IN RE MCKISSACK MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MARIAH MONE’ McKISSACK,
SARIYAH MIRANDA McKISSACK, and
KIMIYAH MICHELLE McKISSACK, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 287522
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-419427-NA
GREGORY JAMES McKISSACK,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SUNJAH MONIQUE HARRIS,
Respondent.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This matter is before this Court for the second time. Respondent-appellant [hereinafter
appellant] previously appealed an order terminating his parental rights to Mariah and Sariyah.1
This Court reversed, finding that the failure to notify appellant of the child protective
proceedings for more than one year after their commencement had denied him due process, and
remanded for further proceedings.2 Approximately two and one half years after remand, the trial
court again terminated appellant’s parental rights. Appellant now appeals as of right from the
order terminating his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
1
Kimiyah was not yet born at that time.
2
In re McKissack/Jones/Harris, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
January 24, 2006 (Docket Nos. 262816/262817).
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In February 2006, appellant was provided with a treatment plan that required him to
participate in various services, including anger management counseling and parenting classes,
and to obtain and maintain suitable housing and legal income. After Kimiyah’s birth on April 7,
2006, she was removed from the care of appellant and the mother of the children based on the
mother’s admission that she had other children in care. By January 2007, however, the case
worker reported that appellant was in full compliance with his treatment plan, and she felt he was
ready to have the children returned to him. Kimiyah was returned to appellant’s care on
February 16, 2007, and Mariah and Sariyah were returned to his care on March 2, 2007.
The record reveals that the children were exposed to domestic violence after their return
to appellant’s care, and appellant admitted that he used excessive force to discipline one of the
children in December 2007. On December 28, 2007, the children were removed from
appellant’s care. A petition seeking the termination of his parental rights was filed on May 2,
2008.
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). Appellant failed to provide proper care and custody for the children by
engaging in domestic violence in their presence and by using excessive force in disciplining one
of the children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The record is also sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that there is no reasonable likelihood that appellant will be able to provide proper
care and custody for the children within a reasonable time considering their ages. Id. Shortly
after this case was remanded in January 2006, appellant was directed to participate in anger
management and domestic violence services. An agency report issued in January 2007 indicated
that appellant was participating in anger management therapy and in domestic violence therapy,
and receiving positive reports from the providers of these services, including Moses Boone, who
reported that appellant had completed the goals of the services. However, subsequent to the
completion of services, appellant used excessive force to discipline one of the children and
repeatedly engaged in domestic violence with his living together partner, Christine Wells, in the
presence of the children. During one of those incidents, one of the children was struck by glass
from a window that Ms. Wells kicked out.
During the termination trial, Boone indicated that he had felt appellant would be able to
safely care for the children after his first completion of services with Boone. However, the trial
court justifiably viewed this prognosis with skepticism in light of Boone’s previous erroneous
judgment of appellant’s progress. Further, it also appears that appellant may not have been
entirely forthright with Boone during his most recent treatment, as he minimized the number of
domestic violence incidents, and failed to reveal any inappropriate interaction with his daughter
despite having admitted in these proceedings that he used excessive force to discipline one of the
children in December 2007. Ms. Williams, who also counseled appellant regarding anger
management subsequent to the December 2007 removal of the children, indicated that she had
noticed a difference in appellant’s accountability and receptiveness, but that he could benefit
from additional therapy.
This case presents a difficult scenario in which appellant appeared to benefit from
services before the children were placed with him, but then demonstrated that he had not
benefited as had been believed. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the trial
court was more than “maybe” or “probably” wrong in concluding that appellant’s apparent
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progress in his second round of anger management/domestic violence services was
untrustworthy. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Consequently, we
conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was no reasonable likelihood
that appellant would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a
reasonable time given their ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).3
The same evidence that establishes that there is no reasonable likelihood that appellant
would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable time, MCL
712A.19b(3)(g), equally establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that the children would
be harmed if returned to his care, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), and the trial court did not clearly err by
relying on statutory subsection (j) as a basis for the termination of appellant’s parental rights.4
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of appellant’s parental rights
was in the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5). Mariah and Sariyah have been
under the jurisdiction of the court since June 2003, and Kimiyah since October 2006. The
history of this case has led to prolonged instability for the children. The older children were
removed from their mother’s care in May 2003,5 and the parental rights of both parents were
terminated in April 2005. Following this Court’s reversal of the termination of parental rights,
the children were in February and March 2007 returned to appellant’s care, where they were
exposed to repeated domestic violence. Appellant’s arrest for domestic violence in early
December 2007 caused the temporary placement of the children in the care of a paternal aunt.
Appellant was again arrested for domestic violence on or about December 28, 2007, resulting in
the removal of the children from his care. Also in December 2007, appellant used excessive
force in disciplining one of the children. Despite having received extensive services, appellant
repeatedly exposed the children to domestic violence after they were placed with him. In light of
appellant’s failure to benefit from past services, it is questionable whether the children can safely
be returned to his care at any time. The trial court was justified in concluding that the best
interests of the children weigh in favor of terminating the parental rights of their father rather
than risking further trauma to the children. As the guardian ad litem for the children expressed
this, the children “can’t be bounced again.” The trial court did not clearly err by finding that
3
Additionally, at the time of the termination trial, appellant resided with an uncle who had not
received clearance as an acceptable person to reside in the same household as the children. The
failure to receive clearance was due to appellant’s failure to provide the worker with the uncle’s
social security number and other information required to perform the clearance. At the time of
the termination trial, appellant did not have suitable housing for the children and there is no
indication that he would have suitable housing within a reasonable time considering the ages of
the children.
4
We do not rely on MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) in affirming the termination of appellant’s parental
rights, as review under this statutory subsection raises several subsidiary issues that have not
been addressed by the parties.
5
Appellant was incarcerated at that time.
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termination was in the best interests of the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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