VIJAYAKUMAR VEMULAPALLI V CITY OF FLINT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VIJAYAKUMAR VEMULAPALLI and
SASIKALA VEMULAPALLI,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 287566
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 04-080506-PZ
CITY OF FLINT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Borrello and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal by leave granted from an order vacating an arbitration award granting
them $6,024,128.10. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the arbitration award.
Plaintiffs are the owners of the 19-story Genesee Towers office building in Flint. The
building was damaged by flooding in August of 2001, apparently caused by the negligent
installation of a new water meter. Due to the flooding damage, all remaining tenants left the
building in 2002. The building has apparently not been inhabited or returned to habitable
condition since that time. On December 24, 2004, plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging that
defendant had effectively taken the property without just compensation. Plaintiffs alleged that
defendant’s employees caused the building to become vacant and significantly lowered its value
through a variety of actions and inactions, including failure to properly replace a water meter,
refusal to issue a certificate of occupancy, public statements that the building was unsafe and
would be condemned, refusal to allow tenants to remain in the building, failure to inspect repairs
followed by citations for lack of inspection, and a general policy that defendant did not intend to
allow plaintiffs to reopen the building.
In August 2006, the parties stipulated to an order adjourning trial and allowing defendant
to file a counterclaim for condemnation of the building pursuant to the Uniform Condemnation
Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.51 et seq. Defendant filed its condemnation countercomplaint on September 26, 2006, and offered plaintiffs $1,540,000 for the property. According
to plaintiffs, defendant never tendered the amount of its good-faith offer or assumed title and
possession of the property as required by the UCPA. Rather than bringing their claims to trial,
the parties agreed to submit the matter to binding arbitration as a condemnation action.
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The arbitration order provided that the arbitrator would have the authority to fashion a
remedy as requested in the counter-complaint as available under Michigan law. The arbitration
was subject to a high/low agreement where the award would be no lower than defendant’s
appraisal value ($1,540,000) and no higher than plaintiff’s appraisal value ($7,338,840), plus
interest, costs, and attorney fees under the UCPA. The parties stipulated that the arbitration
proceeding was subject to the Michigan Arbitration Act, MCL 600.5001 et seq., and that the
circuit court would retain jurisdiction solely for the purpose of enforcing the arbitration award,
enforcing the terms of the agreement, enforcing subpoenas, and determining evidentiary issues.
Paragraph 4 of the stipulated order for condemnation arbitration stated, in relevant part:
4.
The arbitration will be governed by the following procedures:
***
d.
The arbitrator will determine all issues required under the Uniform
Condemnation Procedures Act, including the imposition of costs and fees, as if
the case had been originated in the City of Flint as a formal condemnation under
the UCPA.
e.
The date of the taking shall be the date of the filing of the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants’ complaint on December 27, 2004 or September 26,
2006 [the date defendant filed its counterclaim for condemnation under the
UCPA].
The parties proceeded to arbitration, and on October 31, 2007, defendant moved the
arbitrator to limit evidence of alleged prior acts by defendant and to set the date of the taking at
September 26, 2006. Defendant argued that plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim had been
dismissed by the parties and that the arbitration was supposed to involve only the compensation
plaintiffs should receive for condemnation under the UCPA. Defendant argued that plaintiffs
had waived their opportunity to bring evidence showing conduct by defendant that lowered the
value of the property before condemnation in September 2006. Plaintiffs opposed this motion,
arguing that evidence of property value was liberally admitted in condemnation cases, that
defendant’s actions led to serious diminution of the property’s value, and that evidence of
defendant’s actions was relevant to showing the true fair market value of the property.
