CITY OF PONTIAC V MICHIGAN ASSN OF POLICE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF PONTIAC,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MICHIGAN ASSOCIATION OF POLICE and
PONTIAC POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,
No. 280919
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-079892-CL
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Cavanagh and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Michigan Association of Police and the Pontiac Police Officers Association
(collectively the “union”) appeal as of right from a circuit court order vacating an arbitration
award that required plaintiff, city of Pontiac (the “city”), to reinstate Martice Berry to his
employment as a Pontiac Police Officer. Because we conclude that the arbitrator did not exceed
the scope of his authority and that enforcement of the arbitrator’s decision does not violate public
policy, we reverse the circuit court’s decision and reinstate the arbitration award.
Initially, we note that the Michigan Arbitration Act, MCL 600.5001 et seq., does not
apply to arbitration proceedings conducted pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement. MCL
600.5001(3). Thus, MCR 3.602, which “governs statutory arbitration,” does not apply to this
case.
Labor arbitration awards involving Michigan public employees have traditionally been
reviewed under a very deferential standard adopted from United States Supreme Court decisions
in federal labor arbitration cases. See Port Huron Area School Dist v Port Huron Ed Ass’n, 426
Mich 143, 150; 393 NW2d 811 (1986). “The legal basis underlying this policy of judicial
deference is grounded in contract: the contractual agreement to arbitrate and to accept the
arbitral decision as ‘final and binding.’” Id. Thus, an arbitrator has “no general jurisdiction to
resolve matters independent of the arbitration contract.” Id. at 150-151.
“A court may not review an arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits.” Id. at
150. Rather, “[t]he only issue is whether the arbitrator, in granting the award, disregarded the
terms of his employment and the scope of his authority as expressly circumscribed in the
arbitration contract.” Id. at 151. Accordingly, “an award is properly vacated when that award is
dependent upon an arbitrator’s interpretation of provisions expressly withheld from arbitral
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jurisdiction, or upon an arbitrator’s disregard and contravention of provisions expressly limiting
arbitral authority.” Id. at 152.
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his
award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this
obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. [Id. at
152, quoting United Steelworkers v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 US 593,
597; 80 S Ct 1358; 4 L Ed 2d 1424 (1960).]
A court may “not substitute its opinion on the merits of the grievance for that of the arbitrator.”
Id. at 160; see, also, Lenawee Co Sheriff v Police Officers Labor Council, 239 Mich App 111,
118-119; 607 NW2d 742 (1999). The same is true of “questions of contract interpretation.”
Roseville Community School Dist v Roseville Federation of Teachers, 137 Mich App 118, 124;
357 NW2d 829 (1984). Further, “[w]here it is contemplated [that] the arbitrator will determine
remedies for contract violations that he finds, courts have no authority to disagree with his honest
judgment in that regard.” City of Lincoln Park v Lincoln Park Police Officers Ass’n, 176 Mich
App 1, 6; 438 NW2d 875 (1989), quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union v Misco, Inc, 484 US
29, 38; 108 S Ct 364; 98 L Ed 2d 286 (1987).
“Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties’ agreement.”
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v Garvey, 532 US 504, 509; 121 S Ct 1724; 149 L Ed 2d
740 (2001). “The fact that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract is wrong is irrelevant.”
Roseville Community School Dist, supra at 123. “[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” United
Paperworkers Int’l Union, supra at 38. “The courts . . . have no business weighing the merits of
the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether
there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim.” Id. at 37.
By itself, “improvident, even silly, factfinding,” is insufficient to justify overturning an
arbitration award. Id. at 39; see, also, Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, supra at 509.
In this case, the arbitrator found that Berry ran numerous LEIN inquiries on his exgirlfriend and her new boyfriend. He found that this activity supported the charge of harassment
“to some degree,” but did not merit termination. The arbitrator found that the evidence did not
sufficiently support the complainants’ claims that Berry repeatedly drove by their parents’
homes. The arbitrator found that Berry’s telephone calls and lawsuit against his ex-girlfriend
were acts of harassment, but were not committed in Berry’s official capacity as a police officer.
The arbitrator questioned Berry’s motives for effectuating a traffic stop of his ex-girlfriend’s new
boyfriend, but explained that if the city had presented a proper arbitration case with witnesses
and cross-examination, he would have been able to determine the degree of harassment that was
in fact occurring. Nonetheless, he concluded that there was little question that Berry had
harassed the boyfriend.
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The arbitrator also found, however, that the city failed to provide Berry with proper
notice of the charges, in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. At the arbitration
hearing, the city failed to present any witnesses who participated in the investigation. The
arbitrator found that the evidence presented by the city was less than convincing and not subject
to cross-examination, that the city had conducted a less-than-thorough investigation, and that the
city recorded Berry’s interview in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement.
