CHENG FENG LI V AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF MICHIGAN INS GROUP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHENG FENG LI, Individually and Surviving
Spouse of CHUNQIN HAN, and the ESTATE OF
CHUNQIN HAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285038
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 07-000543-NF
MICHIGAN INSURANCE GROUP, a/k/a
DETROIT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
GROUP,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Talbot and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for
summary disposition and granting plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary disposition in this action
pertaining to the availability of no-fault benefits. We affirm. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
In this automobile no-fault case, the question of whether benefits are owed depends on
the domicile of the injured person. The facts relevant to this issue are not in dispute. Plaintiff
and decedent Han were married and owned a house in Michigan. However, at the time Han was
killed in an automobile accident, he was living in Arkansas and was driving a vehicle he owned,
registered and insured in Arkansas. Han was the only named insured on the policy, and the
policy was not certified to provide Michigan no-fault benefits. At the same time, plaintiff owned
a vehicle registered in Michigan and had her own insurance policy with defendant. She was the
only named insured and her vehicle was the only insured vehicle listed on the policy.
Under MCL 500.3111, personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits are payable if the
injured person is a named insured on a policy or the spouse of a named insured. Payable PIP
benefits include survivor’s benefits paid to the dependents of a beneficiary. MCL 500.3108.
However, a person is not entitled to benefits if, at the time of the accident, he was not a resident
of Michigan, was not driving a Michigan-insured vehicle, and was not insured by a Michigancertified insurer. MCL 500.3113(c). Thus, plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits turns on whether
Han was a resident of Michigan.
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In 1985, after the parties married in China, Han immigrated to Michigan and attended
Michigan State University. In 1986, plaintiff bore their child, Anna. Plaintiff and Anna
remained in China until 1989, when they moved to Michigan to live with Han in married student
housing. In 1995, they became United States citizens. Plaintiff and Han subsequently purchased
a house in Haslett, Michigan in 1999 and resided at that location. Han worked for Michigan
State University from 1994 to 2002 and plaintiff worked continuously from 1998 to the time of
this litigation for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. In 2002, Han accepted a
position as a microbiologist with the State of Arkansas and a part-time position as a
microbiologist with the University of Arkansas. Han could not obtain comparable work in
Michigan; although he was offered work, the pay was not as good and he declined the proffered
positions. Han took few personal items with him other than clothing when leaving Michigan.
Han rented a room from a friend and bought, registered, and insured a vehicle in Arkansas. He
obtained an Arkansas driver’s license and opened a bank account there. However, Han’s
paycheck from his full-time job was deposited directly into the joint account he held with
plaintiff at the MSU Federal Credit Union. Plaintiff remained in Michigan and refused to move
to Arkansas. Han would return to Michigan to be with plaintiff and their daughter spending
approximately five to seven days each month in the state, and for longer periods during holidays
and vacations. He would have dental, medical, and eye examination appointments in Michigan.
Han paid his federal and state income taxes as a resident of Michigan, paid property tax on the
house in Haslett, and received mail there. He did not use his Arkansas address as his permanent
address. However, neither plaintiff nor Han knew how long he would be living in Arkansas.
There was no guarantee that he would ever find a better job and return to Michigan; at the time
of his death, Han had no prospect or offer of work in Michigan. An Arkansas death certificate
was issued, listing Han’s “residence” as his Arkansas address; his funeral and cremation also
took place in Arkansas.
At the hearing on the parties’ cross motions for summary disposition, the trial court
agreed with the parties that the facts were undisputed and the only legal issue regarding liability
was the question of Han’s domicile. After citing the relevant law, the court expressly mentioned
as relevant the tax returns, the home in Haslett, the fact that Han only rented a room in Arkansas,
that he would fly home often, that he maintained possessions in the marital home, had his
paycheck deposited in Michigan, and had his family in Michigan. The court noted that Han
insured and registered his vehicle in Arkansas in order to comply with Arkansas law. The court
concluded that the totality of circumstances indicated that Han was domiciled in Michigan. The
parties stipulated to the amount of benefit owed, and the court entered the judgment amount.
In Michigan, “the terms ‘domicile’ and ‘residence’ are legally synonymous.” Workman v
DAIIE, 404 Mich 477, 495; 274 NW2d 373 (1979). The determination of domicile is generally a
question of fact. Fowler v Airborne Freight Corp, 254 Mich App 362, 364; NW2d (2002).
“However, where, as here, the underlying facts are not in dispute, domicile is a question of law
for the court.” Id. When analyzing whether a person is “domiciled in the same household” as
the insured, courts examine a number of factors, which may include:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person to remain indefinitely or
permanently in the insured’s household;
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(2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the
members of the insured’s household;
(3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same
curtilage, or upon the same premises as the insured;
(4) the existence of another place of lodging for the person alleging domicile in
the household.
(5) the person’s mailing address;
(6) whether the person maintains possessions at the insured’s home;
(7) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s driver’s license and
other documents;
(8) whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the insured’s home; and
(9) whether the person is dependent upon the insured for financial support or
assistance. [Williams v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 202 Mich App 491, 494495; 509 NW2d 821 (1993), citing, in part, Workman, supra.]
These factors do not comprise a comprehensive and exclusive list and are merely “[a]mong the
relevant factors” to be considered. Workman, supra at 496. No one factor is, in itself,
determinative; instead, each factor must be balanced and weighed with the others. Id. at 497 n 6.
It is a fundamental tenet that “‘every man must have a domicile somewhere, and also that
he can have but one.’” Beecher v Common Council of Detroit, 114 Mich 228, 230; 72 NW 206
(1897), quoting Cooley, Taxation (2d ed, p 369). A person’s “existing domicile continues until
he acquires another, and, vice versa, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes his former
one.” Id.
“A removal which does not contemplate an absence from the former
domicile for an indefinite and uncertain time is not a change of it. But when there
is a removal, unless it can be shown or inferred from circumstances that it was for
some particular purpose, expected to be only of a temporary nature, or in the
exercise of some particular profession, office, or calling, it does change the
domicile.” [Beecher, supra at 231, quoting Jacobs, Law of Domicile, § 378.]
In other words, “Domicile [is] that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a
mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.” Henry v Henry, 362 Mich 85, 101102; 106 NW2d 570 (1960), quoting Williams v North Carolina, 325 US 226, 236; 65 S Ct 1092;
89 L Ed 1577 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Both parties emphasize that none of the factors is dispositive. There is support for
defendant’s position in this case, most particularly the fact that there was no end-date for Han’s
life in Arkansas. However, this is just one factor to be considered. As noted by the trial court,
the majority, or six of the nine Workman factors favor plaintiff. Only the factors pertaining to
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Han not residing exclusively in the insured’s residence, the existence of his rented room in
Arkansas, possession of an Arkansas driver’s license and the indefinite nature of his future
tenure in Arkansas favor defendant.
Viewing the totality of the facts in this case demonstrates that Han did not relinquish the
domicile he established over the ten year period he shared a home with plaintiff in Michigan.
Notably, the residence in Michigan was Han’s own house, which was inhabited by his immediate
family. Han’s life in Arkansas was temporary, biding time until he could obtain an adequately
paying job in Michigan. Han evidenced no intent to establish himself as a permanent resident of
Arkansas, having never acquired real estate or even rented an apartment in that state. The
evidence indicates that Han did not merely hope but intended to return to his Michigan home.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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