PEOPLE OF MI V MAKRAM WADE HAMD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282618
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-214212-FH
MAKRAM WADE HAMD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and O’Connell and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (victim under 13 years old), and was sentenced to five
years’ probation and one year incarceration. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues on appeal that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
arising from his trial attorneys’ decision to hold the preliminary examination, their failure to
recognize the prosecution’s evidence and its admissibility, and their failure to interview any
defense witnesses before trial and question one in a specific manner. We disagree.
“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of
fact and constitutional law.” People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 124; 748 NW2d 859, amended
481 Mich 1201 (2008). “This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings for clear error and
reviews de novo questions of constitutional law.” Id. “[B]ecause the trial court did not hold an
evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to the facts on the record.” People v Wilson, 242 Mich
App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000).
“An accused’s right to counsel encompasses the right to the ‘effective’ assistance of
counsel.” People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007), citing US Const, Am
VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 686; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
2d 674 (1984). Generally, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show
that (1) counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under
professional norms and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, if not for counsel’s errors, the
result would have been different and the result that did occur was fundamentally unfair or
unreliable.” People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007).
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“Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise.” People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).
“[T]his Court neither substitutes its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, nor makes an assessment of counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.”
People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). The fact that a chosen
strategy “ultimately failed does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v
Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
Defendant first argues that the decision to hold the preliminary examination1 constituted
ineffective assistance because it resulted in the prosecution adding a second count of seconddegree criminal sexual conduct. This argument is without merit.
It is true that defendant was initially charged with one count of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. In addition, defendant admitted that the police report of Officer Mark Van
Poppelen, which described two instances of sexual touching, was provided to trial counsel before
the preliminary examination. At the preliminary examination, the victim, AD, testified that two
incidents occurred. He stated that defendant told him to come into the bed, and when AD did so,
defendant grabbed AD’s genitals with his hand while he rubbed his genitals against AD’s
backside. At the end of the preliminary examination, the trial court granted the prosecution’s
motion to amend the General Information to change the date of the incident to January 2007 and
to add a second count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
In spite of the addition of the second count, defendant has failed to overcome the
presumption that conducting the preliminary examination was sound trial strategy. At the
preliminary examination, defense counsel Joseph Sefa used information from Officer Van
Poppelen’s report to try to impeach AD. For example, he pointed out where AD’s testimony
differed from the report, such as whether defendant had taken off his own boxer shorts and
whether the incident occurred in a bedroom or in a basement full of people. In fact, at the end of
the examination, Sefa asked for the charges to be dropped because “the report is night and day to
his testimony today.” Although the trial court refused this request, we will not second-guess
matters of trial strategy on appeal, even if the strategy is ultimately unsuccessful. Matuszak,
supra at 58; Kevorkian, supra at 414-415. Moreover, as noted in the trial court’s opinion and
order, the preliminary examination gave defendant a transcript containing sworn testimony,
which he used to impeach AD’s trial testimony. Thus, defendant cannot show that the decision
to proceed with the preliminary examination fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
In addition, defendant cannot satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test by showing
prejudice. Defendant argues that the mere fact that the second count was added to the
information following the preliminary examination establishes ineffective assistance. However,
“[b]oth MCL 767.76 and MCR 6.112(H) authorize a trial court to amend an information before,
1
Defendant contends that Assistant Prosecutor Elisa Ramunno told his appellate counsel that the
prosecution would have waived the preliminary examination, but no such affidavit was
submitted with the motion for new trial, and as such, this unsupported claim is not part of the
record to be considered by this Court. See Wilson, supra at 352.
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during, or after trial.” People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 686; 672 NW2d 191 (2003).
Although under the statute, “a new offense may not be added to an information by a motion to
amend,” id. at 688, MCR 6.112(H) has no such restriction unless the proposed amendment would
unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant.
As admitted on appeal, and as evident from the preliminary examination transcript,
defendant had access to the police report alleging two instances of sexual touching. Therefore,
he cannot show that he was unfairly surprised by the addition of the second count. Moreover,
the count that was added was exactly the same as the count on which defendant was preparing to
go to trial. The defense at trial was the same for both counts: defendant presented witnesses
who contradicted AD’s testimony and defense counsel highlighted the inconsistencies in AD’s
statements during cross-examination and closing arguments in order to establish that no sexual
contact occurred. Thus, defendant cannot show that the mere addition of a second count
prejudiced his defense and, therefore, he cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective because, despite having
received proper notice from the prosecution, they mistakenly believed that Officer Van Poppelen
was the witness under MRE 803A, which concerns hearsay exceptions regarding a child’s
statement about a sexual act. As a result, defendant argues, they deliberately elicited hearsay
information from the officer regarding the allegations that AD made. Defendant contends that
this information was prejudicial because it showed that AD’s statements were consistent over
time. We disagree.
