DEBORAH COMPTON V HELEN ALEXANDRA PASS MD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DEBORAH COMPTON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 5, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
HELEN ALEXANDRA PASS, M.D., JANE E.
PETTINGA, M.D., and WILLIAM BEAUMONT
HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants.
No. 260362
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-048275-NH
ON REMAND
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and Markey and Meter, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff Deborah Compton appealed as of right the
judgment of no cause of action entered in favor of defendants Alexandra Helen Pass, M.D., Jane
E. Pettinga, M.D., and William Beaumont Hospital. On appeal and cross-appeal, we found one
issue to be dispositive and reversed the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for
summary disposition on the basis of causation. Compton v Pass (Compton I), unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 22, 2006 (Docket No. 260362).
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Supreme Court and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the
Supreme Court vacated our opinion and remanded the case to this Court:
for reconsideration, in light of Stone v Williamson, 482 Mich 144 (2008), of
whether this is a lost-opportunity case and whether the defendants are entitled to
summary disposition under MCL 600.2912a(2). On remand, the Court of Appeals
shall also consider the other issues raised by the parties, but not addressed by that
court during its initial review of this case, to the extent necessary to resolve this
case. [Compton v Pass, ___ Mich ___ ; 757 NW2d 119 (2008).]
While concurring in the remand, Justice Markman stated:
MCL 600.2912a(2) provides, in pertinent part, “In an action alleging medical
malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an
opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than
50%.” We recently addressed this provision with some considerable lack of
consensus in Stone v Williamson, 482 Mich 144 (2008).
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Plaintiff’s expert testified that the decedent’s [sic] premalpractice chance of not
suffering from lymphedema or axillary cording was at least 97%, while her
postmalpractice chance of not suffering from lymphedema was 82% and her
postmalpractice of not suffering from axillary cording was 90%. I believe that
this is a lost opportunity cause of action because “it is possible that the bad
outcome would have occurred even if the patient had received proper treatment.”
id. at 218 (Markman, J., concurring in result only). Further, utilizing the formula
described in my opinion in Stone, plaintiff satisfies the § 2912a requirement. I
would reverse the Court of Appeals, but for the fact that my opinion did not carry
the day. Therefore, I must accede to the remand order. [Id. at ___ (Markman, J.,
concurring).]
Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s remand order, we now consider whether plaintiff presented a
lost opportunity case in the trial court, and, if so, whether defendants were entitled to summary
disposition. We hold that plaintiff did plead a claim for lost opportunity pursuant to MCL
600.2912a(2) and that the trial court erred in denying defendants summary disposition.
Accordingly, we again reverse the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for summary
disposition, remand the matter for entry of an order granting summary disposition in defendants’
favor, and vacate all orders the trial court entered subsequent to the reversed order.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural Background
In our original opinion we set forth the factual background of this case:
This claim arises out of an axillary lymph node dissection treatment for
cancer that Drs. Pettinga and Pass performed on plaintiff at Beaumont Hospital in
April 2001. Plaintiff, who sought medical care from Dr. Pass for breast cancer,
alleged that defendants surgically removed at least 18 of her right axillary lymph
nodes as part of NSABP Clinical Trial B-32, without obtaining her informed
consent. Plaintiff alleged that if she had been properly informed, she would have
opted not to participate in the B-32 trial, but instead would have chosen to
undergo the sentinel node removal. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of
defendants’ failure to properly provide her with informed consent, she suffers
permanent axillary cording and lymphedema.
In their motion for summary disposition, defendants argued that pursuant
to MCL 600.2912a(2), plaintiff was required to establish a loss of opportunity to
achieve a better result greater than 50 percent. Defendants asserted that all three
of plaintiff’s oncology experts, stated that the difference between lymphedema
rates stemming from axillary dissection and sentinel node procedures is
significantly less than 50 percent. Plaintiff responded contending that Beaumont
Hospital’s B-32 protocol “is the most crucial document in assessing the morbidity
rates associated with axillary node dissections versus sentinel node biopsies.”
