DEBBIE KLINE V SKATEMORE INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DEBBIE KLINE,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
SKATEMORE, INC., d/b/a ROLLHAVEN
SKATING CENTER, and DANIEL K. BROWN,
No. 288141
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-087121-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, C.J., and Jansen and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant
to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her complaint under the Roller
Skating Safety Act of 1988 (RSSA), MCL 445.1721 et seq., because she was not truly engaged
in the activity of mere roller skating, as contemplated by the act, at the time of her injury.
Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she attended a class on April 30, 2007, at defendant
Rollhaven Skating Center (hereinafter “Rollhaven”) to receive lessons with respect to the sport
of roller derby. While plaintiff knew that the sport itself involved physical contact, she testified
that she had no idea that the first day of lessons would involve actual drills leading to potential
physical contact. Another skater testified that she was instructed to act as a "jammer," which
position sometimes involved physically breaking through other skaters if unable to pass them
without contact. This “jammer” skater crashed into plaintiff, who was acting as a "blocker,"
causing plaintiff to fall and strike her head on the floor. Plaintiff testified that defendant Brown
instructed her to block other skaters who were attempting to pass her, although she did not
expect contact because she assumed the other skaters would try to avoid her. Plaintiff alleged
that she suffered, among other injuries, a closed-head injury.
The complaint alleged counts of negligence, breach of contract, nuisance, and assault and
battery. Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The
trial court ruled:
-1-
We are where we started and that is that this roller skating is roller skating.
This is roller skating. The statute embodies and embraces all various counts as
pled. All counts are dismissed. Motion for summary disposition is granted.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 129; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for
summary disposition where there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact, and the moving
party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. A trial court may grant a
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the pleadings, affidavits, and other
documentary evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there
is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich
358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996), citing MCR 2.116(G)(5). "A genuine issue of material fact
exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open
an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177,
183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). A court may only consider substantively admissible evidence
actually proffered relative to a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
The following sections of the RSSA are relevant to a proper analysis of the issues
presented on appeal:
Each roller skating center operator shall do all of the following:
(a) Post the duties of roller skaters and spectators as prescribed in this act
and the duties, obligations, and liabilities of operators as prescribed in this act in
conspicuous places.
(b) Comply with the safety standards specified in the roller skating rink
safety standards published by the roller skating rink operators association, (1980).
(c) Maintain roller skating equipment and roller skating surfaces according
to the safety standards cited in subdivision (b).
(d) Maintain the stability and legibility of all required signs, symbols, and
posted notices. [MCL 445.1723 - § 3 of the RSSA.]
***
While in a roller skating area, each roller skater[1] shall do all of the
following:
1
Under the RSSA, a “roller skater” is defined as “a person wearing roller skates while that
person is in a roller skating center for the purpose of roller skating.” MCL 445.1722(c). We
reject plaintiff’s argument that she was not a “roller skater” for purposes of the RSSA. The
evidence established that plaintiff fit the statutory definition.
-2-
(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.
(b) Read all posted signs and warnings.
(c) Maintain a proper lookout to avoid other roller skaters and objects.
(d) Accept the responsibility for knowing the range of his or her own
ability to negotiate the intended direction of travel while on roller skates and to
skate within the limits of that ability.
(e) Refrain from acting in a manner which may cause injury to others.
[MCL 445.1724 - § 4 of the RSSA.]
***
Each person who participates in roller skating accepts the danger that
inheres in that activity insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those
dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries that result from collisions with
other roller skaters or other spectators, injuries that result from falls, and injuries
which involve objects or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of
the roller skater which are not otherwise attributable to the operator's breach of his
or her common law duties. [MCL 445.1725 - § 5 of the RSSA.]
***
A roller skater, spectator, or operator who violates this act shall be liable
in a civil action for damages for that portion of the loss or damage resulting from
the violation. [MCL 445.1726 - § 6 of the RSSA.]