Under MRE 803A,
A statement describing an incident that included a sexual act performed with or
on the declarant by the defendant or an accomplice is admissible to the extent that
it corroborates testimony given by the declarant during the same proceeding,
provided:
(1) the declarant was under the age of ten when the statement was made;
(2) the statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of
manufacture;
(3) either the declarant made the statement immediately after the incident or any
delay is excusable as having been caused by fear or other equally effective
circumstance; and
(4) the statement is introduced through the testimony of someone other than the
declarant.
If the declarant made more than one corroborative statement about the incident,
only the first is admissible under this rule.
A statement may not be admitted under this rule unless the proponent of the
statement makes known to the adverse party the intent to offer the statement, and
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the particulars of the statement, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
This rule applies in criminal and delinquency proceedings only.
It is indeed clear from the transcript that trial counsel was confused regarding which
document constituted the required notice. As a result, defendant’s counsel misidentified the
MRE 803A witness. Defense counsel Gerald R. Goulet eventually admitted that he might have
missed the amended information notifying him that AD’s teacher, to whom he had initially come
with the report of sexual abuse, was the correct MRE 803A witness. As such, defense counsel’s
actions may have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness. However, defendant still
cannot show that any error was outcome-determinative.
As in the preliminary examination, the introduction of the content of the police report at
trial enabled defendant to impeach AD’s testimony. Sefa focused on the following differences
between AD’s initial statement and his testimony at trial during his cross-examination of AD:
(1) confusion over the month in which the incident occurred; (2) confusion regarding whether
defendant lured him into a bedroom or engaged in the improper contact in the basement; (3)
discrepancies regarding where other people were located during the incident; and (4) confusion
regarding whether defendant removed his own boxer shorts. Indeed, the prosecutor challenged
defense counsel’s introduction of the information from the police report.2 Sefa also drew
attention to these and other inconsistencies in AD’s statements during his closing arguments.
Even if one were to agree with defendant’s argument on appeal that the report showed
that AD was being consistent with regard to his testimony, defendant still cannot establish
outcome-determinative error as a result of the introduction of the police report because “the
testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under 520b to 520g.” MCL
750.520h. Thus, defendant could have been convicted on AD’s trial testimony alone.
Defendant additionally argues that his trial counsel seemed unaware that the written
statement that defendant gave to Detective Kreilach was admissible under MRE 801(d)(2),3
despite whether defendant testified. Because this statement contradicted the testimony of the
defense witnesses, defendant contends that his trial counsel had no reasonable, strategic reason
for presenting such witnesses and, thus, failed to provide effective assistance.
It is true that defense counsel protested the admissibility of defendant’s statement,
incorrectly claiming that the statement was not admissible because defendant did not testify. It is
also true that defendant’s statement corroborated parts of AD’s testimony and contradicted his
2
The judge overruled the objection, stating that the information was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.
3
Under MRE 801(d)(2)(A), a statement is admissible if it is offered against a party and is “the
party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, except statements
made in connection with a guilty plea to a misdemeanor motor vehicle violation or an admission
of responsibility for a civil infraction under laws pertaining to motor vehicles.”
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own witnesses. Defendant stated that the parents were not home when he and the other boys
woke up on Sunday morning (which the parents and all the siblings denied), that he spent most
of the day in the basement (as opposed to only 20 to 25 minutes, as Tarek and Nadeem
Bouharfouch claimed), that he laid on the blanket (which all the siblings denied), and that he was
wearing boxer shorts and a tank top, as AD had claimed.
Even if it were unreasonable to present such defense witnesses because of ignorance of
the admissibility of defendant’s written statement, defendant cannot show prejudice. Had
defendant called no witnesses, as discussed above, defendant still could have been convicted
based solely on AD’s trial testimony because “the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated
in prosecutions under 520b to 520g.” MCL 750.520h. Although counsel’s strategy of presenting
witnesses who contradicted AD was unsuccessful, we will not second-guess it. Matuszak, supra
at 58, Kevorkian, supra at 414-415.
Finally, defendant claims that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they failed to
interview any of the defense witnesses before trial or to question Fatin Harfouch regarding being
on the mat with defendant and AD, although AD’s sister, KD, had testified that this had
occurred. We disagree.
Although defendant submitted an affidavit from Fatin with his motion for new trial,
stating that she would have testified that she was never on the mat with AD and defendant, as
KD had testified, “[t]he questioning of witnesses is presumed to be a matter of trial strategy.”
