PEOPLE OF MI V SONJIA JEANNETTE JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 17, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 282231
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-010154-FH
SONJIA JEANNETTE JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted in a bench trial of possession with intent to deliver 450 or more
but less than 1,000 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), and possession with intent to
distribute marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii). She was sentenced to three years’ probation.
The prosecution appeals as of right the trial court’s downward departure of defendant’s sentence
under the statutory sentencing guidelines. Defendant cross-appeals her convictions. We affirm.
The prosecution challenges the trial court’s downward departure from the sentencing
guidelines range, arguing that the court failed to provide substantial and compelling reasons or
provide a sufficient justification for the extent of the departure. We ultimately affirm
defendant’s convictions; therefore, it is necessary to address the sentencing issue, and we shall
begin with this issue.
The existence of a particular factor supporting a trial court’s decision to depart from the
sentencing guidelines is reviewed for clear error. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264; 666
NW2d 231 (2003). This Court reviews the determination of whether the factor is objective and
verifiable de novo. Id. Furthermore, this Court reviews the extent of the trial court’s departure
from the sentencing guidelines range, and whether the reason for the departure is substantial and
compelling, for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 264-265. When the sentencing court selects an
outcome falling outside a range of reasonable and principled outcomes an abuse of discretion
occurs. Id. at 269.
Defendant’s prior record variable (PRV) score was ten, placing her at level C. Her
offense variable (OV) score totaled 75, placing her at level IV. Based on this scoring,
defendant’s minimum sentence range was 108 to 180 months. The maximum sentences are 30
years for the cocaine conviction and four years for the marijuana conviction. The trial court
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sentenced defendant to 36 months’ probation. The basis for the trial court’s departure was
primarily defendant’s minimal degree of culpability based on the circumstances of the offense
and, also, to a lesser extent, defendant’s work history and her pursuit of post-secondary
education.
Under Michigan’s legislative sentencing guidelines, a trial court may only depart from
the sentencing guidelines if it has a substantial and compelling reason to do so, and it states the
reason on the record. MCL 769.34(2) and (3); People v Abramski, 257 Mich App 71, 74; 665
NW2d 501 (2003). The court is not permitted to use a factor already considered in the offense or
prior record variables unless the court finds that the characteristic has been given inadequate or
disproportionate weight based on the facts of record. MCL 769.34(3)(b); Abramski, supra at 74.
The trial court’s reasons for departing from the guidelines range must be objective and verifiable.
Id. “They must be of considerable worth in determining the length of the sentence and should
keenly or irresistibly grab the court’s attention.” People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 299; 754 NW2d
284 (2008). Appropriate objective and verifiable factors include: “(1) mitigating circumstances
surrounding the offense, (2) the defendant’s prior record, (3) the defendant’s age, and (4) the
defendant’s work history.” People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 7; 609 NW2d 557 (2000). Pursuit of
post-secondary education is another factor this Court has found objective and verifiable. People
v Perry, 216 Mich App 277, 280, 282; 549 NW2d 42 (1996).
Here, the trial court primarily relied on facts surrounding the crime that mitigated
defendant’s culpability, which is considered an objective and verifiable factor, and which is not
considered under the offense and prior record variables. Daniel, supra at 7. The trial court
found that defendant had aided and abetted the crime by leasing the apartment. However, the
trial court found that there was no evidence she was engaged in actually selling or handling the
drugs, nor did she have any knowledge of the quantity involved. The variables do not take into
account whether a defendant has knowledge of the drug quantities involved. And the trial court
repeatedly pointed out that the sentencing guidelines were so severe because of defendant's score
of 75 on OV 15, MCL 777.45(1)(b), which was the only offense variable upon which points
were scored, and the score was based solely on the amount of narcotics found in the apartment.
We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the mitigating
circumstances surrounding the offenses and defendant’s minimal participation were substantial
and compelling reasons warranting a downward departure.
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant’s
continuous work history beginning at the age of eighteen and her pursuit of higher education
were objective and verifiable mitigating factors constituting substantial and compelling reasons
to downwardly depart. The facts here are distinguishable from People v Claypool, 470 Mich
715, 727; 684 NW2d 278 (2004), which held that employment as a cabdriver for less than two
years did not constitute a substantial and compelling reason for departing from the sentencing
guidelines. This is because the length and continuity of defendant’s work history are particularly
noteworthy. Defendant, who was 31 years old at the time of trial, had been consistently
employed since the age of 18 and was currently employed at the Detroit Medical Center.
