PEOPLE OF MI V MIGUEL SPAIN ROSS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285642
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-028150-FH
MIGUEL SPAIN ROSS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Whitbeck and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Miguel Ross appeals as of right his jury convictions of maintaining a drug
house, possession with intent to deliver marijuana,2 felon in possession of a firearm,3 and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm).4 The trial
court sentenced Ross as a second habitual offender,5 to concurrent prison terms of 24 to 36
months for maintaining drug house, 24 to 72 months for possession with intent to deliver
marijuana, and 24 to 80 months for felon in possession of a firearm. Ross also received a
consecutive two years’ imprisonment for each felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
1
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
In June 2005, police assigned to the Bay Area Narcotics Enforcement Team
(BAYANET) discovered marijuana in a vehicle occupied by Michelle Medina and her boyfriend
Calvin Turner. Medina told the officers where the marijuana had been purchased and rode along
with officers to identify the house, which was located at 3703 York Street. At trial, Medina
testified that Turner had purchased the marijuana from Ross while she waited in the car. Medina
acknowledged that she did not actually see money or drugs change hands when Turner met with
1
MCL 333.7405(1)(d).
2
MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii).
3
MCL 750.224f.
4
MCL 750.227b.
5
MCL 769.11.
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Ross in the front yard, but maintained that when Turner returned to the vehicle he had marijuana,
which he did not have prior to meeting with Ross.
Thereafter, BAYANET member Detective Kenneth Campbell obtained a search warrant
for the York Street address. The police executed the warrant on June 28, 2005, at approximately
11 p.m. The police gave verbal notice of warrant, but the door to the house remained closed and
the officers entered using a battering ram. Once inside, the officers secured three adult males,
including Ross; one adult female; and four small children. The officers then searched the
premises in accordance with the search warrant.
The police found several firearms, including two handguns and one shotgun, in the
master bedroom where they found Ross. The police also found several different kinds of
ammunition, both loose and in a box, in the master bedroom. In addition, the police found three
baggies containing marijuana on top of a dresser in plain sight, next to two digital scales.
Officers also found $329 cash on top of the dresser near the marijuana, a box of sandwich bags
in the dresser, and a bulletproof vest between the mattress and box springs of the bed. Finally,
the police found a Nextel bill with Ross’s name as the account holder and the York Street
address as the billing address in the kitchen. The police later tested several of the seized items
for latent fingerprints, but they found no identifiable prints.
Ross denied living at the York Street address, maintaining that it was the home of the
mother of his children, whom he would often visit. Ross testified that he lived with his mother
and other family members on Bloomfield Avenue, which is located only a short distance from
the York Street house. Ross produced a copy of a Michigan identification card, which showed
his address as 1417 Bloomfield Avenue. Ross explained that the reason the Nextel bill identified
his address as York Street was because he had obtained the phone on behalf of Nicole Hatter, his
children’s mother, who did not have the credit to obtain a phone on her own, and that he had the
bills sent to the York Street address because Hatter had promised to pay them.
The prosecutor cross-examined Ross about several traffic tickets he had received over a
number of years that identified Ross’s address as the York Street address. The prosecutor also
introduced a printout of Ross’s current driver’s license, which also identified Ross’s address as
York Street. Ross denied knowledge of how or why the York Street address would have been
listed for him. He also stated that he never saw the marijuana, guns, or the vest that the police
confiscated.
II. Sufficiency Of The Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Ross argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We review
de novo sufficiency of the evidence claims.6 In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we examine
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of
6
People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
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fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond reasonable doubt.7
Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences it engenders are sufficient to support a
conviction, provided the prosecution meets its burden of proof.8
B. Possession With Intent To Deliver Marijuana Conviction
Ross argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for possession
with intent to deliver marijuana. In order to substantiate this charge, the prosecution must “prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance, (2)
defendant intended to deliver the controlled substance to someone else, (3) the substance
possessed was marijuana and defendant was aware that it was, and (4) the marijuana was in a
mixture that weighed less than five kilograms.”9 Here, Ross challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence as it pertains to the first and second elements.
“Possession may be actual or constructive, and may be joint or exclusive.”10
Constructive possession is established when “the totality of the circumstances indicates a
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband.”11 Ross concedes that the police
found him in the bedroom where they recovered marijuana, but he asserts that he was only
visiting when the raid occurred and contends there was no evidence that he lived in the house.
