RALPH C SACHS V CITY OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RALPH G. SACHS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 2009
Plaintiff/Counter-defendantAppellant,
v
No. 280859
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-708748-CH
CITY OF DETROIT,
Defendant/Counter-plaintiffAppellee,
and
AMRU MEAH,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Wilder and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting judgment in favor of
defendants. We affirm.
Property located at 5000-5010 West Warren in the City of Detroit was ordered to be
demolished on October 21, 1994. Plaintiff purchased the property on February 4, 1998. On
January 9, 2006, defendant Meah, the director of the Buildings and Safety Engineering
Department for defendant city, sent a letter to the city council indicating that the building was
ordered removed on August 7, 2001, and a copy of the letter was sent by certified mail to
plaintiff. The letter concluded that the building presented an actual and immediate danger to the
health, safety, and welfare of the public, and therefore, emergency measures would be taken to
demolish the building with the costs assessed against the property.
On January 23, 2006, plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to the city council questioning
whether the property had ever been inspected because it was not in a dilapidated condition. On
January 25, 2006, plaintiff filed an application to defer any demolition. On January 31, 2006,
defendant Meah advised by letter that a special inspection had occurred on January 27, 2006, and
the building was “secured.” In light of the proposal to rehabilitate and rent the property, it was
recommended that the order of demolition be deferred for three months subject to conditions.
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However, this letter of deferral also provided that: “If the building becomes open to trespass or
if conditions of the deferral are not maintained, we may proceed with demolition without further
hearings.” On May 4, 2006, defendant Meah sent a letter to the city council indicating that the
property was inspected on May 4, 2006, and the property was open to trespass contrary to the
conditions of deferral. Therefore, the property was ordered demolished with the cost of the
demolition assessed against the property. Plaintiff alleged that the property was demolished on
May 8, 2006, but he did not receive the letter until May 9, 2006.
Plaintiff filed a complaint arising from the demolition of the property, raising claims of
inverse condemnation, trespass-nuisance, wrongful demolition, intentional trespass, gross
negligence, tortious interference with property interest and business expectancy, and “intentional
tort.” Defendants moved for summary disposition of the complaint, alleging that plaintiff had a
history of purchasing properties in the city for a “pittance,” failed to repair or rehabilitate the
properties, and filed suit against the city when the properties were demolished. It was asserted
that the city’s ordinance enforcement was a proper exercise of police power, and plaintiff failed
to properly challenge the 1994 demolition order or file a claim of appeal from the decision.
Defendants further asserted that governmental immunity precluded the tort claims. In
opposition, plaintiff alleged that the demolition was improper where the original order of
demolition did not comply with due process. The trial court granted the motion by stating, “In
this case, the City Council approved the demolition back in [1994]. They have the right to
demolish it. The building was in poor condition.” The trial court also granted summary
disposition of defendant’s countercomplaint requesting the costs of the demolition. In the order
disposing of the case, it provided that the judgment amount of $15,600 would be “a lien against
the property” until the judgment was satisfied. Plaintiff appeals as of right.
Summary disposition decisions are reviewed de novo on appeal. Joliet v Pitoniak, 475
Mich 30, 35; 715 NW2d 60 (2006). The moving party has the initial burden to support its claim
for summary disposition by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence.
Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). The burden then shifts
to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue of disputed fact exists for trial. Id. The
nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Id. Affidavits,
depositions, and documentary evidence offered in support of, and in opposition to, a dispositive
motion shall be considered only to the extent that the content or substance would be admissible
as evidence. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Plaintiff first alleges that the 1994 demolition order did not comply with state law or local
ordinance and deprived him of due process of law. However, plaintiff had the burden of
demonstrating a genuine issue of disputed fact existed for trial. Quinto, supra. Plaintiff was not
the record owner of the property at the time of the initial order of demolition. In fact, after
plaintiff became record owner of the property and was advised that the property would be
demolished, he did not challenge the original order, seek appellate relief, or seek an injunction to
prevent any demolition. Rather, plaintiff merely applied for a deferment from the demolition.
Although the deferment was granted, it was subject to conditions and expressly provided that if
the property was subject to trespass or did not meet the conditions imposed, it was subject to
demolition without notice. Defendants have enforcement authority to take measures to correct
dangerous buildings within the jurisdiction and order demolition if the owner fails to comply.
MCL 125.523 et seq. Moreover, when a party has a right to appeal a decision regarding property
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rights, challenges premised on due process, takings, and nuisance do not establish separate
causes of action. Krohn v Saginaw, 175 Mich App 193, 197-198; 437 NW2d 260 (1988).
Rather, those issues are to be raised in the appeal. Id. at 198. Consequently, plaintiff’s challenge
to the dismissal of the wrongful demolition and the trespass-nuisance claims are without merit.
Plaintiff next alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing the inverse condemnation
claim. However, MCL 125.534(5) expressly authorizes the removal of any unsafe structure.
Furthermore, there is no indication that defendants’ actions were designed to take “private
property for public use without commencement of condemnation proceedings.” Attorney Gen v
Ankersen, 148 Mich App 524, 561; 385 NW2d 658 (1986). The trial court did not err in
dismissing this claim.
Plaintiff further asserts that the trial court improperly failed to address the issue of
individual liability by defendant Meah. However, review of the answer to the defense motion for
summary disposition reveals that plaintiff failed to respond to the governmental immunity
argument raised by defendants. Rather, plaintiff’s response concluded, without citation to
authority, that defendant Meah could be grossly negligent by ordering the demolition. The
failure to properly address an issue constitutes abandonment of the issue. See Newton v Bank
West, 262 Mich App 434, 437 n 2; 686 NW2d 491 (2004). A party may not harbor error as an
appellate parachute. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). In light of
plaintiff’s cursory treatment of the issue without citation to authority, the trial court’s dismissal
was proper.
Lastly, plaintiff alleges that the trial court was not authorized to enter judgment against
plaintiff on defendants’ counterclaim where the local ordinance provided for a lien against the
property, not a personal judgment against a party. However, review of the written language of
the order reveals that the trial court expressly provided that the judgment amount for the cost of
demolition constituted a “lien” against the property. This is the remedy provided by law. MCL
125.541; MCL 125.541a.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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