PEOPLE OF MI V MARK ETHAN HATCHER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283459
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-212875-FC
MARK ETHAN HATCHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Meter and Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, conspiracy to
commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2),
conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.157a, felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f, and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced, as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 12 to
30 years in prison for each of his armed robbery convictions, 12 to 30 years in prison for his
conspiracy to commit armed robbery conviction, 8 to 30 years in prison for his first-degree home
invasion conviction, 8 to 30 years in prison for his conspiracy to commit first-degree home
invasion conviction, three to seven and one-half years in prison for his felon in possession of a
firearm conviction, and two years in prison for each of his felony-firearm convictions. He
appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that he was denied his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel when an evidentiary hearing is not previously held, we conduct a de novo review of
the existing record. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). To show that
counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness, a defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s actions constituted sound trial strategy under
the circumstances. Id. at 302. Counsel’s performance must be measured against an objective
standard of reasonableness and without benefit of hindsight. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207,
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216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995). Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make a
futile motion or argument. People v Ish, 252 Mich App 115, 118-119; 652 NW2d 257 (2002).
We reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request
a stipulation that defendant was previously convicted of an unspecified felony and was not
entitled to possess a firearm. Defendant correctly notes that the trial court would have been
obligated to honor such a request, thereby precluding the jury from hearing evidence regarding
the “number and nature” of his prior convictions. People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 377; 572
NW2d 666 (1997). However, in this instance, defendant’s prior felony was for fleeing and
eluding, MCL 257.602a, the nature of which, compared to other felonies, is not a very serious
offense. It follows that defense counsel’s inaction in this regard, which prevented the jury from
speculating that defendant’s prior conviction may have been for a violent, more severe felony,
similar to the charges pending against defendant, constituted sound trial strategy under the
circumstances. Thus, even though defense counsel chose the alternative ground of stipulating to
the fact that defendant had been previously convicted of the felony of fleeing and eluding, MCL
257.602a, which included two traffic misdemeanors, thereby exposing the jury to the nature of
defendant’s prior felony, it nonetheless follows that defense counsel’s performance in this
manner did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Toma, supra at 302;
LaVearn, supra at 216.
We also reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
move for a mistrial on the basis that the prosecutor introduced inadmissible “prior bad acts”
evidence from a witness. Here, in response to the prosecutor’s question to Reginald Peoples
regarding whether he knew defendant, Peoples provided a non-responsive answer that he had
met defendant when he, “Justin [Hatcher] and another friend went and picked [defendant] up
from the other jail, the halfway – I don’t know what it’s called.”
No evidence has been presented to suggest that the insinuated crime defendant might
have been convicted of before Peoples picked him up from jail (or the halfway house), contained
an element of dishonesty, false statement or theft, nor has it been established that the “crime”
could be used to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system
in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” However, even if it
were further found that Peoples’ testimony was offered to attack the credibility of defendant as a
witness or to prove that he had a propensity to commit crimes, and thus, was inadmissible, MRE
404(b)(1); MRE 609, defense counsel nonetheless did not provide ineffective assistance when he
failed to move for a mistrial on the basis that the jury heard the testimony. Defense counsel
immediately objected to the testimony, and furthermore, the jury was (1) already aware that
defendant had been previously convicted of a felony, (2) told that it should disregard the
testimony, and (3) was instructed that it should not consider any evidence that had been stricken
from the record. A jury is presumed to follow a judge’s instructions, People v Bauder, 269 Mich
App 174, 195; 712 NW2d 506 (2005), and instructions are presumed to cure most errors, People
v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). It follows that defendant was not
prejudiced by Peoples’s testimony, and thus, a mistrial would not have been warranted. See
People v Alter, 255 Mich App 194, 205; 659 NW2d 667 (2003). Accordingly, defense counsel
was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial on the basis that the prosecutor introduced
inadmissible “prior bad acts” evidence from a witness. Ish, supra at 118-119.