Ross denied that he lived at the York Street address. However, “[i]t is the province of the jury to
determine questions of fact and to assess the credibility of witnesses.”12 Additionally, the
prosecutor introduced a Nextel bill identifying Ross’s address as the York Street house, as well
as a copy of Ross’s current driver’s license and several traffic tickets identifying the York Street
address as his residence. This was sufficient evidence to establish “a sufficient nexus between
the defendant and the contraband.”13
Ross’s argument that the prosecutor failed to establish the requisite intent is based on a
portion of Detective Kenneth Campbell’s testimony in which the detective conceded that the
amount of marijuana recovered was not substantial and was consistent with personal use.
However, Ross fails to acknowledge Detective Campbell’s additional testimony that, while
quantity is an important factor in determining whether the marijuana is for personal use or
intended for delivery, other factors are also helpful, such as the presence of scales, packaging
7
Id.
8
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
9
People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 419-420; 707 NW2d 624 (2005); see MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(iii).
10
People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 622; 696 NW2d 754 (2005) (citations and quotations
omitted).
11
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 520; 489 NW2d 748, amended on other grounds 441 Mich
1201 (1992).
12
People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 124; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
13
Wolfe, supra at 520.
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materials, cellular phones, currency, and firearms. Detective Campbell also testified that police
look for marijuana pipes, the makings for a marijuana cigarette, or a burnt marijuana butt to
indicate that marijuana is intended for personal use. The police did not find this type of drug
paraphernalia the York Street house. In addition, the police recovered three baggies next to
digital scales that had approximately one ounce of marijuana in each, a standard weight for sale.
C. Maintaining A Drug House Conviction
Ross also argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for
maintaining a drug house. MCL 333.7405(1)(d) provides that a person “[s]hall not knowingly
keep or maintain . . . a dwelling . . . that is frequented by persons using controlled substances, or
that is used for keeping or selling controlled substances.” Ross reiterates his argument that there
was no evidence that he lived at the York Street address and also asserts that the prosecutor
failed to establish the “continuity” necessary to establish that he “kept or maintained” a drug
house.14 We have already rejected the former contention and now reject the latter in light of the
evidence at trial.
Specifically, Medina testified that she and her boyfriend had been to the York Street
address on numerous occasions to purchase drugs and that the drugs were purchased from Ross.
Ross denied ever selling drugs to Medina’s boyfriend, but we will not interfere with a jury’s
credibility determinations.15
D. Felon In Possession and Felony-Firearm Convictions
Ross also argues that his convictions for felon in possession and two counts of felonyfirearm cannot be sustained because the element of possession was not established, a required
element of both charges.16 He also asserts that it was necessary to establish that he was “armed”
in order to convict him of the charged firearm offenses. However, both actual and constructive
possession, described as proximity coupled with indicia of control, can be used to support a
conviction for felon in possession and felony-firearm.17
Again, Ross’s argument is based on the premise that he did not live at the York Street
residence. As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence to lead a reasonable jury to
conclude that Ross lived at the York Street address. Moreover, “[e]ven though the firearm was
not in plain view . . . , the jury could reasonably have inferred that the defendant was in knowing
possession of the firearm based on its proximity to a quantity of controlled substances that the
14
See People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 148; 730 NW2d 708 (2007).
15
People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 561; 679 NW2d 127 (2004) (“This Court will not
interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or deciding the credibility
of the witnesses.”).
16
People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999); People v Parker, 230 Mich
App 677, 684-685; 584 NW2d 753 (1998).
17
People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000).
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defendant was intending to deliver, the defendant’s proximity to both the weapon and the
controlled substances, and the well-known relationship between drug dealing and the use of
firearms as protection.”18 Taken as a whole and viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the evidence below and the reasonable inferences stemming from that evidence was
sufficient to support defendant’s convictions.
III. Double Jeopardy
Ross asserts that his convictions for felony-firearm and felon in possession of a firearm
predicated on possession of the same gun violate double jeopardy unless there is a separate
felony to support the felony-firearm conviction. However, in People v Calloway,19 the Michigan
Supreme Court considered whether these convictions could coexist and ruled that because the
plain language of the felony-firearm statute does not enumerate felon in possession as an
underlying felony exception in the statute, the Legislature has clearly conveyed its intent that
felon in possession may serve as the underlying felony for a felony-firearm offense. Despite
Ross’s protestations, People v Smith20 does not undermine the authority of Calloway.
IV. Due Process
A. Standard Of Review
Ross argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it allowed a police
officer to offer testimony related to whether the marijuana recovered was intended for personal
use or delivery. It is clear from Ross’s argument that although he only refers to a single witness
in his brief, he is actually challenging the testimony of two police officers. Because Ross failed
to object to the testimony at trial, we review this claim for plain error affecting a defendant’s
substantial rights.21
B. Analysis
This Court has repeatedly held that expert testimony from experienced police officers
regarding an inference of intent to deliver based on the circumstances of the drugs found is
admissible.22 Ross asserts that there was no showing that the witnesses were trained in making
evaluations based on reliable principles and methodology. However, Ross stipulated that
18
People v Rapley, 483 Mich 1131; 767 NW2d 444 (2009).
