BRIAN HEYZA V PATRICIA ANN HEYZA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BRIAN HEYZA,
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 2009
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
v
No. 282790
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-604638-DM
PATRICIA ANN HEYZA,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Markey and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. Plaintiff challenges the trial
court’s decision to award defendant primary physical custody of the parties’ minor children
instead of awarding joint physical custody. He also challenges the trial court’s property division,
and awards of child and spousal support. We reverse and remand for further proceedings, with
respect to the trial court’s award of retroactive spousal support for 2007 only, and affirm in all
other respects.
I
The parties married in 1995. They have three minor children. Plaintiff originally filed
for divorce in 2002, but the parties later reconciled, and plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed.
Plaintiff later filed for divorce in February 2006. The parties continued to reside together
throughout the proceedings, including during the lengthy and contentious trial. Plaintiff sought
joint legal and physical custody of the children. The trial court awarded the parties joint legal
custody, but awarded primary physical custody to defendant.
II
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to award joint physical custody
of the children. He argues that the trial court erred in several of its findings regarding the
statutory best interest factors, MCL 722.23(a) – (l), and abused its discretion in awarding
primary physical custody of the children to defendant.
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1.
This Court applies three standards of appellate review in appeals from custody
rulings. Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 358; 683 NW2d 250 (2004). A trial
court’s findings of fact regarding the existence of an established custodial environment,
and regarding each custody factor, are reviewed under the great weight of the evidence
standard. Id. We review the trial court’s ultimate custody decision. Id. Questions of
law are reviewed for clear legal error. Id.
If the court finds that an established custodial environment exists, it may not change that
environment unless it finds clear and convincing evidence that a change in custody is in the
child’s best interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App 526; 752 NW2d 47
(2008). In this case, the trial court found that there was an established custodial environment
with both parents. Therefore, defendant was obligated to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, that awarding her primary physical custody of the children was in their best interests.
The children’s best interests are to be evaluated in light of the statutory best interest factors set
forth in MCL 722.23(a) – (l).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that best interest factors (b), (d), and
(h) favored defendant, and in finding that neither party prevailed with respect to best interest
factors (c), (g), and (j).
With respect to factor (b) (capacity of the parents to provide the children with love and
guidance, and to foster their religious upbringing), we disagree with plaintiff’s argument that the
trial court erred by failing to give sufficient weight to Dr. Swerdlow-Freed’s report. This Court
affords deference to the trial court’s weighing of evidence, and to evaluation of the witnesses’
credibility, in light of the trial court’s superior position to consider these matters. MacIntyre v
MacIntyre, 267 Mich App 449, 459; 705 NW2d 144 (2005); Fletcher v Fletcher (After Remand),
229 Mich App 19, 28; 581 NW2d 11 (1998). Accordingly, the trial court was not obligated to
blanketly accept Dr. Swerdlow-Freed’s report, or to give greater credence to plaintiff’s testimony
than to defendant’s.
Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s finding that defendant played a greater role than
plaintiff in fostering the children’s religious upbringing. The evidence showed that defendant
enrolled the children in catechism, made arrangements for sacrament preparation, and took them
to church. Although plaintiff refuted defendant’s testimony that she took the children to church
weekly, we conclude that the trial court’s finding with regard to this matter is not against the
great weight of the evidence.
However, we agree with plaintiff that the trial court’s finding that plaintiff “tries to be a
friend to the girls more than a parent and places the need for the children’s affection over the
need to discipline” is against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant did not offer evidence
that plaintiff consistently emphasized friendship and affection, over discipline and guidance.
Although there was evidence regarding plaintiff’s involvement in the children’s sports activities,
and that he enjoyed taking them to family events and on his Comerica Park errands, this
evidence did not establish that he did so at the expense of appropriate discipline. Moreover, the
evidence showed that a large part of defendant’s involvement with the children surrounded their
dance classes.
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We also agree with plaintiff that the trial court gave undue weight to evidence that
plaintiff intended to rely on babysitters to supervise his children, on weekday mornings, and on
evenings when he delivers baseball equipment. In Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich 457, 467-468; 547
NW2d 686 (1996), our Supreme Court held that a parent’s plan to rely on daycare is not, in
itself, sufficient to weigh the best interest factors against that parent. The Court did not
categorically reject consideration of childcare plans, commenting that a parent’s “unwise choice
in this regard would reflect poorly on the parent’s judgment.” Id. at 468. But the Court
concluded that the trial court “must look at each situation [to] determine what is in the best
interests of the child.” Id.
