PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH WAYNE RIDEAUX
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 281533
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-211649-FH
KENNETH WAYNE RIDEAUX,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Borrello and Stephens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of two counts of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC III), MCL 750.520d(1)(b), for which he was sentenced as a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent sentences of 10 to 30 years in prison.1 We affirm.
Defendant argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to allow a rational
jury to find him guilty of CSC III beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. We review
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78
(2000). Appellate courts are not juries, and even when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
they must not interfere with the jury’s role. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Viewing the evidence presented in this case in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
we conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed two counts of CSC III. MCL 750.520d
provides in relevant part:
1
At the time of sentencing, defendant was on supervised release for an unrelated federal charge.
Therefore, the trial court ordered that the CSC III sentences be served consecutively to the prior
federal sentence.
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(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if the
person engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the
following circumstances exist:
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(b) Force of coercion is used to accomplish the penetration. . . .
Sexual penetration includes sexual intercourse and fellatio. MCL 750.520a(r). In CSC cases, the
victim’s testimony need not be corroborated by other evidence in order to support a conviction.
MCL 750.520h; People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 632 n 6; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
A rational jury could have found that defendant engaged in two acts of forcible sexual
penetration with the victim. The victim testified to an act of fellatio and an act of vaginal
intercourse. Additionally, she testified that force was used when defendant threatened her with
bodily harm. The jury heard the direct testimony of the victim, which established all of the
elements of the crimes and identified defendant as the perpetrator. While there was no
corroborating testimony or physical evidence, this does not render defendant’s convictions
infirm. MCL 750.520h; Lemmon, 456 Mich at 632 n 6. Although the victim wavered on the
issue whether a knife was used during the attack, she consistently stated that defendant pulled her
by the arm, dragged her into the basement of a home, and threatened to “cut her head off” and
“make her dead” or “wish she was dead” if she didn’t comply with his demands. The jury
determined that the victim’s testimony was credible. The jury is “free to believe or disbelieve, in
whole or in part, any of the evidence presented at trial.” People v Eisenberg, 72 Mich App 106,
115; 249 NW2d 313 (1976). “This Court does not weigh the competing evidence; that is the
jury’s function.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 228; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). We
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s CSC III convictions.
Defendant also argues that his sentences of 10 to 30 years in prison violate federal and
state guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment, US Const, Am VIII, Const 1963, art 1,
§ 16, because they are disproportionate to the offenses and are based on unreliable evidence.
Defendant’s minimum sentence of 120 months, however, was well within the recommended
minimum sentence range under the legislative guidelines. Michigan Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (2008 edition), p 90. Accordingly, the sentences are presumptively proportionate to the
offenses and do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. People v Broden, 428 Mich 343,
354-355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987); People v Powell, 278 Mich App 318, 323; 750 NW2d 607
(2008). Indeed, this Court must affirm a sentence that falls within the appropriate guidelines
range absent an error in the scoring of the guidelines or the trial court’s reliance on inaccurate
information. MCL 769.34(10).
Defendant cursorily suggests that he was improperly sentenced as a fourth habitual
offender because the trial court did not adequately verify the accuracy of the underlying felony
convictions upon which the sentencing enhancement was based. A defendant may not challenge
for the first time on appeal the validity of the underlying convictions used to support his habitual
offender enhancement. MCL 769.34(10); People v Jones, 83 Mich App 559, 568; 269 NW2d
224 (1978); People Mays, 77 Mich App 389, 390-391; 258 NW2d 87 (1977); People v
Covington, 70 Mich App 188, 195; 245 NW2d 558 (1976). At any rate, any error in this regard
was plainly harmless because defendant’s actual minimum sentence was no longer than it might
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have been had he been sentenced as a first-time offender only. Because defendant was a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, the guidelines provided for a minimum range of 87 to 290
months. MCL 777.63; MCL 777.21(3)(c); Michigan Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2008
edition), p 90. But defendant’s actual minimum sentence of 120 months would still have fallen
squarely within the guidelines range of 87 to 145 months even if defendant had been sentenced
as a first-time offender only. MCL 777.63; Michigan Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2008
edition), p 90.
Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a
downward departure from the guidelines. This issue has not been properly presented for review
because it was not raised in defendant’s statement of the questions presented. MCR 7.212(C)(5);
People v Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172; 604 NW2d 781 (1999). Nevertheless, we find that the
trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion for a downward departure in this case.
Defendant did not identify below, nor has he identified on appeal, any substantial and compelling
reasons that would have justified a downward departure. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 257258; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Finally, as noted previously, the trial court could have imposed
much harsher sentences in this case based on defendant’s fourth habitual offender status, but did
not do so. We perceive no error with respect to this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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