The arbitrator denied defendant’s motion to limit evidence and to set the date of the
taking to September 2006 in his November 1, 2007, opinion and order. The arbitrator found that
the date of the taking was a question of fact that could not be set as a matter of law before
arbitration began. Citing In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, City of Detroit v
Cassese, 376 Mich 311; 136 NW2d 896 (1965), the arbitrator pointed out that a city may not
take deliberate actions that reduce the value of private property in order to reduce the amount of
compensation paid upon condemnation of that property. The arbitrator found that Michigan law
supported plaintiffs’ argument that they should be allowed to offer evidence regarding the value
of the property at their proposed December 27, 2004, taking date, including previous actions by
defendant that lowered the value of the land.
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The arbitrator issued his written opinion and award on November 23, 2007. Defendant
had argued that the only issue to be arbitrated was the value of the property on September 24,
2006, the date of the taking. The arbitrator pointed out that the order that referred the case to
arbitration had two proffered dates of the taking, so there was a question of fact regarding the
date of the taking and what evidence would be admitted.
The arbitrator’s opinion did not rely upon any of plaintiffs’ allegations that defendant’s
actions somehow resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the property. Instead, the arbitrator
found that the uninhabitable nature of the property was caused by plaintiffs’ failure to repair the
flood-related damage. The arbitrator reviewed defendant’s assessed values of the property from
1986 to 2007 and noted that the assessed values were not reduced in several years when the
property’s value would ordinarily have diminished. In 1997, plaintiffs bought the subject
property at auction for $500,000. The major tenant left the building in 1998. The property was
damaged by flooding in 2001, and all remaining tenants left the building in 2002. The arbitrator
noted that despite those events, the assessed value of the property did not go down during those
years. Instead, defendant’s assessor reduced the assessed value of the property by one-half in
2004. The arbitrator concluded that this reduction was based upon the fact that the property was
being considered for condemnation. The arbitrator noted that Michigan case law does not allow
a city to take deliberate acts to reduce the value of private property in order to facilitate
condemnation. The arbitrator found that the taking took place December 24, 2004, explaining as
follows:
[T]he date of taking, by the deliberate action of the City of Flint’s Assessor’s
Office in reducing the Assessed Value and True Cash Value by one half for the
subject property, solely because it was being considered for condemnation, in this
case was December 27, 2004.
After determining the date of the taking, the arbitrator compared the parties’ experts’
appraisals of the building. The arbitrator noted that one of the comparable properties relied upon
by defendant’s expert had been sold at a mortgage foreclosure sale and so was not comparable to
the subject property. The arbitrator found plaintiffs’ expert’s appraisal of $7,338,840 “as is” was
overly optimistic in light of the local economy. Relying on the evaluation of plaintiff’s expert
and the true cash value of the property as determined by defendant’s assessor’s office, the
arbitrator believed that the fair market value should be $7,228,200, less the cost of repairs
required to make the property tenantable. Plaintiffs’ expert estimated that such repairs would
cost $2,311,160; defendant’s expert estimated the cost of repairs at $3,291,000. The arbitrator
noted that he had personally inspected the building and that it seemed to be structurally sound.
The arbitrator believed that the reasonable cost for repairs should be $2,350,000, so the net figure
of plaintiffs’ compensation for the building would be $4,878,200. After the inclusion of attorney
fees and expert witness fees, the award totaled $6,024,128.10.
Defendant moved to vacate the arbitration award and plaintiffs moved for judgment on
the award. Defendant argued that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority under the
arbitration order by treating the case as one for inverse condemnation rather than a condemnation
under the UCPA and considering evidence relating to inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs’ counsel
disagreed, arguing that the arbitration order required the arbitrator to pick either the December
2004 or September 2006 date as the date of the taking and that the arbitrator determined
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compensation based on the fair market value of the building as in a UCPA case and did not
award compensation for lost business or rent as would be allowed in an inverse condemnation
case. After considering the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found that the arbitrator did not
exceed his powers but expressed dismay at the amount awarded plaintiffs, stating:
This really is a travesty when a man buys a building for $400,000 and runs
it into the ground and then gets an arbitrator’s ruling for millions which the
taxpayers are going to pay for. It looks like plaintiff has finally struck the pot of
gold. Unfortunately, the taxpayers are in the pot.
