed him, to which
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Hill replied this was correct. On redirect examination, the prosecutor and Hill had the following
exchange:
Q. All right. And counsel asked you if on both occasions was the Defendant in
custody, on the 17th of September and the 23rd of September of ’08; is that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. He was not in custody on this case?
A. No.
Q. When you questioned him on either date; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
The record reflects that the testimony on redirect was the result of defense counsel’s
questions on cross-examination, which may have been asked in order to suggest something
possibly coercive about defendant being interviewed while he was incarcerated in the Macomb
County Jail. As the prosecution argues, once defense counsel opened the door to whether
defendant was incarcerated at the time of the interviews, the prosecutor was permitted to clarify
regarding whether defendant was in custody on this case. Once a defendant raises an issue, he
opens the door to a full, and not just selective, development of the subject. People v Allen, 201
Mich App 98, 103; 505 NW2d 869 (1993); People v Bettistea, 173 Mich App 106, 116; 434
NW2d 138 (1988). Here, the record reflects that the prosecutor merely clarified through his
questioning on redirect that defendant was not in custody with regard to the instant case, but did
not go into any further detail. This permitted the prosecutor to dispel the notion that there was
something coercive or involuntary about Hill’s interviews of defendant.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s questioning violated MRE 404(b), which excludes
evidence of prior bad acts to prove a person’s character. Contrary to defendant’s argument,
however, the evidence was not submitted under a character or propensity theory. Rather, it was
meant to dispel the inference that Hill’s interviews of defendant were coercive. Therefore,
defendant has failed to show plain error.
Regarding defendant’s argument that he was entitled to a mistrial, while a sua sponte
decision to grant a mistrial “is within the sound discretion of a trial judge,” People v Clark, 453
Mich 572, 581 n 6; 556 NW2d 820 (1996), “a mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity
that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” People
v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Further, this Court has determined
that “[a] mistrial should be granted only where the error complained of is so egregious that the
prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.” People v Gonzales, 193 Mich App 263, 266;
483 NW2d 458 (1992). Under the circumstances as a whole, Hill’s testimony did not constitute
an evidentiary error, and even if it was error, it was not so egregious that a mistrial was
necessary. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to a mistrial.
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Further, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial because
counsel is not required to make futile arguments. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608
NW2d 502 (2000). Further, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a curative
instruction because the record reflects that defense counsel affirmatively decided not to request
such an instruction, as a matter of trial strategy, so the jury’s attention would not be drawn to the
alleged error. Defense counsel has wide discretion regarding matters of trial strategy. People v
Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). This Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s
competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d
714 (2009). Therefore, defendant’s claim must fail.
Defendant next argues that the trial court failed to take into account all of the mitigating
evidence before sentencing him as a fourth habitual offender. Defendant contends that the
mitigating factors, which included his remorse, his strong family support, his substance abuse
problems, and his rehabilitative potential, were not considered. As a result, defendant contends
that his sentence should be vacated. We disagree. Our review of unpreserved allegations of
sentencing errors is limited to review for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Sexton, 250 Mich App 211, 227-228; 646 NW2d 875 (2002).
The record reflects that the trial court reviewed defendant’s presentence investigation
report (PSIR) and his sentence information report (SIR), and thus, there is no evidence that the
trial court failed to consider any relevant mitigating evidence in sentencing defendant. People v
Nunez, 242 Mich App 610, 618; 619 NW2d 550 (2000). The PSIR noted defendant’s history of
substance abuse. The record also reflects defendant presented the trial court with the mitigating
factor of his remorse. In addition, defendant’s mother also addressed the court regarding
defendant’s strong family support. The record reflects that the trial court considered these
factors. Moreover, mitigating and aggravating factors are taken into account when scoring the
sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., People v Sargent, 481 Mich 346, 348-349; 750 NW2d 161
(2008). Thus, defendant is not entitled to relief. Further, defendant’s assertion that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to submit further evidence of these mitigating factors lacks
merit because defense counsel is not required to raise meritless objections or make futile
arguments. Snider, 239 Mich App at 425.