The evidence here indicated that plaintiff intended to rely on his mother or sister to come
to his home on mornings when he had physical custody, to supervise the children’s school
preparations. Plaintiff also presented evidence that his part-time employer was able to use other
drivers for late-night delivery jobs, when the children were in his care. With a shared physical
custody arrangement, approximately half of plaintiff’s delivery jobs would occur when the
children were with defendant. This evidence does not suggest that plaintiff would make poor or
unwise choices regarding childcare. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s finding
that best interest factor (b) favored defendant is against the great weight of the evidence.
With respect factor (c) (capacity to provide for the children’s material and medical
needs), plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that the parties were equal. He argues
that defendant’s “extraordinary” financial irresponsibility will probably lead her to file for
bankruptcy, and interfere with her ability to provide for the children’s basic needs. Plaintiff
presented substantial evidence that defendant accumulated high credit card balances, failed to
keep up with payments, and attempted to conceal the dunning notices that she received from
creditors and debt collectors. On the other hand, defendant testified that she was required to
resort to credit cards because plaintiff stopped providing money for necessary expenses. The
trial court did not find that defendant’s credit card problems resulted from selfish or irresponsible
purchases. The court also emphasized that defendant took the greater share of responsibility for
some important family matters, such as meal preparation, laundry, daily schedules, and routines.
The trial court found that both parties had “negative habits” that could affect the
children’s medical needs, because defendant smoked in the house, and plaintiff drank in their
presence. There was evidence that defendant’s smoking could be harmful to Sydney, who had a
respiratory condition. Defendant testified that plaintiff frequently abused alcohol, which led to
aggressive and abusive behavior, but plaintiff denied this, and insisted that his alcohol
consumption was moderate. The trial court did not make any findings regarding the extent or
nature of plaintiff’s alcohol use, nor expressly find that it adversely affected his behavior. Thus,
it appears that the court implicitly discounted defendant’s testimony regarding plaintiff’s alleged
abuse.
In any event, the trial court’s conclusion regarding factor (c) (that the evidence does not
clearly weigh in either party’s favor) is not against the great weight of the evidence. On the one
hand, plaintiff demonstrated financial responsibility by paying for the family’s principal
expenses (although defendant argued that he spitefully withheld money from her, and left her no
alternative but to resort to credit). On the other hand, defendant oversaw most of the children’s
daily needs.
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Further, the parties’ testimony is sharply divided with respect to how their personal habits
affected the children’s health. Despite some disagreements, however, both parties demonstrated
at least adequate responsibility for providing the children with medical, dental, and mental health
care. In light of the foregoing evidence, the trial court’s finding that the parties were equal with
respect to factor (c), is not against the great weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that factor (d) (the length of time the
children have lived in a stable environment) favored defendant. Plaintiff argues that there was
substantial evidence that defendant would not be able to keep the marital home, and points to
evidence that the court later ordered her to vacate the home as of May 1, 2008, and that
foreclosure proceedings have begun. But logically, plaintiff may not rely on events that occurred
after the trial court’s custody decision, to establish that the decision was erroneous when made.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s admitted skepticism regarding his own ability to prevent the loss of the
home, undermines his argument that this factor should have been decided in his favor.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that factor (d) favored defendant is not
against the great weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in finding that both parties were equal with
respect to factor (g) (physical and mental health), and asserts that it gave insufficient weight to
defendant’s apparent suicide note. However, the parties disputed the timing and circumstances
surrounding the note, and there was no evidence that defendant actually attempted suicide.
Where a trial court resolves disputed facts, we give its conclusions deference. See, e.g., Fletcher,
supra at 28. Moreover, there was no other evidence suggesting that defendant was at serious or
substantial risk of attempting suicide. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s finding that the
parties were equal with respect to factor (g) was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff argues that factor (h) (school and community record) did not favor defendant, as
the trial court concluded, because she continuously interfered with his efforts to participate in the
children’s homework. Plaintiff relies on the Custody Evaluation, in which Dr. Swerdlow-Freed
reported that all three children informed him that both parents help them with their homework.
However, defendant denied locking the children’s homework in the car. Thus, there was a
factual dispute, and we owe deference to the trial court’s resolution of it. Defendant also
testified that, historically, she was the parent who attended parent-teacher conferences, and she
played the greater role in managing school and extra-curricular affairs. Because this factor
depended mainly on the trial court’s weighing of evidence and evaluation of witness credibility,
Fletcher, supra at 28, we find that the court’s findings are not against the great weight of the
evidence.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have weighed factor (j) (willingness
and ability of parties to facilitate and encourage a close relationship with the other parent) in his
favor. The court found that this factor did not favor either party. Considering the overwhelming
evidence of the parties’ mutual antipathy, we conclude that this finding is not against the great
weight of the evidence.
