PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL LEE SLOCUM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285563
Isabella Circuit Court
LC No. 07-002008-FC
DANIEL LEE SLOCUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Cavanagh and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii) (making it a felony to engage in sexual penetration with
a person who is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and related to the actor by blood or
affinity), and accosting, enticing or soliciting a child for immoral purposes, MCL 750.145a. The
trial court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent terms of 135 to 360 months in prison for the
CSC I conviction and 17 to 48 months in prison for the accosting conviction. The trial court also
ordered defendant to pay a fine of $1,000 and costs of $2,000 for the CSC I conviction, and a
$400 fine and $800 costs for the accosting conviction, as well as a $60 crime victim rights
assessment for each charge, and restitution. Because we conclude that there were no errors
warranting relief, we affirm.
Officers arrested defendant in October 2007, after the complainant revealed to her
counselor that she had had a sexual relationship with defendant that began in 2003 and ended in
2005. Defendant admitted to the sexual relationship, but testified that the first sexual encounter
between the two took place when the complainant was 16. The complainant, however, testified
to several sexual encounters that took place before her sixteenth birthday.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it permitted the complainant to make
two highly prejudicial statements and that the admission of these statements warrants a new trial.
This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v Yost,
278 Mich App 341, 353; 749 NW2d 753 (2008).
When asked by the prosecutor about the change in the relationship over time, the
complainant testified that she was scared of defendant, in part, because he is “racist.” She also
testified that the sex between them became “more aggressive.” At this point, defense counsel
objected. After the judge excused the jury, he sustained the objection as to the “more
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aggressive” language, and overruled the objection to the “racist” statement. When the jury came
back, the judge did not instruct the jury as to the sustained objection.
Credibility was a central issue at trial, and one potential attack on the complainant’s
credibility was the question of why, in light of her testimony that she did not want to be in a
relationship with defendant, she remained in the relationship for nearly two years. She testified
that she was afraid of defendant, and one reason she felt afraid was because she felt defendant
was racist. The testimony was relevant. MRE 401. Defendant argues that even if it was
relevant, the probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. While we
recognize that an accusation of racism can be prejudicial, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that any unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh
the probative value of this testimony. Yost, 278 Mich App at 353.
To the extent that it was error for the trial court to fail to inform the jury that it had
sustained defendant’s objection to the testimony about the changing nature of the sexual
relationship, such error was harmless. In order to warrant relief, the defendant had to show that
the admission of this testimony undermined the reliability of the verdict. People v Mateo, 453
Mich 203, 211; 551 NW2d 891 (1996). The statement was brief and isolated, was not developed
through further examination by the prosecutor, and was not referenced in the prosecutor’s
closing argument to the jury. In light of these facts, defendant cannot show that this was more
likely than not outcome-determinative. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 494; 596 NW2d 607
(1999).
Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to review in
camera the complainant’s counseling records for the period of 2003 to 2004. The complainant
saw a counselor in 2003 and 2004, before the sexual relationship with defendant began, and
continuing into their relationship. In 2007, after the relationship was over, she saw the counselor
again, and it was at this time that she purportedly first told him about the sexual relationship.
Because the crux of the case was whether the first sexual encounter between the two took place
before or after the complainant’s sixteenth birthday, any statements she might have made to her
counselor during the 2003 to 2004 time period about when the sexual relationship started would
be highly material. However, both the complainant and her counselor testified that she made no
mention of sex with defendant during those sessions. Defendant argues that if the complainant
did disclose the sex in 2003 or 2004, then her counselor had a motivation to lie about it, because
he could face liability for failing to report. Also, he continues, if the complainant told her
counselor that the sex began after her sixteenth birthday, then she had a motivation to lie about it
as well if she had an interest in seeing him convicted.
In People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 677; 521 NW2d 557 (1994), the Michigan
Supreme Court addressed the issue of discovery of privileged records that might contain
exculpatory evidence. The Stanaway Court stated:
[I]n an appropriate case there should be available the option of an in camera
inspection by the trial judge of the privileged record on a showing that the
defendant has a good-faith belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact, that there
is reasonable probability that the records are likely to contain material information
necessary to the defense. [Id.; see also MCR 6.201(C)(2).]
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Defendant did not show that his belief was grounded in articulable fact, such as to require
in camera review of the records. Defendant merely speculated that it was possible that the
complainant or the counselor were not being truthful. Defendant’s speculation was not sufficient
to warrant an in camera review. Stanaway, 446 Mich at 677. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it declined defendant’s request.
We also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay
fines and costs that were not authorized by statute at the time defendant committed his crimes.
Defendant claims, without any apparent basis, that the trial court imposed these fines and costs
under MCL 769.1k, which was in effect at the time of sentencing, but not at the time of
defendant’s conduct. The trial court did not refer to any statute at the time of sentencing.