Plaintiff asserted that, according to the protocol, 82 percent of women undergoing
the axillary node dissection experience some arm morbidity while the morbidity
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associated with the sentinel node biopsy is minimal to none. Plaintiff also cited
the affidavit of her expert Burt M. Petersen, M.D., wherein he asserted that he
agrees with these morbidity rates. Plaintiff also cited the deposition testimony of
Vernon K. Sondak, M.D., stating that he agreed with the 82 percent morbidity rate
identified in the protocol. Plaintiff further argued that she did not simply allege
that she suffered “arm swelling,” but alleged that she was caused pain, suffering,
emotional distress, etc. associated with axillary cording and lymphedema. The
trial court denied defendants’ motion. On the record, the trial court stated that
because plaintiff “alleged and testified at deposition that she suffers from multiple
affects [sic] after the axillary dissection the Court finds there are questions of fact
for the jury.” [Compton I, supra (footnotes omitted).]
In Compton I, we determined that plaintiff had not established that she lost an
opportunity for a better result that was greater than 50 percent. Relying on Fulton v William
Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70, 83-84; 655 NW2d 569 (2002), and MCL 600.2912a(2), we
concluded that to satisfy the proximate cause requirement of a medical malpractice case, plaintiff
was required to make such a showing. Evidence presented to the trial court relevant to this
determination included:
(1) Robert Steele, M.D. opined that the risk of lymphedema was 18 percent with
the axillary lymph node dissection and 0 to 3 percent with the sentinel node
removal.
(2) Allen Meek, M.D. opined that the risk of lymphedema was 35 percent with the
axillary lymph node dissection and 5 percent or less with the sentinel node
removal.
(3) Dr. Meek opined that the risk of axillary cording was as high as 35 percent,
but averaged approximately 12 to 15 percent, with the axillary lymph node
dissection, and would be less than 5 percent with the sentinel node removal.1
We rejected plaintiff’s argument that, in order to recover, she had to show a better than 50
percent chance that she had lost the opportunity for a better result generally; rather, we held that
plaintiff was required to establish this lost opportunity with respect to the specific injuries —
axillary cording and lymphedema. Thus, we held that plaintiff failed to establish a lost
opportunity cause of action pursuant to MCL 600.2912a(2). Plaintiff thereafter applied for leave
to appeal to our Supreme Court.
1
We disregarded the opinion of Burt M. Peterson, M.D., regarding the risks of developing
lymphedema relative to both procedures, because the trial court ruled that his testimony lacked a
scientific basis and that ruling was not challenged on appeal. However, he did opine “the arm
morbidity rate associated with axillary node dissection is 82 percent, and is only about 3 percent
with a sentinel node biopsy.”
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While plaintiff’s application was pending, the Supreme Court released its plurality
opinion in Stone v Williamson, 482 Mich 144; 753 NW2d 106 (2008). In Stone, the defendants
failed to diagnose the plaintiff’s abdominal aortic aneurysm, resulting in a rupture and
emergency surgery with many complications. Moreover, in part due to a prior condition, the
plaintiff’s legs had to be amputated at the thigh; his home had to be reconfigured to
accommodate him, and his wife quit her employment to care for him. The proofs at trial
established that if the plaintiff had been properly diagnosed and undergone elective surgery, he
would have had a 95 percent chance of a better outcome. The misdiagnosis led to a 10 percent
chance of a good result. A majority of the Supreme Court concluded Stone did not present a lost
opportunity case but instead sounded in traditional malpractice. At the conclusion of the lead
opinion, Chief Justice Taylor set forth a summary of the three opinions:
In an attempt to clarify for the reader the majority and minority positions
on each issue, I provide the following summary:
All seven justices would affirm the result of the Court of Appeals decision
and the judgment for plaintiff. Six of the justices believe that this is not a lostopportunity case; Justice Markman would hold that it is such a case. All seven
justices believe that Fulton’s analysis is incorrect or should be found to no longer
be good law, though their reasons for doing so vary.14 Justices Corrigan and
Young and I would find that Fulton is no longer good law because we would hold
that the statute is unenforceable as written. Justice Markman would hold that
Fulton is inconsistent with the statutory language. Justices Weaver, Cavanagh,
and Kelly would hold that Fulton is incorrect because it erroneously added words
to the statute when analyzing the phrase “the opportunity.” Of the four justices
holding that the statute is not unenforceable as written (Justices Weaver,
Cavanagh, Kelly, and Markman), only Justice Markman would define the term
“opportunity” in accordance with the Waddell article, while the other three
(Justices Weaver, Cavanagh, and Kelly) would define it in accordance with
Falcon, but with a higher threshold than Falcon required. The same four justices
(Justice Weaver, Cavanagh, Kelly, and Markman) would hold that loss of the
opportunity is, by itself, a compensable injury, although the opportunity must be
“lost”—that is, the bad result must occur—in order for a claim to accrue.