Convened as a special panel to resolve a conflict between a prior vacated opinion in Dale
v Beta-C, Inc, 223 Mich App 801; 566 NW2d 640 (1997) (Dale I), and Skene v Fileccia, 213
Mich App 1; 539 NW2d 531 (1995), this Court in Dale v Beta-C, Inc, 227 Mich App 57; 574
NW2d 697 (1997) (Dale II), addressed the RSSA and interpreted the sections quoted above. The
Dale II special panel began by discussing the purpose of the RSSA, stating:
The RSSA was enacted to address the concerns with the increasing
frequency of lawsuits filed against skating rink operators and the corresponding
rise in insurance premiums for such facilities. The roller rinks sought legislation
“that would clarify that skaters have certain duties and must assume the risks
inherent in the sport, while rinks have certain duties to observe safety standards.”
House Legislative Analysis, SB 134, November 29, 1988. [Dale II, supra at 65.]
Sections 3 and 6 of the RSSA indicate, however, that the Legislature did not intend to
provide absolute immunity to rink operators. Id. at 66. This Court, in order to preserve the
legislative purpose underlying the RSSA, stated that “the assumption of risk provision of § 5
must be read in conjunction with the duties of operators set forth in § 3 and the creation of civil
liability for operators as set forth in § 6.” Id. at 67. The Dale II special panel held:
-3-
Reconciliation of these provisions leads us to hold that a skater does not
assume the risk of an operator violating the duties prescribed under the act. If a
violation of § 3 of the RSSA is alleged and proved, then pursuant to § 6 the
operator “who violates this act shall be liable in a civil action for damages for that
portion of the loss or damage resulting from the violation.” [Id.]
This Court then drew § 5 of the RSSA into the equation, ruling:
[Pursuant] to § 5, a participant assumes the risks of obvious and necessary
dangers inherent in the sport of roller skating. However, the skater does not
assume the risk of an operator violating the prescribed duties under [§ 3 of] the
act. With the exception of injuries that involve objects or artificial structures
properly within the intended travel of the roller skater, the skater's assumption of
risk is neither limited nor nullified by an operator's breach of a common-law duty.
Finally, a participant's sole recourse against a roller-skating rink operator is
pursuant to the RSSA.
This conclusion was predicated in part on the Court’s determination that § 5’s clause
referencing injuries “not otherwise attributable to the operator's breach of his or her common law
duties” modified only that language in § 5 speaking of injuries involving objects or artificial
structures, not injuries resulting from collisions or falls. Dale II, supra at 68-70 (“modifying
clause is confined to the last antecedent unless a contrary intention appears”).
Turning to the case at bar, review of plaintiff’s complaint and her appellate brief reveals
that she makes no claim whatsoever that defendants violated any of the duties of a roller skating
center operator outlined in § 3 of the RSSA. In regard to § 5, in part, plaintiff has not made any
claim that the injuries involved objects or artificial structures properly within plaintiff’s intended
travel; therefore, defendants’ possible breach of any common-law duty would appear irrelevant.
Under the RSSA, the only arguable avenue for plaintiff to proceed with the litigation arises from
the first sentence in § 5, which provides that “[e]ach person who participates in roller skating
accepts the danger that inheres in that activity insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary.”
The next sentence in § 5 dictates that those dangers include “injuries that result from collisions
with other roller skaters[.]” Under the plain language of § 5, an inherent danger of roller skating,
for which a roller skater assumes the risk, necessarily includes a collision with another skater.2
Here, plaintiff’s injuries were the result of a collision with another roller skater. The question
becomes whether the fact that roller derby lessons were being given somehow alter the
application of § 5. As opposed to the danger of collisions that inhere in the course of roller
skating under normal conditions, which typically result from an accident or even possibly an
intentional act not directed by the rink operator, the roller derby lessons, sponsored and taught by
defendants, gave rise to the potential for purposeful or intentional collisions between skaters as
directed by defendants. The Legislature certainly did not intend to protect a rink operator from
2
The Dale II panel, while partially rejecting the opinion in Skene, did hold that “[t]he Skene
Court properly found that collisions among roller skaters are obvious and necessary dangers
assumed by a roller skater pursuant to § 5 of the RSSA.” Dale II, supra at 65.
-4-
liability in a scenario in which, by way of example, the operator skated into a rink and
intentionally and unexpectedly collided into another skater at full force intending to cause injury,
thereby committing a criminal act, despite the fact that it could be viewed as simply a collision
with another skater encompassed by § 5. Such an act would not be a risk assumed by the harmed
skater when choosing to roller skate. But we do not have any evidence of this kind of egregious
conduct in the case before us today.
