PEOPLE OF MI V DONALD RICHARD BLOWERS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 281188
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001354-FH
DONALD RICHARD BLOWERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his convictions of assault with intent to do great bodily harm
less than murder, MCL 750.84, and felonious assault, MCL 750.82.1 Defendant also appeals his
sentence as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 42 to 180 months for the assault
with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder conviction and 32 to 48 months for the
felonious assault conviction. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand for
correction of his presentence investigation report (PSIR).
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We
disagree. On de novo review, we consider the evidence adduced below in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that all essential elements of the prosecution’s case were proven. People v
Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
“Assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder requires proof of (1)
an attempt or threat with force or violence to do corporal harm to another (an assault), and (2) an
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.” People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575
NW2d 316 (1997). Assault with the intent to cause great bodily harm less than murder is a
specific intent crime. People v Mack, 112 Mich App 605, 611; 317 NW2d 190 (1981).
Specifically, a defendant must have “intend[ed] to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.”
People v Mitchell, 149 Mich App 36, 39; 385 NW2d 717 (1986). “An intent, of course, is a
1
Defendant was also charged with unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b, and kidnapping,
MCL 750.349. The unlawful imprisonment charge was dismissed after the preliminary
examination, and defendant was acquitted at trial of kidnapping.
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secret of a man’s mind, and he can disclose it by declarations or by his actions. And actions
sometimes speak louder than words.” People v Quigley, 217 Mich 213, 217-218; 185 NW 787
(1921). Moreover, “[b]ecause it is difficult to prove an actor’s state of mind, only minimal
circumstantial evidence is required.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 623; 709 NW2d
595 (2000).
Although there was conflicting evidence testimony about what occurred between
defendant and the victim, there was sufficient evidence presented upon which a reasonable
inference could be drawn that defendant possessed the requisite intent. The victim testified that
defendant repeatedly beat her over the course of a 24-hour period. During one of the beatings,
she testified, defendant stretched her face so much that she thought he was going to rip it off.
Additionally, she testified that defendant tried to pull off the partial plate that was attached to her
teeth and that he also wrapped a belt around her neck and pulled it so hard that she thought her
head would explode. She further testified that during this time defendant threatened to kill her
several times. In addition to the victim’s testimony, the emergency room physician who treated
her testified that her injuries were caused by blunt force trauma. Deferring to the jury’s superior
ability to assess witness credibility, People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 376; 220 NW2d 393
(1974), this is sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could infer the requisite intent. The
fact that defendant did not succeed in seriously injuring the victim does not negate his intent to
do so. People v Harrington, 194 Mich App 424, 430; 487 NW2d 479 (1992).
“The elements of felonious assault are (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and
(3) with the intent to injury or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate
battery.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Defendant does not
deny that he assaulted the victim or that he intended to injure her or place her in reasonable
apprehension of an immediate battery when he did so. Instead, he denies assaulting her with a
belt. The victim, however, specifically testified that defendant, indeed, used a belt. Defendant
also notes that there was no medical evidence adduced at trial to corroborate her claims of
strangulation with a belt. But the physician who treated the victim testified that a person could
be strangled yet not be bruised from it. Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to his felonious
assault conviction fails.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court improperly scored offense variable (OV) 7 and
OV 8. We disagree. OV 7 is scored either 0 or 50 points. MCL 777.37(1). To assess 50 points,
the trial court must find that the victim was subjected to “sadism, torture, or excessive brutality
or conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety [the] victim suffered during the
offense.” MCL 777.37(1)(a). “Sadism” is defined as “conduct that subjects a victim to extreme
or prolonged pain or humiliation and is inflicted to produce suffering or for the offender’s
gratification.” MCL 777.37(3). Here, the victim’s testimony detailed a 24 hour long, brutal
attack. She testified that she was strangled with a belt and repeatedly hit in the head, face, and
body; she required hospital treatment. Photographs documented her injuries. The victim
testified that she suffered pain from her injuries. At sentencing, she reported that she continued
to suffer pain from the injuries for months after the attack. Based on the victim’s testimony and
the pictures that confirmed her claims, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion when it assessed 50 points for OV 7.
With respect to OV 8, we initially note an error in the sentencing transcript which
indicates that OV 8 was scored at 50 points. The SIR states that OV 8 was scored at 15 points.