Defendant also raises several additional claims of error with regard to his sentencing.
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred because it failed to explain why his sentence was
proportionate to the offense. We disagree. Again, our review of unpreserved allegations of
sentencing errors is limited to review for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Sexton, 250 Mich App at 227-228.
A trial court must either select a minimum sentence within the guidelines range, or it
must state “substantial and compelling” reasons to justify a departure from the guidelines. MCL
769.34(3); People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 255; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). However, “if the trial
court expressly relies on the sentencing guidelines in imposing the sentence or if it is clear from
the context of the remarks preceding the sentence that the trial court relied on the sentencing
guidelines,” then the trial court is not required to articulate any additional reasons for the
sentence. People v Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 313; 715 NW2d 377 (2006).
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Defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range for this offense was scored at 78 to
260 months. The trial court sentenced defendant to 120 months imprisonment for his conviction.
Because defendant’s minimum sentence was based on the sentencing guidelines, the trial court
was under no obligation to further state its reasons for the sentence. People v Broden, 428 Mich
343, 353-354; 408 NW2d 789 (1987); Conley, 270 Mich App at 313. Additionally, a minimum
sentence that is within the sentencing guidelines, as is the case here, is presumed proportional
and defendant has failed to establish otherwise. People v Powell, 278 Mich App 318, 323; 750
NW2d 607 (2008).
In addition, contrary to defendant’s assertion, his constitutional rights were not violated
by any judicial fact-finding at sentencing. Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531;
159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), relied upon by defendant, is inapplicable to Michigan’s indeterminate
sentencing scheme. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). Accordingly,
“[a]s long as the defendant receives a sentence within that statutory maximum, a trial court may
utilize judicially ascertained facts to fashion a sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s
verdict.” Id. In addition, because defendant’s sentence was proportionate, his underlying
constitutional claim is without merit, because a proportionate sentence does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Powell, 278 Mich App at 323.
Defendant next argues that he was erroneously denied credit for time served in jail
between his arrest and sentencing. We disagree. Because this issue was not properly preserved
by a challenge before the trial court, we review for plain error affecting substantial rights.
Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
Defendant’s argument on this issue is unavailing because there is no dispute that
defendant was on parole when he was arrested. MCL 769.11b, the jail credit statute, does not
apply to parolees who commit new felonies while on parole, such as defendant in this case.
People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 562; 773 NW2d 616 (2009). MCL 769.11b does not apply in
such circumstances because the defendant parolee continues to serve out any unexpired portion
of his earlier sentence, and was therefore not in jail because he was “denied or unable to furnish
bond” for the new offense, but for an independent reason. Id. at 562-563, quoting MCL 769.11b.
Further, a sentencing court does not have the common law discretion to grant credit against a
parolee’s new minimum sentence in contravention of the statutory scheme. Id. at 552. Finally,
contrary to defendant’s argument, the denial of credit against a new minimum sentence does not
violate the double jeopardy clause, equal protection clause, or due process clause of the United
States or Michigan constitutions. Id. at 552. Thus, defendant has not demonstrated plain error.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to reimburse the county
for the expenses of his court appointed counsel without first considering his ability to pay. We
disagree. Because there was no objection to the trial court’s order that defendant reimburse the
county for court appointed attorney fees, we review for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
Previously the rule in this context was that, before ordering an indigent defendant to
reimburse the county for the cost of his or her court appointed attorney, the trial court was
required to “provide some indication of consideration, such as . . . a statement that it considered
the defendant’s ability to pay.” People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 254-255; 690 NW2d 476
(2004), overruled by People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271; 769 NW2d 630 (2009). However, the
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Michigan Supreme Court announced that “Dunbar was incorrect to the extent that it required a
court to conduct an ability-to-pay analysis before imposing a fee for a court appointed attorney,”
and that “Dunbar’s presentence ability-to-pay rule must yield to the Legislature’s contrary intent
that no such analysis is required at sentencing.” Jackson, 483 Mich at 275, 290. Rather, the
ability to pay assessment is only necessary when the “imposition [of fees for a court-appointed
attorney] is enforced and the defendant contests his ability to pay.” Id. at 298. Because an
ability to pay analysis is not required at sentencing before imposing such a fee and the imposition
of such fee has yet to be enforced in this matter, defendant’s claim necessarily fails.