19
People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 451-452; 671 NW2d 733 (2003).
20
People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 316; 733 NW2d 351 (2007).
21
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
22
See, e.g., People v Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 541-542; 499 NW2d 404
(1993) (“The officer was qualified because of his training and experience. The information was
not within the layman’s common knowledge and was useful to the jury in determining [the]
defendant’s intent at the time he possessed the drugs.”); People v Ray, 191 Mich App 107; 479
NW2d 1 (1991).
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Detective Campbell is an expert in the area of marijuana trafficking and all of Detective
Campbell’s testimony cited by Ross (regarding circumstances and objects that Detective
Campbell looks for when determining intent behind a particular marijuana possession) falls
squarely within this area of expertise. The other police officer, Officer Morse, testified that he
had worked as an officer for the Saginaw Township Police Department for 15 years and has
worked on drug cases in the past. Moreover, the only portion of Officer Morse’s testimony that
Ross cites is Officer Morse’s statement that “in the drug world,” scales like those found on the
dresser are “commonly used to weigh narcotics . . . , whatever weight that they sell the narcotics
in.” This evidence, given by a witness qualified by his particular experience, could assist the
jury in considering the matter of intent.23
V. Other Bad Acts Testimony
A. Standard Of Review
Ross argues that the trial court denied him a fair trial by allowing Medina to testify that
she had witnessed a drug sale between Ross and her boyfriend prior to the execution of the
search warrant. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence.24
B. Legal Standards
MRE 404(b) permits the introduction of other bad acts so long as it does not “‘risk
impermissible inferences of character to conduct.’”25 Permissible uses of other acts evidence
includes “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an
act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”26 MRE 404(b) is a rule of inclusion
rather than a rule of exclusion.27
C. Applying The Standards
Here, Medina’s testimony was relevant to show Ross’s intent to distribute the marijuana
the police found at the residence. This is a proper purpose under 404(b).28 Further, without
regard to MRE 404(b), the evidence was admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime.
Evidence of other acts is admissible as part of the res gestae of the offense if the other acts are
23
MRE 401.
24
People v Pattison, 276 Mich App 613, 615; 741 NW2d 558 (2007).
25
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 576; 629 NW2d 411 (2001), quoting People v Starr, 457
Mich 490, 496; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
26
MRE 404(b).
27
People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 303; 639 NW2d 815 (2001).
28
See People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich
1205 (1994).
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“so blended or connected with the [charged offense] that proof of one incidentally involves the
other or explains the circumstances of the crime.”29
Ross also argues that trial court erred in refusing his request to introduce court records
that identified an alternate address for him. The trial court was willing to allow Ross to
introduce the requested evidence. However, the trial court refused to admit the evidence unless
the charges related to the documents came in as well. Other than citing MRE 403, Ross provides
no citation to authority to support his contention that he should have been allowed to introduce
only that part of a document that was helpful to his case. In any event, he has not shown that the
probative value of the evidence was so substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice that the document could not have been admitted, particularly if a limiting instruction
was given.
VI. Jury Instructions
A. Standard Of Review
Ross argues that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court failed to instruct the jury
on simple possession, on the definition of possession or being armed for purposes of the felonyfirearm charges, and on continuity with respect to maintaining a drug house. Ross also argues
that the trial court made numerous other instructional errors. However, he waived all but the
assertion of error based on the denial of his request for an instruction on the lesser offense of
simple possession.30 We review de novo this preserved claim of instruction error.31
B. Legal Standards
“[J]ury instructions must include all the elements of the charged offenses and any
material issues, defenses, and theories that are supported by the evidence.”32 In addition, the
Michigan Supreme Court has held that instruction on an inferior offense is required where “it is
impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser.”33 Because it is
impossible to commit the offense of possession with intent to deliver without first committing
the offense of simple possession, the latter is a lesser-included offense of the former. However,
29
People v Delgado, 404 Mich 76, 83; 273 NW2d 395 (1978) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
30
See People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 688; 660 NW2d 322 (2002) (“By expressly approving
the instructions, [the] defendant has waived the issue on appeal.”).
31
People v Lowery, 258 Mich App 167, 173; 673 NW2d 107 (2003).
32
People v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157, 162-163; 670 NW2d 254 (2003).
