PEOPLE OF MI V JOSEPH RYAN MOORING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 22, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 285562
Kalkaska Circuit Court
LC No. 07-002905-FC
JOSEPH RYAN MOORING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Bandstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529, and resisting or obstructing
a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). The trial court sentenced defendant, as a habitual offender,
third offense, MCL 769.11, to 240 to 720 months’ imprisonment for the armed robbery and
conspiracy convictions and to 32 to 48 months’ imprisonment for the resisting or obstructing
conviction. Defendant’s sentences, while concurrent to each other, are to be served consecutive
to the sentence from which defendant was on parole at the time of the armed robbery. Defendant
received no credit for time served. Because the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion for a directed verdict and because defendant was not entitled to any jail credit for time
served, we affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict on the charges of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Defendant
concedes that the evidence establishes that Roger Demaree committed the armed robbery and
that he drove Demaree to the East Lake General Store, but asserts that there is no evidence to
support an inference that he knew of and intended to aid Demaree in the armed robbery. We
disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of
fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). “Circumstantial evidence
and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of a crime.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (quotation
omitted). “An actor’s intent may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances, and because
of the difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is
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sufficient.” People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 517-518; 583 NW2d 199 (1998) (internal
citation omitted).
Defendant was convicted of armed robbery under an aiding or abetting theory.
Conviction under an aiding or abetting theory requires proof of the following elements:
(1) the underlying crime was committed by either the defendant or some other
person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that aided and
assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its
commission at the time of giving aid or encouragement. [People v Smielewski,
235 Mich App 196, 207; 596 NW2d 636 (1999).]
Similarly, conviction of conspiracy requires proof of an unlawful agreement between two or
more persons with a specific intent to combine with others to accomplish an illegal objective.
People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 481; 505 NW2d 843 (1993).
The prosecution presented evidence showing that defendant, on the evening of September
12, 2007, drove two companions, including Demaree, to the East Lake General Store. Defendant
parked the Jeep he was driving in front of the gas station and went inside to buy a pop. Another
customer of the gas station saw an African-American male crouched down in the passenger seat
of the Jeep. After defendant returned to the Jeep, he drove it to a dark area behind the gas
station. Demaree then entered the gas station, and committed the armed robbery. When police
questioned defendant the next morning, defendant lied about his whereabouts on the previous
evening. Viewing this evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that defendant knew of and, by
acting as the “wheelman,” intended to aid Demaree in the armed robbery. The trial court did not
err in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to award him credit for time
served from the date of his arrest to the date of sentencing. We review this unpreserved error for
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763.
Defendant was arrested while on parole for a previous offense. In People v Idziak, 484
Mich 549, 562; ___ NW2d ___ (2009), our Supreme Court held that “the jail credit statute[,
MCL 769.11b,] does not apply to a parolee who is convicted and sentenced to a new term of
imprisonment for a felony committed while on parole.” It explained:
[O]nce arrested in connection with the new felony, the parolee continues to serve
out any unexpired portion of his earlier sentence unless and until discharged by
the Parole Board. For that reason, he remains incarcerated regardless of whether
he would otherwise be eligible for bond before conviction on the new offense. He
is incarcerated not “because of being denied or unable to furnish bond” for the
new offense, but for an independent reason. [Id. at 562-563.]
Because defendant was not entitled to credit for time served, there was no error by the trial court.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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