PEOPLE OF MI V SIRDAREAN ADAMS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 287034
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 08-000412-AR
SIRDAREAN ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by leave granted from the 55th District Court’s refusal to bind
defendant over to the Ingham Circuit Court on the charges of unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530,
and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and from the
circuit court’s order affirming the district court’s ruling. We reverse and remand. This appeal
has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
A circuit court’s decision concerning a district court’s bindover ruling is reviewed de
novo. People v Crippen, 242 Mich App 278, 282; 617 NW2d 760 (2000). Therefore, this Court
“gives no deference to the circuit court’s decision.” People v Henderson, 282 Mich App 307,
313; 765 NW2d 619 (2009). The district court’s decision declining to bind a defendant over to
circuit court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49, 52; 714
NW2d 335 (2006). “An abuse of discretion occurs . . . when the trial court chooses an outcome
falling outside th[e] principled range of outcomes.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666
NW2d 231 (2003); People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614, 616-617; 727 NW2d 399 (2006).
The prosecution contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to bind
defendant over for trial. The complainant identified defendant as one of the people who beat and
robbed him. The complainant stated that he recognized defendant from a class they had together,
and recognized defendant’s voice from hearing him speak in class, as well as during the assault.
Defendant did not dispute that the complainant was beaten or that his property was taken.
Instead, defendant challenged the complainant’s identification of defendant as one of the
assailants. The prosecutor insists the complainant’s testimony provided sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause to believe that defendant committed unarmed robbery and assaulted the
complainant with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The prosecutor further argues
that, to the extent that defendant’s witnesses provided conflicting testimony, an issue for the trier
of fact was created, but not grounds to deny the bindover motion. We agree.
-1-
In Henderson, supra at 312, this Court recently summarized the duty of the district court
at a preliminary examination:
The primary function of the preliminary examination is to determine
whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant committed it. People v Glass (After Remand), 464
Mich 266, 277; 627 NW2d 261 (2001). Probable cause that the defendant has
committed a crime is established by evidence sufficient to cause a person of
ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of
the defendant’s guilt. People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126; 659 NW2d 604 (2003).
To establish that a crime has been committed, a prosecutor need not prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt, but must present some evidence of each
element. Id. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from the
evidence can be sufficient. People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426, 444; 661 NW2d
616 (2003). If the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt, the defendant
should be bound over for trial where the questions can be resolved by the trier of
fact. Yost, supra at 128.
Parsing the district court’s ruling, it appears that the court felt that, although it found the
complainant credible and believed the charged crimes had been committed, and although there
was sufficient evidence to support the complainant’s identification of defendant as the man who
initially confronted him and pushed him, it could not conclude that probable cause existed to
believe defendant was one of the men who kicked the complainant or that he was the man who
took the complainant’s wallet. In fact, the district court, in attempting to clarify the decision,
stated: “I think there’s ample room for identification problems.”
Robbery is statutorily defined as having occurred when, “A person who, in the course of
committing a larceny . . . uses force or violence against any person who is present, or who
assaults or puts the person in fear.” MCL 750.530(1); CJI2d 18.2. The elements of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder are: “(1) an attempt or threat with force or
violence to do corporal harm to another, and (2) an intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder.” People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). The intent to do
great bodily harm is “an intent to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.” People v Mitchell,
149 Mich App 36, 39; 385 NW2d 717 (1986), citing People v Ochotski, 115 Mich 601, 608; 73
NW 889 (1898).
We note again that the district court found the complainant to be credible.
complainant testified:
The
Yes. I was kicked by the group and then as the group stopped there was
one individual who was still kicking me and they – he did say “stay down, stay
down,” and at that time that’s when that individual reached and took my wallet
out of my pocket and reached into my other pockets as well. [Emphasis added.]