Moreover, defendant’s current pursuit of post-secondary education is an objective and verifiable
factor. Perry, supra at 280, 282. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
defendant’s pursuit of post-secondary education was a substantial and compelling for departure,
where she had been enrolled at Davenport University since 2005, studying medical coding.
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Defendant's current enrollment and continued study in order to further her career keenly grabs
one's attention.
“‘A court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the
sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII if the court has a substantial and compelling
reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure.’” Smith, supra at
303-304, quoting MCL 769.34(3) (emphasis in Smith). The statutory language requires the trial
court to “justify the particular departure in a case, i.e., ‘that departure.’” People v Hegwood, 465
Mich 432, 437 n 10; 636 NW2d 127 (2001), quoting MCL 769.34(3). “[I]f it is unclear why the
trial court made a particular departure, an appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment
about why the departure was justified.” Smith, supra at 304. “A sentence cannot be upheld
when the connection between the reasons given for departure and the extent of the departure is
unclear.” Id. In its departure explanation, “the trial court must explain why the sentence
imposed is more proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines recommendation would
have been.” Id. Thus, the “principle of proportionality” is the standard by which a particular
departure is to be judged. Id. at 299-300. The premise of proportionality is that, “everything
else being equal, the more egregious the offense, and the more recidivist the criminal, the greater
the punishment.” Babcock, supra at 263.
The crux of the prosecution’s argument is that the extent of the downward departure was
an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s departure from the guidelines range of 108 to 180
months constituted a severe departure. However, the trial court properly justified this particular
departure. In Smith, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for an explanation
of the extent of the departure or resentencing because the trial court did not explain its decision
and “comparing defendant’s actual minimum sentences to the recommended minimum sentences
for offenders with similar criminal histories suggests that defendant’s sentences might be
disproportionate.” Smith, supra at 308-311. The Court in Smith outlined possible ways to aid in
analyzing whether a departed sentence is proportionate, but the Court explicitly stated that these
comparisons were not the only measures of whether a sentence is proportionate. Id. at 309.
While reference to the sentencing range grid can be helpful, “a trial court that is contemplating a
departure is not required to consider where a defendant’s sentence falls in the sentencing range
grid.” Id. The minimum sentence of the defendant in Smith was higher when compared to the
highest possible minimum sentences for other defendants with the same PRV level, which
suggested that his sentence might be disproportionate. Id. at 306-308. Because of the extensive
departure and the lack of an explanation, it was not possible to tell whether the trial abused its
discretion in Smith. Id. at 311.
Defendant’s sentence was three years’ probation, while the lowest possible minimum
sentence for someone in defendant’s PRV level under the guidelines is 42 months. This means
the trial court departed significantly below the lowest minimum guideline sentence available for
someone in that PRV level. Despite this, the trial court presented a clear explanation for why
this particular departure was warranted. The trial court’s findings concerning defendant’s
minimal culpability, including the trial court’s determinations that she lacked any knowledge
regarding the scope of the drug activity, that she did not interact with the drugs, and that there
was no “other indicia of persons having a substantial financial gain from the drug trade,” all
provide adequate justification for the extent of the departure, especially when considered in
conjunction with her steady employment and college pursuits. The trial court emphasized
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repeatedly that what made this case exceptional was that the amount of narcotics involved was
driving defendant’s minimum guidelines range, yet she did not have knowledge of the scope of
the operation. Again, the minimum comparison suggested in Smith is not the only measure of
proportionality. Smith, supra at 309. Moreover, in ascertaining whether the departure was
proper, this Court must defer to the trial court’s direct knowledge of the facts and familiarity
with the offender. Babcock, supra at 270. Minimally, we cannot conclude that an abuse of
discretion occurred with respect to the degree of the departure.
We now turn to defendant’s appellate arguments challenging the convictions. Defendant
argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions because there was no
evidence that she lived in the apartment or was ever even there. Defendant contends that
excluding the fact that she leased the apartment there is no evidence to link her to the drug
activity that was taking place within the apartment.
