PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN DANGELO BROOKS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286959
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-002798-FC
BRIAN DANGELO BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant Brian Dangelo Brooks was convicted of one count of assault
with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, one count of felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and one count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second offense, MCL 750.227b. He was found not
guilty of two counts of assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, and one count of
carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227. Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual
offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent sentences of 6 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the assault
conviction and 3 to 10 years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction, and a
consecutive sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court incorrectly scored Offense
Variable (OV) 12 (contemporaneous felonious acts) because it considered both the assault
offenses for which the jury found him not guilty and the assault offense for which he was
convicted. Specifically, in scoring OV 12, the trial court found that defendant had committed
three contemporaneous felonious criminal acts: two assaults with intent to rob and one assault
with intent to do great bodily harm. Defendant was found not guilty of the two charges relating
to the assaults with intent to rob, but was convicted of and sentenced for the assault with intent to
do great bodily harm. Defendant argues that, therefore, he is entitled to resentencing. We
disagree.
When scoring the sentencing guidelines, the trial court uses a preponderance of the
evidence standard, not a reasonable doubt standard. People v Osantowski, 481 Mich 103, 111;
748 NW2d 799 (2008). As a result, “situations may arise wherein although the factfinder
declined to find a fact proven beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction, the same
-1-
fact may be found by a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of sentencing.” People v
Ratkov (After Remand), 201 Mich App 123, 126; 505 NW2d 886 (1993). This is such a
situation. There was sufficient evidence on the record, in the form of witness testimony, to
support the trial court’s inclusion in sentencing of the two charges of assault with intent to rob by
a preponderance of the evidence, even though the jury acquitted defendant of these charges.
Defendant argues that the holding in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296, 301-304; 124 S
Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), should preclude the sentencing court from considering
offenses for which he was acquitted when sentencing OV 12. However, in People v Drohan,
475 Mich 140, 142-143; 715 NW2d 778 (2006), cert den 549 US 1037; 127 S Ct 592; 166 L Ed
2d 440 (2006), our Supreme Court stated that Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s
indeterminate sentencing scheme, in which the defendant is given a sentence with a minimum
and a maximum and a judge may only adjust the minimum sentence at the sentencing hearing.
Id. at 159-160. The Drohan Court held that, in rendering the minimum sentence, a judge could
consider facts that were neither decided by a jury nor admitted. Id. at 159, 164. The Court
concluded that this does not violate either the holding in Blakely or the Sixth Amendment
because “a defendant does not have a right to anything less than the maximum sentence
authorized by the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 159. Because this case only concerns the scoring of
offense variables used to determine defendant’s minimum sentence, Blakely does not apply. The
trial court did not err when it included the assault with intent to rob charges in scoring OV 12.
However, OV 12 defines contemporaneous felonious acts as those that occur “within 24
hours of the sentencing offense” and that “[have] not and will not result in a separate
conviction.” MCL 777.42(2)(a)(i)-(ii). Therefore, none of the acts that resulted in convictions in
this case should be scored under OV 12. The trial court’s inclusion of the assault with intent to
do great bodily harm conviction in scoring OV 12 was erroneous because the defendant was
already convicted for that crime. Therefore, the trial court erred when it scored OV 12 at 25
points instead of at 10 points.
Although defendant correctly notes that a score of zero points for OV 12 would have
reduced his grid location from D-V to D-IV (reducing the minimum sentence range from 29-85
months to 19-57 months), a score of ten points for OV 12 does not have the same effect. Even
with a decreased aggregate OV score of 50 points, defendant’s grid would still be D-V, and he
would still be sentenced within the same range of 29 to 85 months. “Where a scoring error does
not alter the appropriate guidelines range, resentencing is not required.” People v Francisco, 474
Mich 82, 89 n 8; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). Therefore, we decline to remand for resentencing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.