Although the trial court erred in a small number of its findings regarding parental roles in
maintaining discipline and reliance on babysitters, we conclude that these errors did not affect its
decision to award primary physical custody of the children to defendant, rather than awarding the
parties joint physical custody. Considering the trial court’s findings of fact that are not against
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the great weight of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding primary physical custody of the children to defendant.
MCL 722.26a provides, in pertinent part:
(1) In custody disputes between parents, the parents shall be advised of
joint custody. At the request of either parent, the court shall consider an award of
joint custody, and shall state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a
request. . . . The court shall determine whether joint custody is in the best interest
of the child by considering the following factors:
(a) The factors enumerated in section 3.
(b) Whether the parents will be able to cooperate and generally agree
concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.
The parties must be able to agree on such basic decisions including health care, education, and
religion, along with matters of daily decision-making and discipline. Fisher v Fisher, 118 Mich
App 227, 232; 324 NW2d 582 (1982).
In this case, the trial court found:
[A]s to the day-to-day decisions [the parties] are unable to communicate
or cooperate[] with each other. There was ample testimony of how they were
unable to communicate or agree on activities the girls would participate in such as
dance classes, dance competition and even which soccer team they could play on.
They disagree and have fought over the rules on bedtime, allowing children to
sleep with parents, routines for hygiene, and homework. While the children need
both parent[s’] love and continue[d] involvement in their lives[,] they need more
stability and consistency in their daily routines[,] especially during the school
year.
The record amply supports these findings. Alternating residences on a weekly basis between
parents who harbor the degree of hostility toward each other as these parties, was not a viable
option, and would inevitably have given rise to a host of disputes and other problems. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to defendant, finding that
the parties’ animosity toward each other precluded a joint physical custody arrangement.
Plaintiff did not seek primary physical custody in the trial court, and does not do so on
appeal. In sum, under the circumstances described herein, and because shared physical custody
was not a viable option, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
children’s best interests would be served by awarding primary physical custody to defendant.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s custody decision.
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III
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by failing to award him the full portion of
his equity in the marital home when it gave him a $1,300 credit toward his share of the home
equity debt.
In reviewing a trial court’s property division, we review the court’s findings of fact for
clear error, and review its dispositional rulings to determine whether the ruling was fair and
equitable in light of those facts. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151-152; 485 NW2d 893
(1992).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s ruling on this issue is inequitable, because it deprives
him of his full share of the equity. He argues that he is entitled to $11,100 in equity after the
amount of the first mortgage is subtracted from the appraised value of the home, and
accordingly, the trial court should have subtracted the $7,000 that represents his share of the
home equity loan debt, from $11,100, leaving him with $4,100 in equity. We conclude that
plaintiff’s argument is flawed, because plaintiff’s claim that his equity value is $11,100 is based
on the fiction that the property is encumbered only by the first mortgage. The trial court
correctly determined the remaining equity in the home by subtracting the entire amount of
secured debt from the appraised value of the home, leaving each party with $1,300 in equity.
The trial court’s finding that the equity value of the home was $2,600, is not clearly erroneous.
Sparks, supra at 151-152.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s failure to refinance the home and make payments toward
the home equity loan debt have resulted in the initiation of foreclosure proceedings. He therefore
argues that this case should be remanded to the trial court for full reconsideration of the property
division in light of these subsequent events and defendant’s culpability. We disagree. The trial
court was required to equitably distribute the marital property based on the circumstances as they
existed at that time. It would be improper to allow plaintiff to rely on subsequent events to argue
that the trial court’s property distribution was inequitable, since the subsequent events were not
before the trial court at the time it made its decision. On appeal, we are confined to decide the
case based on the record on appeal, which consists of materials that were before the trial court.
See generally MCR 7.210(A)(1).
IV
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s award of spousal support was inequitable and
improperly made retroactive. We agree in part. The same standard of review applicable to the
division of marital property, applies to awards of spousal support. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich
App 700, 727; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Thus, the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for
clear error. Id. If the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, this Court must then decide
whether the dispositional ruling was fair and equitable in light of the facts. Id.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in adjusting the lump-sum spousal support
award from $2,500 to $3,000 after he pointed out in his post-judgment motion that the monthly
amount of support should be reduced from $250 to $208.33. However, the trial court stated that
its original intent was to order monthly spousal support of $250, for an annual sum of $3,000. It
clarified that the $2,500 amount was intended as an award of spousal support for “part of 2007.”