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We likewise reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for
interjecting “evidence of [defendant’s] involvement in another alleged robbery.” Here, in
passing, Andrew Alspaugh implied that defendant might have robbed him on a prior occasion,
testifying that he flashed money in front of defendant and Justin one night, but was not robbed at
that point in time. During cross-examination, after Alspaugh testified that he had met defendant
at a party, he testified that he had actually seen defendant on two occasions. Defense counsel
asked when was the second time that he had seen defendant, which prompted Alspaugh’s
unforeseen answer, “when I got robbed.” In an effort to minimize any prejudice from
Alspaugh’s testimony, defense counsel took it upon himself to further delve into Alspaugh’s
implication that defendant had previously robbed him by asking him questions about the prior
robbery. In doing so, defense counsel successfully elicited testimony that the alleged robbery
involved men with masks on, and that the only reason Alspaugh had to suspect that defendant
was involved, was the fact that one of the men had the same shoes on that defendant was wearing
the night Alspaugh met him. The record therefore establishes that defense counsel did not
initiate the initial reference to a prior robbery, but rather, only further inquired into the incident
in an effort to minimize the effect of the non-responsive reference to the incident.
We conclude that defense counsel’s actions in this regard did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and furthermore, was sound advocacy on behalf of his client.
Moreover, any prejudice resulting from the aforementioned testimony was minimized by the trial
court’s subsequent instructions (at defense counsel’s request) that the jury was “to disregard any
testimony and/or evidence concerning an alleged armed robbery involving [Peoples] and/or
[Alspaugh].” Accordingly, defendant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel in this regard. Toma, supra at 302-303.
Defendant’s next argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted Justin’s out of court statement to the police into evidence. We disagree. We review a
trial court’s decision whether to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457
Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at a trial or hearing, which is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. MRE
801(c); People v Tanner, 222 Mich App 626, 629; 564 NW2d 197 (1997). Hearsay is generally
not admissible as substantive evidence unless it is offered under one of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. MRE 802; Tanner, supra at 629. Under MRE 801(d)(1)(B), a prior statement of a
witness is not hearsay when the witness testifies at the proceeding, is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, the statement is consistent with his/her testimony and the
statement is offered to rebut a charge of express or implied recent fabrication, improper influence
or motive. People v Fisher, 220 Mich App 133, 154; 559 NW2d 318 (1996). To be admissible
as rebuttal to a suggestion of recent fabrication, a prior consistent statement must have been
made before the motive to fabricate arose. People v Jones, 240 Mich App 704, 708-709; 613
NW2d 411 (2000).
Here, the testimony in question is Officer Robert White’s testimony regarding custodial
statements by Justin indicating that Justin, Nathaniel Fowler and defendant planned the robbery,
while Fowler and defendant executed the robbery. Justin testified at trial and was subject to
cross-examination. White’s questioned testimony was consistent with Justin’s trial testimony.
Furthermore, on cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Justin regarding his motives to
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testify and any consideration he received for his testimony. As such, we conclude that defense
counsel’s questions implied that Justin’s trial testimony was fabricated in order to receive
consideration during his own sentencing. Moreover, Justin testified that at the time he made his
custodial statements to White, he had not been promised anything (i.e., the prosecution had not
yet promised Justin that during his own sentencing he would receive consideration for his
testimony), and thus, Justin’s statements to White were made before his alleged motive to
fabricate arose. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed White’s
testimony into evidence under MRE 801(d)(1)(B). Jones, supra at 708-709; Fisher, supra at
154.
Defendant also argues that the prejudicial effect of the cumulative errors in this case
mandates reversal. We disagree. Defendant failed to properly preserve this argument for appeal
by making a cumulative error objection before the trial court. Therefore, we review this issue for
plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-767; 597 NW2d
130 (1999).
Because defendant has not established that any errors occurred, there can be no
cumulative effect of errors that would merit reversal. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112,
128; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). Furthermore, as discussed, supra, the evidence presented clearly
established that defendant and Fowler forcefully entered the victims’ apartment, pointed a
shotgun at them, “ransacked” their apartment, and stole some items from them. Therefore, we
conclude that even if it were found that defendant has established errors, it could not be found
that the cumulative effect of the errors amounted to plain error that affected his substantial rights
to the extent that reversal would be required. LeBlanc, supra at 591; Carines, supra at 773.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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