RYSZARD WOJTUNIECKI V STANDARD FEDERAL BANK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RYSZARD WOJTUNIECKI, HI TECH BODY
SHOP CENTER, INC., HI TECH FLEET
SERVICE-X, INC., RELIABLE-BODY SHOP
TRUCK-TRAILER, and R & W BUILDING
INVESTMENT, L.L.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 280634
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-508929-CZ
STANDARD FEDERAL BANK and NANCY
BURNHAM,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Meter and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right, challenging the trial court’s orders dismissing their claims for
breach of the contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, malicious prosecution, and
false imprisonment. We affirm.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We disagree.
This Court reviews a circuit court’s summary disposition decision de novo. Trost v
Buckstop Lure Co, 249 Mich App 580, 583; 644 NW2d 54 (2002). A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 192; 670
NW2d 675 (2003). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court “‘must consider
the available pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Michigan Ed Employees Mut Ins Co v Turow, 242 Mich App
112, 114-115; 617 NW2d 725 (2000), quoting Unisys Corp v Comm’r of Ins, 236 Mich App 686,
689; 601 NW2d 155 (1999).
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution arising from a criminal prosecution,
plaintiffs were required to show that (1) defendants initiated a criminal prosecution against
plaintiff Ryszard Wojtuniecki, (2) the criminal proceedings terminated in Ryszard’s favor, (3)
defendants lacked probable cause for their actions, and (4) the action was undertaken with malice
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or for a purpose other than bringing Ryszard to justice. Matthews v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 456 Mich 365, 378; 572 NW2d 603 (1998).
The evidence showed that Ryszard’s wife Wanda informed defendant Standard Federal
Bank that Ryszard had forged her name on a check drawn on her account, in which Ryszard had
no interest, deposited the check into his own account, and then withdrew the funds. The bank
notified the police and a Northville Police detective conducted an independent investigation.
After the investigation was completed, a Wayne County prosecutor initiated the prosecution
against Ryszard. Because the prosecutor exercised independent discretion in initiating and
maintaining the criminal prosecution,1 following an independent police investigation, plaintiffs
cannot show that the criminal prosecution of Ryszard was instituted or maintained by defendants.
Id. at 384-386. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution
claim.2
Although plaintiffs assert that defendants failed to make a full disclosure of all relevant
information to the police, the issue of full disclosure is relevant to a defense of reliance on legal
advice, which does not come into play where, as here, the plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie
case by showing that the defendant instigated or maintained the criminal prosecution without
probable cause. Id. at 379-381. To the extent that a failure to disclose could be evidence of
malice, see id. at 379 n 15, evidence of malice was similarly irrelevant because, again, plaintiffs
failed to make out a prima facie case by showing that defendants instigated or maintained the
criminal prosecution without probable cause.
Plaintiffs also challenge the trial court’s dismissal of their false imprisonment claim,
which was based on Ryszard’s arrest for forging Wanda’s name on the check drawn on Wanda’s
account. “To prevail on a claim of . . . false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show that the arrest
was not legal, i.e., the arrest was not based on probable cause.” Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of
Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 18; 672 NW2d 351 (2003). One who instigates a lawful arrest may
not be liable for false imprisonment. See id. Probable cause that a person “has committed a
crime is established by a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person in the belief that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged.” Id. at 19 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, a police investigation revealed that Ryszard forged Wanda’s name on a
check for $19,878, deposited the forged check into his own business account, and then withdrew
1
As noted infra, there was probable cause for Ryszard’s arrest.
2
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erroneously concluded that summary disposition was
proper because they could not establish a special injury. Plaintiffs assert that the element of
special injury is only applicable to a malicious prosecution claim arising from the prosecution of
a civil action, and is not an element of a claim arising from a prior criminal prosecution. Even
assuming that plaintiffs are correct, compare Matthews, supra at 378, and Friedman v Dozorc,
412 Mich 1, 32; 312 NW2d 585 (1981), summary disposition of plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution
claim was still proper because plaintiffs failed to show that defendants instituted or maintained
the criminal prosecution.
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the funds. Because the submitted evidence established that there was probable cause for
Ryszard’s arrest, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for false imprisonment.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration. Woods v SLB Prop Mgt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 629; 750 NW2d 228 (2008).
Plaintiffs failed to show that a different disposition of defendants’ summary disposition motion
was warranted by correction of a palpable error. MCR 2.119(F)(3).
Finally, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the contractually implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing was also properly dismissed.3 There is no independent cause of action for
breach of this implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Fodale v Waste Mgt of Michigan,
Inc, 271 Mich App 11, 35; 718 NW2d 827 (2006); Belle Isle Grill Corp v Detroit, 256 Mich App
463, 476; 666 NW2d 271 (2003).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
3
Although the court did not specifically address this claim in its findings, it clearly dismissed the
entire complaint, and we reject plaintiffs’ claim that a remand is necessary for a further ruling by
the trial court.
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