Because the Court in Dale II restricted the § 5 clause referring to breach of common law
duties to injuries involving objects or artificial structures and not collisions, roller skating
collisions caused by negligence, which cause of action requires the existence and breach of a
duty, Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000), would not appear to
give rise to liability under the RSSA. This is unless of course a separate duty arose under § 3 of
the RSSA, which has not been argued or alleged here. Ultimately, we need not take a definitive
position because, assuming that engaging in the sport of roller derby does not equate to roller
skating as contemplated by the RSSA, thereby removing the case from the RSSA, simple
negligence does not suffice, where plaintiff was injured while participating in a recreational
activity. Our Supreme Court has formally adopted a “reckless misconduct” standard as the
minimum standard of care for participants engaged in recreational activities; carelessness or
ordinary negligence cannot serve as a basis for liability. Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461
Mich 73, 89-90; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). Accordingly, plaintiff’s negligence claim fails.
Furthermore, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that
defendants did not engage in reckless misconduct.
Plaintiff also alleged an assault and battery claim, along with claims of nuisance and
breach of contract. We find that the nuisance and breach of contract claims, as alleged, are
actually in the nature of claims of negligence. “It is well settled that the gravamen of an action is
determined by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels
to determine the exact nature of the claim.” Adams v Adams, 276 Mich App 704, 710-711; 742
NW2d 399 (2007), citing David v Sternberg, 272 Mich App 377, 381; 726 NW2d 89 (2006).
Moreover, plaintiff’s appellate arguments concerning the nuisance and breach of contract claims
are insufficiently briefed. Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 105; 580 NW2d 845 (1998).
With respect to assault and battery, assuming that the RSSA would allow such a claim
against a rink operator under the circumstances presented, we find that, as a matter of law, no
cognizable cause of action for assault and battery arose in the case at bar. In Espinoza v Thomas,
189 Mich App 110, 119; 472 NW2d 16 (1991), this Court stated:
An assault is defined as any intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to
another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of
another, under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of
imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the
contact. A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another
person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact. Protection of
the interest in freedom from unintentional and unpermitted contacts with the
plaintiff's person extends to any part of his body . . . . [Citations omitted.]
However, there is no assault and battery if a recipient consented to the contact, unless the
consent was coerced or fraudulently obtained. People v Starks, 473 Mich 227, 234; 701 NW2d
-5-
136 (2005). Participation in a recreational activity entails a manifestation of consent to bodily
contacts that are permitted by the game. Ritchie-Gamester, supra at 79. “‘[A]n intentional act
causing injury, which goes beyond what is ordinarily permissible, is an assault and battery for
which recovery may be had.’” Id. (citations omitted). The Ritchie-Gamester Court stated:
No matter what terms are used, the basic premise is the same: When
people engage in a recreational activity, they have voluntarily subjected
themselves to certain risks inherent in that activity. When one of those risks
results in injury, the participant has no ground for complaint. [Id. at 87.]
Here, plaintiff understood that she was taking lessons to learn the sport of roller derby,
which is a contact sport, and while plaintiff testified that she did not expect the lesson to include
full-contact drills, she voluntarily chose to participate in a drill before the accident occurred after
being asked to act as a “blocker.” Plaintiff specifically testified that she recognized that blocking
could involve a collision with another skater. Indeed, plaintiff testified that she prepared herself
to block other skaters by extending her arms and also braced herself against possible impact.
She also testified that she was free to leave the skate class at any time. To the extent that an
assault and battery could potentially be attributed to defendants, and not the “jammer” skater
alone who struck plaintiff, and again assuming that the RSSA would allow the claim, we hold
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff consented to participating in the roller derby drill, knowing that
contact was possible. And we cannot conclude that the contact went beyond that ordinarily
permissible in the context of roller derby. Accordingly, there was no assault and battery.
Additionally, with respect to assault and battery, the evidence reflected that the contact between
plaintiff and the “jammer” was inadvertent and not intentional, and an assault, as well as a
battery, requires an intentional and willful act. Espinoza, supra at 119. In sum, reversal is
unwarranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.