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Defendant argues that because the jury acquitted him of the kidnapping charge, there was no
evidence that the victim was taken or held captive, and thus OV 8 should have been scored at
zero points. Points may be assessed for OV 8 only when the sentencing offense is not
kidnapping, MCL 777.38(2)(b), and the trial court finds that the victim was either asported to a
place or situation of greater danger or held captive beyond the time necessary to commit the
offense, MCL 777.38(1)(a). The evidence showed that defendant took the victim from their
home to several motels in the Lansing area. The victim testified that she was afraid to leave with
defendant because she feared that she would be beaten. She also testified that while in
defendant’s car and at each motel location, defendant beat her and forced her to stay with him
against her will. Based on this evidence, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
trial court’s decision to score OV 8 at 15 points. That defendant was not convicted of
kidnapping is not dispositive. Trial courts are not bound by the jury’s determination where
evidence in the record adequately supports a particular score. People v Williams, 191 Mich App
269, 276; 477 NW2d 877 (1991).
Defendant next argues that the PSIR does not reflect changes the court agreed to make to
the description of the offense provided by the investigating agent. We remand for the ministerial
task of making these change to the PSIR. MCL 771.14(6); MCR 6.425(E)(2).
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.
Specifically, defendant argues that because the prosecutor introduced false testimony from the
victim that she bailed defendant out of jail and failed to correct it, he was prejudiced. But
nowhere in the victim’s testimony does she testify to this. Instead, this statement was introduced
during the testimony of a police officer. Further, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated
the following: “[T]he Defendant and the victim agree on one thing. She did not pick him [up]
from jail and bail him out on November 14th.” This correction satisfied the prosecutor’s duties
and effectively cured any prejudice resulting from the testimony. People v Lester, 232 Mich
App 262, 276-277; 591 NW2d 267 (1998).
Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because
defendant failed to preserve this issue by moving for a new trial or a Ginther2 evidentiary
hearing, our review is limited to mistakes on the existing record.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US
Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. The right to counsel is the right to have counsel
effectively assist in the presentation of one’s case. People v Pubrat, 451 Mich 589, 594; 548
NW2d 595 (1996). The determination of whether a defendant received effective assistance
requires a focus on the assistance actually received. Id. at 596. Because effective assistance is
presumed, a defendant who challenges his counsel’s assistance bears a heavy burden. People v
LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). To succeed, a defendant must show that
(1) trial counsel’s actions fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney when objectively
viewed, and (2) but for trial counsel’s unreasonable conduct, there was a reasonable probability
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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the outcome of the trial would have been different. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733
NW2d 713 (2007).
Defendant raises two arguments in support of his claim he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel. Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate and produce
witnesses on his behalf. Specifically, defendant argues that if his trial counsel had produced the
requested witnesses, they would have rebutted the victim’s testimony, which, in turn, would have
changed the outcome of the trial. But counsel has no obligation to call or interview every
possible witness a defendant suggests. People v Beard, 459 Mich 918, 919; 589 NW2d 774
(1998). Counsel’s decisions pertaining to calling witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial
strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). The failure to call
witnesses or present other evidence can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only when it
deprives the defendant of a substantial defense. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688
NW2d 308 (2004). A substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the
outcome of the trial. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).
Here, there is no indication that defense counsel’s failure to call witnesses deprived
defendant of a substantial defense. Defendant argues that if his witnesses had been called, they
would have testified that the victim lied about the extent of her injuries and what they had done
together during the time when she alleges the assaults. Even if the witnesses could have testified
as defendant claims, there is no indication that their testimony would have resulted in an
acquittal. At trial the prosecutor elicited testimony from the victim that she had been less than
truthful about the nature of previous assaults. Additionally, defense counsel cross-examined the
victim about her various motives to lie about being assaulted and whether she was lying about
whether defendant had ever assaulted her. He also attacked the victim’s lack of memory and
highlighted her alcoholism. Thus, defendant was not deprived of a substantial defense.
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel’s failure to procure funds for a private
investigator until sixth months after the assaults was objectively unreasonable. In support of his
argument, defendant cites several federal circuit court opinions; these opinions are not binding
on this Court. Frazier, supra at 242 n 8. Further, none of the cases defendant cites supports a
finding that his trial counsel’s failure to procure funds for a private investigator until sixth
months after the assaults was objectively unreasonable. Defendant’s argument is based on
speculation that had his trial counsel investigated earlier he would have uncovered beneficial
information. Such speculation cannot sustain a claim of ineffective assistance.
Additionally, defendant argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct discussed above deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. As
previously discussed, the prosecutor fulfilled his responsibilities by informing the jury of the
error in the victim’s out-of-court statement, which effectively negated any resulting prejudice.
Defendant’s assertion that contrary to MCL 769.11b, he was denied the full benefit of the
time he served while awaiting trial has been consistently rejected by this Court. See, e.g., People
v Filip, 278 Mich App 635, 641-642; 754 NW2d 660 (2008). His claim that the prohibition in
MCL 791.238(2) against granting parolees who commit crimes while on parole credit for time
served against their new offense violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Double
Jeopardy Clauses is similarly without merit.
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We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences but remand for the ministerial task of
correcting defendant’s PSIR. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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