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Thus, it appears that the trial court intended to order ten months of retroactive spousal support
for 2007. The trial court was authorized to correct a clerical error in its judgment. MCR
2.613(A)(1).
However, the trial court did not make any findings of fact to support its ten-month
retroactive spousal support award. The record does not reveal the factual basis for this decision,
considering that the parties lived together during most of 2007, with plaintiff paying most of the
household costs. Without findings of fact explaining the basis for the retroactive award of
support, we cannot conclude that this portion of the award is fair and equitable. Accordingly, we
remand for reconsideration of the retroactive award, and for findings of fact explaining the
court’s decision to award retroactive spousal support for ten months.
Plaintiff additionally argues that the trial court’s awards of spousal support and child
support were improperly calculated, because the calculations did not reflect that defendant was
not paying income taxes on her earnings.
The trial court imputed income to defendant of $25,480 a year based on the volume of
her babysitting and daycare services. Although there was evidence that defendant failed to
report much of her income, the trial court found that defendant’s income was not exempt from
income taxes. We agree with the trial court that absent any basis for concluding that defendant
had a legal right to forego reporting her income and paying taxes on her income, there was no
basis for adjusting the spousal and child support awards on account of defendant’s anticipated
failure to pay taxes on future earnings. Accordingly, we find no error.
VI
Plaintiff lastly argues that the trial judge should have been disqualified because of bias,
and that this case should be assigned to a different judge on remand. In reviewing a motion to
disqualify a judge, this Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for an abuse of discretion,
and reviews the court’s application of those facts to the relevant law de novo. Olson v Olson,
256 Mich App 619, 638; 671 NW2d 64 (2003).
Similarly, in Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich App 595, 602-603; 691 NW2d 812 (2004), this
Court stated:
The general concern when deciding whether to remand to a different trial
judge is whether the appearance of justice will be better served if another judge
presides over the case. . . . We may remand to a different judge if the original
judge would have difficulty in putting aside previously expressed views or
findings, if reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and if
reassignment will not entail excessive waste or duplication.
. . . We will not remand to a different judge merely because the judge
came to the wrong legal conclusion. Repeated rulings against a party, no matter
how erroneous, or vigorously or consistently expressed, are not disqualifying.
Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate that the judge would be unable to rule fairly on
remand given his past comments or expressed views.
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MCR 2.003(B)(1) provides that a judge is disqualified when “[t]he judge is personally
biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.” Generally, a trial judge is not
disqualified absent a showing of actual bias or prejudice. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420,
440; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). The mere fact that a judge rules against a litigant, even if the
rulings are later determined to be erroneous, is not sufficient to require disqualification or
reassignment. Ypsilanti Fire Marshal v Kircher, 273 Mich App 496, 554; 730 NW2d 481
(2007).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court was biased against him because it required his attorney
to submit a proposed judgment within seven days after the court issued its decision, contrary to
MCR 3.211(F)(1), which allows a party 21 days to submit a judgment after the trial court renders
a decision in a domestic relations action. Plaintiff also asserts that the court failed to return two
trial exhibits. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the court retaliated against him for filing a postjudgment motion by increasing the annual amount of spousal support instead of lowering his
monthly payment. He also argues that the court’s factual findings were one-sided and unfair.
Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish actual bias. Even if the court erred in requiring
plaintiff’s counsel to submit a proposed judgment under the seven-day rule, MCR 2.602(B)(3),
instead of applying MCR 3.211(F)(1), there is no indication that this decision was the result of
bias. An erroneous legal ruling does not establish judicial bias. Ypsilanti Fire Marshall, supra
at 554. Further, there is no indication that the court possessed the requested exhibits and refused
to return them. Rather, the court denied possessing them.
Plaintiff’s remaining allegations involve alleged legal error, which is not a proper basis
for establishing judicial bias. Ypsilanti Fire Marshall, supra at 554. Indeed, the trial court’s
original award of spousal support was inherently inconsistent, requiring that plaintiff pay $2,500
a year, but at a rate of $250 a month. The court corrected this discrepancy when it was brought
to its attention on plaintiff’s motion, by retaining the $250 monthly amount, and adjusting the
yearly amount to $3,000, which the court explained was its original intent. The adjustment was
necessary to correct an obvious clerical error, and there is no indication that the court was
intending to penalize plaintiff or was biased against him. Lastly, the trial court’s factual findings
were not so one-sided as to demonstrate actual bias.
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish grounds either to disqualify the trial judge or
to reassign this case to a different judge on remand.
In sum, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in connection with the trial
court’s award of retroactive spousal support for 2007, only. We affirm in all other respects.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Because neither side prevailed in full, neither side
shall tax costs.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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