PEOPLE OF MI V DOUGLAS RICHARD RUTKOFSKE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285753
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 07-002780-FC
DOUGLAS RICHARD RUTKOFSKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant appeals as of right his convictions of three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1), and one count of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c. The trial court sentenced defendant to
concurrent prison terms of 15 to 30 years on the CSC I counts and 5 to 15 years on the CSC II
count, with 41 days’ credit. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose out of his sexual relationship with his roommate’s
daughter, which started when the daughter was approximately aged nine and continued several
years until she moved to live with her father out of state. The girl alleged that defendant abused
her nearly every day, starting with digital/genital abuse and progressing to digital, object, and
penile penetration. The abuse took place when the girl accompanied defendant on long haul
trucking jobs, as well as in the homes defendant shared with the girl, her brother, and her mother.
Defendant’s theory of the case was that the girl and her brother concocted the CSC
allegations in order to be permitted to live with their father. According to defendant, the children
did not like the discipline and chores that their mother and defendant imposed upon them, and
the children perceived their father to be more lenient. This theory rested in large part upon
whether the jury found the girl’s trial testimony credible. The convictions indicate that the jury
found the girl’s description of the abuse to be credible. We defer to the jury’s credibility
determinations. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 645-646; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
Accordingly, we will not reverse defendant’s convictions unless defendant can establish an error
warranting reversal.
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Defendant first argues that the prosecutor committed several acts of misconduct during
voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument. Defendant objected to only one of these
alleged acts of misconduct. During closing argument, defendant objected to the prosecutor’s
assertion that a mattress was missing from defendant’s home. Defendant argued that there was
no evidence of a missing mattress. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to continue the
argument concerning the mattress. Defendant now contends that the reference to a missing
mattress was a constitutional due process violation. We disagree.
When addressing a constitutional error involving prosecutorial misconduct, this Court
examines the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct tainted the trial to such a
degree that the conviction was a denial of due process. People v Blackmon (After Remand), 280
Mich App 253, 262; 761 NW2d 172 (2008). We find no misconduct in the mattress reference,
and thus find no constitutional violation. A prosecutor’s statements to the jury must be
supported by the evidence or by reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v Unger, 278
Mich App 210, 241; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Here, having reviewed the evidence and the
exhibits, we find that the prosecutor’s argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly stated that defendant first
touched the girl sexually on the outside of her clothes. As defendant points out, the record does
not support the prosecutor’s statement. A prosecutor may not refer to evidence unless the
evidence is substantiated. People v Wolverton, 227 Mich App 72, 78; 574 NW2d 703 (1997). If
the prosecutor fails to substantiate evidence referenced in opening statement, this Court must
determine whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith, and whether the lack of substantiation
prejudiced the defendant. Id. Here, we find no bad faith. The references to touching outside of
clothing had limited persuasive value, particularly in light of the girl’s extensive testimony
describing digital/genital, object/genital, and genital/genital touching. The prosecutor’s brief
references to touching outside of clothing did not increase the likelihood that the jury would
convict defendant of the charged conduct. As such, we find no error.
In addition, defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by reneging on
an agreement that the girl would undergo a medical examination. Defendant has not provided
this Court with a record of the putative agreement, which apparently occurred prior to the time
the prosecutor dismissed charges against defendant without prejudice. Moreover, defendant has
provided nothing to indicate that a physical examination would have resulted in exculpatory
evidence, given the amount of time that had elapsed since the alleged abuse. Consequently, we
find no misconduct regarding the lack of a medical examination. Cf. Brady v Maryland, 373 US
83; 83 S Ct 1194, 10 L Ed 215 (1963).
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor improperly bolstered the girl’s credibility,
improperly appealed to the jurors’ sense of civic duty, and misstated the burden of proof. We
disagree with these assertions. The challenged statements were responsive to statements or
arguments made by defendant. “A prosecutor may fairly respond to an issue raised by the
defendant.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 135; 755 NW2d 664 (2008).
Defendant next argues that the trial judge made erroneous evidentiary rulings and
exhibited an obvious bias toward the prosecution. Although defendant claims that these errors
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were constitutional in nature, we disagree, and accordingly we apply the standard of review for
nonconstitutional errors. To prevail on his evidentiary challenges, defendant has the burden of
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion and that the errors resulted in a
miscarriage of justice. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To prevail
on his unpreserved challenge to the trial court’s neutrality, defendant must demonstrate plain
error affecting his substantial rights. Id.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, nor do we find
evidence of bias. Defendant first sought to introduce evidence from the girl’s electronic
messaging sites, which included references to use of alcohol and marijuana. Defendant argued
that this evidence was admissible to impeach the girl’s preliminary examination testimony that
her father forbade her from using alcohol or drugs. As plaintiff correctly points out, evidence
concerning whether the girl used alcohol or marijuana is at best tangentially probative of whether
her father actually allowed such behavior. Accordingly, under MRE 403, the trial court was
within its discretion to exclude the evidence.
We recognize that one of the electronic messages appears to relate information
concerning the girl’s perception that her father would allow her to chose whether to use alcohol.
Although this electronic message may have been admissible for impeachment purposes, we find
no error requiring reversal in the exclusion of the message. Defendant introduced other
impeachment evidence and has not demonstrated that exclusion of this particular message was a
miscarriage of justice. Carines, 460 Mich at 774. Likewise, we find that defendant has not
established an abuse of discretion or a miscarriage of justice to support his other allegations of
evidentiary error.
Defendant’s claims of judicial bias are similarly flawed. This Court presumes that the
trial judge was impartial, and the burden is on defendant in this case to overcome the
presumption. See In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 151; 486 NW2d 326
(1992). To prevail, defendant must demonstrate a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” on the
part of the trial judge. People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 391; 605 NW2d 374 (1999). A
contested judicial ruling will rarely support a claim of bias. Armstrong v Ypsilanti Charter Twp,
248 Mich App 573, 597; 640 NW2d 321 (2001). Moreover, “[a] trial judge's erroneous ruling,
even when ‘vigorously and consistently expressed,’ is not grounds for disqualification.” Ireland
v Smith, 214 Mich App 235, 249; 542 NW2d 344 (1995). We find nothing in the record to
indicate that the trial court was biased against defendant.
Lastly, we reject defendant’s claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence. Although the majority of the testimony against defendant came from the complainant,
we have previously decided that a complainant’s testimony alone is sufficient to uphold a CSC
conviction against a challenge to the weight of the evidence. See People v Musser, 259 Mich
App 215, 219; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). Further, our Legislature has established that “[t]he
testimony of a [CSC] victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under [MCL 750.]520b to
520g.” MCL 750.520h.
Here, the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to allow reasonable jurors to find that
defendant engaged in sexual conduct with an underage girl who was a member of his household.
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See MCL 750.520b; MCL 750.520c. The evidence included testimony describing sexual activity
to support the CSC II count and testimony describing sexual penetrations to support the CSC I
counts. Id. As noted previously, we cannot second-guess the jury’s determinations as to the
credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, we must affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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