_______________________________________________________________
14
However, because a majority of justices hold that this is not a lost-opportunity
case, the issue of the correctness of Fulton cannot be reached, and Fulton’s
approach remains undisturbed as the method of analyzing lost-opportunity cases.
Nonetheless, because the patient in Fulton would likely have survived had she
received a timely diagnosis, I would assert that the claim should have been treated
as one for ordinary medical malpractice and that the lower courts erred in
applying to it the doctrine of lost opportunity.
_________________________________________________________________
[Id. at 164, (Taylor, C.J.).]
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Following the release of Stone, the instant case was remanded to us for further
consideration.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion for summary
disposition based on lack of a material factual dispute is properly granted if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR
2.116(C)(10); Rice v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 252 Mich App 25, 31; 651 NW2d 188 (2002). “A
genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to
the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v
General Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). In deciding a motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must consider all the evidence, affidavits, pleadings, and admissions in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rice, supra at 30-31.
III. Analysis
Regardless of whether a plaintiff alleges an ordinary medical malpractice or lost
opportunity claim, plaintiff must establish four elements: “(1) the appropriate standard of care
governing the defendant’s conduct at the time of the purported negligence, (2) that the defendant
breached that standard of care, (3) that the plaintiff was injured, and (4) that the plaintiff’s
injuries were the proximate result of the defendant’s breach of the applicable standard of care.”
Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 86; 684 NW2d 296 (2004). Therefore, a lost opportunity
claim may be properly asserted where, either standing alone or together with a traditional
medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
a defendant’s negligence proximately caused the complained of injury. Falcon v Mem Hosp, 436
Mich 443, 461-462; 462 NW2d 44 (1990) (injury resulting from medical malpractice is not only
physical harm, but also includes the loss of opportunity of avoiding physical harm.) With
respect to lost opportunity claims, the second sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2) defines the
“injury” that plaintiff must show. That provision provides:
In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants. In an
action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an
opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the
opportunity was greater than 50%. [Emphasis added.]
In Lanigan v Huron Valley Hosp, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2009), we noted that
while the second sentence of §2912a(2) has generated a great deal of confusion, we are bound by
this Court’s prior opinion in Fulton, supra (“[T]he prevailing analysis for lost opportunity cases
remains that set forth in Fulton, Stone, supra at 164 n 14, and regardless of whether we think
Fulton was properly decided we are bound to follow it.”).
Thus, pursuant to our Supreme Court’s directive, we must address whether the present
case is a traditional medical malpractice case or one of lost opportunity. If it is one of lost
opportunity, we are bound to apply Fulton. Lanigan, supra at ___.