However, MCL 769.34(6), which was in effect at the time of defendant’s conduct, gave the trial
court the discretion to order fines and costs. See People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703, 708-710;
___ NW2d ___ (2009). MCL 750.145a, the statute criminalizing soliciting, enticing, or
accosting a child for immoral purposes, also authorizes the imposition of a fine for the conviction
of that offense. Accordingly, the trial court had the authority to impose the fines and costs at
issue.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the complainant’s
credibility, improperly claimed that defendant lied, expressed his personal opinion as to the guilt
of defendant, and made statements aimed at arousing and inflaming the passions of the jury
during his closing arguments. Defendant’s trial counsel did not object to these statements at
trial. Therefore, we review this claim of error for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
During his closing statement, the prosecutor made the following remarks regarding the
complainant:
She doesn’t have any motive to lie whatsoever. . . .
***
Autumn had no incentive to lie to you folks when she testified. . . . She’s had to
tell the police several times about very private things that have happened that are
very embarrassing to her and she did that. . . .
[S]he’s had to testify at a preliminary examination. . . . So again, no incentive to
lie. . . .
Then she’s had to testify yet another time in front of you folks—fourteen
strangers—another Judge who’s a stranger, court staff, and anyone else who
maybe comes into the courtroom. . . . She’s also had to divulge this, when she
testified, in front of family and friends. . . So no incentive for her to lie
whatsoever.
***
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She had a very good memory as opposed to the Defendant who had a selective
memory.
***
So we look at [the complainant] and whether she has an incentive to lie, and then
we look at the Defendant who has great incentives to lie. . . . Well, the Defendant
has an incentive to get out of trouble for the crimes he’s committed in this case.
He has an incentive to lie to cover up a sexual relationship he had with someone
who was twenty-six, close to twenty-seven years younger than he was. When
Autumn was a little toddler, he was approaching thirty years of age.
***
And the Defendant, he lied several times. And he lied and I caught him on cross
examination lying several times. . . .
***
But the Defendant lying on several levels started with his testimony about who
initiated the sexual intercourse between himself and [the complainant]. . . .
***
But I submit to you that was the situation, the moment, where you say aha, you’re
lying. I call it the aha moment, that you caught him in a direct lie.
Although it is improper for a prosecutor to personally vouch for the credibility of his
witness, it is not improper for a prosecutor to argue from the evidence that his witness is
credible. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 66; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). It is also not improper
for a prosecutor to argue that the opposing witness is not credible or even has lied. People v
Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). The difference depends on whether the
prosecutor’s statements bear a relation to the evidence presented in the case, or whether they
imply some personal knowledge on the part of the prosecutor. Viewing the prosecutor’s
statements in context, see People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004), we
conclude that he never improperly vouched for the credibility of his witness, but argued that the
evidence supported inferences that the complainant had no motivation to lie and that defendant
did.
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor’s statements as to the age difference were not
relevant and could only serve to provoke an emotional response in the jury. Viewed in context,
the statements are meant to help support the prosecution’s theory that defendant was motivated
to lie by embarrassment or shame at the sexual relationship. Even if the comment about the
defendant being nearly 30 when the complainant was a toddler was excessive, such an isolated
statement does not require reversal. Where defendant fails to object and request a curative
instruction, reversal is not required unless the effect of the statement was so prejudicial that the
effect could not have been cured by a jury instruction. People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 18; 260
NW2d 58 (1977). Such is not the case here.
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Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct also fails. The prosecutor’s closing argument was not improper, and thus, any
objection would have been futile. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502
(2000). Moreover, the jury was instructed that “[t]he lawyers’ statements and arguments are not
evidence. They are only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal
theories.” We conclude that this instruction cured any minimal error. See People v Abraham,
256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003) (“Jurors are presumed to follow their
instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.”).
We also reject defendant’s argument that his sentence was an unconstitutional under
Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (1999), and Blakely v
Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). Our Supreme Court has
determined that Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme does not violate the rules stated in
those cases. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006).
Finally, we do not agree that there was any error warranting relief with regard to
defendant’s allegation that the trial court improperly limited his discovery of phone logs and his
argument that he was entitled to an adverse inference instruction based on a missing video of the
interview with the complainant. We conclude that defendant has abandoned his claim of error
regarding the phone logs; defendant’s argument with regard to this claim is devoid of any
meaningful discussion or citation to the record or authorities. See Mudge v Macomb Co, 458
Mich 87, 105; 580 NW2d 845 (1998). With regard to his claim that he was entitled to an adverse
inference instruction, defendant has not presented any evidence that the prosecution or police
acted in bad faith. Absent evidence of bad faith, defendant was not entitled to an adverse
inference instruction. See People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993).
There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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