33
People v Bearss, 463 Mich 623, 627; 625 NW2d 10 (2001) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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an instruction on a lesser offense need only be given if a rational review of the evidence indicates
that the element distinguishing the lesser offense from the greater offense is in dispute.34
C. Applying The Standards
Here, the instruction was not required because it was not supported by the evidence,
particularly Ross’s denial of knowledge on how or why the York Street address would have been
listed for him, his clear statement that he never saw the marijuana, guns, or the bulletproof vest
that were confiscated by the police, as well as his assertion that he never saw anyone smoking
marijuana in the York Street house. Moreover, witness testimony established that at least one
prior sale had occurred before execution of the search warrant.
VII. Prosecutorial Misconduct
A. Standard Of Review
Ross argues that he was denied a fair trial due to numerous instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. We review de novo preserved and unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct
to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial.35 However, unpreserved claims of
prosecutorial misconduct must also withstand scrutiny under the plain error rule.36 To avoid
forfeiture under the plain error rule, a defendant must establish that (1) an error occurred, (2) the
error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, i.e., it affected the
outcome of the lower court proceedings.37 Moreover, even if all three requirements are satisfied,
reversal is only warranted in cases where the error resulted in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant or the error seriously compromised the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings.38
B. Legal Principles
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial.39 Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the
reviewing court must examine the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context.40
34
People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 352; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).
35
People v Wilson, 265 Mich App 386, 393; 695 NW2d 351 (2005); People v Ackerman, 257
Mich App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
36
People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453-454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
37
Carines, supra at 763.
38
Id.
39
People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
40
Thomas, supra at 454.
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“Generally, ‘[p]rosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct.’”41
Nevertheless, a prosecutor may not engage in conduct or make an argument that rises to the level
of denying defendant a fair and impartial trial.42 “A finding of prosecutorial misconduct may not
be based on a prosecutor’s good-faith effort to admit evidence.”43
C. Inference Of Guilt
Ross first takes issue with the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument (actually, a
remembrance of what was said during opening argument) that “we’d like to know who he
delivered it to so the police can take other actions.” Ross asserts that this constituted an
impermissible inference that he and the police believed him to be guilty. However, the trial court
properly instructed the jury that a defendant is presumed innocent, that the verdict should be
based on the evidence adduced, that it was sole judge of the facts, and that it should not convict
Ross unless the prosecutor met his burden on each of the elements. The trial court stated that
“the fact that the defendant is charged with a crime and is on trial is not evidence,” nor are “[t]he
lawyers’ statements and argument.” “Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and
instructions are presumed to cure most errors.”44
D. Search Warrant Testimony
Ross’s next claim of prosecutorial misconduct relates to testimony that a search warrant
was obtained and he asserts that this indicated to the jury that he was already “somewhat guilty.”
Ross has provided no authority to support his claim that this testimony prejudiced him in any
way. In any event, admission of such evidence, even in the absence of a motion to suppress, is
within the range of principled outcomes.45 Indeed, without it, the jury would be left to speculate
on whether the police had legally entered the York Street house and seized the numerous items
from the residence admitted at trial.
E. Bulletproof Vest Testimony
In addition, Ross argues that testimony related to the purpose and use of a bulletproof
vest recovered from the York Street house was improperly elicited as it was irrelevant. “This is
especially true,” he asserts, “since the officers admitted that the vests could be purchased by
private individuals.” However, and critically, Ross indicated that he had no objection to
admission of the vest into evidence.
41
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), quoting People v Rohn, 98 Mich
App 593, 596; 296 NW2d 315 (1980) (alteration by Bahoda Court).
42
Dobek, supra at 63.
43
Id. at 76.
44
People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003).
45
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003) (stating that an abuse of
discretion occurs when a trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled
outcomes).
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F. Jury Selection
Ross also claims that the prosecutor’s statements during jury selection constituted
misconduct. Ross specifically takes issues with the prosecutor’s comments related to lying.
Ross contends that the prosecutor told jurors that when a person looks down that means he is
lying. In point of fact, the prosecutor’s statement indicated that looking at the floor while
making a statement could have an impact on the determination of whether that person was telling
the truth. Despite Ross’s contention that this constituted argument on facts not in evidence, the
prosecutor’s comments were similar to those the trial court made during final instructions to the
jurors that they could consider how a witness looks and acts when making credibility
determinations. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that it should decide the case on the
evidence, which did not include the attorney’s statements. As noted above, jurors are presumed
to follow their instructions.46
G. Prior Bad Acts
Ross’s final claim of prosecutorial misconduct relates to the introduction of testimony
related to a prior drug sale. As discussed above, the contested evidence was properly admitted.