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A. Traditional Medical Malpractice Claim vs. Lost Opportunity Claim
From the Stone pluralities on this issue, we glean that: (1) if the plaintiff can show that
the defendant’s acts or omissions more probably than not caused the physical injury or death, the
plaintiff has a claim for traditional malpractice, as this states the requirement for a showing of
proximate cause; and (2) if the plaintiff cannot show that a defendant proximately caused the
injury, the plaintiff nonetheless may have a claim for lost opportunity if he can show that the
defendant’s acts or omissions more probably than not caused him to lose a chance of survival or
a better result. Thus, the injury in the case of a traditional medical malpractice claim is the injury
or loss of life itself, whereas the injury in a lost opportunity case is the loss of the opportunity for
survival or a better result.
At the outset, we recognize that this is an informed consent case, not a case based on
breach of the standard of care for performing the axillary lymph node dissection surgery itself.
Moreover, the consent in this case had to do with an informed choice between two possible
surgeries, as opposed to informed consent regarding whether to have a procedure at all.
The doctrine of informed consent requires a physician to warn a patient of the risks and
consequences of a medical procedure. Lincoln v Gupta, 142 Mich App 615, 625; 370 NW2d 312
(1985). As previously noted, in a medical malpractice case, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the
standard of care, (2) breach of that standard of care, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation
between the alleged breach and the injury. Craig, supra at 86. Here, the standard of care
required that defendants obtain plaintiff’s informed consent before performing the surgery, and
the failure to do so was a breach of the standard of care. Since she suffered injury, the analysis
turns on proximate cause. In other words, if plaintiff suffered an injury as the result of a
procedure to which the plaintiff did not consent, and would not have had surgery at all if
adequately informed, the plaintiff would have a traditional malpractice case, i.e., the plaintiff
could show that the defendant’s action—the surgery itself—more probably than not caused the
injury. However, the plaintiff alleges that she would have had a less invasive surgery if
adequately informed, which carried the same risk of injury but in significantly fewer cases.
It is undisputed that plaintiff was being treated for breast cancer and the plaintiff’s
complaint indicates that foregoing all surgery was never a contemplated option. Rather, the
practical choice was between the two surgeries. Thus, the question becomes whether it was
more probable than not that plaintiff would have suffered lymphedema and axillary cording from
the axillary node dissection surgery, but not from the sentinel node dissection surgery. In other
words, the issue is whether, by not being advised that there was an alternative with fewer risks,
plaintiff lost an opportunity for a less invasive surgery with a potentially better result. In our
opinion, this is a classic lost opportunity case, and we therefore apply the Fulton analysis: In
order to satisfy the proximate cause element in a lost opportunity medical malpractice action, the
plaintiff must show that the difference between the plaintiff's initial opportunity to survive or
achieve a better result and the plaintiff's opportunity following the malpractice is greater than
fifty percent. Fulton, supra at 83-84.
B. Application of Fulton
With regard to lymphedema, defendants contend that plaintiff’s expert Robert Steele,
M.D. testified that he agreed with the B-32 protocol indicating that the percent chance of
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lymphedema alone following the axillary node procedure is 18 percent while the chance of
lymphedema following the sentinel node procedure is from zero to three percent. Defendants
also note that Allen Meek, M.D. testified that plaintiff’s chance of developing arm lymphedema
after the axillary node dissection was 35 percent and that the chance of lymphedema following
the sentinel node procedure was five percent or less. With regard to axillary cording, Dr. Meek
testified that plaintiff’s risk of axillary cording with a sentinel node procedure was “less than 5
percent.” He testified that her risk of axillary cording following an axillary node dissection
would be “as high as 35 percent” and that a “good average number is somewhere between 12 and
15.” According to this testimony, plaintiff did not lose an opportunity to achieve a better result
that was greater than 50%. Id. at 82-84.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, relies on the portion of the B-32 protocol, which states,
Arm morbidity is common with axillary dissection, and 82% of women
undergoing it experience at least one arm problem, with associated psychological
distress ranging from 17-50%. One study reported the following frequencies of
adverse events in patients: numbness in 70%, pain in 33%, weakness in 25%, arm
swelling in 18%, stiffness in 10% and reduced quality of life in 39%. . . .2
Plaintiff argues “[s]he also lost the opportunity to avoid the pain, axillary cording,
weakness, pulling, and stinging of her arm that resulted from surgery. She lost the quality of life
and psychological comfort that comes with having a healthy and useful right arm and hand.”
