IN RE JOHNSON/GILBERT MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of D.K.J., D.Z.J., and C.I.G., Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 10, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291426
Shiawassee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-011168-NA
APRIL JOHNSON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Stephens, P.J., and Cavanagh and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to
D.K.J. (DOB 4/7/99), D.Z.J. (DOB 7/9/05), and C.I.G. (DOB 10/26/06) pursuant to MCL
712a.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found that petitioner had established
the existence of grounds for termination of her parental rights. She also argues that the trial court
erred when it found that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
We disagree.
An order terminating parental rights need only be supported by one statutory ground.
MCL 712A.19b(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The petitioner has
the burden of proving a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J).
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Once a
statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court shall order termination of
parental rights if it finds “that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests[.]”
MCL 712A.19b(5). A trial court’s best interests finding is reviewed for clear error. In re Trejo,
supra at 356-357.
After review of the evidence here, we conclude that the trial court properly held that
grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights existed. Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
a court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it determines that, “[t]he conditions that led to
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the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), a
court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it determines that, “[t]he parent, without regard
to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provides that a court may terminate a
parent’s parental rights if it determines that, “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the
conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to
the home of the parent.”
The trial court’s conclusion that respondent would not be able to provide proper care and
custody to the children within a reasonable time was not erroneous. A parent’s failure to comply
with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of a parent’s failure to provide proper care and
custody for the child. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Trejo, supra at
360-363, 361 n 16. The testimony indicated that respondent, at least later in the proceedings,
was well intentioned with respect to care of the children and was possibly benefiting from
services. However, the children were in care over a year before respondent even began to
comply with any of the requirements in her parent-agency plan. Six more months passed before
the termination hearing continued, and respondent had not yet completed her therapy. In
addition, while testimony supported a finding that respondent’s parenting skills during her latter
supervised visitation times with the children were appropriate, her ability to properly supervise
the children in an uncontrolled setting had not yet been tested. Moreover, respondent still had
not obtained stable housing or sufficient employment. She was in arrearages on her child
support for C.I.G., and had not paid child support for a fourth child who resided with his father.
It was clear from respondent’s testimony that she continued to think that her housing situation
was suitable for herself and the children, despite the fact that Michael Woodworth could have
made her and the children move at any time. Her assumption that she could support the children
indefinitely through gifts from him was unrealistic. Given this evidence, and respondent’s
somewhat elusive answers during her testimony, the trial court did not clearly err when it held
that this ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The trial court also did not err when it determined that the conditions that led to the
adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that they would be
rectified within a reasonable time. Despite respondent’s assertion to the contrary, the conditions
that led to the adjudication included multiple incidents. D.K.J. had been left home alone or with
his siblings at least 26 times when respondent went to the store. The caseworker reported that
the home was dirty, that there was no food in the home, and that trash was piled in the corner of
the kitchen. This evidence demonstrated a general lack of responsible parenting. This
conclusion was bolstered by respondent’s prior participation with services and her lengthy initial
lack of involvement in regaining custody of her children during this latest incident. Although by
the date of the termination hearing respondent was trying to rectify her parenting skills
deficiencies and deal with her underlying mental issues, she had not yet satisfactorily done so.
Given the length of time in care to that point, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the
conditions that led to the adjudication would not be rectified within a reasonable time.
The trial court’s finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be
harmed if returned to respondent’s home was also supported by the evidence. Even apart from
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the incident that led to the children’s placement in care, respondent’s continued failure to
establish a stable, self-sufficient lifestyle was indicative of a continued propensity to expose the
children to dangerous home situations. Respondent never established her own housing.
Testimony from petitioner’s caseworker supported a conclusion that respondent’s latest
significant other was not a safe and suitable person to watch the children. While respondent
claimed that the daycare near the house could watch the children if she found work, she did not
know how much the service would cost.
Finally, the trial court’s best interests finding was not clearly erroneous. C.I.G.’s father
testified that C.I.G. was comfortable with her life and that respondent’s presence was disruptive.
Petitioner’s caseworker indicated that the children needed permanency; she opined that
respondent could not give this to them because of her lack of progress during the lengthy
proceedings. D.Z.J.’s need for stability and the psychological problems that arose from the lack
of stability in the past were documented in petitioner’s service plan. The evidence supported the
finding that the children needed a stable environment, which respondent clearly could not
provide.
Affirmed.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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