VIII. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Standard Of Review
Ross argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In order to preserve a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make a motion for a new trial or
request an evidentiary hearing in the trial court.47 Ross did not request a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing after the trial. Thus, the issue is unpreserved. We limit our review of
unpreserved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to mistakes apparent on the record.48
B. Legal Standards
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show:
(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms; (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
the proceedings would have been different; and (3) the resultant proceedings were fundamentally
unfair or unreliable.49 A defendant must also overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
actions were the product of sound trial strategy.50
46
Abraham, supra at 279.
47
People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
48
People Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
49
People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
50
People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
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C. Applying The Standards
Ross specifically argues that he was denied effective assistance by his counsel’s failure to
object to the scoring of offense variables (OVs) 2, 14, and 15. Ross was assessed five points for
OV 2. Five points are properly assessed under OV 2 if “[t]he offender possessed or used a pistol,
rifle, shotgun or knife, or other cutting or stabbing weapon[.]”51 Ross asserts that when OV 1
and OV 2 are read together there is an indication that someone must have been endangered by
the possession or use of the weapon in order to assess points for OV 2. However, the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute requires an assessment of points if the offender “possessed
or used,” rather than “possessed or used to threaten or endanger a person.” Each offense variable
is intended to address different aspects of the sentencing offense, although there is obviously
some overlap. OV 1 takes into account whether a person was threatened with a weapon, while
OV 2 accounts for the heightened danger of an offense when a weapon is used, even if not used
directly on a victim. These are separate concerns that can overlap when a person is so
threatened, but this does not mean that the Legislature has not provided for their separate
consideration given the separate concerns they address. The Legislature could have directed that
OV 2 not be scored if points are scored for OV 1,52 and its decision to forgo such a restriction is
instructive.
In the alternative, Ross argues that the points should not have been assessed under OV 2
because he did not possess the weapons found at the house as there was no evidence that he
knew the weapons were there and they were not found on his person. This argument must fail
when there was sufficient evidence to establish that Ross possessed a firearm, as discussed in
detail above.
Ross also challenges the trial court’s decision to assess ten points under OV 14. Ten
points must be assessed under OV 14 when the trial court determines the offender “was a leader
in a multiple offender situation[.]”53 Here, there was a multiple offender situation, as Ross points
out in his brief, given that his girlfriend was also convicted of maintaining a drug house.
However, the evidence at trial established that Ross was the one who actually conducted the
sales in the front yard of the residence. This was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
scoring decision.
Ross was also assessed five points for OV 15. OV 15 requires assessment of five points
if “[t]he offense involved the delivery or possession with intent to deliver marihuana or any other
controlled substance or a counterfeit controlled substance or possession of controlled substances
or counterfeit controlled substances having a value or under such circumstances as to indicate
trafficking[.]”54 Trafficking is defined as “the sale or delivery of controlled substances . . . on a
51
MCL 777.32(1)(d).
52
See, e.g., MCL 777.41 and MCL 777.42.
53
MCL 777.44.
54
MCL 777.45(1)(g).
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continued basis to 1 or more individuals for further distribution.”55 Ross argues that the trial
court erred in assessing these points because there was no evidence of trafficking as defined by
the statute. Ross’s assertion that evidence of trafficking is required in order to assess points
under this statute would result in impermissible surplusage in the language of the statute.56
Instead, a more reasoned interpretation of the language results in the conclusion that the points
should be assessed when (1) the offense involves the delivery or possession with intent to deliver
drugs, or (2) if the offense involved possession of drugs having a value or under such
circumstances as to indicate trafficking. Here the points were properly assessed because the
offense meets the first prong.
Because the offense variables were properly scored, defense counsel was not required to
object. Therefore, Ross’s claim of error cannot succeed based on a failure to raise a meritless
objection.57 We also cannot fault counsel for failing to object to the asserted instances of
prosecutorial misconduct, for, as discussed above, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct.
The trial court also did not err in instructing the jury regarding possession, and we cannot fault
counsel cannot for failing to take further any further action in this regard.58
IX. Sentencing
Ross’s arguments that his sentences are invalid and that he entitled to resentencing were
waived at trial; thus, we need not address them.59
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
55
MCL 777.45(2)(c).
56
People v Perkins, 473 Mich 626, 638; 703 NW2d 448 (2005).
57
People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 8, 27; 620 NW2d 537 (2000) (“Defense counsel is not
required to raise a meritless objection.”).
58
Id.
59
Carines, supra at 762-763 n 7 (“[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right.”) (citation and quotation omitted).
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