However, in her complaint, plaintiff specifically alleged that she suffered lymphedema and
axillary cording:
That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants herein,
Plaintiff Deborah Compton has been caused to suffer severely disabling and
permanent injuries. She now suffers from painful and permanent axillary cording,
and from permanent lymphedema, which causes a painful swelling in her right
arm, elbow joint, wrist, hand, fingers, and finger joints. She must wrap her right
arm with surgical bandages from shoulder to fingertips at all times to attempt to
minimize the painful swelling. Additionally, she must place her arm in a
mechanical pressure pump several times per day for the swelling. She has to live
with severe restrictions and limitations with regard to the use of her right arm
from her axillary cording and lymphedema as follows . . . . [Emphasis added.]
2
Plaintiff also relied on the affidavit of Dr. Petersen, who attested, in agreement with the
protocol, that the “morbidity rate associated with axillary node dissection is 82%, and is only
about 3% with a sentinel node biopsy.” Dr. Peterson’s affidavit is dated November 11, 2004.
However, an order precluding him from offering “any evidence regarding the statistical
probability of developing lymphedema following an axillary dissection versus a sentinel node
procedure” was entered November 8, 2004. On appeal, plaintiff did not take issue with this
ruling.
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While plaintiff specifically alleged axillary cording and lymphedema and pain and suffering
associated with these injuries, she relies on statistical evidence to demonstrate that defendants’
negligence caused her to suffer arm morbidity in general. Plaintiff’s reliance is misplaced: she
must offer proof that defendants’ negligence caused these injuries, not morbidity generally,
which could constitute any number of various other injuries not alleged or sustained. Moreover,
the 82 percent rate of general arm morbidity applies to all women who undergo the axillary
dissection, not necessarily limited to those similarly situated as plaintiff. As such, this general
statistical evidence is without selective application to plaintiff. Without some connection to the
plaintiff, the statistical evidence is, standing alone, only marginally relevant. Lanigan, supra at
___. Relevant evidence means “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. Accordingly, it must be material, that is, related to a
fact of consequence to the action, as well as having probative force which is having a tendency to
make the existence of a fact of consequence to the action, more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 57; 614 NW2d
888 (2000). Plaintiff failed to establish that she had a greater than 50 percent opportunity to
avoid the injuries she claims.
Nonetheless, plaintiff argues that Fulton was wrongly decided. In making this argument,
plaintiff essentially adopts the conclusions of Roy W. Waddell, M.D.’s “A Doctor’s View of
Opportunity to Survive: Fulton’s Assumptions and Math are Wrong,” published in the March,
2007 edition of the Michigan Bar Journal. The article criticizes Fulton’s formula for calculating
lost opportunity because it fails to distinguish “survival rate” from “opportunity to survive” and
erroneously confuses a 50-percentage point differential with a 50 percent opportunity to achieve
a better result. However, although critical of Fulton, our Supreme Court recently asserted:
“Fulton’s approach remains undisturbed as the method of analyzing lost-opportunity cases.”
Stone, supra at 164 n 14 (Taylor, C.J.). Moreover, in Lanigan, supra, we held that Fulton
remains applicable to lost opportunity cases. Thus, plaintiff’s argument fails, and the court erred
in denying defendants’ motions for summary disposition.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that plaintiff presented a lost opportunity case in the lower court. We further
hold that at the time the motion for summary disposition was heard, plaintiff failed to present any
evidence to establish that she had a greater than 50 percent chance of not suffering lymphedema
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or axillary cording. Fulton, supra. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying
defendants’ motion for summary disposition, remand for entry of an order granting summary
disposition in defendants’ favor, and vacate all orders entered subsequent to the reversed order.3
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
3
Because our decision on this issue resolves the case as a whole, we need not address the other
issues on appeal.
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