The arbitrator stated that he could not and would not overlook the city’s violation of
Berry’s fundamental rights under the collective-bargaining agreement. He questioned whether
the city was biased against Berry. He concluded that “[i]n consideration of the charge being that
of a personal matter with the complainants with a minimum of official Police authority involved,
the aborting of the employee rights of the Collective Bargaining Agreement due the Grievant, . . .
the Employer has not met its burden of proving just-cause to justify the Grievant’s termination.”
Applying the applicable standard of review, we note that the city does not claim that the
arbitrator applied any contract provisions expressly withheld from arbitration, or that he
disregarded any provisions expressly limiting his authority. The record discloses that the
arbitrator considered the charges against Berry, and the city’s violations of the collectivebargaining agreement and, consistent with his authority, devised remedies for the contract
violations he found. Courts cannot disagree with an arbitrator’s honest judgment in that regard.
City of Lincoln Park, supra at 6. Contrary to the city’s argument, courts have “no business”
determining that the arbitrator struck an improper balance between Berry’s misconduct and the
city’s violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union,
supra at 37. Whether the arbitrator found, and properly considered, whether any prejudice
resulted from the city’s contract violations goes to the merits of his decision, which is outside the
applicable scope of judicial review.
In sum, we conclude that the arbitrator interpreted and applied the parties’ collectivebargaining agreement, and did not dispense his own brand of industrial justice. Right or wrong,
his award draws its essence from the collective-bargaining agreement and, therefore, should be
enforced.
We disagree with the circuit court’s determination that enforcing the arbitration award
would violate public policy.
The Supreme Court has stated that “[a] court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award
under a collective-bargaining agreement because it is contrary to public policy is a specific
application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to
enforce contracts that violate law or public policy.” Id. at 42. “That doctrine derives from the
basic notion that no court will lend its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral
or illegal act, and is further justified by the observation that the public’s interests in confining the
scope of private agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless the judiciary
takes account of those interests when it considers whether to enforce such agreements.” Id.
In United Paperworkers Int’l Union, id. at 43, the Court noted that in W R Grace & Co v
Local Union 179, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 US 757;
103 S Ct 2177; 76 L Ed 2d 298 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a reviewing court “may not
enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy, and stated that the
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question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts.” The Court “cautioned,
however, that a court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of such contracts is limited
to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is
well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Id. (emphasis
added; internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court noted that in W R Grace, it had
“identified two important public policies that were potentially jeopardized by the arbitrator’s
interpretation of the contract: obedience to judicial orders and voluntary compliance with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” but that the Court had gone “on to hold that enforcement of
the arbitration award in that case did not compromise either.” Id. The Court further stated:
Two points follow from our decision in W R Grace. First, a court may
refuse to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement when the specific terms
contained in that agreement violate public policy. Second, it is apparent that our
decision in that case does not otherwise sanction a broad judicial power to set
aside arbitration awards as against public policy. Although we discussed the
effect of that award on two broad areas of public policy, our decision turned on
our examination of whether the award created any explicit conflict with other
laws and legal precedents rather than an assessment of general considerations of
supposed public interests. At the very least, an alleged public policy must be
properly framed under the approach set out in W R Grace, and the violation of
such a policy must be clearly shown if an award is not to be enforced. [Id.
(internal quotations and citation omitted).]
Applying these principles to the case before it, the United Paperworkers Int’l Union
Court found:
The Court of Appeals made no attempt to review existing laws and legal
precedents in order to demonstrate that they establish a “well-defined and
dominant” policy against the operation of dangerous machinery while under the
influence of drugs. Although certainly such a judgment is firmly rooted in
common sense, we explicitly held in W R Grace that a formulation of public
policy based only on “general considerations of supposed public interests” is not
the sort that permits a court to set aside an arbitration award that was entered in
accordance with a valid collective-bargaining agreement. [Id. at 44.]
The Court added that, even if the Court of Appeals’ formulation of public policy were accepted,
a court would need to draw an inference from evidence of marijuana found in the grievant’s car
that the grievant had been using marijuana at work. Id. However, drawing inferences from the
evidence was exclusively within the arbitrator’s purview and, therefore, was outside the Court’s
permissible scope of review. Id. at 44-45.
Michigan courts have adopted the standards set out in United Paperworkers Int’l Union
and W R Grace. See City of Lincoln Park, supra at 6-8 (no public policy violation found where
arbitration award ordered reinstatement of a police officer who engaged in a consensual,
although improper, sexual relationship while on duty with a woman who had called for
assistance); compare Gogebic Medical Care Facility v AFSCME Local 992, AFL-CIO, 209 Mich
App 693, 697; 531 NW2d 728 (1995) (because the arbitrator found that the grievant had abused
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a patient, requiring her to be listed on a particular register, and applicable state regulations
explicitly forbade a medical facility from employing a listed individual, enforcement of the
arbitration award ordering reinstatement would violate public policy by forcing the employer to
break the law).