The circuit court affirmed the arbitration order, but subsequently granted defendant’s
motion for reconsideration. The court noted that the stipulated order for arbitration did not give
the arbitrator any authority to consider plaintiffs’ original complaint for inverse condemnation or
to consider it as a counterclaim. The court found that both parties had effectively agreed that
issues relating to inverse condemnation were “off the table.” The court further found that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by considering plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims rather
than reviewing the matter solely as one for condemnation under the UCPA, explaining:
This court determines that the arbitrator was under the belief that because
the [original] complaint had not been dismissed in this court’s case that he was
under some unstated authority to rule on it. However, it was also clear to this
Court, for all the reasons stated above, that the arbitrator’s belief was incorrect
and without any factual or legal basis. The sole authority given to the arbitrator
was the stipulated order for condemnation arbitration, which even the arbitrator
acknowledged converted the case to one involving straight condemnation.
Because that order provided no basis for any determination of inverse
condemnation the arbitrator was under no authority to do so.
The circuit court disagreed with plaintiffs that any consideration of their inverse
condemnation claims was harmless because it had no practical effect on the award amount,
explaining:
Inverse condemnation requires a showing of two elements. The moving
party must first establish “that the government’s actions were a substantial cause
of the decline of its property.” Second, the plaintiff must “establish that the
government abused its legitimate powers in affirmative actions directly aimed at
the plaintiff’s property.” Based on the arbitrator’s finding of those elements it is
clear that instead of merely determining a fair market value for the building, that
he found that the City abused its powers against [plaintiffs] to their detriment.
Accordingly, because the arbitrator had no authority to make those
determinations, the City was necessarily denied a fair arbitration process.
Accordingly, [plaintiffs’] argument that the award would have been the
same is pure speculation. There is no way to determine how the arbitrator would
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have ruled if he had treated this case correctly as a straight condemnation case.
This court finds analogous the case of McClain v Alger.[1] In that case the
Michigan Court of Appeals was faced with a lower court error which “taint(ed)the
verdicts in a manner inconsistent with plaintiff’s right to substantial justice.” The
Court determined that “since we cannot speculate as to what the outcome would
have been but for this error, reversal is required.” Similarly, this Court
determines that a new arbitration is required.
Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that before a court
vacates an arbitration award, there “must be error so material or so substantial as
to have governed the award, and but for which the award would have been
substantially otherwise.” In this case, because the arbitrator considered an issue
without any authority and allowed that issue to taint his award and findings of
fact, this court determines that a material and substantial error was made and a
new arbitration is required. [Citations omitted.]
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding that the arbitrator erred
because he exceeded his powers and improperly evaluated the inverse condemnation claim.
Judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is limited by MCR 3.602. Brucker v McKinlay
Transport, Inc, 454 Mich 8, 15; 557 NW2d 536 (1997). That rule provides that a court “shall
vacate an award if . . . the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers . . . .” MCR 3.602(J)(2)(c). An
arbitrator exceeds his powers when he acts beyond the material terms of the contract from which
he draws his authority, or acts in contravention of controlling principles of law. Saveski v Tiseo
Architects, Inc, 261 Mich App 553, 554-555; 682 NW2d 542 (2004). However, modification or
vacation of an arbitrator’s award must be based on an obvious, “facial” error; “a trial court may
not hunt for errors in an arbitrator's explanation of how it determined who is liable under the
arbitrated contract, and who owes what damages to whom.” Saveski, 261 Mich App 558.
Failing to limit review in this fashion “would allow a dissatisfied court to delve deeper and
deeper into an arbitrator's factual and legal support until it finally unearthed a perceived error
that could justify the court's desired outcome.” Id. We review de novo a trial court’s decision to
vacate an arbitration award. Tokar v Albery, 258 Mich App 350, 352; 671 NW2d 139 (2003).