The complainant unequivocally stated that he recognized the person’s voice that told him
to “stay down”: it was “[t]he voice of the defendant who spoke to me at the beginning of the
altercation.” This testimony established (1) a felonious taking of the property of another (the
complainant’s wallet was removed from his pants), (2) by force or violence or putting in fear (the
-2-
complainant was pushed, struck, knocked to the ground, kicked, and cautioned to stay down
while defendant rummaged through his pockets), and (3) there was no testimony that defendant
was armed with a weapon. Furthermore, this testimony also established the crime of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The complainant stated that when the rest of the
group stopped kicking him, defendant (the person he had initially recognized and whose voice he
had heard) kept kicking him and also told him to “stay down.” This established not just the threat
of force or violence to harm another (the admonition to “stay down”—particularly when it was
delivered at the end of a beating—certainly suggested the threat of further force or violence), but
also the actual application of force and violence: kicking the complainant while he was on the
ground. In conjunction with defendant’s initial aggression (demanding that the complainant tell
him what had happened with “my boy” and pushing him), defendant’s actions in kicking the
complainant after he had been knocked to the ground and kicked by other members of the group
demonstrated the intent1 to do serious injury of an aggravated nature. This Court concludes that
this testimony by the complainant was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that
defendant committed unarmed robbery and assault with intent to do great bodily harm.
Defendant presented the testimony of two classmates who stated that, contrary to the
complainant’s testimony, defendant had not spoken in class.2 This testimony constituted, at best,
impeaching evidence that might be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jurors. “It is not, however, the function of the examining magistrate to discharge the accused
when the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt; that is the
province of the jury.” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 469-470; 579 NW2d 868 (1998), citing
People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 103; 276 NW2d 9 (1979), see also Henderson, supra at 312. As
this Court cautioned in People v Hill, 282 Mich App 538, 546; 766 NW2d 17 (2009):
1
The complainant testified that he sustained a fractured knee, a contusion to his jaw, and minor
bruises. However, even in the absence of injury, it is the intent of the assailant that establishes
the crime, and the nature of defendant’s actions in allegedly pushing the complainant and then
kicking him while he was on the ground, and continuing after the others had stopped, established
defendant’s intent. “An intent, of course, is a secret of a man’s mind, and he can disclose it by
declarations or by his actions. And actions sometimes speak louder than words.” People v
Quigley, 217 Mich 213, 217-218; 185 NW 787 (1921).
2
The complainant testified that he was familiar with defendant’s voice because he heard him
speak in class, he heard him speak at the beginning of the assault, and he heard him speak when
he said, “stay down.” The testimony of defendant’s witnesses cast doubt on the complainant’s
testimony that defendant spoke in the class. However, it did not directly contradict the
complainant’s testimony that he recognized defendant because they had been in the same class,
that defendant was the man who spoke to him when the assault began, and that he was the man
who told him to “stay down” as the assault ended. In fact, defendant’s witnesses lent some
credence to the complainant’s claim that he recognized defendant’s voice because they both
agreed that defendant had a very distinctive voice. Once again, the nature of defendant’s
“distinctive” voice, and the question whether the complainant identified the voice because of its
distinctive character would be potentially fruitful areas of inquiry at trial, but they are the sort of
credibility issues that will not preclude a bindover.
-3-
Contrary to what defendant argues, the preliminary examination is not the
time to create questions of fact or present a defense to the charges. People v
Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 469-470; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). Doing so would have
been futile because the district court is not permitted to discharge a defendant on
the basis of factual or credibility disputes. Id.
The district court abused its discretion by refusing to bind defendant over for trial on the
charges of unarmed robbery and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.
There was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecutor to establish that crimes not cognizable
by the district court were committed, and probable cause to believe that defendant committed
those crimes. MCL 766.13; MCR 6.110(E). Apparent conflicts in the complainant’s testimony
were matters that should have been decided by the trier of fact, and the district court abused its
discretion by using those conflicts as a basis for refusing to bind defendant over to circuit court.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.