A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in a bench trial is reviewed by this Court de
novo. People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 642; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). This Court must “‘view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine if any rational trier of
fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id., quoting People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended on other grounds 441
Mich 1201 (1992). When reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, all conflicts in the evidence
must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603
NW2d 95 (1999). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that arise from such
evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). It is solely the trier of fact’s role to weigh the evidence
and judge the credibility of witnesses. Wolfe, supra at 514. Therefore, “[i]t is for the trier of
fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence
and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich
417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
The prosecution must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support
a conviction for possession with intent to deliver more than 450 grams but less than 1,000 grams
of cocaine: (1) that the substance is cocaine, (2) that the cocaine amounted to between 450 to
1,000 grams, (3) that defendant was not authorized to possess the cocaine, and (4) that defendant
possessed it knowingly and with the intent to deliver. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600,
622; 709 NW2d 595 (2005); MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii). The elements for possession with intent to
deliver marijuana are the same except that the substance is marijuana and the amount at issue is
less than five kilograms. MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii).
The element of knowing possession with intent to deliver has two components:
possession and intent. Wolfe, supra at 519. Possession can be shown by circumstantial evidence
and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. People v Nunez, 242 Mich App 610,
615-616; 619 NW2d 550 (2000). “An actor’s intent may be inferred from all of the facts and
circumstances, and because of the difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal
circumstantial evidence is sufficient.” People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 517-518; 583
NW2d 199 (1998) (citations omitted). Actual physical possession is not required to meet the
possession element because possession may be either actual or constructive. Nunez, supra at
615. Intent to deliver has been inferred from the quantity of narcotics possessed, from the way in
which those narcotics are packaged, and from other circumstances surrounding the arrest. Wolfe,
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supra at 524. Also, knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is not an element of a
possession with intent to deliver charge. People v Marion, 250 Mich App 446, 450-451; 647
NW2d 521 (2002); see also People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 627; 628 NW2d 540 (2001)
(knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is not an element of a drug delivery charge).
Defendant was convicted as an aider and abettor. Because the common law distinction
between a principal and an aider and abettor has been abolished by statute, all persons who aid
and abet in the commission of a felony can be tried as principals. People v Robinson, 475 Mich
1, 8; 715 NW2d 44 (2006). To establish aiding and abetting, a prosecutor must show that: “‘(1)
the charged crime was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant
performed acts or gave encouragement which assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) the
defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its
commission at the time that [the defendant] gave aid and encouragement.’” Id. at 8, quoting
People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 67-68; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). The state of mind of an aider and
abettor may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances. Carines, supra at 759. These
include a close association between the defendant and the principal, the defendant’s participation
in the planning or execution of the crime, and evidence of flight after the crime. Id. at 757-758.
First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is
sufficient evidence that another person committed the crimes charged. For the cocaine
conviction, it is undisputed that the amount in question satisfied the statutory requirement.
Further, there is no suggestion that anyone was authorized to possess this substance. The
evidence also showed that Tyrell Anderson, for whom defendant claimed to have leased the
apartment, or whoever had access to the apartment, was storing large quantities of cocaine and
was in engaged in the process of turning powder cocaine into crack cocaine. There were four
small plastic bags of powder cocaine and two small plastic bags of crack cocaine as well as the
wrapper for a kilo of cocaine found inside the apartment. The amount of narcotics, the
packaging in small plastic bags, and the jars used for turning powder to crack cocaine lead to the
reasonable inference that the person who had access to this apartment possessed cocaine with the
intent to deliver it. With regard to the marijuana conviction, marijuana was found stored in a
bedroom in nine individual freezer bags. It is undisputed that the amount in question satisfied
the statutory requirement, and there is no suggestion that anyone was authorized to possess this
substance. The large quantity of marijuana packaged in this way also permitted a reasonable
inference that Anderson, or whoever had control over the apartment, possessed the marijuana
with the intent to deliver it.
Second, defendant performed acts or gave encouragement, which assisted the
commission of the crime. Defendant leased the apartment where the drugs were found. It is not
disputed that she signed the lease and was making payments for the apartment through money
orders after allegedly receiving cash from Anderson. This act assisted the commission of the
crimes because she provided a forum for these activities to take place.
Finally, there must be sufficient evidence that defendant intended the commission of the
crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that she gave her
assistance. The trial court inferred that defendant had knowledge that there was drug activity in
the apartment based on the items of proof of residence found within, including the lease and
lease application. The trial court did not find defendant credible regarding her story that she
merely signed the lease, handed over the keys to Anderson, whom she had a relationship with in
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the past, and never went back. The trial court found that it was inconsistent with common sense
and reason to rent a place under those circumstances but not go to the place, keep a key, nor even
keep the lease documents with her. The trial court also inferred that defendant’s arrangement in
paying rent indicated that she was trying to disassociate herself from what was going on at the
apartment, where she would take rent from Anderson and then pay the rent by money order.