In the present case, the city argues that enforcing an arbitration award requiring it to
reinstate Berry would violate public policy prohibiting misuse of the LEIN system, and would
violate standards adopted by the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards
(“MCOLES”). The city adds that Berry’s harassment of the complainants amounted to stalking,
that Berry’s activities were in potential violation of 42 USC 1983, and that Berry’s reinstatement
is inconsistent with one of the stated purposes of the collective-bargaining agreement, to benefit
the citizens of Pontiac.
The city cites 2008 AACS R 28.14607, which provides, consistently with MCL
28.609b(2), that an officer who discloses information obtained from the LEIN system shall be
“suspended.” However, the rule does not mention termination, nor does it address improper
LEIN usage, even for personal reasons. Here, the arbitrator specifically found that the state
police had concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Berry had disclosed LEIN
information. The arbitrator did not find that Berry’s LEIN usage violated R 28.14607 or MCL
28.609b(2). In concluding otherwise, the circuit court exceeded the permissible scope of its
review. Thus, the city has failed to establish a dominant and well-established public policy that
would be violated by enforcing the arbitration award.
The city argues that the circuit court properly found that enforcing the arbitration award
would require the city to violate MCOLES standards requiring good moral character. We
disagree.
MCOLES is a state agency charged with promulgating rules establishing minimum law
enforcement officer standards, including minimum standards for “moral fitness.” See MCL
28.609(1)(a). In pertinent part, 2008 AC R 28.14203(e) provides that “[a] person selected to
become a law enforcement officer” shall
[p]ossess good moral character as determined by a favorable comprehensive
background investigation covering school and employment records, home
environment, and personal traits and integrity. Consideration shall be given to a
history of, and the circumstances pertaining to, having been a respondent to a
restraining or personal protection order. Consideration shall also be given to all
law violations, including traffic and conservation law convictions, as indicating a
lack of good moral character.
However, R 28.14203 is contained in Part 2, which addresses selection and employment
standards. By contrast, Part 6, entitled Investigations and Revocations, R 28.14601 et seq., does
not mention moral fitness. Instead, R 28.14604 and R 28.14605 provide, consistently with MCL
28.609b, that an officer’s certification may be revoked upon conviction of a felony, and for
making materially false or fraudulent statements during the application process.
Thus, the “good moral character” language on which the city relies applies to new
recruits. There is no similar language allowing an officer such as Berry to be decertified based
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on lack of moral fitness. Thus, the city has failed to show that there is an explicit, well-defined,
and dominant public policy against the continued employment of a certified law enforcement
officer based on a perceived lack of moral fitness.
In any event, even if there was such public policy, the arbitrator did not address the issue
whether Berry possessed good moral character. Nonetheless, the circuit court found that in
harassing the complainant and misusing the LEIN system, Berry violated the MCOLES
requirement that he possess good moral character. In doing so, however, the circuit court must
necessarily have drawn inferences from the evidence presented to the arbitrator, thereby
exceeding the permissible scope of its review. This is not a situation akin to Gogebic, supra,
where, for example, an arbitration award required an employer to reinstate an officer who had
been convicted of a felony, which would clearly violate MCL 28.609b(1). Thus, the circuit court
erred in refusing to enforce the arbitration award based on public policy concerns related to the
MCOLES standards.
The city argues that Berry’s conduct was akin to stalking, as defined in MCL
750.411h(1)(d), and was an arguable violation of the complainants’ civil rights under color of
state law, contrary to 42 USC 1983. We disagree.
The circuit court did not reach these issues. More importantly, the arbitrator did not find
that Berry had engaged in conduct that met the statutory definition of stalking, or that he violated
the complainants’ civil rights. To conclude otherwise, as the city urges, this Court would need to
go outside its proper scope of review and draw inferences from the evidence presented to the
arbitrator. We decline to do so.
Lastly, the city argues that the arbitration award violates one of the goals of the
collective-bargaining agreement, i.e., to benefit the citizens of Pontiac. We again disagree.
The collective-bargaining agreement is not a law or legal precedent. Thus, it does not
qualify as an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy under the standards set out in W
R Grace and United Paperworkers Int’l Union. Instead, the goal of promoting orderly and
peaceful labor relations, for the benefit of the citizens of Pontiac, is a general consideration of the
public interest, and does not provide a basis to refuse to enforce the arbitration award.
For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order and reinstate the arbitrator’s
decision.
Reversed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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