People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 413; 760 NW2d 882 (2008). We will not substitute our
judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will we make an assessment
of counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. Matuszak, supra at 42. Moreover,
defendant cannot show that neglecting to question Fatin in this specific manner affected the
outcome of the trial. As it stands, defense counsel did elicit testimony from Fatin that she never
saw defendant on the mat. This contradicts KD’s claim that she saw Fatin, AD, and defendant
on the mat.
Defendant further alleges that, based on appellate counsel’s interviews with other
witnesses, it is clear that had his trial attorneys interviewed the other defense witnesses before
trial, they would have uncovered evidence that AD had exhibited bizarre and accusatory
behavior toward others long before he met defendant. Defendant claims that his counsel could
have used this evidence to argue that AD’s accusations were not credible. Defendant asserts that
by depriving him of a substantial defense, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Defendant did not attach affidavits from these witnesses to his new trial motion, however, and as
noted above, “because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to
the facts on the record.” Wilson, supra at 352.
We note that “[e]ven the failure to interview witnesses does not itself establish
inadequate preparation. It must be shown that the failure resulted in counsel’s ignorance of
valuable evidence which would have substantially benefited the accused.” People v Caballero,
184 Mich App 636, 642; 459 NW2d 80 (1990) (citations omitted). We also note that KD
testified that AD’s behavior had changed recently, but the family attributed it to the sexual
assault. Therefore, it is unclear whether testimony regarding AD’s recent behavioral problems
would have helped defendant.
The fact still remains that all the defense witnesses gave
testimony that contradicted that of AD: they claimed that the parents were home, that defendant
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was never on the mat, that the mat was in front of the television and not behind the couch as AD
had stated, and that defendant and the other boys were in the basement for only a short time.
Because these witnesses attacked AD’s credibility, defendant was not deprived of a substantial
defense. Therefore, he fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Next, defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
grant him an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for
an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973),
for an abuse of discretion. See People v Collins, 239 Mich App 125, 138-139; 607 NW2d 760
(1999). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the result is outside the range of principled
outcomes.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 144; 755 NW2d 664 (2008).
An evidentiary hearing is appropriate where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
depends on facts not of record. Ginther, supra at 442-443. The trial court should hear testimony
if there is a factual dispute. People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 194; 712 NW2d 506 (2005),
citing Ginther, supra at 442. Defendant does not specify the factual disputes on which his claim
for an evidentiary hearing rests. Instead, he merely concludes that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the hearing because “[a]n unprejudiced person would conclude [d]efendant
should have been given the opportunity to create a record about why the attorneys did what they
did and why they failed to do what they failed to do.” However,
It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or
assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the
basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then
search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. [LME v ARS, 261 Mich
App 273, 286-287; 680 NW2d 902 (2004), quoting Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich
182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).]
Because defendant fails to establish this claim of error, we need not consider it further.
However, we note that the facts necessary to analyze the first two grounds on which defendant
bases his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are wholly contained within the record.
Defendant first protests the addition of a second count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
as a result of the preliminary examination hearing, claiming defense counsel should have waived
the hearing based on the information contained in Officer Van Poppelen’s report. However,
defendant concedes that his trial counsel was given a copy of the report during discovery (and it
is also evident from the transcript of the preliminary examination that this occurred). Therefore,
there is no issue of fact to be developed at an evidentiary hearing.
Second, defendant claims that his counsel was confused regarding the identity of the
MRE 803A witness. As noted, this claim is painfully obvious from the record, most notably
when Goulet admitted in open court that he might have “missed” the amended information with
the updated witness list. It is also apparent from the record that defense counsel believed
defendant’s written statement to be inadmissible.
Finally, the argument that defense counsel did not properly question Fatin regarding
KD’s allegations—part of defendant’s third ground for asserting ineffective assistance—was also
apparent from the record because it concerned questioning at trial. The only issue on which
there could conceivably be a factual dispute would be the issue whether any defense witnesses
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were interviewed before trial. Defendant asserts that his counsel’s failure to interview the
witnesses beforehand resulted in the failure to discover that AD had previously exhibited bizarre
and accusatory behavior, which could have been used to attack AD’s credibility. Defendant’s
motion for a new trial did not include affidavits from any witnesses besides Fatin (and her
affidavit addressed the claim whether she was on the mat with AD and defendant) nor did
defendant assert in the motion that the witnesses had this specific information regarding AD’s
behavior. Because this argument was not raised at trial, the trial court could not have abused its
discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing on this ground. All the other issues that were
properly raised by defendant could be decided by facts on the record. Thus, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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