These are reasonable inferences that suggest defendant had knowledge about the drug
operation Anderson intended to undertake using the apartment. Moreover, the trial court did not
find defendant credible. As stated, it is solely the trier of fact’s role to weigh the evidence and
judge the credibility of witnesses. Wolfe, supra at 514. While defendant's connection to the
apartment is minimal, based on the inferences fairly drawn by the trial court, and viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence for a rational
trier of fact to conclude that defendant had knowledge that the principal intended the commission
of the crimes.
Defendant next argues that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because her
trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of a search warrant
for the apartment, where the affidavit in support of the request for the search warrant was
insufficient to find probable cause to search. We disagree.
Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. “A judge first must find the facts, and then must decide
whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). This
Court reviews the factual findings for clear error and the constitutional question de novo. Id.
However, because there was no hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d
922 (1973), this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Riley
(After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
“‘To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.’” People v Scott, 275 Mich App 521, 526; 739 NW2d
702 (2007), quoting People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995).
“Defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance was sound trial
strategy.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 396; 688 NW2d 308 (2004).
Probable cause to justify a search is required before a search warrant may be issued. US
Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; MCL 780.651(1). Generally, evidence obtained during
an illegal search and seizure must be excluded. People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 528-532; 682
NW2d 479 (2004). Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists when there is a fair
probability, under all of the circumstances outlined in the affidavit, that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place, and we review the magistrate’s determination to
ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. People v Keller,
479 Mich 467, 475; 739 NW2d 505 (2007). If the search warrant is supported by an affidavit
that asserts probable cause, “the affidavit must contain facts within the knowledge of the affiant
and not mere conclusions or beliefs.” People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 298; 721 NW2d 815
(2006). Further, MCL 780.653 provides:
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The magistrate's finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based
upon all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her. The
affidavit may be based upon information supplied to the complainant by a named
or unnamed person if the affidavit contains 1 of the following:
(a) If the person is named, affirmative allegations from which the
magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the
information.
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from which the
magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the
information and either that the unnamed person is credible or that the information
is reliable.
There was probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant because based on
the affidavit there was a fair probability contraband would be found in the apartment. The
affiant, Officer Tooles, has been an officer for 22 years and is familiar with the different variety
of narcotics and methods of selling narcotics. Tooles received information from a source of
information (SOI) that he or she was inside the apartment and observed large amounts of
cocaine. According to the affidavit, the SOI provided pictures of the cocaine to Tooles. The
affidavit also stated that the SOI has been proven reliable and truthful. Background investigation
revealed that defendant leased the apartment, and during his surveillance of the apartment,
Tooles saw five individuals on foot walk up to the location, enter the apartment, stay for a few
seconds, and then exit and leave the area.
Tooles’s experience and his independent verification of the suspicious entries and then
quick exits of the apartment by five individuals entitle him to a presumption of reliability.
People v Ulman, 244 Mich App 500, 509; 625 NW2d 429 (2001). Moreover, the anonymous
SOI spoke from personal knowledge, had been proven reliable and truthful, and Tooles stated
that the SOI provided photographs, establishing the SOI’s credibility. MCL 780.653(b). The
affidavit provided sufficient evidence for a finding of probable cause. Therefore, challenging the
search warrant would have constituted a meritless motion. Because counsel is not required to
make a frivolous or meritless motion defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel. Riley, supra at 142.
Lastly, defendant argues that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
She contends that the lack of evidence connecting her to the drugs found in the apartment and the
lack of evidence showing she was ever seen or had ever gone to the apartment weighs so heavily
against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. We
disagree.
The test to determine if a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is whether the
evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to
allow the verdict to stand. People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 637; 630 NW2d 633 (2001).
Conflicting testimony and questions of witness credibility are insufficient grounds for granting a
new trial. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Except in
extraordinary circumstances, such as where testimony contradicts indisputable physical facts or
physical realities, deference must be given to the trier of fact’s determination. Id. at 645-646.
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Here, the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the verdict. There were large
quantities of cocaine and marijuana found in an apartment that defendant had leased. While
there was not evidence that defendant resided at this apartment or that she was seen there, the
trial court drew reasonable inferences that defendant had knowledge of the drug activity based on
the lease and lease application being found in the apartment, her relationship with the person for
whom she leased the apartment, and her method of paying rent, which suggested that she wanted
to disassociate herself from activity that was going on in the apartment. Therefore, the evidence
did not preponderate heavily against the verdict.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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