CHAD S MAXAM V CRYSTAL A NIEMI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHAD S. MAXAM,
UNPUBLISHED
March 26, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280827
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 02-049876-DC
CRYSTAL A. NIEMI, f/k/a CRYSTAL A.
SNYDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Fort Hood and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this child-custody dispute, defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court
order modifying parenting time from week on/week off to defendant having custody every other
weekend and a no contact order between the child and defendant’s current husband. We reverse
and remand. This case has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
A custody decision is a discretionary ruling that is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 881; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). This Court will not
reverse a custody order on appeal unless the trial court made findings of fact against the great
weight of the evidence, the court committed a palpable abuse of discretion, or the court
committed clear legal error on a major issue. Id. at 877-881; Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App
526, 527; 752 NW2d 47 (2008); Mauro v Mauro, 196 Mich App 1, 4; 492 NW2d 758 (1992).
Clear legal errors occur when the trial court incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law.
Powery, supra.
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it affirmed the referee’s
decision to modify the established custodial environment based up a preponderance of the
evidence.
The trial court may modify or amend a prior parenting time order only for proper cause
shown or because of a change of circumstances. The party seeking the change in parenting time
must prove the change in circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Vodvarka v
Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003); Terry v Affum (On Remand), 237
Mich App 522, 534-535; 603 NW2d 788 (1999). If a change of circumstances is proven, the trial
court must then determine if there is an established custodial environment. If there is, the party
seeking to modify the custody order must demonstrate the change is in the child’s best interest by
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clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.27(1)(c), MCL 722.23; Powery, supra at 528; Foskett
v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 5-6; 634 NW2d 363 (2001); LaFleche v Ybarra, 242 Mich App 692,
695-696; 619 NW2d 738 (2000).
In the instant case, plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence that there had
been a change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting time. Vodvarka, supra;
Terry, supra. Plaintiff discovered in April 2006 that defendant’s long-term boyfriend (now
husband) was a registered sex offender. Defendant had knowledge of her husband’s criminal
background for many years but never informed plaintiff of this information. Dr. Lemmen, a
forensic psychiatrist, testified the husband was at a moderate risk to re-offend. Lemmen stated a
CSC sub-specialist would be most qualified to make a risk of recidivism determination. Dr.
Brooks interviewed defendant but was neither a forensic psychiatrist, nor a CSC sub-specialist.
While defendant’s mother spoke in favor of the husband’s relationship with the child, and child
protective services found no evidence to substantiate allegations of sexual abuse by him, his
juvenile CSC record is extreme. Further, although he has not sexually re-offended as an adult,
he recently admitted to embezzling money from his former place of employment and frequented
topless bars, both of which Lemmen testified are red flags for recidivism. The trial court’s
decision to place more weight on Lemmen’s testimony was not against the great weight of the
evidence. Powery, supra at 527; Mauro, supra at 4. Accordingly, plaintiff demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was a change in circumstances warranting modification
of parenting time. Vodvarka, supra; Terry, supra.
Next, the referee determined, and neither party disputes, there was an established
custodial environment prior to the instant action. Plaintiff’s requested modification from week
on/week off to defendant having custody every other weekend (and no contact between the child
and defendant’s husband) would result in a change in the established custodial environment.
Because of this, plaintiff was required to demonstrate the change is in the child’s best interest by
clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.27(1)(c), MCL 722.23; Powery, supra; Foskett, supra;
LaFleche, supra.
It is not clear on the record whether the referee in fact applied the correct burden of proof
(clear and convincing evidence) in the determination of whether to modify the existing custodial
environment. The referee noted the appropriate burden, with case citation, in the initial
recommendation and order. However, he mistakenly stated the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard in the second recommendation following remand, and did so without case citation.
Similarly, the trial court failed to indicate which standard it applied when accepting the referee’s
recommendations. Rather, it just found the referee’s recommendations were appropriate and in
the child’s best interests. The failure to definitively use the correct burden of proof constitutes
clear legal error. Powery, supra. On remand, the referee and trial court must review the record
and determine whether plaintiff proved modification of the custody order was in the child’s best
interest by clear and convincing evidence.
Furthermore, we also find the trial court erred by failing to consider the best interest
factors required by MCL 722.23. Neither the referee nor the trial court referenced the statutory
best interest factors in their orders. Rather, the referee recounted the findings of fact and the
referee and trial court both summarily stated the custody modification was in the child’s best
interest because it was neither reasonable to expect, nor possible to ensure compliance, with
defendant staying away from her husband every other week. Because there was no reference on
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the record by either the referee in his recommendations and order, or by the trial court in its
order, to the best interest factors, a remand for such findings is required. Rivette v Rose-Molina,
278 Mich App 327, 329-333; 750 NW2d 603 (2008). A mere statement by the trial court that the
referee’s findings were in the best interests of the child is not a sufficient review of the best
interest factors.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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