PEOPLE OF MI V MARION MCNEAL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 281605
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-215583-FH
MARION MCNEAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Gleicher and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of larceny from a motor vehicle,
MCL 750.356a(1). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL
769.12, to 2 to 15 years’ imprisonment. Because we conclude that there were no errors
warranting relief, we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the electric table
saws taken from the victim’s trailer were electronic devices within the meaning of MCL
750.356a(1). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo on
appeal. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 138; 755 NW2d 664 (2008).
Defendant argues that the phrase “electronic device” in the statute is limited by the
preceding terms under the doctrine of ejusdem generis. He argues that when general words
follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will be construed
and restricted by the particular, and that table saws do not fit within the list that precedes “other
electronic device.” Specifically, defendant points out that the statute prohibits the taking of
items from an automobile, including tires, airbags, wheels, and stereos, but that—unlike those
items—table saws are not items closely related with an automobile. Finally, defendant contends
that when looking at the dictionary definition of electronic, common sense dictates that the
statutory phrase was not intended to encompass every device that uses electricity.
The primary goal in construing a statute is “to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature.” People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275 (2002). To achieve this goal,
the Court must begin by examining the plain language of the statute. Id. If the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the Legislature intended its plain meaning
and the statute is enforced as written. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702
(2001).
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Under MCL 750.356a(1), a person who commits larceny by “stealing or unlawfully
removing or taking any wheel, tire, air bag, radio, stereo, clock, telephone, computer, or other
electronic device in or on any motor vehicle, house trailer, trailer, or semitrailer is guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than
$10,000.00, or both.”1 Because the statute does not define the phrase “electronic device,” we
may use a dictionary to construe that phrase “in accordance with [its] ordinary and generally
accepted meaning[].” People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). A device is
“a thing made for a particular purpose, esp. a mechanical, electric, or electronic invention or
contrivance.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Because a device can be
mechanical or electric, the use of the term “electronic” to modify “device” clarifies that the
device must operate with electricity. Hence, the statute plainly applies to any thing made for a
particular purpose that is powered by electricity.
There is no dispute that each of the stolen table saws had to be plugged into an electrical
outlet in order to function. Therefore, they are by definition electronic. Additionally, there is no
dispute that the table saws are devices: they were made for the particular purpose of cutting.
Therefore, the trial court did not err when it concluded that the table saws were electronic
devices.
Moreover, we do not agree with defendant’s suggestion that, under the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, only items closely associated with a motor vehicle fall within the language of
the statute. Defendant’s argument that the statute is only meant to prohibit the taking of items
closely associated with an automobile is misguided because the list before the phrase “other
electronic device” includes items that are not closely associated with automobiles, such as
telephones and computers. For example, a plain reading of the statute shows that a portable cell
phone or a laptop computer would still fall under the purview of the statute even though they
would not be closely associated with an automobile. Under defendant’s interpretation these
items could not qualify because they would not be closely associated with an automobile.
Additionally, because the statute specifically prohibits larceny of these types of items from house
trailers, trailers, or semitrailers, the Legislature clearly intended the scope of the statute to
encompass more than just protecting items typically associated with automobiles. Indeed, given
that the statute applies to larcenies from a house trailer, which could contain the full panoply of
household electronic devices, we conclude that the phrase “other electronic device” was intended
to include any device powered by electricity—including power tools.
The trial court did not err in determining that electric table saws constituted electronic
devices under the statute.
Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
because the prosecution could not establish the fair market value of the saws through the
complainant’s testimony about the purchase price. However, as defendant concedes on appeal,
the prosecution was not required to prove the value of the saws in order to establish the elements
of the crime. See MCL 750.356a(1) and People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 120; 605 NW2d 28
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2008 PA 475 added catalytic converters to the list of items, effective April 1, 2009.
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(1999) (noting the elements of larceny). Hence, this argument is without merit. Further, to the
extent that defendant’s claim could be read as a general challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, after examining the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime. People v Cline, 276 Mich App
634, 642; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). Finally, to the extent that defendant claims that the trial court
erred when it permitted the admission of the valuation testimony and that its admission
prejudiced him, we conclude that the evidence was admissible and, even if it were not, any error
in its admission was harmless. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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