PATRICIA WILKES V TIMOTHY LEQUIA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 15, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286139
Marquette Circuit Court
LC No. 08-045454-CK
TIMOTHY LEQUIA and ANN LEQUIA,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
PATRICIA WILKES and NICHOLAS LAMERE,
JR., Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of
TRAVIS ALVIN LAMERE,
Defendants-Appellants.
PATRICIA WILKES and NICHOLAS LAMERE,
JR., Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of
TRAVIS LAMERE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 286776
Marquette Circuit Court
LC No. 07-044816-NO
TIMOTHY LEQUIA and ANN LEQUIA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Bandstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals arise from the tragic accidental death of a young child in
foster care. We affirm the trial court decisions in both cases.
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The Marquette Department of Human Services (DHS) placed the child, who was aged
two and a half, in the foster parents’ household after the child’s parents were arrested. The child
lived in the foster home for a week while DHS investigated alternative placement with the
relatives. Before DHS completed its investigation, the child wandered into the river adjacent to
the foster parents’ home and drowned. The child’s estate sued the foster parents, who sought
coverage from State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, their homeowners insurance company.
The company filed a summary disposition motion against the foster parents and the estate, on the
ground that the policy’s household exclusion barred coverage of the estate’s claim. The trial
court granted summary disposition in favor of the company. Subsequently, a different trial court
granted summary disposition in favor of the foster parents on the underlying claim, finding that
the foster parents were immune from suit under MCL 722.163.
We turn first to the appeal in the insurance action. The estate and the foster parents claim
that the trial court erred by finding that the child was a “resident” of the foster parents’
household within the meaning of the policy. We review the trial court’s summary disposition
decision de novo, Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 464; 703 NW2d 23 (2005),
considering the entire record and examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 277; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). We
also conduct a de novo review of legal questions concerning insurance contracts. Rory, supra at
464.
When deciding an insurance coverage issue, this Court must apply the terms of the
policy. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 111; 595 NW2d 832 (1999). Unless
the policy terms are ambiguous, the Court will enforce the policy as written. Id. To decide
whether a policy provision is ambiguous, the Court must determine whether the “words may
reasonably be understood in different ways.” Raska v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 412 Mich 355,
362; 314 NW2d 440 (1982). When considering exclusions to insurance policies, we read the
contract as a whole, and we must enforce clear and specific exclusions. Tenneco Inc v Amerisure
Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 429, 444; 761 NW2d 846 (2008). If we find the exclusion
ambiguous, we construe the provision in favor of the insured. Id.
The policy in this case excluded liability coverage for bodily injury to any “insured.”
The policy defined “insured” to include residents of the named insureds’ household. The parties
on appeal disagree as to whether the term “resident” is ambiguous as used in the policy. Having
examined the household exclusion and the definition of “insured,” we find no ambiguity.
Although the term “resident” is not defined in the policy, we apply the term as written, in
accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Berkeypile v Westfield Ins Co, 280 Mich App
172, 178; 760 NW2d 624 (2008). The plain and ordinary meaning of “resident” in this context
refers to a person living in a particular place as a member of a household. The child was living
in the foster parents’ household at the time of his death, having been formally placed there by a
government agency having legal authority to do so to provide him a “stable, loving family
environment.” MCL 722.953(a). Thus, the child was an insured within the meaning of the
policy.
The estate and the foster parents argue that the trial court should have applied the analysis
described in Workman v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477, 496; 274 NW2d 373
(1979) to find that the child was not a resident of the foster parents’ household. Assuming
without deciding that the Workman analysis applies in this context, the Workman factors would
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suggest that the child was a resident within the meaning of the homeowners policy. Most
importantly, although the child’s placement was temporary and indefinite, he was physically
present in the foster parents’ household in a family environment. And, consistent with the
language of the insurance policy at issue here, the foster parents were not just providing the child
a place to be domiciled, they were responsible for his care.
Turning to the appeal in the wrongful death action, we must determine whether the foster
parents are immune from the estate’s suit. The determination whether statutory immunity bars a
foster child’s claim is a question of law for the Court. Spikes by Simmons v Banks, 231 Mich
App 341, 349; 586 NW2d 106 (1998). We review questions of law de novo. Ford Motor Co v
City of Woodhaven, 475 Mich 425, 438; 716 NW2d 247 (2006).
The immunity issue requires application of MCL 722.163, which protects foster parents
from negligence suits arising from the “exercise of reasonable parental authority” over their
foster children, and from negligence suits arising from the “exercise of reasonable parental
discretion with respect to the provision of” care. MCL 722.163(1)(a), (b). To overcome the
statutory immunity protections, the alleged facts must be sufficient to state a claim for
negligence falling outside the protection provided by the parental authority and parental
discretion provisions, or for neglect, for which there is no statutory immunity. See Spikes, supra
at 350-351.
To state a claim for neglect, the allegations must establish that the defendant placed a
child at an unreasonable risk, that the defendant should have had knowledge of the risk, and that
the defendant was able to intervene to eliminate the risk but failed to do so. MCL 722.622(j);
Spikes, supra at 350-351.1 Here, the record contains nothing to establish that the foster parents
placed the child at an unreasonable risk. Rather, the facts demonstrate that the estate’s claim is
based on negligent supervision, which the Supreme Court has determined to be barred by
parental authority immunity. Plumley v Klein, 388 Mich 1, 8; 199 NW2d 169 (1972).2 The
record establishes that the foster parents allowed the child to remain outdoors with their 12-yearold son for approximately half an hour, while the foster father checked on the child periodically
from the windows and the deck.3 Both the foster father and the 12-year-old stated that they were
monitoring the child. Even if their monitoring efforts were negligent, their conduct can only be
described as negligent supervision, not as neglect. As our Court has reasoned in applying
Plumley, “not every act or omission by a parent can be regarded as actionable negligence.”
Haddrill v Damon, 149 Mich App 702, 706; 386 NW2d 643 (1986). Thus, parents have been
adjudged immune from suit in a variety of situations, including dirt bike crashes, id., gunshot
1
The Child Protection Act has been amended and various subsections have been redesignated
since the Spikes opinion. See PA 1998 531; PA 2000 45; PA 2002 661; PA 2002 693; PA 2004
563. The language of the child neglect definition has not changed.
2
The Plumley immunity provisions for parents were replicated in the foster parent immunity
statute. Spikes, supra at 348. Thus, precedents applying Plumley are apposite here.
3
We note that parents often place children of the victim’s age here in the care of 12-year old
babysitters.
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wounds, Wright v Wright, 134 Mich App 800, 807-808; 351 NW2d 868 (1984), and swimming
pool injuries, McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139-140; 298 NW2d 687
(1980).
The estate also argues that the foster parents should have provided a fence to prevent
access to the river. This Court rejected a similar argument in Ashley v Bronson, 189 Mich App
498, 506-507; 473 NW2d 757 (1991). The parental discretion provision provides immunity for
negligent acts of commission and omission, so long as the acts are attributable to reasonable
parental discretion. Here, the foster parents’ decision to live adjacent to the river was a
reasonable, albeit tragic, exercise of parental discretion, as was their decision to leave the area
unfenced.
We affirm.
involved.
No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, a question of public policy
/s/ Joel P. Hoesktra
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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