“Generally, the parties’ agreement determines the scope of arbitration.” Rooyakker &
Sitz, PLLC v Plante & Moran, PLLC, 276 Mich App 146, 163; 742 NW2d 409 (2007).
Ambiguities or conflicts in the terms should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id.
The stipulated order for arbitration stated that defendant’s counterclaim for condemnation
under the UCPA would be submitted for arbitration and that the arbitrator would determine all
issues under the UCPA, including imposition of costs and fees, as if the case had been brought as
a formal condemnation under the UCPA. The final paragraph of the stipulated order stated that
the pending action (i.e., the remaining inverse condemnation claim) would be dismissed upon
1
150 Mich App 306, 318; 388 NW2d 349 (1986).
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surrender of possession to defendant. While the arbitration agreement limited the subject of the
arbitration to determining plaintiffs’ compensation and other remedies for condemnation under
the UCPA, it did not preclude the arbitrator from reviewing the history of the dispute or
considering evidence that predated the filing of defendant’s condemnation counterclaim when
determining the proper amount of compensation for the condemned property.2
Moreover, review of the arbitrator’s decision does not show that the arbitrator exceeded
the scope of the stipulated order by somehow treating the matter as one for inverse condemnation
rather than a condemnation action under the UCPA. While the arbitrator’s opinion noted
plaintiffs’ claims of inverse condemnation and stated that this case involved a “hybrid” between
inverse condemnation and “pure” condemnation, review of the entire opinion shows that the
arbitrator did not rely on the inverse condemnation allegations and instead found that the
uninhabitable condition of the building was caused by plaintiffs’ decision not to repair the flood
damage. The arbitrator specifically found that “any damage to the tenancy of the subject
property was proximately caused by [plaintiffs’] failure to repair the flood[-]related damage to
the subject property.”
The arbitrator did not award damages for defendant’s alleged interference with plaintiffs’
use of their property,3 but instead tried to determine the fair market value of the building in its
present condition to provide plaintiffs proper compensation for condemnation. In determining
the fair market value, the arbitrator relied upon the appraisal testimony from the parties’ experts,
defendant’s past tax assessments of the property, and repair estimates from the parties’ experts.
The circuit court’s conclusion that the award may have been affected by the inverse
condemnation arguments is pure speculation with no basis derived from the face of the award.
The arbitrator did note that defendant’s assessor substantially decreased the assessed value of the
building for 2004 when it became apparent that defendant would condemn the property. This
evidence was relevant to the credibility of defendant’s appraisal of the property’s fair market
value and was properly considered by the arbitrator. It does not mean that the arbitrator was
improperly basing his decision on the inverse condemnation argument. The arbitrator’s award
was designed to compensate plaintiffs for the loss of the property under the UCPA.4
2
Paragraph 4(e) of the stipulated order stated that “[t]he date of the taking shall be the date of the
filing of the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants’ complaint on December 27, 2004 or September 26,
2006.” The fact that the arbitrator was given a choice between a December 2004 and September
2006 date of taking shows that he was expressly authorized to consider evidence predating
September 26, 2006.
3
An inverse condemnation claim requires the plaintiff to prove that the government interfered
with the plaintiff’s use of his property. Hinojosa v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 263 Mich App
537, 549; 688 NW2d 550 (2004).
4
The arbitrator specifically stated that he had to “rely on the intent of the UPCA, and that is to
make certain that when governmental entities seek to take private property for public use, that
just compensation is paid to the owner of the property.”
-6-
As noted in Krist v Krist, 246 Mich App 59, 67; 631 NW2d 53 (2001), an arbitrator’s
factual findings are not subject to appellate review. The arbitrator reached a tenable decision in
this case based on the arbitration agreement and the evidence presented, and the court erred in
vacating the arbitration award. There was no “facial” error in the arbitration award. Saveski,
261 Mich App 558.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment based on the arbitration award. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Douglas B. Shaprio
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