PATRICK SHELSON V SCHMIDT INDUSTRIES INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK SHELSON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 281123
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 05-003336-NZ
SCHMIDT INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a September 21, 2007, judgment entered in favor of
plaintiff in this case in which plaintiff alleged that defendant violated MCL 418.301(11) of the
Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq.1 (WDCA), by
discharging plaintiff in retaliation for exercising his rights under the act and for threatening to
sue defendant. We affirm.
Plaintiff injured his hand while working for defendant Schmidt Industries, Inc. He
underwent surgery on his hand and was unable to work for a period of time during which he
received worker’s compensation benefits. According to plaintiff, defendant’s owner, David
Schmidt, allegedly became quite upset on July 16 when he learned that plaintiff’s doctor did not
release him to return to work until July 19, and told plaintiff that if he did not return to work the
next day he would “suffer the consequence,” because “it was costing him entirely too much
money for [plaintiff] to be on comp [sic].” Plaintiff was placed on light duty work upon his
return to work on July 19, and Schmidt told him that he was not working fast enough and that he
needed to “speed things up. Plaintiff was heard threatening to sue defendant, and was thereafter
discharged from his employment. Defendant stated in response to plaintiff’s interrogatories,
“[t]he plaintiff’s employment was terminated because he threatened to file a lawsuit against this
company.”
Defendant raises a myriad of issues, none of which challenge the evidence supporting the
conclusion that plaintiff was discharged for exercising his rights under the WDCA. First,
1
MCL 418.101 et seq.
-1-
defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7). Specifically, defendant maintains that plaintiff’s action was untimely because
it was filed outside the limitations period contained in the employment agreement. We review de
novo both a decision on a motion for summary disposition and a question of contractual
construction. Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 643; 753 NW2d 48 (2008).
The employment agreement provided that plaintiff had three months from the time of
termination of his employment to institute any action against defendant, notwithstanding any
other period of limitations set forth by Michigan law, “to the extent that any court finds said
period to be reasonable.” However, defendant failed to comply with the rules of civil procedure,
specifically MCR 2.111(F)(2) and (3), by not raising the contractual limitations period in its
answer, and by failing to amend its answer to include this affirmative defense. These rules
clearly provide that a party who fails to raise in its pleadings or by motion the affirmative
defense of the expiration of a limitations period waives that defense. Defendant first invoked the
limitations period in the contract in its motion for summary disposition that was filed more than a
year after the commencement of litigation, and after the close of discovery. We conclude that
the trial court properly denied the motion for summary disposition based on the contractual
limitations period.2
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly granted plaintiff’s motion to exclude
the defense of failure to mitigate of damages. We disagree. The failure of a discharged
employee to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense that is to be established by the employer.
Rasheed v Chrylser Corp, 445 Mich 109, 124; 517 NW2d 19 (1994). Again, defendant failed to
comply with MCR 2.111(F)(2) and (3) by not pleading the affirmative defense in its answer to
the complaint and, therefore, waived the defense.3
Defendant also asserts that it should have been permitted to submit evidence of plaintiff’s
collateral sources of income, namely from workers’ compensation and Michigan Employment
Security Commission benefits, because the judgment should have been offset by the amount of
collateral income received. See MCL 600.6303. However, MCL 600.6303 applies to personal
injury suits, whereas the present suit involves a violation of the WDCA. The statutory collateral
source rule thus does not apply.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence under MRE
608(b) of Schmidt’s offer to perjure himself in an unrelated proceeding under MRE 608(b). We
2
Defendant’s argument on appeal focuses solely on the legal propriety of contractually
shortening a limitations period. Defendant does not address on appeal the failure to timely raise
the limitations period and has not provided this Court with any reason why the contractual
provision in the employment contract that existed since 1998 was not invoked earlier.
3
Defendant merely raised the issue but merely raised it verbally during the hearing on plaintiff’s
motion, almost two years after the answer was filed. Defendant never filed a motion to amend
its answer, nor did it file a response to plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude mitigation
evidence.
-2-
review a trial court’s decision on evidentiary matters for an abuse of discretion. People v Miller,
242 Mich App 38, 54; 617 NW2d 697 (2000). A trial court abuses its discretion when it admits
evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. Michigan Dep’t of Transportation v Haggerty
Corridor Partners Ltd, 473 Mich 124, 134; 700 NW2d 380 (2005).