In addition, defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction
for first-degree home invasion. Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to present any
evidence that he intended to commit a larceny. We disagree.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence de novo. People v Cline, 276 Mich
App 634, 642; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). We must “‘view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution and determine if any rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id., quoting People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508,
515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
When reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, all conflicts in the evidence must be
resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95
(1999). It is solely the trier of fact’s role to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of
witnesses. Wolfe, 440 Mich at 514-515. Therefore, “[i]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate
court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the
weight to be accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d
158 (2002).
The elements of first-degree home invasion are: (1) the defendant broke and entered a
dwelling or entered the dwelling without permission; (2) when the defendant did so, he intended
to commit a felony, larceny, or assault, or he actually committed a felony, larceny, or assault
while entering, being present in, or exiting the dwelling; and (3) another person was lawfully
present in the dwelling or the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon. People v Sands,
261 Mich App 158, 162; 680 NW2d 500 (2004); MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant was tried under
the theory that he intended to commit a larceny within the dwelling and defendant only
challenges whether there was sufficient evidence to show that he had the intent to commit
larceny.
“Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the property of another, done with felonious
intent and without the owner’s consent.” People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 257-258; 549
NW2d 39 (1996). A defendant’s breaking and entering cannot be the sole basis on which to
presume intent to commit larceny, but a reasonable inference of intent may be based on the
nature, time, and place of defendant’s actions before and during the breaking and entering.
People v Uhl, 169 Mich App 217, 220; 425 NW2d 519 (1988). “An actor’s intent may be
inferred from all of the facts and circumstances, and because of the difficulty of proving an
actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient.” People v Fetterley, 229
Mich App 511, 517-518; 583 NW2d 199 (1998) (citations omitted). In addition, a defendant’s
intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence, including “the act, means, or the manner
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employed to commit the offense.” People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 458; 628 NW2d 105
(2001).
The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient
to convict defendant of first degree home invasion. According to the trial testimony, at
approximately 9:30 a.m. on the date of the incident, Georgia Masouridis was alone at a
condominium owned by her sister and her sister’s boyfriend (who were both at work). Georgia
heard a noise and when she went to investigate, discovered that the sliding glass door and the
screen door on the back of the dwelling had been dislodged. Georgia saw two males running
away from the glass door. Although Georgia did not see the faces of the two males, nine
fingerprints matching defendant’s fingerprints were recovered from the sliding glass door. The
evidence established that defendant had previously been a frequent visitor to this condo because
he was a friend of one of the owners, but that defendant had not been there in at least a month
prior to the incident. In addition, the evidence showed the sliding door glass had been cleaned
only two days before the incident.
Based on the evidence, the jury could have drawn a reasonable inference that defendant,
because of his familiarity with the condo owners, believed he was breaking into the condo
through the backdoor at a time when both occupants were at work. When unexpectedly
confronted by Georgia, defendant fled. Based on defendant’s behavior and familiarity with the
location and residents, the jury could have drawn a reasonable inference that defendant’s timing
and behavior showed that he had the intent to commit a larceny. There was sufficient evidence
to support defendant’s conviction.
Lastly, defendant argues in his Standard 4 brief that the court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. We disagree. Whether a lower court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law that we review de novo. People v Clement, 254 Mich App 387, 389-390; 657 NW2d 172
(2002).
“The circuit court is a court of ‘general jurisdiction,’ MCL 600.151, having ‘original
jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law....’ Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13.” People v
Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 458; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). See also MCL 600.601. And, we have long
recognized that circuit courts have original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving felonies.
See, e.g., People v Bidwell, 205 Mich App 355, 358; 522 NW2d 138 (1994). Because firstdegree home invasion is a felony, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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