Plaintiff had requested admissions from Schmidt regarding his offer to commit perjury
and make untruthful statements about an incident that he did not witness. Because Schmidt did
not timely respond to the request for admissions, the trial court deemed them admitted, and held
that all but one of the admissions was admissible. The admissions did not reveal anything about
Schmidt’s plea of no contest to a charge of obstruction of justice, a conviction, or any actual
testimony given by Schmidt.
MRE 608(b) provides as follows:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified.
The evidence in question clearly concerns Schmidt’s character for truthfulness and, therefore, the
trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting it.
Further, evidence of Schmidt’s prior conduct was presented in the form of testimony
from himself and other witnesses. Thus, that the request for admissions was admitted is of little
import. Schmidt testified that he had a meeting with his staff in 1998 in which he informed them
of his offer to perjure himself regarding the criminal matter in order that they would not be
shocked to read about it in the newspaper. A long-time employee answered in the affirmative
when asked if Schmidt “acknowledged that he offered to perjure himself in another matter” in
order to warn employees that it would be in the newspaper. Aside from the requested
admissions, the record clearly indicates that Schmidt offered to give false testimony and
statements in the criminal matter. Although the record lacks the level of detail that the requested
admissions provide, it well establishes Schmidt’s prior conduct in question. Thus, even if the
requested admissions were improperly admitted, any error was harmless.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by redacting the employment agreement
before admitting it into evidence because the entire contract was relevant under MRE 401 and
402. However, defendant fails to argue with specificity why the entire contract was relevant,
why it “materially changed” the employment relationship, or how defendant’s case suffered
because of the redaction. Under MRE 403, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” The trial court properly redacted the contract in order to avoid confusion,
excluding any portion that may imply defenses that were not before the jury.
-3-
Defendant argues next that the trial court erred by failing to make findings regarding the
reasonableness of the attorney fees in awarding case evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)
where defendant objected to the reasonableness of the $250 hourly attorney fee rate requested by
plaintiff.4 We review a trial court’s ruling on a request for attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. Smith v Smith, 278 Mich App 198, 207; 748 NW2d 258 (2008).
Under MCR 2.403(O), a prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee based on
a reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by the trial judge for services necessitated by the
rejection of the case evaluation. The following factors should be considered when determining
the reasonableness of a fee award:
(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time,
and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the
difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of
the professional relationship with the client. [Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588;
321 NW2d 653 (1982).]5
Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling was made without apparent consideration of
these factors and requests that the case be remanded for a determination of the issue of attorney
fees in accordance with Wood. However, “the trial court need not detail its findings as to each
specific factor considered,” Wood, supra at 588, and under MCR 2.517(A)(4) decisions on
motions do not require findings of fact. Michigan Nat’l Bank v Metro Institutional Food Service,
Inc, 198 Mich App 236, 241-242; 497 NW2d 225, 227 (1993).
Here, plaintiff’s counsel asked for attorney fees at an hourly rate of $250 based on the
Economics of Law Practice that was produced by the State Bar of Michigan in 2003, but
plaintiffs were only awarded $200 per hour. This exhibit indicated that an attorney practicing in
excess of 25 years6 and charging $225 an hour would fall in the 75th percentile. For an attorney
that specialized in labor law, the rate would be $285 per hour at the 75th percentile. Counsel also
presented evidence of the hourly rates he had been awarded as sanctions in past cases, including
$125 in 1993 and $200 in 1996. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the court was
familiar with plaintiff’s counsel experience and background. Defendant has not noted any
deficiencies in plaintiff’s counsel’s experience and background such that an hourly rate of $200
4
Initially, we note that defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to fees and costs because the
case evaluators considered mitigation of damages, an issue not presented at trial. Defendant
provides no legal authority for this argument, and we decline to address it.
5
In Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008), a case decided after the judgment
was entered in this case, our Supreme Court elaborated on the method for calculating attorney
fees as case-evaluation sanctions, concluding that a trial court should begin its analysis by
determining the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, and multiplying
this number by the reasonable number of hours expended in the case. The number produced by
this calculation should serve as the starting point for calculating a reasonable attorney fee.
6
Plaintiff’s counsel has been licensed to practice law since 1982.
-4-
would be unreasonable. Further, at the hearing on the issue, defendant expressly recognized that
fees for 150 hours of work should be awarded. In light of defense counsel’s recommendation,
and plaintiff’s attorney’s unchallenged credentials, we conclude that the hourly attorney rate is
reasonable, and that there was no abuse of discretion regarding the award of attorney fees.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.